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Abstract: The Philokalia and Mental Wellbeing 
 
The Philokalia is an anthology of texts which are concerned with finding God within 
the human soul. It is founded upon a philosophical tradition which draws upon Plato, 
Aristotle and the Stoics, and a Christian tradition which, beginning with the New 
Testament authors, continued through Clement, Origen and the early patristic 
authors, and found its first flourishing in the Desert Fathers. In particular it draws 
upon the psychological insights of Evagrios of Pontus concerning the “eight 
thoughts” or passions. 
 
The concept of the passions represents a sophisticated phenomenology of the inner 
life which explains why people fail to adhere to the virtues that they espouse and 
make judgements which do not withstand the light of reason. It thus provides fertile 
theological ground for exploring the process of temptation. An understanding of the 
role of demons in provoking the passions maintains the tension necessary to 
recognise both external influence and inner motivation; both the way in which 
human beings are acted upon, and also the way in which they must accept personal 
responsibility. The passions are both an aspect of the human soul, but also 
something external which influences from without. They are the focus of an inner 
struggle against an enemy that threatens to destroy and enslave. The passions are 
“hostile pleasures”. In a dynamic process, which invites comparison with the 
phenomenon of addiction, they both confer pleasure and pain, they attract and 
enslave, they seduce and destroy. 
 
The Philokalia was compiled as a “guide to the practice of the contemplative life”. 
The radical remedies that it sought to provide for the passions were each included 
with a view to the fundamental vision of prayer which made radical sacrifice 
worthwhile. They are not cures which will simply make the problem go away, but 
they offer a way of life which may subdue and overcome the passions in pursuit of a 
theological vision of human well-being. They include a practical life of ascetic 
discipline, watchfulness, psalmody, and prayer. 
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According to the Philokalia, to be a flourishing human being is to participate as fully 
as human beings may in the life of God in Christ. To this end, it is concerned 
primarily with the flourishing or well-being of the inner life of human beings. 
However, this is an inner life of a different kind than contemporary discourse 
acknowledges. Although the Philokalia exercises a kind of reflexivity, it is not the 
radical reflexivity that Taylor traces back to Augustine. Although it offers an 
objectification of (what we would call) emotions, desires and feelings, it is not 
Taylor’s Cartesian disengagement. Perhaps most importantly, the expressivism that 
gives us positive cause to articulate our own unique understanding of the voice of 
nature within us is completely inverted in the world of the Philokalia, which is much 
more concerned with our awareness of the negativity of the passions within and 
reaching out to the “measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ” beyond. But this 
is only to acknowledge its situation within an anthropology formed by Platonic 
philosophy and Christian theology in relative isolation from many of the trends that 
Taylor identifies. The Philokalia is nonetheless concerned with a radical vision of 
the inner life which shows as much perceptiveness of the subtleties, deceptions, 
intricacies and aspirations of human thoughts as anything that has come after it.  
 
The Philokalia offers a kind of psychotherapy, but it has a vision of a radically 
different kind of therapy than contemporary psychologies acknowledge. The 
Philokalia insists on discussing everything in primarily theological terms. The effect 
of this is not simply to broaden the discussion in such a way that God must be 
included, but rather it offers an invitation to encounter God in prayer. It then 
understands the inner world of thoughts and feelings as something that must be 
discussed if a conversation about prayer is to begin. Rather than being a manual for 
psychotherapy, the Philokalia invites us to pray. In order that we progress in prayer, 
it advises that we will need to talk about things which are now more usually 
considered the domain of psychotherapy. Whereas Freud’s patient, Anna O, saw the 
treatment that she was offered as a “talking cure”, the Philokalia offers a “praying 
cure”.  
 
The Philokalia demonstrates that thoughts are powerful. They have the capacity to 
enslave and control, to deceive, to blind, to make sick and to kill. But they also have 
the capacity to set free, to empower, to illuminate, to heal and to bring life. Thoughts 
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have the power to deny prayer, and to enable prayer, to obscure God and to reveal 
God. 
 
How may the Philokalia be interpreted for a post-Cartesian, post-Kantian 
philosophical age where dualism is frowned upon and the nature of the subjective 
self is no longer universally agreed upon? The language of inwardness is common to 
psychotherapy and the Philokalia, even if they have different emphases and 
interpretations to offer. Both worlds of discourse recognise that the psyche is in need 
of a cure, even if they have different anthropologies, diagnoses and prescriptions to 
offer. The Philokalia offers a non-dualistic way of discussing the inner life. 
Although it is pre-Kantian in its suppositions, its effectively “phenomenological” 
approach to the self works surprisingly well in a post-Kantian world. 
 
The kind of “pure prayer” towards which the Philokalia leads its reader requires that 
prayers be purified of thoughts that are not true, and it is not possible to identify 
which thoughts these are without some kind of hermeneutical process by means of 
which to interpret their true meaning. Equally, to pray truly requires that a true 
interpretation of thoughts be made, in order that these thoughts may be offered to 
God in prayer. Eventually, however, thoughts in any ordinary human sense become 
inadequate for prayer, just as all human language is inadequate to express the 
superabundant excess of meaning that is God. 
 
The Philokalia offers a therapeutic programme aimed at finding God in prayer. In 
order to implement this programme, it is necessary to undergo a kind of 
psychotherapy. The psychotherapy of the Philokalia is distinctive by virtue of its 
therapeutic focus on wellbeing understood in terms of prayer and union with God. 
Ultimately, this therapy leads to a breakdown in boundaries between inwardness and 
the outer world, between knowledge and unknowing, and between God and self.
ix 
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Names & Abbreviations 
 
Many of the names of authors of the Philokalia are susceptible to differing 
transliteration. The spellings employed in the English translation of the Philokalia 
have been used throughout in this dissertation, except where quoting from other 
published work. 
 
Many of the authors of the Philokalia are saints of the Christian Church, and are 
referred to as such in the text of the Philokalia. For simplicity, and to avoid making 
distinctions in the present context, they have been referred to here without the prefix 
of “Saint” or “St”. This also avoids the difficulty, as in the case of Evagrios, of 
deciding what to do when the person is recognised as a saint of one part of the 
Church but not another. 
 
[Name] The use of square brackets around a name indicates that a text is 
attributed to the named author but that is in fact no longer considered to have been 
actually written by that author. Unless otherwise indicated, this means that the true 
author of the text is now unknown. 
 
Titles of works included within the English translation of the Philokalia have been 
abbreviated according to the list of abbreviations provided at Appendix 1.2 
 
 
Abbreviations used for titles of the works of Evagrios 
 
Foundations  The Foundations of Monastic Life: A Presentation of 
the Practice of Stillness (Included in the English 
Philokalia as Outline teaching on asceticism and 
stillness in the solitary life) 
To Eulogius  To Eulogius. On the Confession of Thoughts and 
Counsel in their Regard 
Eight Thoughts On the Eight Thoughts 
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Praktikos  The Monk: A treatise on the Practical Life 
On Prayer  Chapters on Prayer (Included in the English 
Philokalia as On Prayer: 153 Texts) 
Other works of Evagrios, where mentioned, are referred to using their full title. 
 
Other abbreviations 
C&C Refers to the tabulation of versions of the Philokalia provided by (Conticello 
and Citterio, 2002) 
DS Refers to the entry on the Philokalia in Dictionnaire de Spiritualité (Ware, 
1984) 
Ref Reference 
Vol Volume Number 
 
References to the Philokalia 
Throughout, references to the English translation of the Philokalia are given in the 
format: Volume Number, page number(s), # (or ##) paragraph number(s). 
Eg 1, 234, #5, indicates Volume 1, page 234, paragraph 5 
 
 1
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
As sheep to a good shepherd, the Lord has given to man intellections of this 
present world1 
 
Thoughts, like sheep, given the chance, are prone to wander aimlessly. They follow 
one another, without any necessary sense of direction or purpose. They are often 
found gathered together in flocks, but each individual creature presents its own 
image of vulnerability and individuality. Sheep get lost, and become sick or lame or 
hungry. But they can also be shepherded, thus gaining direction, and may be cared 
for, fed, and protected. A good shepherd, who cares for his or her sheep, will search 
out the lost, feed the hungry and care for the sick. 
 
Such an image, particularly for those familiar with rural life, offers countless 
metaphorical and parabolic possibilities. Thus, most famously in the Christian 
tradition, Jesus is the good shepherd and we are the sheep of his pasture.2 Evagrios 
of Pontus, however, writing in the 4th Century CE, suggests that we are all shepherds 
and that God has given us thoughts – or here “intellections” – as sheep to be cared 
for. 
 
It is a much neglected, and somewhat disconcerting, facet of the extended metaphor 
of sheep and shepherd, at least in relation to the New Testament of Christian 
scripture, that the sheep are, at the end of the day, there for the shepherd – or their 
owner – and not primarily the other way around. Whilst sheep are kept for wool, 
lambs were slaughtered in sacrifice and for food. Unless they are the victims of 
sickness, or of marauding wolves, sheep are eventually slaughtered. Perhaps this 
reality betrays an intended irony when the Jesus of John’s gospel expresses his 
willingness to lay down his life for his sheep? However, returning to the metaphor of 
thoughts as sheep that human beings shepherd in their minds, can we say that these 
sheep are there for the benefit of those who think them, rather than for their own 
sake? 
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The answer to this question will depend upon theology and philosophy for, it could 
well be argued, amongst other things, that the thoughts are simply there – for no 
purpose – or that they are there for the benefit of those who think them, or that they 
are ultimately there for the glory of God. Perhaps it is a little more helpful, however, 
to ask what the purpose might be of shepherding these thoughts? Surely most people 
shepherd their thoughts with a purpose in mind? That purpose might be to serve their 
own advantage, or to serve the benefit of others, or to serve God, or perhaps it might 
be for some other purpose. However, the fact is that we do shepherd our thoughts 
and that we perceive ourselves as doing so for a purpose. No matter how much they 
wander randomly, become sick, follow the wrong leader, or otherwise misbehave, it 
is a feature of the inner life of human beings that we do keep trying to shepherd our 
thoughts in particular ways with particular purposes in mind. The writing and the 
reading of this text are but one example of this amongst an infinite number of 
possible examples that could be taken from the thoughts that human beings have, 
whether communicated in speech or writing or remaining secret within our own 
human minds and souls. 
 
Furthermore, the shepherding of thoughts is something which we perceive as 
uniquely and characteristically human and as deeply intimate. To talk about the 
ways in which we shepherd thoughts within our own inner space is to talk about 
something which gets to the heart of what it means to be human and also – at the 
individual level – to the heart of what it means to be “me”. Thoughts are very 
personal and yet, because they wander like sheep, going to places to which we 
perhaps wish they hadn’t gone, we may be ashamed of them and not want other 
people to know about them. Undoubtedly most of us, most of the time, only share 
with others those thoughts that we feel pleased with, or at least which are not 
embarrassing. We talk about the ones that are shepherded in ways that we think 
others will approve of, but not about the ones that get lost, or the ones that we took 
to places that we are ashamed of. Our conversation about the shepherding of our 
thoughts, if not the actual business of shepherding, is strongly determined by a sense 
of what is socially acceptable. 
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In a post-Freudian world, we are aware that much of what we “think” is unconscious 
and that the unconscious world – of which we are generally not explicitly aware, but 
about which we are generally uneasy – has characteristic ways of making itself felt: 
in dreams, in slips of the tongue, in humour and so-on. Indeed, so familiar are we 
now with this concept that we feel less ashamed than we used to of confessing 
thoughts that Freud has led us to believe we need not be ashamed about. Or, at least, 
we are less ashamed of some such thoughts some of the time, for we now seem to 
spend much more time in western society talking about sex, but much less time 
talking about death, for example. 
 
Applying this Freudian knowledge to our metaphor of thoughts as sheep and 
ourselves as shepherds, we might say that we don’t always know where our sheep 
have gone, but we are often vaguely aware that there are some missing. Or else we 
might be more ready to admit pasturing sheep in some places than in others. But, 
still, the process of tending this flock is very important to us and we spend much of 
our waking life – if not all of our waking life – giving it our attention. 
 
Where, then, does this extended metaphor take us? 
 
It is used here primarily for two reasons. Firstly, it facilitates an introduction to 
talking about why our inner world is important to us as human beings and yet why 
we also often do not speak about it. Secondly, however, the quotation with which it 
began is taken from one of the earlier contributions to a collection of texts known as 
the Philokalia – an anthology of spiritual writings from the Eastern Christian 
tradition, spanning the 4th to the 15th Centuries CE. 
 
Philokalia means literally “love of the beautiful”, but is usually understood in Greek 
as referring to an anthology of works.3 Today, reference to the Philokalia is usually 
taken, unless specified otherwise, to denote a particular anthology assembled by two 
Greek monks in the 18th Century, which was first published in Venice in 1782.4 The 
compilers, Nikodimos of Mount Athos (1749-1809) and Makarios of Corinth (1731-
                                                 
3
 Thus, in 358-359CE, Basil the Great and Gregory of Nazianzus compiled an anthology of the works 
of Origen which was also known as the Philokalia (Cross and Livingstone, 1997, p.1280) 
4
 A second edition was printed in Athens in 1893, in two volumes, and then a 3rd edition was 
published between 1957 and 1963 in five volumes (see Chapter 2). 
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1805) apparently chose their texts with a view to making more widely available that 
which would be helpful in the spiritual life, drawn from the hesychastic tradition. 
This tradition, broadly understood, seeks to find an inner stillness of the soul – away 
from the distractions of thoughts and desires – within which contemplation of God 
might be undertaken and, eventually, union with God found. In other words, it is a 
tradition of Christian prayer which emphasises attention to the inner life, the life of 
thoughts, with a view to the purpose of contemplating God himself. To quote from 
another contributor to the Philokalia, Maximos the Confessor, and following the 
same metaphor used by Evagrios, within this tradition: 
sheep represent thoughts pastured by the intellect on the mountains of 
contemplation5 
 
The intention here, then, is to explore the ways in which this collection of texts 
might help with the process of shepherding thoughts or, to be less allegorical, the 
ways in which the tradition expressed within this collection of texts might assist in 
developing a Christian understanding of the inner life of thoughts and of nurturing 
mental well-being. Necessarily, this exploration does not confine itself to the inner 
life – for the Philokalia talks of virtue in Christian living and not only of thoughts 
and desires. However, it does emphasise the life of prayer as the only basis within 
which Christians can properly understand the inner life or conceive of mental well-
being. It thus assumes from the outset that the central, primary and underlying 
purpose for which Christians will properly and beneficially shepherd their thoughts 
is that of loving, serving and worshipping God. It also assumes that the shepherding 
of thoughts for other purposes – such as human happiness as an end in itself – will 
always be more or less unsatisfactory. However, whilst these are fairly major 
assumptions, which atheist shepherds of thoughts such as Freud would undoubtedly 
disagree with, it is not intended that they should hide this exploration away from a 
critical encounter with other shepherds and other traditions. On the contrary, such 
encounters are exactly what is intended here. 
These assumptions do recognise, however, that complete objectivity is not 
attainable, either in the inner life or in academic discourse. An observer must occupy 
a particular position in order to observe and an awareness of the subjectivity of the 
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space which one occupies is, it is contended here, not a weakness but rather a 
strength. There may, then, be other reasons for my use of the metaphor of sheep and 
shepherd as an introduction to this work. In fact, perhaps there is a necessity – rather 
than merely the possibility – of other reasons for my beginning in this way. If I 
approach this work from an academic perspective, I must also necessarily approach 
it as an exploration of my own inner world from within the Christian tradition to 
which I belong. This exploration will surely reveal that there must be other reasons 
for my choice of this particular metaphor – reasons which are either concerned with 
exploring my own conscious sense of vocation to be a shepherd of thoughts, or else 
perhaps my own unconscious thoughts around this theme (the “sheep” that I am only 
vaguely aware have “gone missing” from the fold of my consciousness). Perhaps – 
as I hope – these reasons concern my sense of purpose in combining a vocation to 
the priesthood with a training in clinical psychiatry and academic study, all of which 
seem to me to have this theme in common. Or perhaps – although I consciously deny 
it – they concern an attempt to find connections where there are none – to cover up 
the aimlessness of the mental wandering of my own thoughts like lost sheep. The 
point is not so much that either of these reasons is necessarily correct as that there 
are various possible reasons which are more concerned with the subjectivity of my 
vocation to write than the actual purpose of writing this particular text for others to 
read. 
This subjectivity of writing is not eliminable from this text, but neither is it entirely 
unhelpful. Because of it, I approach the Philokalia with a view to being challenged 
by its discourse as to the ways in which my own thoughts may better be shepherded. 
If I do not allow the texts of the Philokalia to challenge me in this and other ways, as 
I also myself challenge them with a spirit of critical academic enquiry, the encounter 
is false. Indeed, to talk about a subject such as this and to remain entirely unaffected, 
or to avoid altogether any examination of its impact upon the understanding of one’s 
own thoughts, would seem rather dishonest. This is, after all, itself primarily an 
attempt to shepherd thoughts for a particular purpose – that of understanding better 
how the inner life may be understood and developed. Although the circularity of this 
process might seem to some to be undermining of objectivity, it is the reality of the 
process in which the compilers and authors of the Philokalia themselves engaged 
and in which they invite us to join them. Whilst I will not be uncritical of these 
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fellow authors, yet I trust that I will show enough respect to take seriously what they 
have said to me. 
I have wondered (my thoughts wandering like lost sheep perhaps?) what other 
metaphors might have been used to introduce this subject. As much of the writing 
was undertaken on Holy Island, in Northumberland, I looked across the beach and 
saw rocks scattered across the sea shore like sheep scattered across a pasture. I 
considered my own walks across these beaches and the way in which one’s attention 
is divided between an intended destination across the beach and the immediate task 
of finding a firm footing for one’s next step. It is easy to go astray from the former 
goal because of the necessity of the latter task. Rocks on the beach, like thoughts in 
the mind, are necessary as a basis for moving forward, but can easily also lead away 
from the place to which one intended to travel. But the need to find a firm footing 
does not invalidate the destination or refute the evidence of the eyes. It speaks only 
to human limitation. 
Do such images assist in the examination of a subject which, since Freud, has 
become the subject of a vast and diverse technical literature? The possible answers 
to that question will be left for later consideration, but an un-prejudiced examination 
of a pre-Freudian and pre-modern literature and the wisdom that it contains cannot 
avoid examining the possibility that they do assist in reaching a final destination; 
whereas, perhaps, the more technical tools of our contemporary academic discourse 
may confine themselves more to finding the next rock on which to stand. 
The writers of the Philokalia sought a final destination by means of taking 
individual steps with care. To the best of my ability I have sought to follow that 
example in my writing on this subject. The following dissertation may therefore be 
considered as comprising six steps towards the goal of understanding what the 
Philokalia has to tell us about mental well-being and the shepherding of thoughts. 
These steps are: 
1. In Chapter Two I give consideration to influences that have helped to shape 
the writing of the Philokalia, its compilation, its teachings on the inner life of 
thoughts, and the foundations upon which it has been built. I do not feel that 
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the teaching of the Philokalia on the inner life can be properly appreciated 
without this contextual information. 
2. In Chapter Three, I focus on the teaching of the Philokalia on thoughts of a 
particularly troublesome kind, which the Philokalia refers to as “passions”. I 
have started here partly because this is such a central theme of the Philokalia, 
but also because it is where human beings start in trying to order their 
thoughts. It is a study in the unruliness of human thoughts, their tendency to 
go astray, and the nature of the challenge that they present to those who wish 
to shepherd them. 
3. In Chapter Four, my controlling metaphor turns from rural life to the world 
of medicine, and I consider the remedies for the passions that the Philokalia 
prescribes. 
4. Chapter Five might be considered a glance towards my final destination, 
rather than a step forward. However, if it is a step forward, it is the step of 
understanding how the Philokalia conceives mental well-being. In the 
medical terms of the previous chapter, it is concerned with better 
understanding health in order to be better equipped to treat the disease of the 
passions. 
5. Chapter Six steps aside from the Philokalia in order to give consideration to 
the contemporary world of psychotherapy. What is psychotherapy, how does 
it conceive mental well-being, and what does it aim to achieve? The 
possibility of understanding the Philokalia as providing a kind of 
psychotherapy is then considered. This raises questions about the nature of 
the soul, or self, and human concerns with inwardness and reflexivity. 
6. Chapter Seven attempts to explore the relationship between thoughts and 
prayer. When the Philokalia is consulted as a source of reference on 
thoughts, or the inner life, it always turns the focus onto prayer. When it is 
consulted as a source of guidance on prayer, it turns the reader’s attention 
towards a careful examination of their thoughts. This relationship therefore 
seems to be central to the Philokalia. It is studied here with reference to the 
preceding discussion on psychotherapy, and also by way of a brief 
exploratory engagement with some other western strands of thought, on 
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philosophy (Paul Ricoeur on hermeneutics) and spirituality (Denys Turner 
and The Darkness of God). 
In Chapter Eight, by way of an epilogue reflecting briefly on the steps that have been 
taken, we shall return to the theme of shepherding thoughts and reflect on where our 
journey has taken us. 
I will close this introduction with one final quotation from the Philokalia on the 
theme of sheep and shepherds, this time from Ilias the Presbyter: 
Where fear does not lead the way, thoughts will be in a state of confusion, 
like sheep that have no shepherd. Where fear leads the way or goes with 
them, they will be under control and in good order within the fold. Fear is the 
son of faith and the shepherd of the commandments. He who is without faith 
will not be found worthy to be a sheep of the Lord's pasture.6 
 
Here, then, is the question to be addressed. How does the Philokalia teach us that we 
can control and order thoughts that are confused, difficult to control and in disorder? 
 
                                                 
6
 Ilias the Presbyter, 3, 65, #136-137 
 9
Chapter 2: Influences and Foundations 
 
Explorations of the inner world of human beings might reasonably be expected to be 
dependent upon the outer world in which they live: its culture, its history, traditions, 
assumptions, language and beliefs. Such things influence the way in which we 
perceive ourselves and thus, at least potentially, the way in which we think. If we are 
to understand properly what the authors and compilers of the Philokalia had to say 
about the inner life it would therefore seem to be important to consider the nature of 
their outer world, and especially its anthropological assumptions and beliefs. 
However, this immediately presents a problem, for the Philokalia is the work of 
about forty authors, and two compilers, whose lives span well over a thousand years. 
Can anything be said about “their world” which might go beyond vague generalities 
or spurious over-generalisations? 
 
It might be tempting to emphasise the importance of tradition to Byzantine 
civilisation, and Orthodox Christianity, as reason for expecting continuity of 
fundamental assumptions across even a thousand years and more of writing. 
However, it has famously been suggested that “to represent Byzantium as immutable 
over a period of eleven centuries is to fall into a trap set by Byzantium itself”.1 We 
must also remember that, during the period in question, some very significant events 
took place – not least the seven universally agreed ecumenical church councils and 
the great schism of 1054. The doctrinal, and especially the Christological, 
controversies that raged during this period variously affect different works within 
the Philokalia. For example, one work attributed to Neilos the Ascetic in the original 
Greek Philokalia is now known to have been by Evagrios of Pontus (b345/346, 
d399), but transmitted under the name of Neilos because of the tainting of reputation 
of Evagrios by his association with Origenist heresy. Almost at the other end of the 
chronological span of the Philokalia, the writings of Gregory Palamas (1296-1359) 
show evidence of his concern to defend the hesychast tradition itself from its critics. 
Maximos the Confessor (580-662), the single biggest contributor of texts, was exiled 
and tortured for his defence of the doctrine of the divine and human wills in Christ, 
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in keeping with the Council of Chalcedon. He was only vindicated at the 6th 
Ecumenical Council, almost 20 years after his death. The historical contexts and 
doctrinal preoccupations that emerge from place to place within the Philokalia are 
thus varied indeed, and in some places represent fierce controversies of their time. 
 
In an introduction to the English translation of the Philokalia, the translators and 
editors suggest that there is an inner unity to the Philokalia which is conferred more 
than anything by recurrent reference to invocation of the name of Jesus (or the Jesus 
Prayer as it is now known). They argue that this is “one of the central forms of the 
art and science which constitute hesychasm” and that this is evident even in some of 
the earliest texts.2 It is again tempting to draw from this a reassurance as to common 
underlying assumptions within the Philokalia, but that would certainly be premature. 
The Jesus Prayer is but one theme amongst many to be found in these texts and it is 
hardly clear that it is a major theme in the earlier texts, even if it might be argued 
that evidence of it is to be found in them. It would seem in any case unlikely that a 
tradition of spirituality dating back to the 4th Century would not have undergone at 
least some changes in emphasis and development of ideas – especially in view of the 
vicissitudes of its history. Thus, for example, the later texts would seem to show 
evidence of the influence of the Syrian spirituality introduced in the 13th/14th 
Century revival, an influence which exerts its own distinctive emphasis on these 
later texts. 
 
A glossary provided in the English translation to the Philokalia also implies that 
there is a consistency of terminology throughout its span of writings. There is no 
doubt that this glossary provides helpful clarification for the reader who is new to 
the Philokalia and its world of thought, and that there is a terminology with which a 
reader gradually becomes familiar as he or she reads and re-reads the Philokalia. 
However, greater familiarity begins to suggest that the appearance of consistency is 
almost as much confusing as it is helpful. Thus, for example, the glossary helpfully 
points out that even such a fundamental term as “passion” refers on the part of some 
writers to something intrinsically evil, but on the part of others to something 
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fundamentally good, something which may be redeemed.3 Again, the helpful 
analysis of the process of temptation4 refers to various sources, both from within the 
Philokalia itself and also John Climacus’s Ladder of Divine Ascent, but careful 
study of these sources shows a heterogeneity of understandings, albeit with some 
core terms (such as “provocation” or “assent”) which are used more or less 
consistently. 
 
It is not, however, necessary to be completely nihilistic as to the possibility of 
grasping something of an understanding of the common assumptions that have 
formed the understanding of life in the inner world that is such a central theme of the 
Philokalia. Firstly, there have been historical, philosophical and theological 
influences, which appear to have provided something of an enduring source of 
reference to its authors. Secondly, there is evidence of internal consistency in regard 
to certain significant fundamental assumptions and themes – of which the Jesus 
Prayer is but one. 
 
It would therefore appear helpful here to give some further consideration to the 
following: 
 
1. The compilation and history of the Philokalia as an anthology of texts 
2. The anthropology of the Philokalia 
3. The tradition of the Desert Fathers 
4. The work of Evagrios of Pontus 
5. The use of scripture by the authors of the Philokalia 
 
To some extent these might be considered as external influences that helped to shape 
the Philokalia, but to some extent (especially in the case of Evagrios) they are in fact 
internal to its fabric. They are therefore considered together here, partly as formative 
external influences and partly as foundational stones upon which the Philokalia was 
erected. 
 
 
                                                 
3
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4
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1. Compilation, Translation and Evolution of the Philokalia 
 
The hesychastic tradition, from within which the Philokalia emerged, has a long 
history. From as early as the 4th Century CE, the term “hesychia” was used by 
Christian monastic writers to refer to a state of inner quietness to be achieved in 
prayer as preparation for communion with God.  From the 6th to the 11th Centuries in 
the Byzantine world, a “hesychast” was simply a monk or ascetic, and hesychasm 
referred simply to a broadly contemplative approach to prayer. In the 13th and 14th 
Centuries there was something of a spiritual revival, centred on Mount Athos, in 
which Gregory of Sinai (1258-1346) and Gregory Palamas (1296-1359) took a 
leading role. This gave birth to a movement now known as the “Hesychast 
Tradition”, which drew upon traditions of Christian spirituality both from Syria and 
the Egyptian desert fathers. 
 
The hesychastic tradition came under fierce attack in the 14th Century, primarily 
because of an assertion that prayer of the heart can lead to a vision of Divine Light; a 
light which, it was asserted, can be seen even in this life, and by human eyes in a 
literal physical sense. This light, it was further asserted, is identical to that which 
surrounded Christ on Mount Tabor in his transfiguration. Gregory Palamas, a 
contributor to the Philokalia, was a leading – and eventually successful – defender 
of the tradition against these attacks. Hesychasm was formally adopted at the 
Councils of Constantinople (1341, 1347 and 1351) and subsequently became an 
accepted part of Orthodox spiritual tradition.5 
 
The compilation and dissemination of the Philokalia in the 18th Century represented 
a significant component of a renaissance of the hesychastic tradition.6 The 
Philokalia was compiled by Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain and Makarios of 
Corinth, both of whom belonged to the spiritual renewal movement of the 
“Kollyvades”. This movement was traditional and conservative, critical of liberal 
teaching of the enlightenment, and enthusiastic for the spirituality and theology of 
                                                 
5
 Cross and Livingstone, 1997, pp.763-764 
6
 Sheldrake, 2005, pp.335-336; Philokalia 1, pp.14-15 
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the Fathers of the Eastern Church. However, Nikodimos at least was not so 
conservative as to prevent his drawing upon western sources, in his own writings.7 
 
Makarios, was born in 1731 in Corinth and was named Michael at his baptism. He 
was educated in Corinth and eventually became a teacher there himself. In 1764 the 
Archbishop of Corinth died, and Michael was elected his successor. In 1765, in 
Constantinople, he was ordained Archbishop and renamed Makarios. As Archbishop 
he began a series of reforms, including prohibition of clergy from holding political 
office, and measures to ensure that the clergy were properly educated. The outbreak 
of the Russo-Turkish war in 1768 forced Makarios to leave Corinth and although 
peace was restored in 1774 another Archbishop was appointed in his place and he 
never resumed his position there. In 1783, Makarios anonymously published 
Concerning Frequent Communion of the Divine Mysteries, in which he argued the 
case of the Kollyvades in favour of more frequent reception of communion than the 
two or three times each year that had become customary. The book was hastily 
condemned by the Ecumenical Patriarch but later (in 1789) approved and 
recommended by a new Patriarch. The last years of his life, from 1790 to 1805, were 
spent almost entirely in a hermitage on Chios where, according to Cavarnos, he 
“[subjected] himself to severe ascetic struggle, practicing interior prayer, writing 
books, confessing and counselling people, instructing them in the true Faith, inciting 
them to virtue, and offering material help to those in need.”8 
 
Nikodimos was born in 1749 on Naxos, one of the Aegean islands. He was educated 
initially on Naxos, and from the age of 15 years at Smyrna, where he learnt Latin, 
Italian and French. In 1775 he went to Mount Athos and became a monk. It was in 
1777 that Makarios visited Athos and gave him the task of editing the Philokalia, 
and also two other works,9 although in fact the two men had first met some years 
earlier on the island of Hydra. Nikodimos went on to become a prolific author, editor 
                                                 
7
 Cross and Livingstone, 1997, p.1152; Nikodimos wrote in one of his later works “We must hate and 
detest the misbeliefs and unlawful customs of the Latins and others who are Heterodox; but if they 
have anything sound and confirmed by the Canons of the Holy Synods, this we must not hate.” 
(quoted in (Cavarnos, 1994, p.31). Two of his works, The Unseen Warfare and Spiritual Exercises, 
were adaptations of writings by Roman Catholic authors (ibid, pp.31-35). 
8
 Cavarnos, 1972, p.31 
9
 Evergetinos, and Concerning Continual Communion. The former was an 11th Century work on the 
lives and teachings of the Desert Fathers. The latter is a text attributed to Makarios himself. 
(Cavarnos, 1994) 
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and translator of other theological works.10 Nikodimos’ last years were spent in 
writing, and it is as an author, translator and compiler that his life most stands out. 
However, there is also no reason to doubt the testimony that he practiced mental 
prayer assiduously throughout his 34 years on Mount Athos.11 It would not seem 
unreasonable to speculate that his introduction to the Philokalia by Makarios in 1777 
exerted a life long influence upon him. 
 
Clearly the selection of texts for inclusion in the Philokalia is a very significant 
matter, but we know surprisingly little about how the selection was made. 
Constantine Cavarnos first reports a traditional view that it was compiled by monks 
on Mount Athos in the 14th Century, but then goes on to assert that Makarios himself 
was the real compiler.12 We might speculate that the selection was not actually made 
by Nikodimos and Makarios, but rather already existed in some way as a collection 
of texts revered by tradition, or else assembled by earlier compilers. 
 
We do know that the texts were drawn from the libraries of Mount Athos. The 
introduction by Nikodimos refers to “manuscripts which had been lying inglorious 
and motheaten in holes and corners and darkness, cast aside and scattered here and 
there”.13 In this introduction, Nikodimos also describes the purpose of the Philokalia 
as being the provision of a “mystical school” of mental (or “inward”) prayer14: 
This book is a treasury of inner wakefulness, the safeguard of the mind, the 
mystical school of mental prayer…. an excellent compendium of practical 
spiritual science, the unerring guide of contemplation, the Paradise of the 
Fathers, the golden chain of the virtues…. the frequent converse with Jesus, 
the clarion for recalling Grace, and in a word, the very instrument of 
theosis.”15  
 
The full title of the original Greek Philokalia is:  
The Philokalia of the Neptic Saints gathered from our holy Theophoric 
[“God-bearing”] Fathers, through which, by means of the philosophy of 
                                                 
10
 See Ibid., and Chamberas, Bebis and Harakas, 1989, pp.5-65, from where these biographical details 
are drawn. 
11
 Cavarnos, 1994, p.60 
12
 Cavarnos, 1972, pp.23-24. Cavarnos does not appear to have any firm evidence for this view. 
13
 Ibid., pp.24, 100 
14
 Sheldrake, 2005, pp.488-490; Philokalia 1, p14 
15
 Cavarnos, 1972, p.101 
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ascetic practice and contemplation, the intellect is purified, illumined, and 
made perfect16 
 
The English translators of the Philokalia, commenting on the title and subtitle, 
suggest that it is through “love of the beautiful” that the intellect is “purified, 
illumined and made perfect”, and that it was this purpose of purification, 
illumination and perfection that governed the choice of texts.17 The texts of the 
Philokalia are thus, they argue, “guides to the practice of the contemplative life”.18 
There would seem to be no reason to disagree with this view, although it still leaves 
many questions unanswered. 
 
All the texts included in the Philokalia by Nikodimos and Makarios were originally 
written in Greek, except for two by John Cassian, which were translated from Latin 
into Greek during the Byzantine period. We may count 62 texts included in the 
Philokalia (see Appendix 1.1).19 
 
The authors were undoubtedly all men (although the actual authorship of some texts 
remains in dispute) and all belonged to the monastic tradition. Cassian is the only 
“western” author included. The single biggest contributor was Maximos the 
Confessor, followed by Peter of Damaskos. About some of the authors we know 
much; about others, however, we know little or nothing with any certainty. We may 
calculate that there were approximately 40 or more authors in all (see Appendix 1.3). 
Attributions of authorship of some texts in the original Greek edition are now known 
to be incorrect. In several cases we know that contributions were made to particular 
texts by two or more authors. 
 
The Philokalia, as a compilation of the original Greek texts, prepared by Makarios 
and Nikodimos, with an overall introduction and with notes to introduce the texts 
associated with each author, was published in a single volume in Venice in 1782 at 
the expense of John Mavrogordatos, Prince of Moldo-Wallachia.20 A second edition 
was produced in Athens in 1893, including some additional texts by Patriarch 
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 Smith, Palmer, Sherrard and Ware, 2006, p.viii 
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 Philokalia 1, p.13 
18
 Philokalia 1, p.14 
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 Abbreviations that will be used here to refer to these texts are given in Appendix 1.2 
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 Cavarnos, 1972, pp.24-25, 100 
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Kallistos. A third edition was produced in five volumes, also in Athens, in 1957-
1963.21 
 
The first translation of the Philokalia was into Slavonic, was made by Paisius 
Velichkovsky (1722-1794)22, and was published in Moscow in 1793 under the title 
Dobrotolubiye and under the sponsorship of Metropolitan Gabriel.23 Velichkovsky 
was a Ukrainian monk who lived on Mount Athos from 1746-1763. He was later 
abbot of large monasteries at Dragomirna (1763-1775) and Niamets (1779-1794) in 
Romania and was the initiator of a spiritual renaissance there within the hesychastic 
tradition. 
 
During his time on Mount Athos, Velichkovsky developed a concern to find, copy, 
collect and translate patristic texts. Initially this seems to have arisen out of an 
inability to find a suitable spiritual instructor (or starets). Starchestvo (or eldership) 
was a key element in the hesychastic tradition.24 However, as Velichkovsky was 
unable to find someone suitable as his own starets, he seems to have turned to 
patristic writings as an alternative source of instruction.25 The concern for patristic 
texts that he acquired in this way early in life continued during his later life as an 
abbot in Romania, by which time he seems to have had literally hundreds of monks 
working on the tasks of copying and translation. 
 
Velichkovsky’s Dobrotolubiye was not a complete translation of the Greek 
Philokalia. We may count only 27 of the 62 works comprising the latter which were 
included in the former.26 A second edition, published almost 30 years after 
Velichkovsy’s death, included a further 13 works. 
 
                                                 
21
 Philokalia 1, p.11. It is this third edition which was used as the basis for the English translation. 
22
 Cross and Livingstone, 1997, p.1685, Schema-monk Metrophanes, 1976, Featherstone and 
Tachiaos, 1989 
23
 Schema-monk Metrophanes, 1976, pp.232-238. Metropolitan Gabriel, having received the 
translation from Velichkovsky, then assigned a team of scholars to the process of checking it for 
accuracy before publication. 
24
 Parry, Melling, Brady, Griffith and Healey, 1999, p.460 
25
 Schema-monk Metrophanes, 1976, pp.64-67 
26
 See Appendix 1.1. Note also that two chapters of Gregory of Sinai’s Further Texts were omitted, 
but that some additional texts attributed to Patriarch Callistus were included.  
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It is clear that Velichkovsky’s interest in patristic works was one that he shared with 
the compilers of the Greek Philokalia and also that he knew of their interest. In a 
letter of uncertain date to Archimandrite Theodosius of Sophroniev, Velichkovsky 
wrote of Makarios’ fervour and care in the process of seeking out and copying 
patristic books on Mount Athos, a process that led to the publication of the 
Philokalia.27 It is also clear that Velichkovksy’s interest in these texts predated by 
many years the assignment by Makarios to Nikodimos in 1777 of the task of 
compiling and editing the Greek Philokalia. Whether we may accept the conclusion 
of the editors of the biography of Velichkovsky (written by his disciple Schema-
monk Metrophanes) that in fact it was Velichkovsky who imparted to Makarios the 
knowledge of what to look for, the purpose of the search, and awareness of the value 
of the texts would seem much more debatable.28 However, it is clear that 
Velichkovsky’s translation work began very many years before the Philokalia was 
published in 1782. We might speculate that a loose collection of texts existed prior 
to the interests of both Velichkovsky and Makarios. 
 
Subsequently, the Philokalia was translated into Russian. There are widespread 
references in the literature to an alleged Russian translation by Ignatii Brianchaninov 
(1807-1876), published in 1857.29 However, according to Kallistos Ware it would 
seem that this translation does not in fact exist.30 A Russian translation by Theophan 
the Recluse (1815-1894) was published in Moscow from 1877-1889 in five volumes, 
also under the title Dobrotolubiye. 
 
Theophan31 studied at Kiev Academy and entered monastic orders in 1837. After 
two months he was ordained priest and subsequently became a schoolteacher. Like 
Makarios, he demonstrated an openness to western scholarship and was widely read. 
In 1850 he was appointed as a member of the Russian Official Commission to 
Jerusalem. In the course of this work he travelled widely and was able to visit a 
series of ancient libraries, which he found to be neglected and unappreciated. He 
developed a knowledge of French, Arabic, Green and Hebrew which enabled him to 
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 Schema-monk Metrophanes, 1976, pp.180, 183 
28
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29
 See, for example: Chamberas, Bebis and Harakas, 1989, p.21; and Philokalia 1, p12. 
30
 Ware, 1984 
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 Biographical details here are drawn primarily from: Schema-monk Metrophanes, 1976. See also 
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read and catalogue the rare manuscripts that he found. It would seem that it was at 
this stage in his life that he developed an interest in early ascetic Christian literature. 
 
In 1859 Theophan became Bishop of Tambov, and then in 1863 Bishop of Vladimir. 
In 1866 he became Prior of Vysha monastery. Three months later he was released 
from his responsibilities as superior in order to become a recluse and in 1872 he 
entered almost complete seclusion. During his time in seclusion Theophan engaged 
in a prolific correspondence and also published a number of important works, 
including Unseen Warfare (a revision and translation of an earlier Greek translation 
of Lorenzo Scupoli’s Spiritual Combat and Path to Paradise made by Nikodimos) 
and the Russian Dobrotolubiye. 
 
Theophan’s Dobrotolubiye represented a considerable expansion of the Greek 
Philokalia, from 1200 to 3000 pages, published in 5 volumes.32 The Philokalia was 
later translated into Romanian by Father Dumitru Stniloae (1903-1993), and 
published between 1946 and 1991 in 12 volumes under the title Filocalia sau 
culegere din scrierile sfintsilor Parintsi. The additions to the Romanian Filocalia are 
even more numerous and extensive (see Appendix 1.1). 
 
Stniloae was born in, and lived his whole life in, Romania but received theological 
education in Athens and Munich. He became a professor of theology in Bucharest 
and published 90 books, 275 theological articles and numerous other translations, 
reviews, lectures and other items over a period of some 60 years.33 Stniloae had a 
particular interest in the works of Gregory Palamas. Along with many other clergy, 
he was imprisoned from 1958 to 1963 by the communist authorities as a political 
criminal. Four volumes of his translation of the Philokalia, based on the first two 
volumes of the Greek Philokalia, were published prior to this imprisonment, during 
the period 1946 to 1948. The fifth volume did not appear until 1976. However, after 
the translation of the Greek Philokalia was completed (with the publication of the 
eighth volume in 1979)34 Stniloae continued to work on four more volumes, 
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incorporating works by a number of authors not included in the original Greek 
version.35 
 
Modern translations of the Greek texts of the Philokalia have also appeared in 
English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Finnish and Arabic, and the Greek text 
may now be consulted in a modern, 5th Edition.36 
 
If our speculation that a loose collection of texts already existed prior to 1777 is 
correct, then the apparently free additions of texts to Russian and Romanian 
translations might be taken to suggest something of a living tradition. Within this 
tradition, additions to a core Philokalia were apparently either not considered 
inappropriate, or else were thought necessary because of unavailability of the 
supporting texts that would originally have been found alongside the Philokalia in 
the library of Mount Athos.37 
 
 
2. Anthropology 
 
In his Republic, Plato (c347-247 BCE) argues for a tripartite understanding of the 
human soul or mind ().38 Both in the course of Plato’s argument, and also in our 
own experience, two of these elements are easier to understand than the third. All 
three are more akin to motives than to “parts” in any anatomical sense. The first is 
reason, a reflective and rational element (GHJILKNMLOPKRQ9H SUT ). The second is irrational 
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appetite (V WUXYKNZ\[^]_`OaKRQ9H SUT ) – which includes desires such as hunger, thirst and sexual 
drive, orientated towards satisfaction and pleasure. The third (Z\[^]KRQ9H SUT ), including 
apparently varied motives such as anger, indignation, ambition and a sense of what 
is “in the heart”, the so-called “incensive” power, might be translated “spirited” – 
although the use of such a theologically loaded word in the present context would 
inevitably be confusing. For Plato, the immortal soul was understood as being 
imprisoned, during this life, in its physical body. 
 
The Platonic understanding of the soul has been very influential upon Christianity in 
general, and in particular the tripartite model of the soul appears to have influenced 
the Philokalia, almost from beginning to end. However, before we give 
consideration to this in more detail, it is important to say something about the 
relationship between body and soul. 
 
The Philokalia not infrequently, but perhaps mainly in its earlier texts, refers to an 
apparently tripartite model of human beings, usually as body, soul and spirit, or as 
body soul and intellect. Thus, for example, in the text attributed to Antony the Great 
(but probably actually of Stoic origin), and placed as the first text in the original 
Greek Philokalia, we find: 
Life is the union and conjuncture between intellect, soul and body, while 
death is not the destruction of these elements so conjoined, but the 
dissolution of their inter-relationship; for they are all saved through and in 
God, even after this dissolution.39 
 
Again, in Evagrios: 
Let the virtues of the body lead you to those of the soul; and the virtues of 
the soul to those of the spirit; and these, in turn, to immaterial and principial 
knowledge.40 
 
However, this impression of a tripartite anthropology appears to be either 
unrepresentative or illusory as there appear to be many more references to human 
                                                 
39
 Philokalia 1, 344, #93 
40
 Philokalia 1, 69, #132 
 21
beings as simply body and soul (or, sometimes, body and intellect41), and it is clear 
that this is because the spirit, or intellect, is seen as being merely a part of the soul. 
Thus, for example, in the aforementioned text attributed to Antony we find: 
The body, when it is united with the soul, comes from the darkness of the 
womb into the light. But the soul, when it is united with the body, is bound 
up in the body's darkness. Therefore we must hate and discipline the body as 
an enemy that fights against the soul.42 
In fact, although it was clearly believed by the original compilers to be an authentic 
work of Antony, the English translators of the Philokalia have placed this work in an 
appendix on the basis that there is no evidence of Christian authorship, but rather 
that it appears to be a collection of Stoic and Platonic texts written between the 1st 
and 4th Centuries CE. (The negative Platonic view of the soul as imprisoned in the 
body is clearly evident here.) However, the understanding of human beings as body 
and soul seems to provide the generally pervading anthropology of the Philokalia, 
and the tension between the body and soul is often evident. For example, in 
Theodoros the Great Ascetic: 
What, then, is the nature of our contest in this world? The intelligent soul is 
conjoined with an animal-like body, which has its being from the earth and 
gravitates downwards. It is so mixed with the body that though they are total 
opposites they form a single being. Without change or confusion in either of 
them, and with each acting in accordance with its nature, they compose a 
single person, or hypostasis, with two complete natures. In this composite 
two-natured being, man, each of his natures functions in accordance with its 
own particular powers. It is characteristic of the body to desire what is akin 
to it. This longing for what is akin to them is natural to created beings, since 
indeed their existence depends on the intercourse of like with like, and on 
their enjoyment of material things through the senses. Then, being heavy, the 
body welcomes relaxation. These things are proper and desirable for our 
animal-like nature. But to the intelligent soul, as an intellective entity, what 
is natural and desirable is the realm of intelligible realities and its enjoyment 
of them in the manner characteristic of it. Before and above all what is 
characteristic of the intellect is an intense longing for God. It desires to enjoy 
Him and other intelligible realities, though it cannot do this without 
encountering obstacles. 43 
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 See, for example, Peter of Damaskos, in Philokalia 3, 135, or Theodoros the Great Ascetic in 
Philokalia 2, 39. In the latter, “intellect” and “soul” appear to be used almost interchangeably. 
42
 Philokalia 1, 347, #117 
43
 Philokalia 2, 43-44 
 22
Elsewhere, the tension between body and soul is even more marked, as in the 
reference by Theognostos to “war between body and soul”,44 or else more positively 
construed, as in Peter of Damaskos: 
We should marvel, too, at how the body, that is not its own animating 
principle, is, at God’s command, commixed with the noetic and deiform soul, 
created by the Holy Spirit breathing life into it (cf. Gen. 2:7)45 
 
Here, and in other places,46 the relationship between body and soul is seen as parallel 
to that between God and human beings. God/soul provides the “animating principle” 
or life to that which would otherwise be inanimate or lifeless. Similarly, in Gregory 
Palamas, the divine quality of the soul, albeit set in contrast to the material nature of 
the body, is emphasised in the context of the doctrine of creation: 
So great was the honour and providential care which God bestowed upon 
man that He brought the entire sensible world into being before him and for 
his sake. The kingdom of heaven was prepared for him from the foundation 
of the world (cf. Matt. 25:34); God first took counsel concerning him, and 
then he was fashioned by God's hand and according to the image of God (cf. 
Gen. 1:26-27). God did not form the whole of man from matter and from the 
elements of this sensible world, as He did the other animals. He formed only 
man's body from these materials; but man's soul He took from things 
supracelestial or, rather, it came from God Himself when mysteriously He 
breathed life into man (cf. Gen. 2:7). The human soul is something great and 
wondrous, superior to the entire world; it overlooks the universe and has all 
things in its care; it is capable of knowing and receiving God, and more than 
anything else has the capacity of manifesting the sublime magnificence of 
the Master-Craftsman. Not only capable of receiving God and His grace 
through ascetic struggle, it is also able to be united in Him in a single 
hypostasis. 47 
 
This vision of the divine soul in union with a physical body created by God is in 
tension, however, with the condition of the soul and body as they exist after “the 
fall”: 
When God through His life-giving breath created the soul deiform and 
intellective, He did not implant in it anger and desire that are animal-like. 
But He did endow it with a power of longing and aspiration, as well as with a 
courage responsive to divine love. Similarly when God formed the body He 
did not originally implant in it instinctual anger and desire. It was only 
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afterwards, through the fall, that it was invested with these characteristics 
that have rendered it mortal, corruptible and animal-like. For the body, even 
though susceptive of corruption, was created, as theologians will tell us, free 
from corruption, and that is how it will be resurrected. In the same way the 
soul when originally created was dispassionate. But soul and body have both 
been denied, commingled as they are through the natural law of mutual 
interpenetration and exchange. The soul has acquired the qualities of the 
passions or, rather, of the demons; and the body, passing under the sway of 
corruption because of its fallen state, has become akin to instinct-driven 
animals. The powers of body and soul have merged together and have 
produced a single animal, driven impulsively and mindlessly by anger and 
desire. That is how man has sunk to the level of animals, as Scripture 
testifies, and has become like them in every respect (cf. Ps. 49:20). 48 
 
Much of what the Philokalia has to tell us about the inner life depends upon this 
basic anthropology of body and soul created by God in union with each other, but 
also in tension with each other, fundamentally good, but also fundamentally 
distorted and corrupted by the fall. Whilst, as we have seen already, there are 
variations in emphasis amongst different contributors to the Philokalia, which is 
only as one would expect, this basic understanding seems to pervade the texts. 
Sometimes the emphasis is more on the goodness of creation, sometimes more on its 
corruption as a result of the sin of Adam. The sense of tension between body and 
soul, and within the soul, is however more or less ubiquitous. 
 
As for the soul itself, the tripartite Platonic model is adopted throughout, almost 
completely without any deviation or dissent.49 In English translation, these parts are 
usually rendered as the “intellect” or “intelligence”, the “desiring” or “appetitive” 
power, and the “incensive” power. The latter two are often referred to as the 
“passible”, or irrational, aspects of the soul, implying greater vulnerability to passion 
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receptive of reason, and that which is not (the latter being the “vegetative” aspect). These divisions 
would appear to approximate to Maximos’s division into the power of nourishment and growth (ie the 
vegetative part), the imagination and instinct (ie the irrational which is receptive of reason), and the 
intelligence and intellect (ie the rational part). This model was further elaborated by Nemesius of 
Emesa (fl c390) whose work was clearly known to Maximos (Telfer, 1955, pp.203, 345-347).  
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(	
 - about which, more later). However, this does not imply that the intellect or 
intelligence is not also susceptible to passion, and the passions are sometimes 
classified according to which of these three parts of the soul they primarily affect. 
 
At this point, various clarifications are required, for things are not quite as simple as 
has been portrayed so far. In particular, the nature and terminology of Plato’s 
“rational” element of the soul, as understood by the authors of the Philokalia, 
requires some further elaboration. According to the glossary in the English 
translation of the Philokalia, this part of the soul is to be referred to as the 
“intelligent” (GHJILKNMLOPKRQ9H SUT ) aspect or “intelligence” (GHJILKRQ9H SUT ). However, in practice, 
the authors of the Philokalia often also refer to it as the “intellect” (TLHJ[b`c ).50 
Furthermore, both of these terms are clearly distinguished from “reason” (dKRe SUTLHJKfe ), a 
term which is never used by authors of the Philokalia as a name for this part of the 
soul.51 
 
Reason is clearly distinguished from intellect and intelligence. As the translators and 
editors of the English edition make clear in their glossary, it is: 
the discursive, conceptualizing and logical faculty in man, the function of 
which is to draw conclusions or formulate concepts deriving from data 
provided either by revelation or spiritual knowledge (q.v.) or by sense-
observation. The knowledge of the reason is consequently of a lower order 
than spiritual knowledge (q.v.) and does not imply any direct apprehension 
or perception of the inner essences or principles (q.v.) of created beings, still 
less of divine truth itself. Indeed, such apprehension or perception, which is 
the function of the intellect (q.v.), is beyond the scope of the reason.52 
 
This becomes clear in, for example, usage of the term by Ilias the Presbyter: 
                                                 
50
 As, for example, in Isaiah the Solitary (Philokalia 1, 28, #26), where “intellect” is used, or in Peter 
of Damaskos where, at Philokalia 3, 100, “intelligence, or intellect” is referred to as though the terms 
are in this context completely interchangeable. 
51
 Although “reason” is used in discussion about the soul – for example, it is referred to by John of 
Damaskos and Nikitas Stithatos as one of the “senses” or “faculties” of the soul (Philokalia 2, 334; 4, 
81, #10). 
52
 Philokalia 4, 434 
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By means of intellection the intellect attains spiritual realities; through 
thought the reason grasps what is rational. Sense-perception is involved with 
practical and material realities by means of the fantasy.53 
 
The intellect, however, is described in the English glossary as the “highest faculty” 
possessed by human beings, through which they may perceive spiritual realities. 
Rather than operating through use of rational or abstract processes, it discerns 
Divine truth by direct experience or “intuition”. It is the means by which human 
beings may engage in contemplation.54 
 
In distinction from this, the Greek root of the word for intelligence betrays its even 
closer association with Divine reality – with the ghHJILH c  himself. It is used with 
reference to the possession of spiritual knowledge. It is the “ruling aspect” of the 
intellect.55 
 
Thus, for example, Maximos the Confessor writes: 
Every intellect girded with divine authority possesses three powers as its 
counselors and ministers. First, there is the intelligence. It is intelligence 
which gives birth to that faith, founded upon spiritual knowledge, whereby 
the intellect learns that God is always present in an unutterable way, and 
through which it grasps, with the aid of hope, things of the future as though 
they were present. Second, there is desire. It is desire which generates that 
divine love through which the intellect, when of its own free will it aspires to 
pure divinity, is wedded in an indissoluble manner to this aspiration. Third, 
there is the incensive power. It is with this power that the intellect cleaves to 
divine peace and concentrates its desire on divine love. Every intellect 
possesses these three powers, and they cooperate with it in order to purge 
evil and to establish and sustain holiness. 56 
 
Here, intelligence, desire and the incensive power represent the three powers of the 
intellect, where “intellect” appears effectively to be synonymous with “soul”.57 
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 Philokalia 3, 47, #3; see also 50, #26, where reason is seen as a kind of intermediary between 
sense-perception and intellect. What Palmer et al translate here as “fantasy” might better be 
understood as “imagination”. 
54
 Philokalia 4, 432 
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 Ibid 
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 Philokalia 2, 202-203, #73 
57
 In the previous paragraph the intelligence, desire and the incensive power are actually referred to as 
the three powers of the soul. 
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Elsewhere, the intellect is distinguished from the soul,58 or else described as being in 
various other relationships to it. It is referred to as being in the depths of the soul,59 
as being the “eye of the soul”,60 as being “the pilot of the soul”,61 as being 
“consubstantial” with the soul,62 the illumination of the soul,63 and as capable of 
being united with the soul,64 The relationship is therefore not a simple one, and the 
descriptions of it, at least in the Philokalia, do not appear to be entirely consistent. 
 
The place of intelligence, however, is to restrain the intellect and the passions,65 to 
contemplate virtue,66 and to cleave to God himself.67 But this purpose can only be 
fully understood in the context of the incarnation of the ghH SUILH c  who has created, and 
re-created, all things, including the human GHJILKRQ9H SUT : 
The Logos of God, having taken flesh and given our nature subsistence in 
Himself, becoming perfect man, entirely free from sin, has as perfect God 
refashioned our nature and made it divine. As Logos of the primal Intellect 
and God, He has united Himself to our intelligence, giving it wings so that it 
may conceive divine, exalted thoughts. Because He is fire, He has with true 
divine fire steeled the incensive power of the soul against hostile passions 
and demons. Aspiration of all intelligent being and slaker of all desire, He 
has in His deep-seated love dilated the appetitive aspect of the soul so that it 
can partake of the blessings of eternal life. Having thus renewed the whole 
man in Himself, He restores it in an act of re-creation that leaves no grounds 
for any reproach against the Creator-Logos.68 
 
The Platonic tripartite model of the soul is thus very much in evidence in the 
Philokalia, but it is also clear that it has been utilised for a Christian purpose – that 
of understanding the inner life of human beings in the context of the incarnation of 
God in Christ. 
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 Eg Philokalia 1, 344, #94 in the text attributed to St Antony, where it is explicitly stated that the 
“Intellect is not the soul”; and in the text by Thalassios in Philokalia 2, 311, #81; 
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 Diadochos of Photiki, Philokalia 1, 280 
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 John of Damaskos, Philokalia 2, 335 
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 Nikitas Stithatos, Philokalia 4, 102, #85 
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 Nikitas Stithatos, Philokalia 4, 116, #37 
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 Nikitas Stithatos, Philokalia 4, 126, #67 
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 Nikiphoros the Monk, Philokalia 4, 205 
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 Hesychios the Priest, Philokalia 1, 187, #145 
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 Theodoros the Great Ascetic, Philokalia 2, 18, #23 
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 Peter of Damaskos, Philokalia 3, 277 
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3. The Desert Fathers 
 
For three centuries Christians suffered persecution. At first (until about 64CE) this 
was at the hands of Jewish authorities, then at the hands of the Roman empire. 
Christianity seems widely to have been disapproved of in the Roman world, and 
Christians were referred to as “atheists” because of their failure to believe in the 
Roman gods. At times this disapproval was associated with mob violence. 
Successive emperors and governments made it a capital offence to be a Christian, 
banished Christians, confiscated their property, sent them into the arena to fight as 
gladiators, tortured and imprisoned them. Churches and copies of scripture were 
burned. Periods of respite were brief, until in 311 Galerius, Caesar of the east, issued 
an Edict of Toleration. Although his successor Maximinus attempted to counteract 
this edict, his efforts were largely ineffective and in 313 he also issued notices of 
toleration. Emperors in the west, first Maxentius and then Constantine, followed suit 
and in 313 the latter drew up an edict of toleration similar to that of Galerius.69 
 
It is perhaps hard for many Christians today to imagine what it must have been like 
to live, and die, under the persecution experienced by Christians during these first 
three centuries, although it is also easy to exaggerate. For example, persecution of 
Christians in Russia in the 20th Century might arguably have been much worse. 
Nonetheless, many died, and some renounced their faith. Many, but not all, lived on 
the social edges of society. For them, the injunction of Jesus that they should deny 
themselves and take up their crosses and follow him can hardly have seemed 
metaphorical.70 It would seem also that such Christian communities lived in eager 
anticipation of the expected return of Christ. In this context, there is evidence from 
the early 3rd Century CE onwards, some Christians, although at this stage they 
should not be considered to have adopted a “monastic” life, deliberately chose a 
poor, celibate and ascetic lifestyle in order that they may devote themselves more 
fully to their Christian vocation as they understood it.71  
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 Ferguson, McHugh and Norris, 1999, pp.895-899 
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 Eg Luke 9:23 
71
 Ward, 2003, pp.viii-ix 
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At the beginning of the 4th Century CE, with the edicts of toleration, and then the 
adoption of Christianity by Constantine, everything changed. Christianity was now a 
legal and acceptable part of the fabric of society. Undoubtedly, many Christians 
found this difficult to accommodate. Increasingly, some – perhaps many – chose to 
retreat into the deserts of Syria, Palestine, and especially Egypt, where they could 
devote themselves to prayerful waiting for the return of Christ.72 One contemporary 
account states: 
One can see them in the desert waiting for Christ as loyal sons watching for 
their father… There is only the expectation of the coming of Christ in the 
singing of hymns… There is no town or village in Egypt and the Thebaid 
which is not surrounded by hermitages as if by walls.73 
 
Many of these Christians lived as solitary hermits – perhaps most famously Antony 
of Egypt, whose subsequently highly influential life was written by Athanasius.74 
Others lived in coenobitic communities, and from this developed a Christian 
tradition of monasticism which eventually, at least partly through the influence of 
John Cassian (c365-c433), had an important influence upon the whole western 
European monastic tradition.75 
 
Amongst the desert hermits, coenobites and monks of the 4th and 5th Centuries CE, 
there developed a focus on the inner life – upon the presence of sin in the human 
heart, the need for forgiveness, virtue in human living, and prayer. Many, perhaps 
most, of these Christians were not learned. Their focus was upon a simple, practical, 
living of life in prayer and certainly not on writing or on academic study. Indeed, the 
impression is sometimes given that writing and study were positively frowned 
upon.76 However, various kinds of literature did emerge from this tradition.77 In 
particular, there are the “Lives” of various saints (especially that of Antony of Egypt 
by Athanasius, c355-362), accounts of travels to the Egyptian desert (especially the 
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Lausiac History, c419/420, and the History of the Monks of Egypt, c394/395), 
various kinds of instructional literature (notably that by Evagrios and Cassian), and 
letters from various authors (including seven by Antony of Egypt and fourteen by 
Ammonas). The pinnacle of traditional monastic literature, however, is to be found 
in the sayings, proverbs and anecdotes of those who lived in the Egyptian desert, 
which were recorded, edited and passed on. Collections of these sayings appeared in 
the late 5th Century and in the 6th Century, which are now known as the “Sayings of 
the Desert Fathers” or the Apophthegmata Patrum.78  
 
The life of the Desert Fathers was severe. They lived in small huts, or in caves, and 
undertook basic manual work such as rope or basket making. They ate and drank 
extremely little, they forsook sleep in favour of prayer and, of course, they gave up 
the possibilities of marriage and family life. Renouncing of material possessions was 
a fundamental step, and most did not even have a copy of the Bible, but would rely 
for prayer and meditation on such passages as they had committed to memory. Most 
of their time would be spent alone, and remaining alone in ones cell was often 
emphasised as being of fundamental importance to the spiritual life. 79 
 
Sayings that have been handed down frequently take the form of a question – usually 
posed by a visitor or by a more junior brother to an older and wiser “Abba” or, in 
some cases, “Amma”. The responses given to such questions vary between the 
obscure, profound, apparently rude, and extremely harsh. Because they are usually 
located in particular circumstances, many of which were not be recorded, different 
sayings can also appear contradictory of each other. However, they also reflect 
extreme humility, compassion, wisdom and, at least sometimes, humour. 
 
In some ways, the Philokalia and the sayings of the Desert Fathers are worlds apart. 
A five-volume anthology hardly compares with a largely oral tradition that had a 
suspicion of books and learning. However, possession of the Philokalia potentially 
avoids the need to own, or have access to, a large library.80 Some of the “centuries” 
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exclusively upon the Bible and the Philokalia in the course of his travels on foot through 19th Century 
Russia (Savin and Hopko, 2001).  
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of texts in the Philokalia also have a literary quality about them which is not 
dissimilar to that of the Apophthegmata Patrum. They have similar ascetic concerns, 
they both appear to be intended as a basis for prayer and living, rather than academic 
study, and they employ a not dissimilar terminology of the inner life of thought and 
prayer and virtue. 
 
Thus, for example, we might compare Abba Theonas and Hesychios the Priest on 
prayer and the passions: 
Abba Theonas said, “When we turn our spirit from the contemplation of 
God, we become the slaves of carnal passions.”81 
 
Whereas, in the writings of Hesychios we find: 
Contemplation and spiritual knowledge are indeed the guides and agents of 
the ascetic life; for when the mind is raised up by them it becomes indifferent 
to sensual pleasures and to other material attractions, regarding them as 
worthless. 82 
 
Such common ground should, of course, not be surprising. Apart from the general 
observation that the Desert Fathers might be considered the founders of Christian 
monasticism or, if this is debated, at least that they influenced its subsequent course 
very considerably, and that the Philokalia emerged from that same monastic 
tradition, there are also more direct links to be found. 
 
At least three of the earlier authors of the Philokalia had in fact lived in the Egyptian 
desert themselves. Isaiah the Solitary was probably not the contemporary of 
Makarios of Egypt that Nikodimos considered him to be, but probably did live at 
Sketis in Egypt in the 5th Century CE, before moving to Palestine, and therefore can 
be said to represent firsthand experience of the tradition of the Desert Fathers.83 
Evagrios of Pontus (or Evagrios the Solitary as he is known in the English 
translation of the Philokalia) went to Egypt in 383CE and spent the remaining 16 
years of his life first at Nitria and then at Kellia. During this time he was a disciple 
of Makarios the Great (also known as Makarios of Egypt) and also had contact with 
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Makarios of Alexandria.84 John Cassian lived in Egypt from c385/6 to 399, during 
which time he was a disciple of Evagrios. He subsequently travelled to 
Constantinople and then spent the remainder of his life in the west. He founded two 
monasteries in Marseilles and wrote two books, The Institutes and The Conferences, 
based upon his experiences in the Egyptian desert, abbreviated parts of which are 
included in the Philokalia.85 Although between them these three authors contribute a 
little less than a third of only the first volume of the Philokalia, they are the first 
three books in the English translation and are the earliest contributors. 
 
In addition to Isaiah, Evagrios and Cassian, it seems likely that Mark the Ascetic 
also spent some time living as a hermit in the desert, although in fact we know very 
little about him.86 The Philokalia also includes a paraphrase by Symeon 
Metaphrastis of homilies that purport to be by Makarios the Great, whose sayings 
feature prominently in the Apophthegmata Patrum. However, it would now seem 
highly unlikely that Makarios was in fact the author of these homilies.87 Similarly, it 
is of note that the opening work of the original Greek Philokalia was one attributed 
to Antony the Great. Although this is now known not to have been written by 
Antony of Egypt, it would seem reasonable to assume that it may have suited the 
compilers of the Philokalia very well to place first in their work a text by this most 
famous of the Desert Fathers. 
 
In addition to the contributions to the Philokalia by those who had firsthand 
experience of the desert tradition, it is clear that there is a more pervasive influence. 
For example, Peter of Damaskos (whose works effectively provide a “mini-
Philokalia” within the Philokalia) quotes the Desert Fathers some 30 times,88 and 
Nikiphoros the Monk quotes from the lives of a number of the Desert Fathers in his 
work on Watchfulness and the Guarding of the Heart.89 The Desert Fathers also 
exerted an indirect influence on writers such as Maximos the Confessor, the single 
largest contributor to the Philokalia, although this is not always explicitly 
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acknowledged.90 But perhaps the most important direct and indirect influence comes 
from the perceptiveness of Evagrios of Pontus. There can be little doubt that his 
spirituality and psychology influenced all the subsequent writers whose works were 
included in the Philokalia.91 It is therefore to Evagrios that we must turn next. 
 
4. Evagrios of Pontus 
 
If you are a theologian, you will pray truly; and if you pray truly, you will be a 
theologian.92 
 
Evagrios93 (c345-399) was born in Pontus, in Cappadocia, but moved in 379 to 
Constantinople, where he studied under Gregory Nazianzen. By this time he was 
possibly already a monk. Although, up until this time, he appears to have shown 
much promise as a theologian, he left the city in 382 having begun an affair, albeit 
perhaps unconsummated, with the wife of a prominent local figure. Fleeing to 
Jerusalem he came close to abandoning his monastic vocation altogether, but was 
persuaded not to by Melania the Elder, a prominent Roman widow and foundress of 
a double monastery. Perhaps also with her encouragement, Evagrios left Jerusalem 
in 383 for the Egyptian desert, where he was to remain (apart from brief excursions 
to Alexandria and elsewhere) until his death. 
 
Evagrios spent his first two years in Egypt in the desert at Nitria, one of the major 
monastic centres of the time. He then retired to the even more remote centre of 
Kellia, where he became a pupil of Makarios the Great, one of the most famous of 
the Desert Fathers. During his time here he subjected himself to a severe regime, 
which probably damaged his health. He would sleep only four hours each night, 
walking back and forth and keeping himself occupied in order to remain awake 
during the day. When subject to sexual temptation he once spent an entire night in 
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mid-winter praying naked standing in a cistern of water.94 He ate only once a day, 
and then only very limited foods. 
 
He remained at Kellia until his death in c399. During this time he became a 
respected teacher and, unusually, also the author of a series of important works. 
Amongst these were instructions on the monastic life (The Foundations of Monastic 
Life: A Presentation of the Practice of Stillness,95 and The Monk: A treatise on the 
Practical Life96), numerous commentaries on scripture (including Scholia on 
Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Job, and Psalms), various letters and mostly importantly for 
the present purpose some works on prayer and the inner life (Chapters on Prayer97, 
On the Eight Thoughts,98 On Thoughts99, Antirrhetikos, Gnostikos, and the 
Kephalaia Gnostica). Some of these works100 survive only in Latin, Armenian or 
Syriac translation. 
 
During his lifetime, Evagrios remained a respected theologian and teacher on the 
spiritual life. After his death, as the works of Origen were increasingly scrutinised 
and condemned as heretical, Evagrios’ reputation began to suffer by association. 
Despite this, his works were widely circulated and translated into Latin, Coptic, 
Syriac, Arabic and various other languages. However, eventually, Origenism was 
condemned and, because of his perceived association with the theology of Origen, 
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Evagrios was anathematised. Despite this, Evagrios’ insights into prayer, the inner 
life and asceticism were still widely appreciated and were read and developed by 
others. That it was possible that this could happen was partly because his so-called 
theological works were separated from his ascetic and spiritual works, partly 
because of wide dissemination and translation, and also because some works were 
transmitted under other names (as indeed originally happened with one of his 
contributions to the Philokalia). 
 
i. Foundations 
 
Taught by Makarios, Evagrios shared with the Desert Fathers a belief that inner 
stillness, hesychia, was facilitated by avoiding frequent or inappropriate social 
contacts, or any other external circumstances which might provide unnecessary 
agitation or distraction.101 In Foundations, he sets out the basics: celibacy, poverty, a 
frugal diet, living either alone or with like-minded brothers in the desert, avoidance 
of cities, infrequent contact with family and friends, undertaking basic manual 
labour so as not to be a burden on others, but avoidance of buying and selling where 
at all possible, and sleeping little and only on the ground.  All these matters were, 
however, merely preliminary. His real concern was with the inner world of thoughts 
and it is here that he showed himself to be highly psychologically perceptive and 
original. These “foundations” of the monastic life are put in place in order to attain 
and preserve an inner state of “stillness”102 () and this in turn is preparatory to 
other things, which he deals with in his other works. 
 
ii. Eight Thoughts 
 
In Eight Thoughts, Evagrios deals in turn with eight thoughts, or kinds of thoughts, 
each of which presents to the Christian a point of potential struggle or temptation. 
The material is presented as a series of brief paragraphs, often only one sentence 
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long, under each heading. These paragraphs take the form of proverbs, aphorisms, or 
wise sayings, or else admonitions and instructions. Allegory and metaphor are used 
liberally. Reference to, and quotation of, scripture is used to illustrate and justify, but 
some whole sections of the discourse (specifically on fornication and acedia) do not 
explicitly refer to scripture at all. Whilst the texts have a certain quality reminiscent 
of the sayings of the Desert Fathers, and presumably must have been derived, at least 
in part, from the same underlying oral tradition, the Fathers are not explicitly quoted. 
The texts appear to be offered for contemplation and reflection – to be prayed over 
and lived out rather than studied systematically in an academic fashion. One is left 
with the impression that they arise in turn from Evagrios’ own reflections, and those 
of his mentors. 
 
The list, which appears elsewhere in Evagrian work and is original to Evagrios, has 
been highly influential upon other authors – including authors of the Philokalia. 
Elsewhere, Evagrios states that “All the generic types of thoughts fall into [these] 
eight categories in which every sort of thought is included.”103 The list comprises the 
following: 
 
1. Gluttony 
2. Fornication 
3. Avarice 
4. Anger 
5. Sadness 
6. Acedia 
7. Vainglory 
8. Pride 
 
The title of this work refers to these items as being “thoughts”, but in other works 
(eg On the Vices opposed to the Virtues) they are referred to as vices, and in each 
case there is at least some reference here to an opposing virtue. In places the 
thoughts are also referred to as “passions” (eg Gluttony, #3; Fornication, #12; 
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Avarice, #1). In other works (eg Praktikos), but interestingly not here, Evagrios 
refers to demons using the same names. 
 
Gluttony, fornication and avarice are all concerned with desires that affect the 
concupiscible or appetitive aspect of the soul.104 Anger is concerned with “a boiling 
over”105 of the irascible part of the soul. Elsewhere, Evagrios makes clear that 
sadness, vainglory and pride arise in the intelligent aspect of the soul, and that acedia 
arises from both the passible and intelligent aspects of the soul.106 
 
Table 2.1 summarises Evagrios’ teaching on the eight thoughts. In each case, 
Evagrios proves to be a perceptive and diligent student, who has analysed the root 
causes, nature and consequences of the particular kind of thought. Gluttony is a fire 
fuelled by food, fornication is a wind that throws the ship of the soul off course, and 
avarice sinks that ship by weight of possessions.  Anger is a form of madness, 
impairing the intellect, and sadness, which arises from frustration of anger or desire, 
is all consuming and all encompassing, like a devouring lion, or a prisoner’s bonds. 
Acedia is a wind that bends a delicate plant, but Evagrios notes that a wind also has 
the potential to strengthen a growing plant. Vainglory is the bindweed that saps 
away life, and the rock which causes shipwreck. Pride is a wound or infection that 
requires treatment by cautery or a scalpel if it is to be cured. Each of these thoughts, 
if not treated correctly, leads to its own particular consequences. They are inter-
related and mutually reinforcing. 
 
It is perhaps helpful here to say a little more about sadness and acedia, as these 
might represent more unexpected items in the list, at least to contemporary western 
minds. Evagrios refers to sadness as arising as a result of frustration of desire, or else 
closely following anger.107 It is thus closely related to the other passions, but also 
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similar to contemporary accounts of depression.108 Acedia is “a relaxation of the 
soul which is not in accord with nature”.109 It thus represents a lack of commitment 
to, or perseverance with, the vocation of the ascetic life and/or the life of prayer. 
These thoughts are therefore more significant in terms of where they arise from, and 
what they lead to. Like desire for food or sexual fulfilment, it is not so much that 
these thoughts are sinful in themselves – for they are most often uninvited – but 
rather they present temptations to something else. 
 
Evagrios also proves perceptive in his analysis of various trains of thought and 
sequences of events. Thus, for example, in his section on fornication he includes a 
much longer than usual paragraph (2.8), in which he traces the typical course of a 
series of interactions of a monk and a woman. At first encounter, modesty and 
chastity prevail. At a second encounter, the gaze has changed subtly, and at a third 
encounter eye contact has been made. Eventually, the soul is besieged by the 
interaction; it has become “entangling”, destructive and poisonous. Similarly, in the 
section on acedia (6.15), he provides an amusing account of a monk who is supposed 
to be reading. But this monk finds himself yawning, stretching, looking at the wall, 
counting pages, and jumping to the end. If he gives in to sleep, Evagrios observes, 
then he will find himself awakened by hunger. 
 
Apparently innocent, or even good, thoughts and actions may thus lead to 
undesirable outcomes. Elsewhere, Evagrios goes further and suggests that beneath 
the apparently innocent thought or action there lays another motive. For example: 
A person afflicted with acedia proposes visiting the sick, but is fulfilling his 
own purpose.110 
 
Evagrios is not specific here as to whether such a person consciously intends 
proposing visitation of the sick for ulterior purposes.111 The possibility is left open 
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that they might not have insight into their own motivation. Thus, being unaware of 
the dynamics of such thoughts, they may be deceiving themselves more than others 
as to their true purpose. However, once having read these passages, it is clearly 
Evagrios’ expectation that the monk will no longer be able to claim ignorance of 
what is really going on in his (or, we might add, her) own mind. 
 
The context and purpose of considering each of these eight thoughts is clearly that of 
facilitating a life of virtue and of prayer. Thus, for example, in the section on 
gluttony we find: 
The smoke of incense sweetens the air, and the prayer of the abstinent person 
presents a sweet odour to God (cf Rev. 8:4).112 
 
Or again, in the section on vainglory: 
Vainglory advises you to pray in the streets, but he who wars against it prays 
in his chamber (cf. Matt. 6:5-6).113 
 
However, the work does not treat of prayer itself, and is generally considered to be 
an introductory work, for the monk who is in the early stages of monastic life. 
 
iii. Praktikos 
 
Praktikos takes things on a further stage. It deals again with the eight thoughts, 
saying a little about the nature of each and then providing more or less brief 
suggestions for remedies against each of them. However, it then develops a more 
general discussion about the passions and the part that sense perceptions and demons 
play in provoking them. This provides the introduction to a series of instructions for 
dealing with these things including, for example, attentiveness to ones thoughts, that 
one might get to know better the tactics of the demons. It then moves on to a 
discussion of impassibility. 
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Impassibility (eiWUXaeiSUZ\VNKRe ), or dispassion as it is usually translated in the Philokalia, is 
concerned with impartiality or detachment, with peace or tranquillity, but not with 
absence of suffering.114 It is translated by Cassian as “purity of heart”.115 According 
to Evagrios, impassibility is encountered after victory is gained over the 
demons/passions.116 It is the “blossom” of the practical life and, in turn, gives birth 
to love.117 Although he does not develop the theme here, it is also the gateway to the 
first type of contemplative prayer – that of the contemplation of the essence of 
created beings.118 
 
Praktikos closes with further practical advice about the ascetic life and then with 
some sayings of the Desert Fathers. 
 
iv. On Thoughts 
 
On Thoughts takes things on a further stage and provides a more detailed account of 
the mental life and especially of the struggle against the demons. It is clear that this 
is all in aid of attaining “pure prayer”, but again little is said about that in this work. 
The work rather appears to be preparatory for that end; it is written for the monk 
who is striving to achieve impassibility.119 
 
In On Thoughts, three thoughts – those of gluttony, avarice and vainglory – are seen 
as being of fundamental importance. Demons are understood as being at work in 
these thoughts: as suggesting them, enticing human beings with them, and as being 
“entrusted” with them.120 It is these thoughts/demons which open the way to all the 
others and it is these three with which Jesus is understood as having been tempted in 
the wilderness.121 Further, all demonic thoughts are understood as entering the soul 
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through “mental representations of sensible objects”.122 It is not all such mental 
images, or memories, that are necessarily demonic, but rather those that are 
associated with “irascibility or concupiscibility contrary to nature”.123 In other 
words, these thoughts arouse the desiring and incensive aspects of the soul in a way 
which is likely to lead to sinful behaviour and which prevents the intellect from 
perceiving the image of God. This may happen in sleep as well as in wakefulness.124 
 
Thoughts are understood by Evagrios as originating from angels, from demons or 
from the human mind. He uses as an example thoughts of gold. Angelic thoughts 
may be about why God created gold, how it is referred to in the Bible and the holy 
purposes to which it may be put. Demonic thoughts will be about selfish acquisition 
of gold and the pleasures that this will bring. Human thoughts neither investigate 
divine purpose, nor indulge selfish passion, but rather appear to be a dispassionate 
imaging of gold by the intellect.125 
 
Later, “mental representations”, by which he appears to be referring to the neutral 
images that are human thoughts, are metaphorically referred to as sheep which have 
been entrusted to human beings as to a shepherd.126 These sheep are vulnerable to 
wolves or other wild beasts. The extended metaphor becomes a little confusing as it 
is developed because he first refers to wolves as being another kind of mental 
representation (by implication associated inappropriately with passion), but then 
goes on to refer to sheep being snatched by wild beasts when inappropriately 
pastured – eg when the mental representation of a brother is “pastured with hatred”. 
On the one hand it appears that he considers wolves to be impassioned mental 
representations, but on the other hand he appears to consider wild beasts to be the 
potentially ravaging activities of the respective parts of the soul – incensive, desiring 
or intellective. It is clear, however, that he considers that the incensive and desiring 
aspects of the soul do have fundamentally good purposes. The proper function of the 
incensive part is to chase off the wolves, and the function of the desiring part is to 
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nurture the sheep. Although he does not explicitly say so here, it is also more or less 
implicit that the proper function of the intellect is prayer. 
 
In On Thoughts, Evagrios also introduces some new demons. Amongst these are 
“vagabond” and “insensibility”.127 Each is attributed, as are all the demons, with 
purposeful motivation to lead the soul away from God. The former does this by 
means of wandering, purposeless and irrelevant thoughts which at first simply 
occupy the mental space which otherwise might have been taken by knowledge of 
God, and then lead on to other thoughts, or rather demons, which more directly lead 
away from virtue and from God. The latter acts by diminishing the soul’s sense of 
the seriousness of sin and of the fear of God. Later in this work, Evagrios also 
develops an account of the strategies of the demons, especially giving consideration 
to the circumstances of the monk who has been in combat with them for some time. 
For example, he talks of the way in which they follow in succession in their assaults 
– stronger ones following on from weaker ones – and of how they may change their 
tactic from (for example) a temptation to gluttony to a temptation to excessive 
asceticism.128 (Such a temptation is still put into the mind by the demon of gluttony; 
it is simply gluttony in another form.) 
 
The purpose of Evagrios’ account of the demons is to arm the monk to fight against 
them. Thus, for example, he encourages his reader to be self-reflective about where 
his thoughts are led by “vagabond”, in order that he can more easily recognise his 
influence, expose it and resist it.129 Similarly, if a demon introduces a thought of 
avarice, the reader is encouraged to analyse the way in which it is not the object 
itself, or the mind or the mental representation of the object that is sinful, but rather a 
hostile desire to put the object to an improper use.130 
 
Impassibility is seen here as being more nearly attainable than it was in Praktikos. 
For example, advice is given about how to test whether or not it has been attained.131 
There is also a concluding account of the need for freedom from mental 
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representations as a pre-requisite for contemplative prayer.132 Contemplative prayer 
(or more correctly “pure” prayer) is the goal towards which Evagrios has been 
leading his pupils and which is now coming into sight. His treatment of this for his 
more advanced pupils is first contained in On Prayer, a work which was originally 
included in the Philokalia under attribution to Neilos of Ancyra. 
 
v. On Prayer 
 
Prayer is defined by Evagrios as “a communion of the mind with God”133 and as 
“the ascent of the mind towards God”.134 His vision of prayer is much broader than 
these succinct definitions might appear to imply. In fact, he sees it as taking in the 
whole breadth of the ascetic life. However, at its heart, “true prayer” or “pure 
prayer” is the goal of the ascetic life and is something that is not easily attained. 
 
For Evagrios, “the way of prayer… is… twofold: it involves the practical on the one 
hand and the contemplative on the other”.135 The practical life, as understood by 
Evagrios, is concerned with overcoming the “thoughts” (or vices, or passions) that 
he has dealt with at some length in his other works, and especially in Praktikos, as 
described above.136 It represents a struggle against the demons, the outcome of 
which is impassibility.137 It paves the way for contemplative prayer.138 
 
Contemplative prayer is understood by Evagrios as comprising natural 
contemplation and theological contemplation.139 Although these kinds of 
contemplation are nowhere precisely defined in On Prayer, it is already fairly clear 
here that natural contemplation is concerned with contemplation of natural, or 
created, beings, and theological contemplation is concerned with contemplation of 
God himself. The distinction between these is very important. In comparison with 
the latter, the former hardly qualifies as prayer at all. Thus, for example, Evagrios 
                                                 
132
 On Thoughts 40-42 
133
 On Prayer 3 
134
 On Prayer 35 
135
 On Prayer Prologue 
136
 Eg Praktikos 87; See also To Eulogius 15.15 
137
 Praktikos 60, 81; Thoughts 29 
138
 Eulogius 29.31; Praktikos 32 
139
 On Prayer Prologue 
 43
warns that natural contemplation can lead the mind “far away from God”.140 Indeed, 
natural contemplation is eventually incompatible with the contemplation of God 
himself. Contemplation of God is free of the images and intellections associated 
with created things.141 Natural contemplation is contemplation of the many, 
theological contemplation is contemplation of the One.142 
 
On Prayer thus begins with a consideration of the practical life insofar as it relates 
directly to the subject of prayer. This includes a reminder of the need to attend to the 
virtues,143 the merit of tears,144 the need to avoid distractions145 and anger,146 and the 
likelihood that the demons will oppose the efforts of the monk to pray.147 The reader 
is enjoined not to pray for his148 own needs, but rather that God’s will be done.149 
However, all of this is, yet again, merely preliminary to the task in hand. 
 
Prayer, Evagrios tells us, is all about God. Prayer is about loving God, being in 
communion with God,150 being near to God,151 beholding the “place of God”,152 
longing for God,153 and journeying with God.154 Prayer is bestowed by God.155 
 
If God himself is the destination of a journey then the journey begins with pursuit of 
virtue, in order to get to the place of natural contemplation, which in turn leads to the 
contemplation of the Logos himself.156 Prayer is a focus on God which is blind to all 
distractions. Initially, and most fundamentally, these distractions are from the 
passions, but as the soul draws nearer to God it becomes blind even to the 
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distractions offered by natural contemplation of corporeal, or even incorporeal, 
beings.157 And so, Evagrios turns at last to the focus of pure prayer, which is God 
himself. 
 
He warns that God cannot be contemplated in the form of any image.158 God is 
immaterial, without quantity or form. Attempts to approach God in this way are 
therefore either misguided human effort, or demonically inspired. On the other hand, 
for the soul that is receptive, God graciously bestows prayer, sending his angels to 
oppose demonic activity, to provide illumination and to instil “knowledge of true 
prayer”.159 Whilst this appears to be the climax of Evagrios’ On Prayer, it can easily 
feel as though it is an anti-climax. Pure prayer remains an unimaginable and 
undescribed mystery for it is communion with God who is imageless, and the 
imageless cannot be imagined or described. Whilst there is much that can be done to 
make the soul receptive to God, pure prayer is ultimately the gift of God and so 
Evagrios urges patience.160  
 
Perhaps this accounts for the shift of focus at this point to something that sounds at 
first as though it ought to have been in Lesson 1 – the matter of psalmody.161 
Psalmody, Evagrios urges, “puts the passions to sleep”162 and prepares the mind for 
prayer. Although he implies here that it is a form of natural contemplation, he clearly 
sees this as being a good way to maintain a patient readiness for God to bestow 
theological contemplation or pure prayer.163 But there is some ambiguity, for 
psalmody is both something which he urges his reader practise, and also something 
which, like pure prayer, is graciously bestowed by God.164 
 
The structure of the work from this point on is curious. Sinkewicz, in his translation, 
groups together paragraphs 89 to 105 under the heading of “Trials”, paragraphs 106 
to 112 under the heading of “Apophthegmata” and then 113-153 as a concluding 
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miscellany. The Apophthegmata might be taken as undergirding what has gone 
before with the authority of the Desert Fathers or, perhaps more likely, as providing 
examples to encourage patience and perseverance. The other paragraphs provide a 
return to earlier themes – such as the need to be wary of the attacks of the demons, 
and the imagelessness of true prayer. Perhaps these also are offered as 
encouragements to perseverance, even when the path towards prayer seems to be 
opposed by demons and when their proffered images of God might appear seductive. 
Whatever the intention may have been, the work ends on a positive note: 
When you have passed beyond every other joy in your prayer, then you have 
truly discovered the practice of prayer.165 
 
After the battle with the passions is won, when the demons have been defeated, 
when patience has been rewarded by God’s gracious bestowal of prayer, when the 
seduction of that which can be imagined and described has been rebuffed, the 
“theology” that is the contemplation of God in prayer offers more joy than anything 
else possibly could. It is clear, however, that this is still just the beginning. 
 
vi. Gnostikos 
 
In Gnostikos, we learn a little more. Gnostikos appears to have been intended as a 
part of a trilogy, comprising Praktikos, Gnostikos, and Kephalaia Gnostika.166 It 
comprises 50 chapters, which are devoted largely to the subject of contemplative 
knowledge, for this is the primary concern of the “gnostikos”, the “one who knows”. 
However, this is not to say that the practical or ascetical life can now be forgotten. 
There are repeated reminders against such things as anger,167 sadness,168 avarice,169 
vainglory,170 and gluttony171. Vice and virtue are still important concerns.172 
Knowledge cannot be acquired by one who is still immersed in the passions.173 
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According to Gnostikos, there are two kinds of knowledge. There is that which is 
derived by the senses from the external, material, world, and that which is derived 
interiorly by grace.174 Gnostikos is concerned, however, not so much with these 
kinds of knowledge in themselves, as with what might be expected of the gnostikos 
himself. In addition to exhortations about vice and virtue, which have already been 
mentioned, advice is given on what may or may not be said to others,175 and on what 
it is “necessary” or “good” to know.176 Interestingly, speaking about God “without 
[careful] consideration” is warned against.177 However, in contrast, Evagrios 
apparently considers it important to advise on “causes of abandonment” or reasons 
why God might withdraw from the soul for its own good. These include the 
revealing of virtue, punishment which leads to renewal of virtue, the salvation of 
others, humility, and hatred of evil.178 Evagrios warns against going beyond one’s 
knowledge, or imagining that one knows more than one actually does.179  
 
Rather as Prayer closes with a series of apophthegmata, drawing on the authority of 
the Desert Fathers, Gnostikos closes with a series of quotations from various 
authorities, including Basil of Caesarea, Athanasius, and Didymus the Blind.180 Two 
final chapters then tantalisingly suggest that the goal of the life of knowledge is 
merely a preparation for something else: theology, a restoring gaze upon God 
himself. 
The goal of the praktike is to purify the intellect and to render it free of 
passions; that of the gnostike is to reveal the truth hidden in all beings; but to 
distance the intellect from matter and to turn it towards the First Cause – this 
is a gift of theology. 
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Gazing fixedly upon the archetype, I strive to engrave the images without 
neglecting anything which might accomplish the gaining [back] of the fallen-
away.181 
 
vii. Kephalaia Gnostika 
 
We are thus taken, eventually, to Kephalaia Gnostika, the final part of the trilogy, in 
the hope of finding out more about exactly what Evagrios understands contemplative 
prayer to be. However, as David Bundy has commented, this work is “deliberately 
disjointed and cryptic, intended only for those who are already committed to an 
ascetic life and who have the intellectual background to read the ‘encoded’ 
instructions”.182 It is clearly intended to be read only by those who are advanced in 
the life of prayer, and who have already achieved apatheia. Even then, it would 
appear to be something that is intended as a basis for contemplation – not as 
something which is to be read from beginning to end in a logical sequence of 
argument. It is, after all, offered as an aid to the person who is seeking God, who is 
beyond all words and images, and any encounter with whom is inevitably ineffable. 
All of this said, we find out some interesting things here about contemplative prayer. 
 
Firstly, contemplation is a kind of vision of the soul: 
THE sense, naturally by itself, senses sensory things, but the mind [nous] 
always stands and waits [to ascertain] which spiritual contemplation gives it 
vision.183 
 
Secondly, and connected with this metaphorical vision, contemplation is concerned 
with knowledge, of God, of Christ, and of created beings: 
THE light of the nous is divided into three: 
knowledge of the adorable and holy Trinity; 
and the incorporeal nature that created by it; 
and the contemplation of beings.184 
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Knowledge of created things is concerned with their 		, their inner essences or 
meanings. It is apatheia that enables this knowledge, or vision, of the inner essences 
of things: 
THE nous that is divested of the passions and sees the logoi of beings does 
not henceforth truly receive the eidola that (arrive) through the senses; but it 
is as if another world is created by its knowledge, attracting to it its thought 
and rejecting far from it the sensitive world.185 
 
Knowledge of God, however, is importantly different to the knowledge that is the 
concern of contemplation of created beings. God is “essential knowledge”, never 
simply an “object” of contemplation.186 Spiritual contemplation therefore remains, 
ultimately, a mystery.187 Amongst many aspects of this mystery, however, Evagrios 
returns repeatedly to his vision of God as both Unity188 and Trinity,189 and of Christ 
as existing in unique relationship both to God and human beings.190 
 
Thirdly, contemplation is transformative: 
JUST as the senses are changed through being receptive of different 
qualities, so also the nous is changed, [through] constant gazing at diverse 
contemplations.191 
 
Contemplation is healing,192 generative,193 brings growth and life,194 is restorative,195 
and even deifying.196 Contemplation of the logoi of judgement and providence 
appear to assume a particular significance in this process. For Evagrios, “judgement” 
is a matter of God’s progressive transformation of reasoning beings (		, a 
category which includes but is not confined to human beings) in order to assist their 
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spiritual development, and “providence” is a matter of God’s provision of what is 
required to return them to the union with God from which they are fallen.197 
 
Fourthly, Evagrios provides us with a definition of contemplation: 
CONTEMPLATION is: 
spiritual knowledge of the things which have been and will be: 
it is this which causes the nous to ascend to its first rank.198 
 
Contemplation is defined, therefore, in terms of knowledge and of salvation of the 
human soul. Commenting on this definition, Dysinger suggests that we should see 
here a Christological and soteriological basis for the Evagrian theology of 
contemplation. Because God in Christ has both descended and ascended, the 
contemplative who, by definition, has fallen from his primordial state is also enabled 
to ascend towards [knowledge of] God.199 
 
Fifthly, there are different kinds of contemplation. We have already seen (above) 
that “natural” and “theological” contemplation are to be distinguished. However, in 
Kephalaia Gnostika, the classification becomes much more complex and 
inconsistent. There appears to be an expectation of progress from “second” to “first” 
natural contemplation: 
VIRTUES cause the nous to see second natural contemplation; and the latter 
cause it to see first [natural contemplation]; and the first in its turn (makes it 
see) the Blessed Unity.200 
 
Terminology of first and second natural contemplation occurs in Evagrian literature 
only in Kephalaia Gnostika, and nowhere else.201 There are also references to up to 
five kinds of contemplation: 
                                                 
197
 Dysinger, 2005, pp.171-195; Reference to the logoi of judgement and providence is not lacking in 
Kephalaia Gnostika (see, for example, 1.27, 5.4, 5.7, 5.16, 5.23, 6.43, 6.75), but is perhaps less 
evident here than one might expect from the prominent place that Dysinger sees it as taking in 
Evagrian thought. Could it be that this is because Evagrios ascribes it a low place in the hierarchy of 
contemplation (1.27), whereas Kephalaia Gnostika is written for the monk who is at an advanced 
stage of progress in contemplative life? 
198
 Kephalaia Gnostika 3.42; Elsewhere, Dysinger translates “former rank”, rather than “first rank” 
(Ibid., p.38) 
199
 Kephalaia Gnostika 6.19 
200
 Kephalaia Gnostika 3.61; See also 2.4, which presents a four stage progression. 
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FIVE are the principal contemplations under which all contemplation is 
placed. It is said that the first is contemplation of the adorable and holy 
Trinity; the second and third are the contemplation of incorporeal beings and 
of bodies; the fourth and the fifth are the contemplation of judgment and of 
providence.202 
 
Elsewhere, a different five-fold order is presented: 
WITH God is said to be: first, the one who knows the Holy Trinity; and next 
after him one who contemplates the logoi concerning the intelligible 
[beings]; third, then, is one who also sees the incorporeal beings; and then 
fourth is one who understands the contemplation of the ages; while one who 
has attained apatheia of his soul is justly to be accounted fifth,’.203 
 
And elsewhere again different two and three fold orders are presented.204 
 
All of this is not easy to disentangle and the tangle is made no easier to unravel by 
the virtual interchangability of the terms “contemplation” and “knowledge”,205 as 
well as an at times rather mystical use of the term “contemplation” in relation to 
Christ himself.206 If the tangle can be unravelled, it is clear that Evagrios only 
expects us to unravel it in the practice of contemplative prayer itself. 
 
What is finally clear, is that contemplative knowledge of God, Unity and Trinity, is 
the aim of the Evagrian system. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
201
 Dysinger, 2005, pp.41-42 identifies ten instances of this (2.2, 2.4, 2.20, 3.61, 3.67, 3.84, 3.86, 
3.87, 4.19 & 4.51), amongst which first natural contemplation is only explicitly named in three (3.61, 
3.67 & 3.87) but is alluded to in three more (2.2, 2.4 & 2.61). However, in his translation, first natural 
contemplation (or first contemplation of nature) is also apparently clearly referred to in 2.13, 3.27, 
3.33, 4.10, and second contemplation of nature in 4.10. First and second natural contemplation are not 
unambiguously defined, and Dysinger discusses various possible interpretations (p42). 
202
 Kephalaia Gnostika 1.27; See also reference to a “third” contemplation in 3.21 
203
 Kephalaia Gnostika 1.70; See also a three-fold classification in 1.74 
204
 Kephalaia Gnostika 3.19, 4.27, 6.2 
205
 Dysinger, 2005, p.44 
206
 Kephalaia Gnostika 3.24, 3.26. See also 2.3, where “spiritual knowledge” is referred to in a 
similar way. 
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5. Scripture 
 
Scriptural quotations, allusions and references are pervasive within the text of the 
Philokalia. Scripture is used to justify, illustrate, explain and facilitate the themes 
which the authors take up. Again, with a work spanning so many centuries, it is not 
surprising to find that there are differences in frequency and style of reference, as 
well as in theological approach, to scripture. Thus, for example, there appears to be 
far more frequent explicit reference to scripture in the works of Peter of Damoskos 
than in any other author. However, the foundational importance of scripture to all of 
the authors of the Philokalia is evident207 and so it deserves some further 
consideration here. 
 
Scripture is used again and again as justification for the ideas that are expressed in 
the Philokalia, even to the point of appearing to a modern reader to be contrived. 
Thus, for example, in a work of Isaiah the Solitary we find a series of quotations 
from the Psalms used as authority for the hesychastic concept of “guarding of the 
heart”: 
Holy Scripture speaks everywhere about the guarding of the heart, in both 
the Old and the New Testaments. David says in the Psalms: 'O sons of men, 
how long will you be heavy of heart?' (Ps. 4:2. LXX), and again: 'Their heart 
is vain' (Ps. 5:9. LXX); and of those who think futile thoughts, he says: 'For 
he has said in his heart, I shall not be moved' (Ps. 10:6), and: 'He has said in 
his heart, God has forgotten' (Ps. 10:11).208 
 
It is not at all evident to us that such examples show that scripture speaks anywhere, 
let alone “everywhere”, about guarding of the heart in the sense understood within 
the hesychastic tradition. In order to understand this apparently curious use of 
scripture we must consider the nature of the hermeneutical tools employed within 
the Philokalia. However, what must first be affirmed is that the authors of the 
Philokalia share an understanding that scripture provides foundational authority for 
their theology, anthropology, psychology and spirituality. Even if we, or their 
contemporaries, might argue that their use of scripture is flawed, yet the important 
                                                 
207
 The only obvious exception being the work attributed to St Antony in the first volume of the 
original Greek Philokalia, now known not to be of Christian authorship. 
208
 Philokalia 1, 26-27 
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point for them appears to be that they are able to argue that what they believe about 
the inner life and prayer can be shown to be consistent with scripture and not alien to 
it. In this sense, even the later writers appear ultimately to rely not on tradition but 
rather on scriptural authority for what they teach. 
 
We should not, however, allow this reliance on scripture as authority to mislead us 
into thinking that scripture was primarily either a source of theological concepts and 
ideas or the means of justifying such concepts and ideas when they were drawn from 
elsewhere. The Philokalia is concerned primarily with prayer, and with the virtuous 
life as an essential basis for prayer, and so the importance of scripture is primarily as 
an aid to prayer and a guide to virtue. Thus, for example, Hesychios the Priest warns 
against an approach to scripture that avoids confrontation with its implications for 
practical living: 
He who does not know the truth cannot truly have faith; for by nature 
knowledge precedes faith. What is said in Scripture is said not solely for us 
to understand, but also for us to act upon.209  
 
Further, meditation on scripture provides a means of approaching God in prayer. For 
example John of Karpathos states that:  
nothing so readily renews the decrepit soul, and enables it to approach the 
Lord, as fear of God, attentiveness, constant meditation on the words of 
Scripture, the arming of oneself with prayer, and spiritual progress through 
the keeping of vigils.210 
 
Scripture is thus understood not as an end in itself but as a means of assisting the 
soul in its approach to God. Maximos the Confessor therefore warns that, if used 
incorrectly, scripture can hinder rather than assist in this process.211 On the other 
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 Philokalia 1, 172, #60; See also John Cassian in Philokalia 1, 75, Mark the Ascetic in Philokalia 
1, 116, John of Karpathos in Philokalia 1, 302, #20, and Peter of Damaskos in Philokalia 3, 103, 191 
210
 Philokalia 1, 302, #20; See also Peter of Damaskos in Philokalia 3, 227, the teaching attributed to 
Abba Philimon in Philokalia 2, 346, and Nikitas Stithatos in Philokalia 4 127, #70. For Nikitas 
Stithatos, scripture has a different part to play at different stages of the spiritual life, assisting first in 
the struggle for virtue, then in turning the intellect towards God in prayer, and finally in bestowing 
divine illumination (Philokalia 4, 133-134, #90) 
211
 Philokalia 2, 155, #73; Maximos appears to be concerned that the reader will become focussed on 
the literal sense of the text, rather than upon God revealed in and through the text. 
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hand, correctly used, scripture provides an essential aid to the intellect in its ascent 
to God.212 
 
On the one hand, then, the writers of the Philokalia understand scripture as 
interpreting the human condition213 and leading the soul towards God. On the other 
hand, however, this process assumes that the human soul is also capable of properly 
interpreting scripture. This reflexive hermeneutical process is largely implicit within 
the Philokalia, but it is an important one. Most frequently, it appears to assume the 
form of allegory. 
 
Allegory is to be found everywhere in the Patristic interpretation of scripture, and is 
certainly not unique to the Philokalia. Both the European Reformation and the 
Enlightenment have left a deep distrust of such an approach, which is seen as 
lacking in objectivity both theologically (because it supposedly avoids encounter 
with the divinely revealed truth contained in scripture) and scientifically (because it 
is perceived as the antithesis of the historical-critical method, making almost no 
effort to discern the “original” meaning of the text).214 However, to approach the 
Philokalia with this kind of distrust is to completely misunderstand the Patristic 
method and purpose of allegorical interpretation. It is also to ignore the way in 
which modern hermeneutical thinking and Patristic allegorical interpretation of 
scripture both recognise that in fact texts are capable of multiple meanings and that 
the “original” meaning (if indeed that is accessible at all) is not the only possible 
valid one. Most importantly, it fails to appreciate the mystery, richness and depth 
that the Fathers found in scripture. Allegorical interpretation, understood in this way, 
is not a flawed method for uncovering objective meaning, it is rather (at least in the 
present, Christian, sense) an exploration of the mystery of God in Christ. It is, in 
fact, prayer. 
 
Examples of allegory abound within the pages of the Philokalia.  For example, John 
Cassian interprets “the wicked of the earth” and “the children of Babylon”, in 
                                                 
212
 Philokalia 2, 255-256, #82, and 267, #31 
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 See, for example, Peter of Damaskos in Philokalia 3, 99, 275 
214
 For a more detailed account, to which I am indebted here, see Louth, 1989, pp.96-131. 
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Psalms 101 and 137 respectively, as being wicked thoughts.215 The story of Ish-
bosheth and his doorkeeper, in 2 Samuel 4:5-8, is interpreted by Neilos the Ascetic 
as referring to the intellect and reason.216 Maximos interprets Jacob’s well, in John 
4:5-15, as a reference to scripture itself.217 Nikitas Stithatos interprets the 
bread/food, the wine, and the oil, referred to in Psalms 104:15 and 23:5 as references 
to scripture, each in respect of a different stage of the spiritual life.218 
 
Peter of Damaskos appears to be alone amongst the authors of the Philokalia in his 
expression of reservation at this hermeneutical method. Ironically, he expresses this 
reservation in the context of an approving reference to an allegorical interpretation 
of John 10:1 by Maximos the Confessor, and further uses the same allegory himself 
in the course of his argument: 
If, however, a thief or robber tries to enter, not by the proper door, but by 
‘climbing up some other way’, as the Lord puts it (John 10:1), then the 
sheep-that is, according to St Maximos, divine thoughts  - pay no attention to 
him. For the thief enters only so that he can deceive by hearsay, and kill the 
Scriptures by turning them into allegory, since he is unable to interpret them 
spiritually. Thus through his presumption and his pseudo-knowledge he 
destroys both himself and the divine thoughts contained in the Scriptures. 
But the shepherd, as a good soldier of Christ, feels compassion for these 
thoughts; and by keeping the divine commandments he enters in through the 
narrow gate (cf. Matt. 7:13), the gate of humility and dispassion. Before 
receiving divine grace he devotes himself to studying and to learning about 
everything by listening to others; and whenever the wolf approaches in the 
guise of a sheep (cf. Matt. 7:15), he chases him off by means of self-
criticism, saying, ‘I do not know who you are: God knows.’ And should a 
thought approach shamelessly and ask to be received, saying to him, ‘If you 
do not watch over thoughts and discriminate between things, you are 
ignorant and lacking in faith’, then he replies, ‘If you call me a fool, I accept 
the title; for like St John Chrysostom I know that whoever is foolish in this 
world becomes wise, as St Paul puts it’ (cf. 1 Cor. 3:18).219 
 
The intent of this discourse, in which thoughts are allegorically understood as sheep 
in both John 10 and Matthew 7, appears not so much to be an injunction against the 
use of allegory altogether (for that would invalidate both his own use of allegory, 
and that of Maximos) but rather a warning against “presumption” and “pseudo-
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 Philokalia 2, 193-194, #29 
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 Philokalia 3, 248 
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knowledge” which may be displayed in the inappropriate use of allegory by those 
unable to interpret the scriptures “spiritually”.220 Like Maximos, Peter therefore 
seems to be concerned about the possible misinterpretation of scripture by those who 
are not as wise as they would like to imagine. The solution – of “spiritual” 
interpretation221 – appears to be a combination of humility and dispassion, obedience 
to scriptural commands, willingness to learn from others, and a willingness to appear 
foolish, if necessary, in being ready to admit to not knowing how to interpret. In 
other words, proper interpretation relies – at least in part – upon acquisition of 
dispassion and virtue, but is ultimately a matter of the grace of God. A similar model 
is given expression elsewhere in the Philokalia by Diadochos of Photiki: 
Spiritual knowledge comes through prayer, deep stillness and complete 
detachment, while wisdom comes through humble meditation on Holy 
Scripture and, above all, through grace given by God.222 
 
Here, interpretation of scripture begins to sound much more like contemplative 
prayer, and indeed other authors of the Philokalia also speak of it in this way. For 
example, we find Maximos the Confessor writing: 
As soon as anyone practises the virtues with true intelligence, he acquires a 
spiritual understanding of Scripture. He worships God actively in the new 
way of the Spirit through the higher forms of contemplation, and not in the 
old way of the written, code (cf. Rom. 7:6), which makes man interpret the 
Law in an outward and sensual manner and, Judaic-like, fosters the passions 
and encourages sin.223 
 
Spiritual interpretation of scripture thus appears to be itself a form of contemplative 
prayer. 
 
In some ways, this hermeneutic might be regarded as a hermeneutic of suspicion, for 
it recognises that human beings have a capacity to deceive themselves and it 
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encourages the interpreter of scripture to distrust his or her own interpretation until 
finding confirmation of it elsewhere in scripture, or from those who are holier and 
wiser.224 However, perhaps the terminology of suspicion is anachronistic here, for it 
evokes an age of scriptural interpretation informed by Freud, Nietzsche and Ricoeur 
and this is clearly not the world in which Peter of Damaskos lived. Rather, we 
should consider this to be a hermeneutic of humility, which recognises that the 
interpretation of scripture depends upon the grace of God, that no single 
interpretation is likely to exhaust its meaning, and that there are always others holier 
and wiser against whose interpretations one’s own thoughts must be tested. 
 
This is not a completely pre-critical hermeneutical model. We have seen already that 
it is critical at the personal, subjective, level. Neither does it eschew academic study, 
although it does place this in a broader context of the virtuous life and of prayer. It is 
also capable of accommodating source-critical comments, such as when we find 
John Cassian making reference to the reliability of the “best manuscripts”.225 Indeed, 
it is a rich source of critical reflection, insofar as it values the criticism offered by 
the interpretations of tradition.226 However, it is not critical in a modern academic 
sense. Thus, for example, Peter of Damaskos displays a lack of willingness to 
countenance the possibility that St Paul did not write the epistle to the Hebrews, or 
that Dionysios did not write the texts attributed to him. Moreover, his arguments 
against alternative authorship of these texts appear to reflect his own contemplative 
intuition, presumably reinforced by a sense of what he understood that tradition had 
taught on such matters. 
 
The hermeneutic most frequently encountered in the Philokalia thus appears to be a 
contemplative one. Any tendency towards extreme subjectivism is checked by the 
emphasis on humility and the appeal to the traditions of the Church. This might be 
criticised as making it inherently conservative. However, it is also radically 
reflective and reflexive. It emphasises scripture as a place of personal encounter with 
the Logos of God. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
The influences upon, and foundations of, the Philokalia that have been considered 
here together reflect a focus on finding God within the human soul. Evagrios was 
himself a part of the tradition of the Egyptian desert, and the compilers of the 
Philokalia merely collated and passed on texts that they inherited. On this basis, one 
could argue that the three foundations of the Philokalia are actually scripture, 
tradition and reason, where the primary tradition is that of the Desert Fathers, and 
the primary appeal to reason is that of Plato. However, this would be to gloss over 
the enormous original contribution made by Evagrios, who translated and made 
sense of the Christian traditions of the Egyptian desert in a highly perceptive way. If 
the anthropology of the Philokalia is fundamentally Platonic, then surely its 
psychology is fundamentally Evagrian. 
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Chapter 3: The Passions 
 
PASSION ( - pathos): in Greek, the word signifies literally that which 
happens to a person or thing, an experience undergone passively; hence an 
appetite or impulse such as anger, desire or jealousy, that violently dominates 
the soul.1 
 
The passions ( ) represent a central concept in the psychology of the 
Philokalia and yet, with only one or two exceptions, its authors do not generally 
seem to consider that this concept requires definition. The definition helpfully 
provided by the editors of the English translation emphasises the passivity of that 
which is experienced by the soul.2 However, for the present purpose, there is much 
more that needs to be said about the way in which the concept has been developed, 
employed and implicitly defined by the authors themselves. 
 
Before proceeding to consider the way in which the concept is understood within the 
Philokalia, it may be helpful to look first at its use in the classical tradition, and then 
at the way in which it was employed by the Desert Fathers, and particularly by 
Evagrios. 
 
 
1. The Classical Tradition 
 
Whereas  is rendered consistently by the English translators of the Philokalia 
as “the passions”, translators of the works of classical literature have employed a 
variety of other terms. Thus, for example, in the glossary provided by one translator 
of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, “pathos” is listed as meaning “susceptibility, 
feeling, emotion, experience, effect, affection, passion”.3 Richard Sorabji, in the 
introduction to his work on Stoic theory, Emotion and Peace of Mind, justifies use of 
the English word “emotions”, in preference to “passions”, on the basis that, in 
                                                 
1
 From the glossary to the English translation of the Philokalia 
2
 cf Stapakis and Coniaris, 2004, p.xiii 
3
 Thomson, Treddenick and Barnes, 1983, p.369 
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contemporary usage, the latter might be taken to indicate extreme emotions.4 Not 
only does this difficulty of translation reflect the lack of a completely equivalent 
contemporary English word, but also it reflects the richness and variety of emphasis 
or understanding of the underlying term in classical thought. 
 
The Platonic understanding of the division of the soul into rational and irrational 
parts has already been discussed in Chapter 1. According to this model, the passions 
are an expression of the irrational part of the soul, which is itself divided into 
desiring and incensive parts. In Phaedrus,5 Plato likens the soul to a charioteer with 
two horses, each of which tends to pull in a different direction. The charioteer 
represents the rational part of the soul, and the two horses the irrational parts. 
According to this model, it is the task of the rational part to keep the irrational parts 
of the soul (and thus the passions) under control. 
 
The Aristotelian understanding is somewhat different, and Aristotle appears to have 
defined the passions differently in different works. Thus, in The Art of Rhetoric, he 
defines  as: 
those things by the alteration of which men differ with regard to those 
judgements which pain and pleasure accompany, such as anger, pity, fear and 
all other such and their opposites.6 
 
He then goes on to consider in turn each of ten specific passions: anger, calm, 
friendship, enmity, fear, confidence, shame, favour, pity, indignation, envy and 
jealousy.  
 
In Nicomachean Ethics, however, his definition is: 
desire, anger, fear, daring, envy, joy, friendliness, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity, 
and in general all conditions that are attended by pleasure or pain.7 
                                                 
4
 Sorabji, 2002, pp.7, 17; Whilst Sorabji’s concern about this possibility is undoubtedly well founded, 
the use of the word “emotion” is also not without its shortcomings. In particular, in contemporary 
usage, it has a rather narrower field of meaning than  had in classical thought. Reference here 
will therefore be to “the passions”, except where particular reference is made to emotion or appetite 
or other particular aspects. 
5
 Rowe, 2005, pp.26-39 
6
 Lawson-Tancred, 1991, p.141. Note that  is here translated by Lawson-Tancred as “Emotions”. 
7
 Thomson, Treddenick and Barnes, 1983, p.98. Note that  is here translated by Thomson as 
“feelings”. 
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Here we find that the examples listed differ, but also that whereas both definitions 
are concerned with pain and pleasure, the one and not the other is also concerned 
with altered judgement. Presumably, this is because the discourse in The Art of 
Rhetoric is concerned with the ways in which the emotions may influence or sway 
the judgement of those at whom a particular rhetorical discourse is aimed. However, 
it may also be significant that “desire” is referred to as one of the passions in 
Nicomachean Ethics, but not in Rhetoric. This terminology implies such things as 
hunger and thirst, and elsewhere in Nicomachean Ethics it is clear that sexual desire 
is also to be included.8 This takes Aristotle’s use of the term in Nicomachean Ethics 
well beyond anything that we would usually consider to be “emotion”. In De Anima, 
the meaning is stretched still further.9 
 
In his article on Aristotle and the Emotions, Stephen Leighton10 concludes that 
Aristotle is not inconsistent, but rather that his use of the term   varies 
according to context. Thus, in a broad sense,  refers to various mental states 
– emotions and desires – which are defined by their association with pleasure or 
pain. Where he is being more specific, as in Rhetoric, he focuses more narrowly on 
states defined by an influence on judgement. 
 
In the writings of Aristotle, it is possible to identify two inter-related components to 
passion: the feeling of pain or pleasure, and also the beliefs with which they are 
associated. Aristotle is not entirely explicit about whether the latter are sufficient, or 
merely necessary, for the former, but generally seems to write as though beliefs are 
sufficient conditions, at least where the passions in question are what we might refer 
to as emotions.11 Further, these beliefs have in common that they ascribe value to 
objects in the external world, and Aristotle affirmed the rightness of this ascription. 
Thus, it is right and proper to feel grief at the death of a friend, or to fear disgrace, as 
long as these feelings are appropriate and proportionate to the circumstances in 
                                                 
8
 Leighton, 1982, especially see p169 (note 2); Thomson, Treddenick and Barnes, 1983, p.187. 
9
 Lawson-Tancred, 1986, p.128, Leighton, 1982, p.173, note 35 
10
 Leighton, 1982 
11
 Nussbaum, 1994, pp.81-91 
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hand.12 Not to feel grief, not to feel fear, would represent an undervaluing of things 
that are held to be important, and would thus represent a lack of integrity. 
  
Stoicism offered yet another perspective. According to the Stoics virtue depended 
upon reason and the virtuous man is therefore also the wise man. The passions, 
although somewhat differently understood by different Stoic philosophers, therefore 
reflect a failure of reasoning. 
 
According to Zeno of Citium (333/332-262 BCE), founder of the Stoic school, the 
passions involve disobedience to reason.13 In other words, they are cases of going 
against one’s own better judgement. Zeno further introduced the concept of a rapid 
“fluttering” or “oscillation” of the soul between two opposed thoughts – that of 
reason, and that of passion. For Zeno, the passions were excessive impulses, which 
were, by definition, movements of the soul.14 These movements are associated with 
the making of judgements, perhaps even caused by judgements, but it is the 
movements themselves that constitute the passions. 
 
Chrysippus of Soli (c280-c204 BCE), the greatest exponent of Stoic philosophy, 
understood the passions rather as being judgements.15 In particular he understood 
two judgements as being involved: a judgement of something as being good or bad, 
and a judgement that it is appropriate to react. On the basis of present and future 
concerns, this allowed the Stoics to identify four generic passions: distress, pleasure, 
fear, and appetite: 
• Distress is the judgement of present bad, associated with the judgement that 
it is appropriate to feel an inner “contraction” or “sinking” of the soul. 
• Pleasure is the judgement of present good, associated with the judgement that 
it is appropriate to feel an inner “expansion” or “lifting” of the soul. 
• Fear is the judgement of expected bad, associated with the judgement that it 
is appropriate to avoid it. 
                                                 
12
 Ibid., pp.91-96 
13
 Sorabji, 2002, pp.54-65 
14
 Ibid., p.33 
15
 Ibid., pp.29-54 
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• Appetite is the judgement of expected good, associated with the judgement 
that is appropriate to reach out for it. 
 
Chrysippus understood these judgements as being almost invariably false.16 Firstly, 
the Stoics understood nothing as being inherently good or bad except moral 
character. Other things were to be treated as “indifferents”. Only virtue really 
matters, and ultimately it is only our virtue that is really under our own control. 
Other things might be worth striving for, but having given our all to attain (or avoid) 
them, and having failed or succeeded, it does not ultimately matter that we failed or 
succeeded, whereas our virtue in the process of striving, and only this, does matter. 
If the judgement of goodness or badness is wrong, the judgement of appropriate 
reaction is inevitably also wrong. Even in respect of correct judgements of that 
which is good (ie virtue) or bad, the judgement of appropriateness of reaction is, in 
the Chrysippian view, usually false. However, because the passions are understood 
as being judgements, and because assent to any particular judgement can be given or 
withheld, Chrysippus understood emotions as being both voluntary and eradicable. 
 
Posidonius (135-51 BCE), in contrast, although a Stoic, adopted a seemingly much 
more Platonic position in recognising irrational “capacities” of the soul which, 
although involuntary, he believed could be trained.17 Thus, as education is necessary 
for the rational capacity of the soul as a means of gaining knowledge and 
understanding, so a process of “habituation” is necessary for the irrational capacities 
of the soul. This process began, in his understanding, with attention to the diet and 
lifestyle of the pregnant mother, and continued with such matters as the effect of 
music upon the irrational capacities of the soul. However, it also involved a more 
rational process of habituation, such as dwelling in advance on possible unpleasant 
things that might happen, so that if and when they do happen they are not unfamiliar 
and may be associated with lessened passion, or even be experienced without 
passion. 
 
                                                 
16
 Ibid., pp.169-193 
17
 Ibid., pp.94-98 
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Posidonius was not alone in the classical tradition in believing that the passions also 
depend upon physical bodily states. Galen (c129-199 CE), a physician with Platonist 
sympathies, believed that both the soul and its capacities depended upon the balance 
or “blend” of hot, cold, wet and dry. This in turn depended, in his view, upon diet, 
lifestyle and climate.18 In fact, the view that mental states were in some way or 
another dependent upon (or that they “followed”) physical, bodily states seems to 
have been held by Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans, and others.19 
 
If this belief in the relationship between physical bodily states and the passions 
offers one area of fairly widespread agreement, there also appears to have been a 
wide degree of agreement that the passions are all concerned with beliefs about 
things external to the human agent, and especially beliefs about the value of things. 
Thus, love represents attachment to these externals (and especially to other persons), 
grief, pity and fear relate to their loss (by ourselves or others). Anger, which seems 
to be closely related to love, is concerned with our vulnerability to the actions of 
external agents – mainly other persons – towards us. The passions thus represent a 
valuing of things (including, but not only, other people) external to ourselves. For 
Aristotle, this was as it should be. To value things – especially other people – is 
appropriate as a recognition of their importance. But for Plato, and especially for the 
Stoics, this was not the way it should be at all. In their estimation, only virtue was 
held to be of value, and this is something that is located within. In comparison, 
externals are of no great consequence. For them, the passions therefore concern 
faulty beliefs, an over-estimation of the value of externals, which simply makes us 
vulnerable to things that are outside our own control.20 
 
Martha Nussbaum21 has identified four theses in the classical tradition which are 
concerned with the relationship between belief (or judgement) on the one hand, and 
passion on the other. It is on the basis of these that the differences between the 
various philosophical schools become clear. They are: 
a) Necessity of belief for passion 
                                                 
18
 Ibid., pp.253-260 
19
 Ibid., pp.261-272 
20
 Nussbaum, 1994, pp.91-93 
21
 Ibid., pp.371-372 
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b) Belief as a Constituent Element of passion 
c) Sufficiency of belief for passion 
d) Identity of belief with passion 
 
Affirmations of these theses may be summarised thus: 
 
 Plato Aristotle Epicurus Zeno Chrysippus 
Necessity j  j  j  j  j  
Constituent 
Element 
? j  ? k  j  
Sufficiency k  ? ? j  j  
Identity k  k  k  k  j  
 
The Stoic view, and especially Chrysippus’ influential account of it, is thus the 
extreme one, insofar as these theses are concerned. Furthermore, according to the 
Stoics, the passions have an in-built propensity to tend towards uncontrollable 
excess, and they are inter-related in such a way that each one tends to lead to others. 
Love leads to hate and anger, joy leads to fear and grief, pity to rage, and so-on.22  
 
 
2. The Desert Fathers 
 
The Desert Fathers also spoke about the passions but we do not find (at least not 
within the Apophthegmata Patrum) any attempt on their part to define exactly what 
they are. However, a number of things become clear from a reading of references to 
the passions within the Apophthegmata. Firstly, the passions are closely related to 
thoughts – but are not necessarily the same thing as thoughts. Thus, Abba Abraham 
challenges an old man who claims that he has “destroyed fornication, avarice and 
vain-glory in [him]self”.23 When the old man explains that he struggles against his 
thoughts so as not to act wrongly, Abba Abraham points out that “the passions 
                                                 
22
 Ibid., pp.396-398 
23
 Ward, 1984, p.33 
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continue to live; it is simply that they are controlled by the saints”.24 In this way, 
Abba Abraham appears to imply that the passions are in fact thoughts. However, in a 
fashion which is typical of the way in which the sayings of the Desert Fathers can be 
contradictory of each other, a saying of Abba Arsenius seems to imply that the 
passions are an “exterior” affair, to be contrasted with the “interior activity” of 
thoughts: 
A brother questioned Abba Arsenius to hear a word of him and the old man said 
to him, ‘Strive with all your might to bring your interior activity into accord with 
God, and you will overcome exterior passions.’25 
 
Secondly, as both of the examples just quoted show, the passions are something with 
which the godly person is expected to struggle or strive inwardly. Whether or not 
they are actually thoughts, they are at least something which seems to exert a strong 
grip upon the inner self in such a way as to make it hard to resist. They are thus also 
closely related to concepts of temptation and desire: 
A brother asked Abba Sisoes, ‘What shall I do about the passions?’ The old man 
said, ‘Each man is tempted when he is lured and enticed by his own desire’ 
(James 1.14)26 
 
Perhaps the closest that we come to finding a definition of the passions amongst the 
Apophthegmata is in the parable of the governor and the courtesan, attributed to 
John the Dwarf: 
There was in a city a courtesan who had many lovers. One of the governors 
approached her, saying, ‘Promise me you will be good, and I will marry 
you.’ She promised this and he took her and brought her to his house. Her 
lovers, seeking her again, said to one another, ‘That lord has taken her with 
him to his house, so if we go to his house and he learns of it, he will 
condemn us. But let us go to the back, and whistle to her. Then, when she 
recognises the sound of the whistle she will come down to us; as for us, we 
shall be unassailable.’ When she heard the whistle, the woman stopped her 
ears and withdrew to the inner chamber and shut the doors.’ The old man 
said that this courtesan is our soul, that her lovers are the passions and other 
men; that the lord is Christ; that the inner chamber is the eternal dwelling; 
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 Ibid., p.34 
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 Ibid., p.10, #9; In another saying, attributed to Abba Poemen (Ward, 1984, p.172, #34), the 
passions are said to work in four stages: in the heart, in facial expression, in speech and in action. 
According to this model the passions are therefore neither wholly an interior nor an exterior affair, 
but rather begin within the heart and thus affect successively external demeanour, speech and 
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those who whistle are the evil demons, but the soul always takes refuge in 
the Lord.27 
 
Here, the lovers of the courtesan are allegorically understood as the passions and 
they remain outside of the soul – at least unless or until the soul chooses to let them 
in.28 They are therefore not inner thoughts, although they clearly evoke desire within 
the soul. They are also in this parable, at least when they attempt to entice the soul, 
demonic. However, the relationship between the passions and the demons is also 
complex and it is interesting that the parable allows a degree of ambiguity about this. 
On the one hand the lovers (and other men) are the passions. On the other hand 
“those who whistle” are the demons. John seems to deliberately distinguish here 
between the passions and the demons, whilst allowing the possibility that the two are 
the same.29 
 
Passions that are specifically named in the Apophthegmata include: “an uncontrolled 
tongue”,30 fornication,31 avarice,32 vain-glory,33 anger,34 slander,35 and accidie.36 
 
 
3. Evagrios of Pontus 
 
Evagrios also used the concept of the passions in his works as though it would 
automatically be understood what he meant by it. However, it is clear from his 
writings that he understands the passions as closely related to thoughts (		). 
Passions and thoughts are in places referred to almost interchangeably37 and 
elsewhere are referred to as though there is an intimate causal relationship between 
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them.38 To complicate things somewhat, he also clearly understands a close causal 
relationship between the passions and sense perception.39 Thus memories of sensory 
objects can also evoke the passions, and vice versa.40 And, further, there is a close 
relationship between the passions and the activity of demons.41 
 
The passions are referred to by Evagrios as subjecting us to warfare,42 slavery,43 
imprisonment,44 burning,45 and sickness.46 Their effects are to lead us away from 
stillness,47 to impede prayer,48 and to cause sadness.49 
 
Passions that are specifically named by Evagrios include: malicious talk,50 
contention,51 vainglory,52 pride,53 jealousy,54 gluttony,55 fornication,56 
licentiousness,57 avarice,58 anger,59 pleasure,60 greed,61 sadness,62 and resentment.63 
Thus, all of the “eight thoughts” are specifically understood as being passions,64 as 
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well as various other behaviours, emotions and attitudes more or less directly related 
to them. Concupiscibility65 and irascibility66 are also referred to as passions, 
although perhaps this might better be understood as a way of referring to groups of 
passions rather than specific passions. Elsewhere, Evagrios classifies the passions 
into passions of the soul and passions of the body.67 
 
The concept of “the passions” is thus not without considerable ambiguity in the 
Evagrian literature. Although, subjectively, it is usually possible to understand 
exactly what he means by it, on the other hand, objectively, the concept is elusive 
and difficult to define. There is a tension between the extent to which the passions 
are external – or at least externally imposed – and the extent to which they are an 
internal feature of human experience which human beings must own. It is also not 
entirely clear whether they are thoughts, emotions, motives, powers of the soul, or 
possibly something else; although it does seem fairly clear that whilst they may be 
manifested as outward behaviour, it is more with the internal phenomena from 
which the behaviour arises that Evagrios is fundamentally concerned. 
 
Perhaps the closest that we get to an Evagrian definition of a passion is where, in 
reference to the passion of avarice, he writes that this is: 
a pleasure hostile to humanity, born of free will, and compelling the mind to 
make improper use of the creatures of God68 
 
If this may be considered a definition, it clearly has limitations. If the passions are 
“pleasures” then this definition requires us to understand anger and sadness as 
pleasurable, which is certainly contrary to what we would usually expect, if not 
fundamentally contradictory. However, it might be argued that the definition is, after 
all, particular to avarice and that in the case of sadness and anger we are dealing 
with frustration of pleasure rather than pleasure itself.69 
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The definition, if it is a definition, certainly encapsulates some of the ambiguity of 
the concept. Whilst the passions are “hostile to humanity” and put the mind under 
compulsion, they are also here “born of free will” and engage the mind as an active 
participant in the improper use of God’s creatures. They are thus, in a sense, both 
external and internal. However, it is not entirely clear what “born of free will” means 
here. It is true that Evagrios sometimes sees the passions as arising as a result of 
human decision. For example, the decision to eat more than is needful, in the 
Evagrian schema, is likely to give birth to the passion of fornication.70 But, 
elsewhere, he talks about the demons as “presiding” over,71 “mobilising”,72 or even 
“producing”,73 the passions. There is, in any case, something of an internal 
contradiction between that which is both born of free will and yet which results in 
compulsion of the mind. 
 
This definition does, however, also have its value. It understands the passions not 
merely as pleasures, but rather as “hostile pleasures”. Within this tension is 
conveyed the sense of something desirable which is nonetheless not fundamentally 
in our own best interests. It also introduces the idea that the passions make 
“improper” use of creatures of God which are fundamentally good and which do, 
therefore, have their proper uses. The passions are thus concerned with a tendency 
which is contrary to divine purpose. In this sense, they are intimately concerned with 
what it means for human beings to be subject to temptation. 
 
There would seem to be little doubt that Evagrios understood the passions as being 
potentially set in motion by heterogeneous factors, some of which would appear to 
be more or less completely outside of human control and some of which are more or 
less within human influence.74 We might also note, in passing, that Evagrios even 
understood human thoughts, let alone passions, as arising from a variety of origins 
and thus, in a sense, not always belonging to the person who thought them.75 Given 
the complexity of his understanding of the relationships between thoughts, 
memories, sense perceptions and passions we should therefore not be surprised if we 
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find within the Evagrian corpus various, or even diverse, understandings of what we 
might call the phenomenology of the passions. 
 
Despite this complexity and diversity, perhaps there are still some conclusions which 
can be drawn here in respect of the Evagrian understanding of the passions. Firstly, 
the concept would appear to encompass two tensions: that of pleasure with hostility 
to human good, and that of human free will with the experience of being acted upon. 
Secondly, it is concerned with Divine purpose in the created order, particularly as it 
affects the relationship of human beings to objects encountered in their internal and 
external worlds. Beyond this, it is perhaps wise to allow the concept something of 
the ambiguity and flexibility which Evagrios himself appears to have allowed it. 
 
 
4. The Philokalia 
 
i. Definitions 
 
Only two authors of the Philokalia, Maximos the Confessor and Philotheos of Sinai, 
provide any kind of definition of the passions. Briefly taking the second of these 
first, Philotheos of Sinai writes that: 
Passion, in the strict sense, they define as that which lurks impassionably in 
the soul over a long period.76 
 
This “definition” is somewhat circular, in that it defines “passion” by reference to 
that which “lurks impassionably” in the soul, and thus begs the question as to what 
exactly impassionable lurking might be. The answer to that question is at least partly 
provided by a consideration of the context within which Philotheos offers the 
definition: that of a consideration of the strategy of the demons, and of the process 
by which human beings are subject to temptation. We shall return to a consideration 
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of the latter process shortly. First, however, it may be helpful to give somewhat 
more detailed consideration to the definition(s) offered by Maximos the Confessor. 
 
In the first century of his Four Hundred Texts on Love, Maximos helpfully explains 
that: 
A culpable passion is an impulse of the soul that is contrary to nature.77 
 
By way of amplification and clarification, Maximos offers in his second century of 
these texts some examples of what such impulses contrary to nature might be: 
Passion is an impulse of the soul contrary to nature, as in the case of 
mindless love or mindless hatred for someone or for some sensible thing. In 
the case of love, it may be for needless food, or for a woman, or for money, 
or for transient glory, or for other sensible objects or on their account. In the 
case of hatred, it may be for any of the things mentioned, or for someone on 
account of these things.78 
 
The two defining criteria thus appear to be that a passion is both an “impulse of the 
soul” and also “contrary to nature”. Nature is clearly here understood, as in most of 
the texts of the Philokalia, not in the sense of the natural way that things are found to 
be in the world, but rather in the sense of the way that things were divinely intended 
to be. In the second of the above quotations, this is further seen as being evidenced 
by the “mindless[ness]” and “needless[ness]” of the impulses in question. There also 
appears to be an implication that contrariness to nature might be evidenced by 
motivation for transient and selfish pleasure, rather than eternal and Divine purpose. 
This general model is further affirmed in the third century of these texts, where it is 
stated that “a passion is mindless affection or indiscriminate hatred for… things”.79 
 
The references here to mindlessness in relation to love and hatred appear to suggest 
that Maximos sees the rational part of the soul as that part which, properly, directs 
the desiring and incensive parts towards their proper purpose. Passions are thus, 
effectively, those impulses of the desiring and incensive parts of the soul which are 
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not conformed by the rational part of the soul to Divine purpose. Elsewhere, in 
Various texts on theology, the divine economy, and virtue and vice, he writes: 
When the intelligence dominates the passions it makes the senses instruments 
of virtue. Conversely, when the passions dominate the intelligence they 
conform the senses to sin. One must watchfully study and reflect how the 
soul can best reverse the situation and use those things through which it had 
formerly sinned to generate and sustain the virtues.80 
 
He further explains: 
Every passion always consists of a combination of some perceived object, a 
sense faculty and a natural power - the incensive power, desire or the 
intelligence, as the case may be - whose natural function has been distorted. 
Thus, if the intellect investigates the final result of these three inter-related 
factors - the sensible object, the sense faculty and the natural power involved 
with the sense faculty - it can distinguish each from the other two, and refer 
each back to its specific natural function. It can, that is to say, view the 
sensible object in itself, apart from its relationship to the sense faculty, and 
the sense faculty in itself, apart from its connection with the sensible object, 
and the natural power - desire, for example - apart from its impassioned 
alliance with the sense faculty and the sensible object. In this way, the 
intellect reduces to its constituent parts whatever passion it investigates, in 
much the same way as the golden calf of Israel in Old Testament days was 
ground into powder and mixed with water (cf. Exod. 32:20): it dissolves it 
with the water of spiritual knowledge, utterly destroying even the passion-
free image of the passions, by restoring each of its elements to its natural 
state.81 
 
Here it becomes clear that Maximos understands the passions as actually comprising 
a complex pathology of one of the three powers of the soul in combination with a 
perceived object and the sense faculty responsible for perception of that object. 
However, the root of the pathology lies clearly in one or another of the powers of the 
human soul, not in the object itself or the process of sensory perception. In fact, 
elsewhere, Maximos distinguishes more clearly between objects and perceptual 
images of objects, on the one hand, and passions on the other.82 The pathology thus 
lies within the soul – not in the world of perception or of that which is perceived. 
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It also becomes clear in this text that Maximos understands the intelligence as being 
equally capable of pathology as the incensive and desiring parts of the soul. 
However, he also understands the “intellect” (by which he at first appears here to 
mean the rational function of the soul in a more originally Platonic sense) as capable 
of analysing its own pathology in a rational way. Furthermore, this rational analysis 
appears, in itself, to be understood as being in some way therapeutic – capable of 
breaking the “impassioned alliance” and restoring everything to its proper purpose 
and function. This process only makes sense insofar as the intellect and intelligence 
are here distinguished, or else the intelligent part of the soul would have to be seen 
as capable of understanding and restoring its own pathology. But the reference to 
“spiritual knowledge” (ILTLl b MLK c ) perhaps also implies the need for a form of 
knowledge imparted by Divine grace as necessary to enable this self-reflective and 
restorative process. 
 
ii. Lists 
 
There are many and various lists of the passions in the Philokalia. These vary from 
apparently ad hoc groupings of two or three particular passions through to the 
magisterial listing of 298 passions by Peter of Damaskos.83 However, it is clear that 
the “eight thoughts” first identified by Evagrios provide a common point of 
reference to at least four other authors, over a period of almost a millennium, even if 
the order or nomenclature varies slightly from place to place (see Table 3.1). 
 
Within this list of eight passions, although not always consistently, and sometimes 
adding to the list, various authors attempt to identify a smaller number of 
“principal”, “main”, or “worst” passions (see Table 3.2). Within these shorter lists, 
gluttony, avarice, and self-esteem may be seen to occur especially frequently. 
 
The legacy of Evagrios in the Philokalia is therefore clear. The eight thoughts 
provide an apparently enduring directory of the particular passions that may be 
identified in human experience, even if numerous variations might be added, or 
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various contractions of it might be made. The passions which are found in these lists 
might all find their roots in the inner world of human thought, but it is clear that they 
are a varied group of phenomena, including emotions, desires, behaviours and 
attitudes. 
  
iii. Vocabulary and Metaphor 
 
A rich, colourful and diverse vocabulary is employed by the authors of the 
Philokalia in reference to the passions. This vocabulary employs metaphor 
extensively, stretching the meaning of words well beyond their normal limits in an 
attempt to bring to life the nature of what is essentially an abstract concept. So 
stretching is this process, that it is at times difficult to know to what extent 
personification and metaphor are being used, and to what extent the concept has 
been reified and the passions objectively understood as personal demonic entities. 
However, there is no doubt that the language employed offers considerable material 
for characterisation of the way in which the passions are to be understood within the 
tradition of the Philokalia. 
 
A full and systematic analysis of the language of the passions as employed by the 
Philokalia would realistically require a critical edition of the Greek text in electronic 
form,84 and suitable grammatical software capable of searching for different word 
forms. However, as a preliminary exploration of the language of the passions, lists of 
adjectives, nouns and verbs encountered in reference to the passions in the English 
translation of the Philokalia are listed in Appendices 3.1 to 3.3.85 In Table 3.3 these 
words have been grouped according to theme.86 
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From these tables, and in particular from Table 3.3, it is clear that the language of 
the passions in the Philokalia is highly metaphorical and symbolic, diverse, and at 
times contradictory or paradoxical. Thus, for example, the passions are portrayed as 
being both “inner” phenomena, but also “outer” in relation to the human subject. 
They are portrayed as being both “fire” and “frost”. These oppositions appear to 
operate in such a way as to convey something of a dialectical tension in respect of 
certain aspects of the passions, or perhaps in such a way as to overcome a certain 
inherent ineffability. 
 
Doubtless different observers might see different patterns that emerge from 
Appendices 3.1 to 3.3, or else might want to emphasise a lack of any consistent 
pattern in the way that the passions are characterised in the Philokalia. However, 
Table 3.3 is offered here as one way of attempting to bring some order and to 
suggest some major themes that emerge: 
1. A large number of terms are employed which might be seen as pertaining to 
six inter-related themes, here labelled as “destructive/attacking”, 
“controlling/enslaving”, “influence/temptation”, “evil/defiling”, 
“dark/obscuring” and “subtle/cunning”. The passions are thus seen as evil 
forces which assail and otherwise influence human beings in such a way as 
to bring them into slavery and imprisonment. In general, this language 
affirms a sense of passivity of the human subject in the face of attack. 
However, there are clear references to human agency (eg words like 
“reprehensible” and “culpable” imply human guilt in succumbing or co-
operating in some way). The language of darkness and cunning also conveys 
a sense of the human subject being taken unawares by an invisible and crafty 
enemy who propagates obscurity, or perhaps generates a kind of “fog of 
war”, as a means of gaining victory through inadvertent co-operation of the 
deceived and confused human subject with the powers of darkness. 
2. The passions are characterised as being both living things (be it “plant” or 
“animal” or “human”), a part of the natural order, but also as “unnatural”, 
pathological and a source or kind of death. Thus, the passions grow, have 
roots and come to life, but they are also an incurable malady, a disease or 
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plague, a kind of “death”. The passions are almost always seen as unnatural, 
in the sense that they are contrary to the Divinely instituted natural order of 
things, even if they are occasionally understood as “natural” in the sense that 
they are a part of the natural order of things in a fallen world, or else that 
they have a proper natural purpose if employed as servants of the human 
subject rather than being themselves served. 
3. The affective character and expression of the passions receives surprisingly 
little explicit attention, although it is frequently implied in metaphor, such as 
the metaphors of storm, tumult and turbulence, and of course several of the 
named passions (see below) are affective states. An affective dimension is 
also implied in, or associated with, metaphors such as those of violence, 
dragging down, darkness, degradation and intoxication. 
4. The passions are referred to in various places as having almost material 
existence, or at least as being some kind of power or energy with physical 
effects. However, there are also references by Maximos the Confessor to 
their being without existence, and thus impotent. 
5. The passions are both continuously present, but also come and go. They are 
active, but may also (at least for a time) remain inactive or lay quiescent. 
6. The passions both exist within the human subject, but also assail him or her 
from without. 
7. The passions are desert like – in being arid, hot or cold – but are also 
described in terms of water (moisture, sea, springs, etc).  There is almost 
certainly a reference here, at least in some places, to humoral theories of 
disease (based upon a balance between “hot” and “cold” or “wet” and 
“dry”)87. However, it would appear likely that these metaphors operate at 
various levels and in different ways. A “sea”, for example, might also evoke 
images of drowning, being adrift, of great expanse, and of being at the mercy 
of the elements. 
8. The passions are consistently quantified, where any quantification is offered, 
as being both numerous and great.  
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The passions are thus clearly seen in the Philokalia as a formidable, personal, active 
and evil foe. There may be ambiguity about whether they attack from within or 
without or as to the nature of their ontology. They may come and go, or they may be 
always present. They may be redeemable, or not. But there must clearly be no 
underestimating the power of the passions to assail the inner life of human beings, to 
deny human beings their full potential, and to draw them into utter darkness, at least 
as far as the authors of the Philokalia are concerned. 
 
iv. Processes 
 
The passions are not viewed, within the tradition of the Philokalia, as has been seen, 
as merely static phenomena or states. They are active processes, or at least they are a 
part of an active process, and they are closely related to the activity of demons, the 
inner mental life of human beings, and the experience of temptation to sin. 
 
Various processes of temptation, and other mental processes which involve the 
passions, are described in the Philokalia. These are summarised in Tables 3.4a to 
3.4g. In Table 3.5 an overall summary is provided. 
 
It is not clear that the original identification of these processes originates with 
Evagrios, although certainly Evagrios does show an acute awareness of the way in 
which human beings are tempted and drawn into fruitless or seductive mental 
processes to the detriment of virtue and of prayer.88 Rather, the earliest contributor 
to the Philokalia in whose writings such processes may be identified is Mark the 
Ascetic (see Table 3.4a). Importantly, Mark identifies and defines mental 
phenomena of “Provocation”, “Entertainment”, “Assent” which are connected in a 
sequential process which, if not successfully resisted, culminates in morally culpable 
acts or thoughts (ie sin). The process is described in slightly different terms in each 
of two places in Mark’s writings in the Philokalia. Given the apparent influence of 
these texts on later writers, some further detail here is warranted. 
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In On the Spiritual Law,89 Mark describes provocation as “an image-free stimulation 
in the heart”. This he distinguishes carefully from thoughts accompanied by images 
as a result of the giving of mental assent to them. This process is morally culpable. 
Elsewhere, in Righteous by Works,90 he makes clear that provocation is initiated by 
the devil but that the giving of assent to provocations is facilitated by a human 
process of indulgence which he describes here as entertainment. The process is 
apparently thus: i) provocation of thoughts (initiated by the devil), ii) pleasurable 
entertainment of these thoughts (by a self-indulgent human mind), and iii) assent. 
However, there is some ambiguity. Why does Mark accord significance to the 
linking of thoughts with images in On the Spiritual Law, whereas in Righteous by 
Works, it is the pleasurable entertainment and then acceptance of thoughts that 
distinguishes provocation from a morally culpable state of assent? 
 
Elsewhere, Mark describes other mental phenomena and processes, suggesting that 
things might work differently at different times and/or in different people. Thus, in 
the passage immediately preceding the one just described in On the Spiritual Law, 
he refers to “the passions” as being the result of “prepossession”.91 The passions are 
not here defined, but prepossession is defined as “the involuntary presence of former 
sins in the memory”. It is also made clear here that a provocation can develop into 
prepossession. The more experienced monk will repulse a provocation before it 
develops into a prepossession. The monk who is still engaged in the stage of “active 
warfare” however will be concerned principally with preventing a prepossession 
from developing into a passion. The sequence for the novice is thus provocation, 
prepossession, passion. For the more advanced monk, however, the provocation may 
be promptly repelled at source. 
 
It is implicit, although not entirely clear, that Mark intends us to understand an 
overall sequence, of provocation, entertainment, assent, prepossession, passion. This 
certainly seems to be what the English translators of the Philokalia think, as their 
glossary describes a sequence of this sort, apparently based largely or entirely on the 
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pattern outlined by Mark (see Table 3.4g).92 Here, they emphasise the transition 
from entertainment to assent as being distinguished by resolution to act or, in other 
words, the intention of the heart. The transition from assent to prepossession, 
according to their understanding, is made as a result of “repeated acts of sin”. As a 
result, “force of habit” makes it more difficult to resist temptation. Neither of these 
distinctions is necessarily completely clear in the text of the passages from Mark that 
have just been considered.93 However, they would certainly appear to be reasonable 
interpretations of them. 
 
It is implicit, both in the Markan texts and in the Glossary to the English translation, 
that the actual committing of sin represents a step in the sequence intermediate 
between assent and prepossession. However, for both, it is the giving of assent, and 
thus not the act of sin itself, that is morally culpable. In fact, in this context, it is 
clear that the commission of sin actually occurs within the mind; assent is, in effect, 
a sinful act (even if only an “act” of thought). 
 
It is not entirely clear, either in the Markan texts or in the English Glossary, what 
distinguishes a prepossession from a passion. The emphasis in both places is upon 
the struggle to prevent a prepossession from becoming a passion. However, it would 
appear clear that they are not the same thing – even if only differing in degree – and 
that, according to Mark, passions do not only arise as a result of prepossession. 
Thus, in On the Spiritual Law, he distinguishes between passions resulting from free 
choice and those due to prepossession, on the basis of whether or not rebuke is 
welcomed (which it is in the latter case, but not the former). 
 
Before moving on to the processes described by other authors in the Philokalia, we 
must consider just one more complication in the Markan account. This concerns the 
phenomenon of “momentary disturbance of the intellect” (	
). This is 
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considered at all, and his emphasis in defining prepossession appears to rest more with the presence 
of sins in the memory than with considerations of repetition or habit. 
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referred to by Mark in only one place in the Philokalia, in his Letter to Nicolas,94 
where he encourages his reader “to put to death every trace and stirring of passion 
itself”. In this context, a momentary disturbance of the intellect is a simple thought 
of lust, occurring without any “movement or working of bodily passion”. As the 
English translators aptly comment,95 this cannot be the same thing as a provocation, 
since Mark clearly expects that freedom from such momentary disturbances is 
possible, whereas provocations must be experienced even by the most advanced 
monk. It must, therefore, be something more than simply provocation, but 
presumably rather less than entertainment? 
 
Whatever the remaining ambiguities of the process(es) described by Mark the 
Ascetic, they clearly provide a perceptive and helpful theological and psychological 
account of the mental phenomena of temptation and passion. The value of this 
approach was obviously recognised by other authors, amongst whom, we may 
assume, was John Climacus (“John of the Ladder”; c579 – c649), abbot of the 
monastery of the Burning Bush (later St Catherine’s) on Mount Sinai, and the author 
of The Ladder of Divine Ascent. 
 
The Ladder was one of the most influential works of early Christian spirituality, 
being widely translated and disseminated. Although not included in the Greek 
Philokalia, extracts were included in the Dobrotolubiye, and the full text was 
included in the Romanian Filocalia. Addressing the contemplative and “active” 
aspects of Christian life, The Ladder offers thirty steps which lead from renunciation 
of the world, through the practice of the virtues and the struggle with the passions, to 
union with God.96 In Step 15, which deals with chastity, or the struggle against the 
passion of lust, John quotes the “discerning Fathers” as authority and source for his 
account of distinctions between “provocation, coupling, assent, captivity, struggle, 
and… passion”.97 Whilst he does not explicitly refer to Mark the Ascetic, the 
terminology and descriptions bear a remarkable similarity to Mark’s account.98 
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the work of Mark the Ascetic, albeit also to Maximos the Confessor (about which, see below). 
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John’s account is somewhat more detailed and logically ordered than that of Mark, 
and is also less ambiguous (see Table 3.4b). What Mark refers to as entertainment, 
John refers to as “coupling”, which is defined as “conversation” with the word or 
image encountered in the provocation. John does not make distinctions here based 
upon the linking of thoughts with images,99 but rather assent is a “delighted yielding 
of the soul to what it has encountered”. John does not refer to prepossession at all, 
but between assent and passion he introduces “captivity” and “struggle”. The former 
refers to “forcible and unwilling abduction of the heart” and the latter to the counter-
attacking force, which may win or lose the battle “according to the desires of the 
spirit”. Finally, passion is here described as “something that lies hidden for a long 
time in the soul and by its very presence it takes on the character of a habit, until the 
soul of its own accord clings to it with affection”. 
 
John also identifies a phenomenon of disturbance (	
), which appears to 
be more or less similar to Mark’s category of the same name, but which again carries 
a slightly more detailed description. This description includes more of an emphasis 
on the speed of the disturbance than is found in the Markan account, it also includes 
reference to its appearance “by a simple memory” (such that it appears to overlap 
somewhat with the Markan category of prepossession), and finally it describes a 
movement directly from sense perception to commission of a sin of unchastity 
without intervening thought. 
 
The causal sequence of the process is made fairly explicit by John. Provocation is a 
word or image encountered, coupling is conversation with what has been 
encountered, assent is yielding of the soul to what has been encountered, and so on. 
However, he does remain open to the possibility that passions may generate 
thoughts, as well as thoughts generating passions.100 
 
John’s more detailed account of these processes seems to have influenced at least 
some subsequent authors of the Philokalia. In particular, Philotheos of Sinai (? 
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9th/10th Century) and Peter of Damaskos (11th/12th Century) produce very similar 
accounts (see Table 3.4b), albeit the latter inexplicably moves the category of 
struggle from its place between captivity and passion, back to a new location 
between coupling and assent.101 Peter also explicitly acknowledges John Climacus 
as his source.102 
 
Returning for a moment to the 7th Century, Maximos the Confessor (580-662), a 
contemporary of John Climacus, described in On Love: C4, a work subsequently 
included in the Philokalia, a similar but different account of the process of the 
passions (see Table 3.4c). This account, in the first of the four centuries of which 
this work is comprised, was based initially on a quotation from Colossians 3:5:  
Put to death therefore whatever is earthly in you: unchastity, uncleanness, 
passion, evil desire and greed103 
 
Maximos interprets Paul’s references to: “earth” as “the will of the flesh”, 
“unchastity” as “the actual committing of sin”, “uncleanness” as “assent to sin”, 
“passion” as “impassioned thoughts”, “evil desire” as “the simple act of accepting 
the thought and the desire”, and “greed” as “what generates and promotes passion”. 
From this interpretation he derives a sequence of memory, passion free thought, 
lingering of the thought, arousal of passion, failure to eradicate passion, assent, and 
the committing of sin.104 
 
In the second century of the same work, Maximos describes the process slightly 
differently.105 Here, the sequence is that of demonic activity, which acts upon the 
“passions lying hidden in the soul”, which in turn generates impassioned thoughts, to 
which assent is given, leading to sin in the mind, and then sin in action. 
 
The processes described by Maximos in the first and second centuries of Four 
hundred texts on love differ in various minor ways, notably that one begins with 
memory, and the other with demonic activity. However, they are clearly not 
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completely different, and a composite model is proposed in Table 3.4c. Neither are 
these processes completely different than those proposed by Mark the Ascetic and, 
after him, John Climacus. Both begin with a provocation (although Maximos does 
not call it this), both involve a stage of lingering with or entertaining thoughts, both 
recognise the giving of assent to these thoughts as crucial to moral responsibility, 
and both allow a place for the committing of sin in the mind as prelude to the 
committing of sin in action. What is perhaps most different, apart from the largely 
differing terminology, is that passion appears to be the outcome of the process 
described by Mark and John, whereas it makes an appearance much earlier on in the 
process described by Maximos. In particular, in the second of the two Maximian 
accounts described here, it is the “passions lying hidden in the soul” upon which the 
demons initially act, and it is these passions which allow the possibility of the 
arousal of “impassioned thoughts”.106 
 
It would perhaps be making too great an assumption to conclude either that the 
processes described by Mark the Ascetic and John Climacus on the one hand, and 
Maximos on the other, are completely separate traditions or that they must have 
common historical origins. However, other authors of the Philokalia would appear 
to have drawn on either or both of them, or to have developed new descriptions of 
similar processes. 
 
Thus, we find that the (? 7th Century) text attributed to John of Damaskos uses 
similar terminology to Mark and John, but with addition of a new term of 
“actualisation” (for the putting of impassioned thoughts into effect), and removal of 
“passion” to an earlier stage in the process, more akin to the approach of Maximos 
(see Table 3.4d).107 
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 However, the process is somewhat confused – not least because Maximos chooses to interpret 
Paul’s reference to “passion” as actually meaning “impassioned thoughts” in his first account, but 
then not referring further to impassioned thoughts (as opposed to passion) in this account, and 
subsequently apparently distinguishing passions and impassioned thoughts in his second account. 
107
 “Wrestling” is also moved to an earlier stage in the sequence than that described by John 
Climacus. 
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Hesychios the Priest (? 8th or 9th Century) retains the terminology of provocation, 
coupling and assent, but almost completely without reference to the passions.108 
Here the mental process described is one of temptation to sin, rather than drawing on 
the terminology of the passions (see Table 3.4e). 
 
Theodoros the Great Ascetic (? 9th Century) describes a sequence of “forbidden 
desire”, assent, passion, and sin.109 Symeon Metaphrastis (late 10th/early 11th 
Century) describes perhaps the simplest process of all, but without any terminology, 
in which simple self examination, and an inward bias of love towards God or the 
world, determine outward action.110 Finally, Ilias the Presbyter (late 11th/early 12th 
Century) describes a sequence of imaging evil, desiring evil, feeling pleasure or pain 
in respect of evil, becoming conscious of evil, and then inwardly or outwardly 
uniting with evil.111 (See Table 3.4e for a summary of these processes). 
 
Table 3.4f summarises an altogether more complicated series of processes described 
by Gregory of Sinai (c1245-1346) in On Commandments and Doctrines.112 It is clear 
that Gregory intends us to realise that the processes are complex and can move in 
different directions. For example, the prompting of demons gives rise to passion, but 
passion can also give entry to demons. At risk of over-simplifying things, it would 
seem that the basic sequence here is of distractive thoughts giving rise to fantasies, 
which in turn gives rise to the passions. But passions can then give rise to further 
distractive thoughts (apparently with or without the involvement of demons) and so 
the whole cycle can repeat itself. 
 
Table 3.5 provides an overall summary of the above processes. It will be seen that 
“assent” provides the almost universal reference point in the processes summarised 
here; only Symeon Metaphrastis and Ilias the Presbyter avoid this term completely. 
The triad of provocation, coupling (or entertainment) and assent is employed by five 
out of the nine authors of the Philokalia included in the table. Passion, where it 
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appears, usually appears towards the end of the sequence described by each author, 
but Maximos the Confessor, and the text attributed to John of Damaskos, find a 
place for the passions somewhat earlier in their processes. 
 
What does this review of passion as process in the Philokalia reveal? 
 
Firstly, and most importantly, it is clear that the passions are viewed as important by 
the authors of the Philokalia113 not for abstract theological reasons, but because they 
represent a key aspect of the phenomenology of temptation and sin. This is not to 
say that the concept of the passions does not draw both on classical philosophy and 
also Christian theology, but it is above all a concept which arises out of the lived 
experience of a tradition of spirituality which dates back to the Egyptian desert, or at 
least to the writings of Mark the Ascetic. It draws on a collective wisdom which is 
based, it would seem, upon self-reflection and subjective experience. Passion is a 
key part of the understanding, within this tradition, of how thoughts lead to sins. It is 
true that there are various starting points, and various ending points, in the processes 
described. In some places passion appears as a root cause, and in others as a final 
state of captivity. However, it is passion which removes temptation, virtue and 
prayer from a merely rational arena into the realm of feelings, emotions and desires 
which exert a power over human beings to draw them in a direction which they 
might otherwise not choose to take. It is this which makes the life of virtue and 
prayer so challenging. 
 
Secondly, although the passions are to be viewed in the context of the inner world, 
as primarily subjective experiences of what it is to be human in the presence of the 
realities of evil and sin, yet they are also relational phenomena. Quite apart from 
reference to demonic provocation of the processes which culminate in the passions, 
these processes display concern with relationship with the self, with others and with 
God. They recognise an implicit division within the self which presents choices – for 
good or evil. We may be drawn powerfully in one direction or another, and we can 
choose to be self-indulgent or we can choose to deny ourselves. They recognise also 
an implicit division from others, and a tendency to misuse that which we perceive 
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Glossary of terms has been referred to here on several occasions. 
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with our senses – a tendency which will, by default and but for the grace of God, be 
biased always towards self-indulgence and pleasure rather than the good of others or 
the proper use of created things. They recognise more explicitly, a division of 
ourselves from God. And it is union with God in prayer that is the goal offered by 
both the Philokalia and the Ladder of Divine Ascent. 
 
Thirdly, however, a recognition that the passions are a process, or at least a part of a 
process, guards against naïve optimism that they are a thing of the past, or that they 
need no longer be taken seriously. As was noted in the last section, the passions are 
dynamic and active phenomena that may appear to come and go, to become 
quiescent or to re-emerge. This being the case, complacency is dangerous, even for 
the more experienced, let alone for the spiritual novice. Given the right provocation, 
or momentary disturbance, for all except the most advanced in the spiritual life, 
there will always be the danger of re-emergence of the passions. 
 
v. Physiology and Pathology 
 
It has been noted that, amongst diverse metaphors employed for the passions, the 
Philokalia includes a reference to medical terms. There is a degree of diversity 
within this realm of medical reference, with the passions being referred to as 
maladies, paralysis, plague, sickness and wounds, amongst other things (see 
Appendix 3.2). Whilst, on the one hand, this appears to be just one of a number of 
(largely metaphorical) themes identifiable within the vocabulary employed (as 
discussed above) it does seem to play an important role in acknowledging that the 
passions comprise pathological processes with physical, as well as spiritual and 
psychological, aspects. To this extent, it is rather more than metaphorical. Normally 
in the Philokalia the emphasis is upon the spiritual and psychological dimensions of 
the process, as described in the last section, but where the physical is mentioned, it is 
seen to be in a dynamic interaction with the spiritual and psychological. 
 
The vocabulary of the Philokalia betrays a humoral understanding of the physical 
nature of human beings. Humoral theories are found in the writings of Plato and the 
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Hippocratic corpus.114 Although there is some variation amongst humoral theories, 
the Hippocratic account, in The Nature of Man, refers to four substances or 
humours: blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile. Health depends upon the 
balance of these humours in strength and quantity. These humours differ in terms of 
two binary pairs of qualities: hot and cold, moist and dry, and these four qualities are 
also referred to, at least in this work, as “elements”. Understanding of causation and 
treatment of disease, according to this system, thus depends upon imbalance and 
restoration of balance, respectively. Medical theories based upon such 
understandings remained popular for many centuries and were transmitted to the 
Arabic world, and later to Latin America. Although they were disproved by modern 
scientific medicine, they continue to form the basis for much folk medicine in 
various parts of the world.115 
 
Specific humours are referred to only very infrequently in the Philokalia. However, 
for Mark the Ascetic, sensual desire needs to be cooled and dried and therefore, 
presumably, represents excess heat and moisture. Overeating and the drinking of 
wine are understood by him to cause heating of the blood.116 Bile is understood by 
Hesychios the Priest to be associated with the incensive power of the soul,117 
whereas for Gregory of Sinai this power is associated with over-heating of the 
blood.118 Philotheos of Sinai refers to the “will of the flesh” as a compound of blood 
and phlegm,119 Ilias the Presbyter refers to reduction in hot-bloodedness and drying 
up of the sexual organs in the elderly,120 and Nikitas Stithatos refers to the creation 
of human beings with “gastric fluid” (presumably bile) that is dry and cold like the 
earth, blood that is warm and moist like air and fire, and phlegm that is moist and 
cold like water.121  
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In a somewhat more complex reference,122 Maximos the Confessor refers to desire 
as producing a “diffusion” of blood around the heart and the incensive power as 
causing the blood to boil. His concern here appears to be to show that the 
intelligence should “stand alone”,123 or that it should be in command of the whole 
human being. Where this does not happen, physical influences, such as the 
imbalances of diffused or boiling blood, appear to work to reinforce the enslavement 
of the intelligence to the passions. Where it does happen, such physical imbalances 
are eliminated. This text may also reflect an awareness on the part of Maximos of a 
Platonic anatomy which associated the rational part of the soul with the brain, the 
incensive part with the heart, and the desiring part with the liver.124 However, 
anatomical associations of this sort appear to be quite rare in the Philokalia.125 
 
General references to the body’s humours, and to temperament as the balance or 
blend of the body’s humours,126 are somewhat more commonly found. In these 
references, the humours are seen both as a cause of the passions, but also as a point 
at which demons may exert an effect upon human beings so as to cause passion. 
Thus, Evagrios refers to thoughts from which the intellect should withdraw, out of 
its longing for God, as having their source in sense perception, memory, or soul-
body temperament.127 However, having initially left the impression that these are 
purely natural phenomena that may distract from prayer, he goes on to suggest that 
Satan may in some way disturb the temperament of the body as a means of 
producing such thoughts.128 Similarly, Diadochos of Photiki talks of Satan using the 
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body’s humours to “befog the intellect with the delight of mindless pleasures”,129 
and of his exploitation of them so as to “seduce” the soul.130 
 
Maximos the Confessor refers to “angels, demons, the winds and diet”, as well as 
“memory, hearing and sight - namely when the soul is affected by joyful or 
distressing experiences”, as being potential causes of change in the body’s 
temperament, each of which may in turn thus lead to either impassioned or 
dispassionate thoughts.131 Thalassios the Libyan similarly recognises both natural 
(diet and weather) and demonic influences as potential causes of disturbance in 
temperament.132 
 
Gregory of Sinai sees “senseless anger and mindless desire” as arising from the 
body’s humours, in contrast to the intrinsic incensive and desiring powers of the 
soul, which give rise to courage and divine love respectively.133 By way of 
explanation of this rather dualistic understanding, Gregory argues that the body was 
created without humours. Exactly where the humours came from in Gregory’s 
thought is unclear (at least insofar as the texts included in the Philokalia are 
concerned). However, in the Gregorian scheme of things, the humours are associated 
with corruptibility and materiality, and these were qualities which appeared at the 
time of the fall, thus rendering human beings more like (non-human) animals.134 
Conversely, at the resurrection of the body, the destiny of human beings is to be free 
of humours once again. For Gregory, this “almost bodiless” state is achievable for 
the dispassionate person even in this life.135 
 
The Philokalia should, therefore, not be seen as painting a purely psychological and 
spiritual portrait of the passions. The passions are, rather, seen as being in dynamic 
interaction with the human organism, both caused or mediated by, and causing, 
physical changes in the body. 
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vi. Conclusions 
 
The understanding of the passions that is conveyed in the Philokalia is one of a 
pathology of the soul which distorts our relationships with God and the created 
order. The passions are a varied group of phenomena, including emotions, desires, 
thoughts, attitudes and behaviours. They transcend contemporary notions of affect or 
appetite, but they all involve processes of thought which are in some way 
“weighted” or biased towards self-indulgence, and thus away from God. In this 
sense, they are not “natural”, they are not according to Divine purpose. 
 
A predominant image of the passions in the Philokalia is one of an assailing and 
enslaving enemy, but the wealth and diversity of language employed should warn 
against simplistic understanding, and against any underestimation of the seriousness 
of the threat that the passions present to the person whose goal in life is one of pure 
prayer or union with God. The language of personification, metaphor and demonic 
activity should not lead towards a projection of the passions into a purely spiritual 
dimension of life, or to a denial of personal responsibility, for the passions are 
clearly identified as “inner” as well as “outer”, as being intimately related to the 
material order of things and not simply “spiritual”. 
 
The understanding of the passions conveyed by the Philokalia is especially a 
dynamic one, which is concerned with processes of temptation to evil, human 
responsibility, and experience of the inner world of thought, desire and choice. 
 
The Philokalia therefore appears to draw both on Aristotelian and Evagrian 
understandings, as well as upon the tradition of the Desert Fathers. In particular, it 
recognises that the passions are concerned with the inner world of thoughts, affect 
and desire, with important implications for personal moral responsibility and 
judgement. It also recognises that the passions behave both as hostile external 
agencies, but also as an inner pathology of the human body and soul. However, the 
Philokalia has expanded considerably upon the vocabulary and understanding of 
these sources. 
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The Philokalia is not always consistent in its understanding of the passions, but this 
is hardly surprising for an anthology of forty or so authors, writing over a period of 
more than a millennium. Neither is it necessarily the purpose of either the authors or 
compilers of the Philokalia to produce an entirely consistent account or terminology. 
Rather these texts are presented for meditation, reflection and prayer. Thus, the 
passions may be both the outcome and origin of inner mental processes, depending 
upon the purpose or terminology of any particular writer. Rather, the shared concern 
of these authors is with human reflection upon how the passions do operate against 
the pursuit of virtue and the life of prayer – both as the origin of thoughts which lead 
away from both of these objectives, and also as the result of processes of thought 
which result from perception, memory, and demonic provocation. 
 
 
5. The Passions - Conclusions 
 
Taking together the composite picture of the passions that emerges from the classical 
tradition, the Desert Fathers, Evagrios and the Philokalia, what overall conclusions 
may be offered here? It is clear that there are some inconsistencies, variations of 
understanding, and lack of clarity, but some over-riding themes do emerge. 
 
Firstly, the passions represent a rich and complex understanding of the inner life of 
human beings which goes a long way towards providing a robust psychological 
framework for understanding the struggle for virtue. The passions provide a 
phenomenology of the inner life which incorporates perception, affect, cognition and 
appetite in support of explaining why people fail to adhere to the virtues that they 
espouse and make judgements which do not withstand the light of reason. 
 
Following on from this, it is clear that the passions provide fertile theological ground 
for exploring the process of temptation. Although at times the role of the demons is 
ambiguous and open to possibly unhelpful literalist interpretation, or else a 
demythologisation which leads only to dismissal, the concept as developed by the 
Desert Fathers, Evagrios and the other authors of the Philokalia maintains the 
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tension necessary to recognise both external influence and inner motivation; both the 
way in which human beings are acted upon, and also the way in which they must 
accept personal responsibility. The passions are both an aspect of the human soul, 
but also something external which influences from without. They are thus the focus 
of an inner struggle against an enemy that threatens to destroy and enslave. 
 
The passions are, however, not merely hostile. They are rather “hostile pleasures”. In 
a dynamic process, which invites comparison with the phenomenon of addiction, 
they both confer pleasure and pain, they attract and enslave, they seduce and destroy. 
 
Secondly, the passions provide a framework for explorations of spirituality and 
prayer. If the pleasures that seduce human beings actually only enslave, the question 
arises as to what brings freedom? If the things that we think will make us happy 
don’t, or if at best they obscure, befuddle and confuse, then the question arises as to 
how peace may be found and true happiness pursued. For Christian theology, this 
becomes a question of the quest for God in prayer, and an understanding of the 
passions provides a potential way of advancing in this quest; it is a way of 
overcoming some of the major obstacles. For the Desert Fathers, Evagrios and the 
other authors of the Philokalia, an understanding of the passions was only useful as 
a means to this end, but it was nonetheless, in their view, a very important means.
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Table 3.3 The language of the passions 
 
Theme Adjectives Nouns Verbs 
Destructive/
Attacking 
Anarchic 
Deadly 
Destroying 
Destructive 
Hostile 
Rebellious 
Savage 
Violent 
Armies, hostile 
Assaults 
Attack(s) 
Blasts 
Enemies 
Slaying 
Violence 
Attack 
Beset 
Besiege 
Bring injury 
Conquer 
Debilitate 
Destroy 
Fight 
Harass 
Induce suffering 
Kill 
Oppose 
Overcome 
Overpower 
Overwhelm 
Pierce 
Prevail 
Revolt 
Shake 
Shatter 
Shipwreck (faith) 
Slay 
War 
Weaken 
Controlling/ 
Enslaving 
Dominant 
Ruling 
Tyrannising 
Bonds 
Burden 
Clutches 
Domination 
Egypt of the spirit 
Fetters 
Grip 
Lordship 
Princes  
Prison(s) 
Red Sea 
Slave(ry) 
Sway 
Tyranny 
Yoke 
 
Carry away 
Constrain 
Dominate 
Drag down 
Encompass 
Enslave 
Ensnare 
Get a hold 
Govern 
Hold back 
Imprison 
Keep from (prayer) 
Master 
Oppress 
Prevent 
Stifle 
Tie 
Tyrannise 
Influence/ 
Temptation 
Culpable 
Taking advantage 
Imprint 
Influence 
Mediators (of eternal 
Distract 
Drag 
Generate images 
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Theme Adjectives Nouns Verbs 
punishment) Generate other passions 
Induce a state 
Involve 
Lead (astray) 
Motivate 
Persuade 
Prompt 
Stimulate 
Suggest 
Evil/ 
Defiling 
Abominable 
Accursed 
Corrupting 
Degrading 
Demonic 
Evil 
Foul(est) 
Foul-smelling 
Frightful 
Gross(er) 
Hateful 
Ignoble 
Impure 
Noxious 
Reprehensible 
Ridiculous 
Shameful 
Shameless(ly) 
Sinful 
Unclean 
Unholy 
Corruption  
Crooked paths 
Defilement(s) 
Depravity 
Dunghill 
Evils 
Fall 
Filthy, soiled, garment 
Fumes 
Putrescence 
Soot 
Stench  
Stink 
Ugliness 
Become (evil) 
Corrupt 
Defile 
Give (entry to demons) 
Impel (towards evil) 
Intoxicate 
Precede (demons) 
Produce licentiousness 
Rot 
Seek (our perdition) 
Smut 
Stain 
Dark/ 
Obscuring 
Dark 
Behind 
Hidden 
Secret 
Unnoticed 
Unseen 
Cloak  
Cloud(s) of cares 
Fantasies 
Storm clouds 
Engulfing clouds 
Darkening 
Darkness 
Murk  
Night 
Obscurity 
Veil 
Befuddle 
Blind 
Darken 
Delude 
Induce darkness 
Produce obfuscation 
Produce obscurity 
Subtle/ 
Cunning 
Subtle(st) Cunning Creep 
Lie 
Lurk 
    
Living 
(plant) 
Grown 
Rooted 
Herbs of the soul (evil) 
Root(s) 
Seeds 
Suckers 
Grow 
Put down (roots) 
Take root 
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Theme Adjectives Nouns Verbs 
Animal Bestial 
Brute-like 
Camels Make (like domestic 
animals) 
Life v Death  Death 
Life 
Come to life 
Deaden 
Natural 
v 
Unnatural 
According (to 
nature) 
Contrary to nature 
Natural 
Unnatural 
 Belong to nature 
Disease Incurable 
Unhealed 
Malady 
Paralysis 
Plague 
Sickness 
Weals 
Wounds 
Afflict 
Cause disease 
Enervate 
Wound 
    
Affective Affecting 
Dreadful 
Full (of sorrow) 
Stirring 
Provocations Affect 
Agitate 
Deject 
Disturb 
Grieve 
Humiliate 
Produce disturbance 
Provoke 
Trouble 
Storm  Storm  
Tempest 
Torrents 
Tumult  
Turbulence 
Turmoil 
 
    
Material/ 
Sensual 
v 
Without 
existence 
Bodily 
Carnal 
Earthly 
Fleshly 
Insubstantial 
Material 
Sensual 
Worldly 
 
 
Existence (without) 
Material, raw  
Materiality 
Matter 
Matter, inflammatory 
Sensuality 
Attach (to a sensible 
thing) 
Come into being 
Induce to descend to the 
realm of the senses 
Consist 
Produce diffusion of 
blood around the 
heart 
Energy/ 
Power 
v 
Impotent 
Impotent 
Powerful 
Strong 
Burning energy 
Energy 
Impulse(s) 
Impulsion 
Power 
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Theme Adjectives Nouns Verbs 
Active 
v 
Inactive 
Active 
Inactive 
Quiescent 
Action 
Activity 
Acts 
Movement  
Operations 
Quiescence 
Working(s) 
Operate 
Work 
Coming & 
going 
v 
Continuously 
present 
Adherent 
Continuous 
Emerging 
Habitual 
Inveterate 
Present 
Dispositions 
Eruption 
Infancy 
Presence 
Resurgence 
State 
Waves 
Arise 
Arouse 
Decrease 
Disperse 
Increase 
Return 
Spring 
Stay 
Subside 
Visit 
    
Inner 
v 
Outer 
Deep-seated 
In us 
Indwelling 
Inherent (in thought) 
Innate 
Inner 
Outer 
Woven garment 
Old garment 
Belong to soul/body 
Establish within 
 
    
Dry v Wet  Aridity 
Moisture 
Sea 
Springs 
Waters 
 
Hot v Cold  Fire 
Flame 
Frost 
Heat  
Heat, arid 
Winter 
 
    
Many Innumerable 
Many 
Prevalent 
Swarming in 
Swarm  
Great Enormous 
Great 
Serious 
Mountains  
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Theme Adjectives Nouns Verbs 
Remaining 
(Not 
elsewhere 
classified) 
Coarse(r) 
Contrary to the 
intelligence 
Human 
Linked (with 
images) 
Mindless 
Opposing (one 
another) 
Company 
Desires 
Form 
Rawness 
Servants 
Sphere  
Stone 
Trace 
World 
Assume (form) 
Become (good) 
Contribute 
Intercommunicate 
Support (other 
passions) 
 
10
7 
 Ta
bl
e 
3.
4a
 
Pr
o
c
es
se
s 
le
ad
in
g 
to
 
pa
ss
io
n
, 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
M
ar
k 
th
e 
As
ce
tic
 
(ea
rly
 
5t
h  
Ce
n
tu
ry
) 
in
 
th
e 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
Pr
o
v
o
ca
tio
n
 
M
o
m
en
ta
ry
 
di
st
u
rb
an
ce
 
o
f 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 
En
te
rt
ai
n
m
en
t 
As
se
n
t 
Pr
ep
o
ss
e
ss
io
n
 
Pa
s
si
o
n
 
“
A
 
pr
o
v
o
ca
tio
n
 
is 
an
 
im
ag
e-
fre
e 
st
im
u
la
tio
n
 
in
 
th
e 
he
ar
t. 
Li
ke
 
a 
m
o
u
n
ta
in
-
pa
ss
,
 
th
e 
ex
pe
rie
n
ce
d 
ta
ke
 
co
n
tr
o
l o
f i
t 
ah
ea
d 
o
f t
he
 
en
em
y.
”
 
1,
 
11
9,
 
#1
40
 
 “
Th
e 
de
v
il 
in
iti
at
es
 
th
e 
w
ho
le
 
pr
o
ce
ss
 
by
 
te
st
in
g 
a 
m
an
 
w
ith
 
a 
pr
o
v
o
ca
tio
n
 
w
hi
ch
 
he
 
is 
n
o
t 
co
m
pe
lle
d 
to
 
ac
ce
pt
”
 
1,
 
14
5,
 
#2
24
 
“
th
e 
m
er
e 
th
o
u
gh
t 
o
f l
u
st
…
.
 
w
ith
o
u
t 
an
y 
m
o
v
em
en
t 
an
d 
w
o
rk
in
g 
o
f 
bo
di
ly
 
pa
ss
io
n
”
 
1,
 
15
3 
“
th
e 
m
an
,
 
u
rg
ed
 
o
n
 
by
 
se
lf-
in
du
lg
en
ce
 
an
d 
se
lf-
es
te
em
,
 
be
gi
n
s 
to
 
en
te
rt
ai
n
 
th
is 
pr
o
v
o
ca
tio
n
 
w
ith
 
en
joy
m
en
t”
 
1,
 
14
5,
 
#2
24
 
“
O
n
ce
 
o
u
r 
th
o
u
gh
ts
 
ar
e 
ac
co
m
pa
n
ie
d 
by
 
im
ag
es
 
w
e 
ha
v
e 
al
re
ad
y 
gi
v
en
 
th
em
 
o
u
r 
as
se
n
t; 
fo
r 
a 
pr
o
v
o
ca
tio
n
 
do
es
 
n
o
t 
in
v
o
lv
e 
u
s 
in
 
gu
ilt
 
so
 
lo
n
g 
as
 
it 
is 
n
o
t 
ac
co
m
pa
n
ie
d 
by
 
im
ag
es
.
”
 
 
1,
 
11
9-
12
0,
 
#1
41
 
(S
ee
 
al
so
 
1,
 
12
2,
 
#1
82
) 
 “
he
 
ta
ke
s 
pl
ea
su
re
 
in
 
[th
e 
pr
o
v
o
ca
tio
n
] 
an
d 
ac
ce
pt
s 
it”
 
1,
 
14
5,
 
#2
24
 
“
Pr
ep
o
ss
es
sio
n
 
is 
th
e 
in
v
o
lu
n
ta
ry
 
pr
es
en
ce
 
o
f 
fo
rm
er
 
sin
s 
in
 
th
e 
m
em
o
ry
.
 
A
t t
he
 
st
ag
e 
o
f a
ct
iv
e 
w
ar
fa
re
 
w
e 
tr
y 
to
 
pr
ev
en
t i
t f
ro
m
 
de
v
el
o
pi
n
g 
in
to
 
a 
pa
ss
io
n
; a
fte
r 
v
ic
to
ry
 
it 
is 
re
pu
lse
d 
w
hi
le
 
st
ill
 
bu
t a
 
pr
o
v
o
ca
tio
n
.
”
 
 
1,
 
11
9,
 
#1
39
 
(S
ee
 
al
so
 
1 
12
2,
 
#1
83
) 
“
W
he
n
 
w
e 
ha
v
e 
fre
ed
 
o
u
rs
el
v
es
 
fro
m
 
ev
er
y 
v
o
lu
n
ta
ry
 
sin
 
o
f t
he
 
m
in
d,
 
w
e 
sh
o
u
ld
 
th
en
 
fig
ht
 
ag
ai
n
st
 
th
e 
pa
ss
io
n
s 
w
hi
ch
 
re
su
lt 
fro
m
 
pr
ep
o
ss
es
sio
n
.
”
 
 
1,
 
11
9,
 
#1
38
 
 
 
 
 
Th
o
se
 
w
ho
 
ar
e 
u
n
de
r 
th
e 
sw
ay
 
o
f p
as
sio
n
s 
m
u
st
 
pr
ay
 
an
d 
be
 
o
be
di
en
t. 
Fo
r 
ev
en
 
w
he
n
 
th
ey
 
re
ce
iv
e 
he
lp
,
 
th
ey
 
ca
n
 
o
n
ly
 
jus
t 
m
an
ag
e 
to
 
fig
ht
 
ag
ai
n
st
 
th
ei
r 
pr
ep
o
ss
es
sio
n
s.
 
 
1,
 
13
9,
 
#1
60
 
“
If y
o
u
 
ha
te
 
re
bu
ke
,
 
it 
sh
o
w
s 
th
a
t t
he
 
pa
ss
io
n
 
in
 
w
hi
ch
 
yo
u
 
a
re
 
in
vo
lv
ed
 
is 
du
e 
to
 
yo
u
r 
o
w
n
 
fre
e 
ch
o
ic
e.
 
Bu
t i
f y
o
u
 
w
el
co
m
e 
re
bu
ke
,
 
th
e 
pa
ss
io
n
 
is 
du
e 
to
 
pr
ep
o
ss
es
sio
n
.
”
 
1,
 
12
0,
 
#1
51
 
“
W
he
n
 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 
th
ro
u
gh
 
re
jec
tio
n
 
o
f t
he
 
pa
ss
io
n
s 
at
ta
in
s 
to
 
u
n
w
av
er
in
g 
ho
pe
,
 
th
en
 
th
e 
en
em
y 
m
ak
es
 
it 
v
isu
al
iz
e 
its
 
pa
st
 
sin
s 
o
n
 
th
e 
pr
et
ex
t o
f c
o
n
fe
ss
in
g 
th
em
 
to
 
G
o
d.
 
Th
u
s 
he
 
tr
ie
s 
to
 
re
ki
n
dl
e 
pa
ss
io
n
s 
w
hi
ch
 
by
 
G
o
d's
 
gr
ac
e 
ha
v
e 
be
en
 
fo
rg
o
tte
n
,
 
an
d 
so
 
se
cr
et
ly
 
to
 
in
fli
ct
 
in
jur
y.
 
Th
en
,
 
ev
en
 
th
o
u
gh
 
so
m
eo
n
e 
is 
ill
u
m
in
ed
 
an
d 
ha
te
s 
th
e 
pa
ss
io
n
s,
 
he
 
w
ill
 
in
ev
ita
bl
y 
be
 
fil
le
d 
w
ith
 
da
rk
n
es
s 
an
d 
co
n
fu
sio
n
 
at
 
th
e 
m
em
o
ry
 
o
f w
ha
t h
e 
ha
s 
do
n
e.
 
B
u
t i
f h
e 
is 
st
ill
 
be
fo
gg
ed
 
an
d 
se
lf-
in
du
lg
en
t, 
he
 
w
ill
 
ce
rt
ai
n
ly
 
da
lly
 
w
ith
 
th
e 
en
em
y'
s 
pr
o
v
o
ca
tio
n
s 
an
d 
en
te
rt
ai
n
 
th
em
 
u
n
de
r 
th
e 
in
flu
en
ce
 
o
f p
as
sio
n
,
 
so
 
th
at
 
th
is 
re
co
lle
ct
io
n
 
w
ill
 
pr
o
v
e 
to
 
be
 
a 
pr
ep
o
ss
es
sio
n
 
an
d 
n
o
t a
 
co
n
fe
ss
io
n
.
”
 
1,
 
13
8,
 
#1
52
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 Ta
bl
e 
3.
4b
 
Pr
o
ce
s
se
s 
le
ad
in
g 
to
 
pa
ss
io
n
, 
ac
c
o
rd
in
g 
to
 
Jo
hn
 
Cl
im
ac
u
s,
 
an
d 
au
th
o
rs
 
in
 
th
e 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
w
ho
 
fo
llo
w
 
a 
si
m
ila
r 
pa
tte
rn
 
Jo
hn
 
Cl
im
ac
u
s 
b 
c5
79
 
d 
c6
49
 
 
 La
dd
er
 
o
f 
D
iv
in
e 
As
ce
n
t, 
St
ep
 
15
,
 
pp
18
2-
3 
Pr
o
v
o
ca
tio
n
 
D
is
tu
rb
an
ce
 
o
f t
he
 
m
in
d 
Co
u
pl
in
g 
 
As
se
n
t 
Ca
pt
iv
ity
 
St
ru
gg
le
 
Pa
ss
io
n
 
“
sim
pl
e 
w
o
rd
 
o
r 
im
ag
e 
en
co
u
n
te
re
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
fir
st
 
tim
e,
 
w
hi
ch
 
ha
s 
en
te
re
d 
in
to
 
th
e 
he
ar
t”
 
“
In
 
a 
m
o
m
en
t, 
w
ith
o
u
t a
 
w
o
rd
 
be
in
g 
sp
o
ke
n
 
o
r 
an
 
im
ag
e 
pr
es
en
te
d,
 
a 
su
dd
en
 
pa
ss
io
n
at
e 
u
rg
e 
la
ys
 
ho
ld
 
o
f t
he
 
v
ic
tim
.
”
 
“
co
n
v
er
sa
tio
n
 
w
ith
 
w
ha
t 
ha
s 
be
en
 
en
co
u
n
te
re
d,
 
w
he
th
er
 
th
is 
be
 
pa
ss
io
n
at
el
y 
o
r 
o
th
er
w
ise
”
 
 
“
de
lig
ht
ed
 
yi
el
di
n
g 
o
f t
he
 
so
u
l t
o
 
w
ha
t i
t h
as
 
en
co
u
n
te
re
d”
 
“
Fo
rc
ib
le
 
an
d 
u
n
w
ill
in
g 
ab
du
ct
io
n
 
o
f t
he
 
he
ar
t, 
a 
pe
rm
an
en
t l
in
ge
rin
g 
w
ith
 
w
ha
t 
w
e 
ha
v
e 
en
co
u
n
te
re
d 
an
d 
w
hi
ch
 
to
ta
lly
 
u
n
de
rm
in
es
 
th
e 
n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
o
rd
er
 
o
f o
u
r 
so
u
ls”
 
“
fo
rc
e 
eq
u
al
 
to
 
th
at
 
w
hi
ch
 
is 
le
ad
in
g 
th
e 
at
ta
ck
…
 
th
is 
fo
rc
e 
w
in
s 
o
r 
lo
se
s 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
th
e 
de
sir
es
 
o
f t
he
 
sp
iri
t”
 
“
so
m
et
hi
n
g 
th
at
 
lie
s 
hi
dd
en
 
fo
r 
a 
lo
n
g 
tim
e 
in
 
th
e 
so
u
l a
n
d 
by
 
its
 
v
er
y 
pr
es
en
ce
 
it 
ta
ke
s 
o
n
 
th
e 
ch
ar
ac
te
r 
o
f 
a 
ha
bi
t, 
u
n
til
 
th
e 
so
u
l o
f i
ts
 
o
w
n
 
ac
co
rd
 
cl
in
gs
 
to
 
it 
w
ith
 
af
fe
ct
io
n
”
 
“
fre
e 
o
f s
in
”
 
 
“
so
m
et
im
es
”
 
fre
e 
o
f s
in
 
 
Th
e 
“
co
n
di
tio
n
 
o
f 
so
u
l”
 
de
te
rm
in
es
 
w
he
th
er
 
o
r 
n
o
t i
t i
s 
sin
fu
l 
Ju
dg
ed
 
di
ffe
re
n
tly
 
de
pe
n
di
n
g 
u
po
n
 
pr
ay
er
,
 
im
po
rt
an
ce
 
o
r 
co
n
te
x
t o
f e
v
il 
th
o
u
gh
ts
 
“
ca
n
 
ea
rn
 
a 
cr
o
w
n
 
o
r 
pu
n
ish
m
en
t”
 
“
u
n
eq
u
iv
o
ca
lly
 
de
n
o
u
n
ce
d 
in
 
ev
er
y 
sit
u
at
io
n
 
an
d 
re
qu
ire
s 
su
ita
bl
e 
pe
n
ite
n
ce
 
o
r 
fu
tu
re
 
pu
n
ish
m
en
t”
 
Ph
ilo
th
eo
s 
o
f S
in
ai
 
? 
9t
h/
10
th
 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
 Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
3,
 
29
, 
#3
4-
36
 
Pr
o
v
o
ca
tio
n

 
 
Co
u
pl
in
g
 
 
As
se
n
t
 
Ca
pt
iv
ity

 
 
Pa
ss
io
n
 
“
a 
th
o
u
gh
t s
til
l f
re
e 
fro
m
 
pa
ss
io
n
, 
o
r 
an
 
im
ag
e 
n
ew
ly
 
en
ge
n
de
re
d 
in
 
th
e 
he
ar
t a
n
d 
gl
im
ps
ed
 
by
 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
”
 
 
“
to
 
co
m
m
u
n
e 
w
ith
 
th
is 
th
o
u
gh
t o
r 
im
ag
e,
 
in
 
ei
th
er
 
an
 
im
pa
ss
io
n
ed
 
o
r 
a 
di
sp
as
sio
n
at
e 
w
ay
”
 
 
“
th
e 
pl
ea
su
ra
bl
e 
ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 
o
f t
he
 
so
u
l o
f t
he
 
th
in
g 
se
en
”
 
“
th
e 
fo
rc
ib
le
 
an
d 
en
fo
rc
ed
 
ab
du
ct
io
n
 
o
f t
he
 
he
ar
t, 
o
r 
pe
rs
ist
en
t i
n
te
rc
o
u
rs
e 
w
ith
 
th
e 
o
bje
ct
, 
di
sr
u
pt
in
g 
ev
en
 
o
u
r 
be
st
 
st
at
e”
 
 
“
th
at
 
w
hi
ch
 
lu
rk
s 
im
pa
ss
io
n
ab
ly
 
in
 
th
e 
so
u
l o
v
er
 
a 
lo
n
g 
pe
rio
d”
 
“
sin
le
ss
”
 
 
“
n
o
t a
lto
ge
th
er
 
fre
e 
fro
m
 
sin
”
 
 
“
sin
fu
ln
es
s…
 
de
pe
n
ds
 
u
po
n
 
o
u
r 
in
n
er
 
st
at
e”
 
“
o
n
e 
th
in
g 
at
 
th
e 
tim
e 
o
f 
pr
ay
er
,
 
an
o
th
er
 
w
he
n
 
w
e 
ar
e 
n
o
t e
n
ga
ge
d 
in
 
pr
ay
er
”
 
“
th
e 
st
ru
gg
le
 
its
el
f 
br
in
gs
 
u
s 
ei
th
er
 
pu
n
ish
m
en
t o
r 
cr
o
w
n
s 
o
f v
ic
to
ry
”
 
“
in
co
n
te
st
ab
ly
 
le
ad
s 
ei
th
er
 
to
 
a 
co
rr
es
po
n
di
n
g 
re
pe
n
ta
n
ce
 
o
r 
to
 
fu
tu
re
 
ch
as
tis
em
en
t”
 
Pe
te
r 
o
f 
D
am
as
ko
s 
11
th
/1
2t
h 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
 Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
3,
 
20
7 
Pr
o
v
o
ca
tio
n

 
 
Co
u
pl
in
g
 
W
re
st
lin
g
 
As
se
n
t
 
Se
du
ct
io
n
 
o
r 
Ca
pt
iv
ity
 
 
Pa
ss
io
n
 
“
co
n
ce
pt
io
n
s 
o
f e
ith
er
 
go
o
d 
o
r 
ev
il”
 
 
“
to
 
en
te
rt
ai
n
 
a 
pa
rt
ic
u
la
r 
th
o
u
gh
t a
n
d 
pa
rle
y 
w
ith
 
it”
 
“
th
is 
le
ad
s 
u
s 
ei
th
er
 
to
 
gi
v
e 
as
se
n
t t
o
 
it 
o
r 
to
 
re
jec
t i
t”
 
“
o
u
r 
in
te
lle
ct
 
w
re
st
le
s 
w
ith
 
th
e 
th
o
u
gh
t, 
an
d 
ei
th
er
 
co
n
qu
er
s 
it 
o
r 
is 
co
n
qu
er
ed
 
by
 
it”
 
“
a 
pl
ea
su
ra
bl
e 
in
cl
in
at
io
n
 
o
f t
he
 
so
u
l t
o
w
ar
ds
 
w
ha
t 
it 
se
es
”
 
“
th
e 
he
ar
t i
s 
in
du
ce
d 
fo
rc
ib
ly
 
an
d 
u
n
w
ill
in
gl
y 
to
 
pu
t t
he
 
th
o
u
gh
t i
n
to
 
ef
fe
ct
”
 
 
“
W
he
n
 
th
e 
so
u
l d
al
lie
s 
fo
r 
a 
lo
n
g 
tim
e 
w
ith
 
an
 
im
pa
ss
io
n
ed
 
th
o
u
gh
t 
th
er
e 
ar
ise
s 
w
ha
t w
e 
ca
ll 
a 
pa
ss
io
n
.
 
Th
is 
in
 
tu
rn
…
 
be
co
m
es
 
a 
se
ttl
ed
 
di
sp
o
sit
io
n
…
 
co
m
pe
lli
n
g 
th
e 
so
u
l…
 
to
w
ar
ds
 
th
e 
co
rr
es
po
n
di
n
g 
ac
tio
n
”
 
“
n
ei
th
er
 
co
m
m
en
da
bl
e 
n
o
r 
re
pr
eh
en
sib
le
”
 
 
“
O
u
r 
re
ac
tio
n
 
to
 
th
e 
th
o
u
gh
t, 
if 
in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 
w
ith
 
G
o
d’
s 
w
ill
,
 
is 
pr
ai
se
w
o
rt
hy
,
 
th
o
u
gh
 
n
o
t 
hi
gh
ly
 
so
; b
u
t i
f i
t a
cc
o
rd
s 
w
ith
 
ev
il,
 
th
en
 
it 
de
se
rv
es
 
ce
n
su
re
.
”
 
“
br
in
gs
 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 
ei
th
er
 
cr
ed
it 
o
r 
pu
n
ish
m
en
t 
w
he
n
 
th
e 
th
o
u
gh
t i
s 
pu
t 
in
to
 
ac
tio
n
”
 
 
 
 
“
m
u
st
 
ei
th
er
 
re
pe
n
t p
ro
po
rt
io
n
at
el
y 
o
r 
el
se
 
u
n
de
rg
o
 
pu
n
ish
m
en
t i
n
 
th
e 
ag
e 
to
 
co
m
e”
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bl
e 
3.
4c
 
Pr
o
c
es
se
s 
le
a
di
n
g 
to
 
pa
ss
io
n
, 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
M
a
x
im
o
s 
th
e 
Co
n
fe
ss
o
r 
(58
0-
66
2) 
   So
u
rc
e 
Pr
o
ce
ss
/T
er
m
in
o
lo
gy
 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
2,
 
62
,
 
#8
3 
(C
o
l 3
:5
)1  
“
w
ha
t g
en
er
at
es
 
an
d 
pr
o
m
o
te
s 
pa
ss
io
n
”
 
(S
t P
au
l: 
gr
ee
d) 
“
ac
t o
f a
cc
ep
tin
g 
th
e 
th
o
u
gh
t a
n
d 
th
e 
de
sir
e”
 
(S
t P
au
l: 
ev
il 
de
sir
e) 
Im
pa
ss
io
n
ed
 
th
o
u
gh
ts
 
 
(S
t P
au
l: 
pa
ss
io
n
) 
A
ss
en
t t
o
 
sin
 
(S
t P
au
l: 
u
n
cl
ea
n
n
es
s) 
Co
m
m
itt
in
g 
o
f s
in
 
 
(S
t P
au
l: 
u
n
ch
as
tit
y) 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
2 ,
 
62
-
63
,
 
#8
4 
M
em
o
ry
 
 
pa
ss
io
n
 
fre
e 
th
o
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Chapter 4: Remedies for the Passions 
 
If the passions are “hostile pleasures”, which threaten to enslave and debilitate 
human beings, then what remedies might be found to address them? 
 
There is no doubt that remedies for the passions are on offer, in the classical 
tradition, in the teachings of Evagrios and the Desert Fathers, and in the Philokalia. 
However, before moving on to consider these remedies, and to assess their efficacy, 
it may be well to consider briefly what is being suggested by the idea of a “remedy”, 
or at least what might be implied in the use of that word in the present context. 
 
A “remedy” might refer either to a cure or treatment for a medical condition, or else 
to something that puts right a problem or fault.1 These two meanings are clearly 
similar, the main difference being in the explicitly medical allusion of the first, 
which is lacking in the second. As we have already seen, medical metaphor provides 
at least a part of the vocabulary of the passions as encountered in the Philokalia and 
“remedies” for the passions are referred to in various places within it pages.2 
However, it is not the only metaphor. The passions can also be viewed as hostile 
forces, enslaving powers, desert-like regions, confusing influences, and so on. 
According to which metaphors are preferred, defences, weapons, escape routes, 
evasion tactics, maps, guides, life supports, manifestos, or various other non-medical 
terms might be preferable to the word “remedy”. One of the advantages of the word 
“remedy” over, say “therapy” or “treatment” is that it allows more ambiguity and 
greater scope for understanding such non-medical interpretations. But, as the 
medical sense does seem to be somewhat predominant, to what extent is it legitimate 
                                                 
1
 Thus, in Collins English Dictionary, the main two meanings of the noun remedy are given as: 1. 
“any drug or agent that cures a disease or controls its symptoms” and 2. “anything that serves to put a 
fault to rights, cure defects, improve conditions, etc.” (Anderson, Butterfield, Daintith, Holmes, 
Isaacs, Law, Lilly, Martin, McKeown, Stibbs and Summers, 2004). A third meaning, which need not 
be considered further here, is concerned with the legally permitted variation in weight or quality of 
coins. 
2
 Eg: Evagrios (Philokalia 1, p58, #7); Maximos the Confessor (Philokalia 2, p60, #66-67; 2, p73, 
#44); Gregory of Sinai (Philokalia 4, p236, #107) 
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to allow medical terminology a hegemony in this account? Would completely non-
medical terminology3 be more appropriate here? 
 
Firstly, it is important to note that the classical tradition, in its predominantly 
philosophical account of the passions, also recognised that the philosopher is a 
physician who seeks to bring healing to the suffering human soul. Martha Nussbaum 
has traced out this medical model carefully in her book The Therapy of Desire.4 
Recognising that ancient Greece also had available other models of ethical enquiry, 
she argues that the medical model offered certain advantages. It provided pragmatic 
and compassionate help to its patients, taking into account the realities of their lives 
and the views of patients about their own condition, their needs and desires. It 
listened to its patients, it engaged them in their treatment and it sought their well-
being. In short, it was a patient-centred approach. 
 
Classical philosophy thus sought both to immerse itself in the reality of its patients’ 
lives and circumstances, but also to find the critical objectivity and perspective that 
comes with professional distance. Like a good physician, the philosopher therefore 
sought both to make contact with patients by means of empathy and a good “bedside 
manner”, but also to apply critical skills to interpretation of the history and findings 
thus obtained. In order to try and sort out the material presented by its patients, it 
then made use of some very medical ideas, such as diagnosis of disease, reference to 
norms of health, and appropriate methods of investigation.5 
 
Perhaps more controversially, there were other implications of the medical model of 
philosophy.6 For Nussbaum, medicine is directed mainly towards the health of the 
individual. Whilst this neglects contemporary medical perspectives on public health, 
and the role of the public health physician, it is certainly a potential danger that a 
focus on the needs of an individual will lead to a neglect of the wider community. 
Medicine is also usually associated with an asymmetry of roles. The doctor is the 
                                                 
3
 Eg “solutions”, “responses”, “answers” and a variety of other non-medical terms could be 
considered appropriate. 
4
 Nussbaum, 1994 
5
 Ibid., pp.28-29 
6
 Not all of these are discussed here. In particular, value relativity, and the instrumental use of reason 
and the virtues of argument, are also discussed by Nussbaum, as well as various other questions (see 
pp13-47).  
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expert, and the patient is expected to be obedient and compliant. Notwithstanding 
the contemporary trend towards empowerment of “service users”, patients are also 
traditionally discouraged from seeking alternative or conflicting therapies. 
 
The medical model therefore offered classical philosophy certain advantages and, at 
least potentially, disadvantages of perspective upon its proffered remedies for the 
passions. Arguably, the former outweigh the latter but, even if they do not, at least 
this model reminds us that we should not be neglectful of the latter. Thus, for 
example, in any critique that we bring to bear upon particular remedies that are 
proffered for the individual, it might be well to ask what help they offer to a 
community. Or, again, does a particular remedy that might be helpful for one patient 
prevent another patient from seeking (possibly – for them) more effective help 
elsewhere? In a similar way, it would seem, medical terminology might offer a 
useful vocabulary and framework for studying the responses to the passions that are 
to be found in the pages of the Philokalia. 
 
Secondly, medical metaphors are familiar to Christian theology. In the synoptic 
gospels,7 Jesus famously identifies sinners as being those who are sick (

	
) and thus in need of a physician (	). Luke Dysinger notes that, by the 
end of the fourth century there was a well established tradition of using medical 
analogies as illustrations of Christian principles.8 In On Thoughts, Evagrios refers to 
Christ as the “physician of souls”, in Praktikos he refers to ascetic practices as 
[medicinal] “remedies” (), and in Thirty-Three Ordered Chapters, he lists 
sixteen biblical afflictions which are allegorically interpreted as spiritual vices.9 In 
the Apophthegmata there are references to healing from blasphemous thoughts10and 
to anger as sickness,11 and prayer is likened to medicine.12 Amongst others, Ignatius 
of Antioch, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and (to a lesser extent) Athanasius all 
                                                 
7
 Matthew 9:12, Mark 2:17, Luke 5:31 
8
 Dysinger, 2005, p.104 
9
 On Thoughts 3 & 10 (these passages are also both included in the Philokalia), Praktikos 38. An 
English translation of Thirty-Three Ordered Chapters is provided by Sinkewicz, 2003, pp.224-227. 
See also Dysinger, 2005, pp.115-123 
10
 Ward, 1984, p.180, #93 
11
 Ibid., p.233, #13 
12
 Ibid., p.231, #3 
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employed medical imagery in their writings.13 In the Philokalia, references are made 
to Jesus as physician14 or doctor,15 and to God as physician16 or doctor.17 Maximos 
the Confessor refers to the person who is able to use the passions as a remedy 
against evil as being a physician,18 and, similarly, Thalassios the Libyan refers to the 
“physician like intellect”19. 
 
Thirdly, medical terminology offers a bridge across different perspectives, academic 
disciplines, and professional boundaries. Nussbaum notes that the challenges 
confronting classical philosophy in its day were not unlike those encountered by 
psychological medicine today, and that its concerns in many ways anticipated those 
of modern psychoanalysis.20 Galen, in the 2nd Century CE, was able to talk about 
passions as “diseases of the soul” as both a physician and philosopher.21 Modern 
psychoanalysis, and other psychodynamic therapies, have important historical roots 
in the work of physicians such as Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and Carl Jung (1875-
1961).22 Even where psychotherapy is offered in a completely non-medical setting, 
medical terminology (such as “therapy”, “pain” and “pathology”) still tends to creep 
into the conversation. The long tradition of using medical language as illustration, 
metaphor and allegory in the Christian tradition also enables a connection to be 
made here. 
 
                                                 
13
 Dysinger, 2005, pp.104-114. Larchet also draws attention to the references to sickness, illness or 
disease of the soul, and other medical language, employed by the Desert Fathers, John Cassian, John 
Chrysostom, and others (Larchet, 2005, pp.89-125). 
14
 John of Karpathos (“great Physician”): Philokalia 1, p325 
15
 By John Cassian (“Doctor of our souls”: Philokalia 1, p76 [cf “Doctor of souls”: Philokalia 1, 
p84]), Diadochos of Photiki (Philokalia 1, p268, #53), and Symeon Metaphrastis (“good doctor”: 
Philokalia 3, p329, #100: This could be taken as reference to God as doctor, but the gospel reference 
indirectly implies that it is Jesus). 
16
 By Maximos the Confessor (“good and loving physician”: Philokalia 2, p72, #39; “Physician of 
souls”: Philokalia 2, p73, #44; See also the more general reference to God as physician in Philokalia 
2, p169, #20), and by Peter of Damaskos (“Physician of our souls”: Philokalia 3, p77; “our 
Physician”: Philokalia 3, p78 [cf 3, pp170, 233: “your Physician”]; “the Physician”: Philokalia 3, 
p140) 
17
 By John Cassian (“Doctor of men’s souls”: Philokalia 1, p87) and Nikitas Stithatos (“doctor of our 
souls”: Philokalia 4, p113, #23) 
18
 Philokalia 2, p179, #66 
19
 Philokalia 2, p328, #44 
20
 Ibid p26 
21
 Jackson, 1969, p.380, Harkins and Riese, 1963 
22
 It must also be noted, however that many reservations have been expressed about the medical 
model in this context, and perhaps especially so where the less biological and more psychological 
disturbances of mental well-being are concerned. 
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Fourthly, although medical science is sometimes criticised as being reductionistic, 
and the “medical model” is perceived by some as being unduly preoccupied with the 
biological aspects of physical disease, medicine at its best offers an holistic 
understanding of the problems encountered by a patient in context. This 
understanding now commonly refers to the “bio-psycho-social” model of complex 
disorders such as addiction, and increasingly also recognises a spiritual dimension to 
the problems that people encounter, and the remedies that are offered for them.23 An 
holistic medical model of this kind is therefore integrative of the physical, 
psychological, social and spiritual. Given the way in which the Philokalia easily 
switches between talking about the passions in physical, psychological and spiritual 
terms, medical language would therefore appear to offer a promising vocabulary and 
conceptual framework. 
 
For these reasons, the word “remedy” with its implication of, but not exclusive 
reference to, a medical dimension of things will be used in this chapter in relation to 
various proposed responses to, or solutions for, the problem of the passions. Whilst 
the medical inferences of this term will be taken up where appropriate, they will not 
be allowed to exclude other (at times more helpful) metaphorical images of the 
forms that these remedies might take.  
 
This chapter will be devoted, then, to a consideration of the remedies offered for the 
passions, first within the classical tradition, then by Evagrios and the Desert Fathers, 
and finally by the Philokalia itself. 
 
 
1. The Classical Tradition 
 
Plato appears not to have expected that the passions could, or even should, be 
eliminated, but rather that restraint should be exercised in their expression, in order 
not to impede the process of deliberation necessary as a basis for rational action.24 
 
                                                 
23
 Cook, Powell and Sims, 2009 
24
 Republic 603e – 604d 
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For Aristotle, the remedy to the passions was to be found in learning to respond to 
particular situations in a rationally appropriate way. To some extent this learning 
depends upon processes which are outside individual control – it is something which 
takes time (it is not often observed in the young), it depends upon upbringing and 
family environment in childhood, and it is dependent upon the wider social 
environment of the community. The task of philosophy is therefore not only 
concerned with individuals learning to manage their passions, but of creating good 
homes and a more just society.25 Insofar as it is concerned with the individual, 
however, it is concerned with moderation of the passions.26 
 
Moderation of the passions for Aristotle was a matter of finding the mean – being 
neither completely wanting nor excessive in respect of any particular passion. 
However, this was not simply a matter of quantity, it was also concerned with the 
nature and context of the passion: 
It is possible, for example, to feel fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity, and 
pleasure and pain generally, too much or too little; and both these are wrong. 
But to have these feelings at the right times on the right grounds towards the 
right people for the right motive and in the right way is to feel them to an 
intermediate, that is to the best, degree; and this is the mark of virtue.27 
 
This understanding of moderation thus allows that some passions (eg malice, 
shamelessness and envy) are always wrong. Similarly, some actions based upon 
passion (eg adultery) will always be wrong.28 
 
For Aristotle, the remedy for the passions, the means of achieving the therapeutic 
goal of moderation, depends upon their responsiveness to reason – at least to some 
degree.29 Engagement in therapy for the passions will involve self-scrutiny, 
reflection and critical review.30 It is thus possible to learn moderation – albeit within 
certain limits imposed by age, upbringing and social circumstances. This intellectual 
learning process is morally complemented by practice and the development of good 
                                                 
25
 Nussbaum, 1994, pp.96-101 
26
 Sorabji, 2002, pp.194-195 
27
 Nichomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106 
28
 Nichomachean Ethics 2.6, 1107 
29
 Nussbaum, 1994, p.82 
30
 Ibid., p.97 
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habits.31 Aristotle (taking in this respect a contrary position to Plato) also recognised 
a value in emotional catharsis,32 for example induced by music or drama. This 
therapy, which by very use of the word catharsis implies an analogy with medical 
catharsis, appears to have been based upon the idea that induction of emotion in a 
safe and appropriate context is helpful in getting rid of “excess” or unhealthy 
emotion that might otherwise cause problems. 
 
For the Stoics, the necessary remedy was understood as being much more severe. 
Nothing short of complete elimination of the passions would do. The wise person 
(even if wise people were rarely to be found) was one who is completely free of the 
passions. Events that would be painful for others are, for the wise person, merely 
like a grazing of the skin.33 According to Epictetus, the spirit of such a person is 
“like the country on the other side of the moon: it is always calm there”.34 This state, 
of freedom from the passions, or apatheia, could be envisaged as a happy and god-
like state of contemplation.35 
 
Why did the Stoics believe that such a radical remedy was indicated? Their 
arguments seem to have been along the following lines:36 
 
1. The passions are false judgements. They are concerned with external objects 
which, pace Aristotle, are of no real value. 
2. The passions are not necessary, pace Aristotle, to motivate virtuous action. 
3. The passions are experienced as a state of illness. They are associated with 
often severe (emotional) pain, weakness and disability. This is true even of 
positive passions, such as joy or love, as well as negative states such as anger 
or fear. 
                                                 
31
 Nichomachean Ethics 2.1-2.4 
32
 Sorabji, 2002, pp.288-300 
33
 Nussbaum, 1994, pp.390, 395 
34
 Quoted by Ibid., p.390 
35
 Sorabji, 2002, pp.187-189 
36
 Nussbaum, 1994, pp.389-398; Nussbaum points out that there is a degree of circularity in some of 
these arguments. It is only because passions are defined as false judgements that they must be 
eliminated, but the argument for elimination rests upon their evaluation as false. Similarly, passions 
are not necessary to motivate virtuous action, according to the Stoic position, because external things 
are held to be of no value. But if some external things are held to be of value then that evaluation 
does provide the proper motivation for virtue. See also Sorabji, 2002, pp.181-193 
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4. The passions represent vulnerability to an uncontrollable and changeable 
world. 
5. The passions are uncontrollable: they tend to excess, and indulgence in one 
makes us liable to others 
 
The Stoics did allow for certain affective states, called eupatheiai, which did not 
need to be eliminated. These were “prudent caution”, will or “rational wish”, and a 
kind of joy or “rational uplift”.37 However, they were keen to emphasise that these 
are not passions, and they give the appearance more of being an apologetic against 
Aristotelian criticisms of Stoic apatheia as being a loss of all that is emotionally 
valuable, rather than in any way undermining the radical nature of the Stoic 
indictment of the passions. 
 
The remedies that the Stoics prescribed for the passions were adopted from various 
sources, including the Pythagoreans and the Cynics, as well as apparently innovating 
their own practices. The nature and practice of these remedies included, amongst 
other things, the following: 38 
• A daily review each morning of what might be expected or achieved that 
day, and/or an evening review of one’s reactions to the day’s events 
• Observing one’s own angry face in a mirror, so as to appreciate the 
ugliness of anger 
• Ascetic discipline: not eating meat, sleeping on a hard bed, avoiding hot 
baths 
• Meditation on suicide. (Seneca understood the possibility of suicide as 
always providing, in extreme circumstances, a possible final alternative 
to unvirtuous action that might otherwise be imposed by force of 
circumstances or by an evil dictator). 
• Reflection on what is or is not within one’s power. (Things that are 
outside of one’s own power, in Stoic terms, are merely indifferent.) 
                                                 
37
 Nussbaum, 1994, p.399, Sorabji, 2002, pp.47-51 
38
 Sorabji, 2002, pp.213-220, 222-224, 235-238, 241-242  
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• Conscious and regular remembering of the impermanence of things 
(including the mortality of family and other loved ones) and anticipation 
of misfortune.39 
• Exercise of patience in waiting by not projecting ones thoughts forward 
to what is anticipated 
• Self-distraction from emotional states 
• Inviting and exercising self-criticism 
• Learning to want only with reservation (eg “if Zeus wills”). 
• Relabelling: Eg If caught up in a crowd, imagine it to be a festival, if 
thinking of a dead son imagine him as merely absent,40 or if thinking of 
an attractive woman imagine her as smelling unpleasant.41 
• Considering the lot of others (which might either offer an example to 
follow, or else a reminder that things could be worse) 
• Living each day as if it is your last 
• Delay before acting on anger 
 
 
2. The Desert Fathers 
 
As has already been seen in Chapter 3, the Apophthegmata offer a completely 
unsystematic approach to the passions. However, there does seem to be a general 
sense that, although perhaps the passions should be entirely eliminated, in practice 
they are controlled or subdued rather than completely destroyed. Thus, for example, 
we find Abba Abraham demonstrating to a man who claims to have destroyed the 
passions that in fact he has only brought them under control, and that they still live 
within him.42 In a rather cryptic story about Abba Bessarion, his disciples relate that, 
although he passed his life in solitude “without trouble or disquiet”, seeming 
                                                 
39
 Anaxagoras, on hearing that his son was dead, is quoted as saying “I know I had begotten a mortal” 
(Ibid., p.235) 
40
 It seems that, in certain circumstances, the Stoics were willing to accept the imagining of, or even 
belief in, that which is not actually true. 
41
 Sorabji, 2002, p.222, Nussbaum, 1994, pp.179-181 
42
 Ward, 1984, pp.33-34, #1 
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“entirely free from all the passions of the body”, yet in company and in relatively 
more comfortable surroundings, he would weep and lament.43 
 
Where the possibility of eliminating the passions entirely is raised, it is never 
entirely clear that this is a possibility that can be realised in practice.44 Thus, for 
example, we find Abba Poemen talking about instruction of others as the proper task 
of the man who is “whole and without passions”.45 But this saying is clearly a 
warning against giving instruction to others when the passions still linger within. It 
is not clear that Poemen imagines that there are many, or even any, such passion free 
people about. 
 
In various places, reference is made to “struggle” with the passions, or to the 
passions being brought under control. In addition to the story of Abba Abraham, 
already related (above), we find Abba Arsenius referring to the inner struggle that is 
needed in order to bring exterior passions under control: 
A brother questioned Abba Arsenius to hear a word of him and the old man 
said to him, ‘Strive with all your might to bring your interior activity into 
accord with God, and you will overcome exterior passions.’46 
 
Similarly, Abba Joseph talks of “reigning” over the passions,47 and Abba Pityrion, 
although he speaks of “banishing” demons, speaks only of “subduing”, “mastering”, 
or “controlling” the passions themselves.48 
 
An interesting saying by Abba Poemen suggests that remedies for the passions were 
identified as operating at different possible levels, according to a four stage process 
through which the passions were understood to operate: 
Another brother questioned him in these words: ‘What does, “See that none 
of you repays evil for evil” mean?’ (1 Thess. 5.15) The old man said to him, 
‘Passions work in four stages – first, in the heart; secondly, in the face; 
                                                 
43
 Ibid., pp.42-43, #12 
44
 Perhaps the closest we get to this is in a somewhat enigmatic saying of Abba Sisoes. In response to 
a disciple who asks why the passions do not leave him, he says “Their tools are inside you; give them 
their pay and they will go.” (Ibid., p.213, #6) 
45
 Ibid., p.185, #127 
46
 Ibid., p.10, #9 
47
 Ibid., p.104, #10 
48
 Ibid., p.200, #1 
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thirdly, in words; and fourthly, it is essential not to render evil for evil in 
deeds. If you can purify your heart, passion will not come into your 
expression; but if it comes into your face, take care not to speak; but if you 
do speak, cut the conversation short in case you render evil for evil.’49 
 
Apatheia, or complete elimination of the passions, can be understood here as being a 
state of purity of heart, although it is still not clear to what extent it was expected 
that this might ever be realised in practice. If passions linger in the heart, yet they 
can still be prevented from exerting an influence, according to Abba Poemen, upon 
non-verbal or verbal communication with others, and upon actions. 
 
A rather different model appears to be implied in a saying by Abba Sisoes: 
Abba Joseph asked Abba Sisoes, ‘For how long must a man cut away the 
passions?’ The old man said to him, ‘Do you want to know how long?’ Abba 
Joseph answered, ‘Yes’ Then the old man said to him, ‘So long as a passion 
attacks you, cut it away at once.’50 
 
Here, it would appear that apatheia might never be attainable – for the passions are 
portrayed as autonomous agents capable of continuing, or presumably also 
renewing, their attacks for as long as they choose. The remedy is to respond swiftly 
to “cut away” the passion as soon as possible in the face of each new attack. On the 
basis of this saying alone, it might be presumed that Abba Sisoes and Abba Poemen 
had rather different understandings of how the passions operate, with the former 
seeing them as external assailants, and the latter understanding them as situated 
within the human heart. However, in another saying attributed to Abba Sisoes, it is 
clear that he also understood them as forces operating from within, responsibility for 
which must be owned by the human agent: 
A brother asked Abba Sisoes, ‘What shall I do about the passions?’ The old 
man said, ‘Each man is tempted when he is lured and enticed by his own 
desire’ (James 1.14)51 
 
Elsewhere, in a saying which suggests that remedies should be varied according to 
the maturity of strength of the individual concerned, Abba Joseph talks of the need 
for some to resist attacks of the passions, and “cut them off”, thus not allowing them 
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entry within, whereas others may allow them “entry” and then fight against them 
within. Indeed, the latter course of action is described as one which brings about a 
strengthening of the person concerned. Remedies may thus be understood as 
operating on the basis of both interior and exterior models of agency. 
 
In that rather enigmatic fashion which is so typical of the Apophthegmata, the 
brother enquiring of Abba Sisoes, in the last quoted saying, above, who effectively 
asks what remedies he might use against the passions, is here told simply that they 
dwell within him – that they have their roots in his own desires. Whilst this implies 
that remedies must therefore be employed at this level, that is interiorly, it hardly 
gives any practical advice about exactly what to do. Perhaps the implied remedy is 
simply to be reflective upon what exactly his own luring and enticing desires 
actually are? Even then, the brother is not told what he should do once he identifies 
them. 
 
In fact, very few specific or direct instructions are given in the Apophthegmata as to 
what remedies should be employed against the passions. Control of the tongue is 
clearly considered to be important, and is mentioned more than once. Thus, Abba 
Agathon says: 
No passion is worse than an uncontrolled tongue, because it is the mother of 
all the passions.52 
 
Again, Abba Hyperechius says: 
He who does not control his tongue when he is angry, will not control his 
passions either.53 
 
However, these sayings are rather circular and unspecific. If the problem is lack of 
control of the tongue, and the remedy is to control the tongue, we are told nothing 
about how to implement the remedy. 
 
Abba John the Dwarf offers more specific advice about the benefit of fasting as a 
means of weakening the passions.54 Abba Cronius, offering a remedy for “invisible” 
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passions, talks of “seek[ing] after God” and “remember[ing] the eternal 
judgement”.55 Abba Makarios offers the remedy (perhaps more prophylactic than 
curative) of not criticising others.56 Elsewhere, in a passage reminiscent of Stoic 
teaching on indifferents, he suggests that slander and praise, poverty and riches, 
deprivation and abundance should be accepted alike.57 
 
Another passage reminiscent of Stoicism, this time making use of the technique of 
relabelling, is found in the story of an anonymous brother who was tempted by 
lustful thoughts. In this story, the brother is said to dig up the corpse of his dead wife 
and smear her blood onto his cloak. When he returned to his cell, the cloak 
eventually began to smell. He would then say to himself: 
‘Look, this is what you desire. You have it now, be content.’ So he punished 
himself with the smell until his passions died down.58 
 
Again, the story of a hermit who burned all his fingers in order to overcome the 
temptation of lust is explicitly a Christian reminder of the fate of eternal torment for 
those who consent to passion, but it might also be taken as a Stoic reminder of one’s 
own mortality, or else as a form of self-distraction.59 
 
We might conclude that remedies for the passions may be found amongst the 
sayings of the Desert Fathers, that they operate at various levels and in different 
ways, but that they are often enigmatic and unspecific. We are left with a clear 
impression that finding such remedies is important, but that in the end, they need 
continuing application. To continue with our medical imagery, we might say that 
these remedies are more like an ointment for a chronic skin condition than an 
antibiotic that will definitively eliminate an acute infection. 
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3. Evagrios of Pontus 
 
In Praktikos, Evagrios identifies love and abstinence as the principle preventive 
remedy for the passions.  
The passions are naturally set in motion by the senses. When love and 
abstinence are present, they will not be set in motion; when they are absent, 
they will be set in motion.60 
 
In the Kephalaia Gnostika, he identifies knowledge as that which heals the nous, 
love as that which heals the thumos, and chastity as that which heals the epithumia.61 
This corresponds with the general advice that he gives in Praktikos as an 
introduction to a more detailed consideration of particular remedies for each of the 
eight thoughts in turn: 
When the mind wanders, reading, vigils, and prayer bring it to a standstill. 
When desire bursts into flame, hunger, toil, and anachoresis extinguish it. 
When the irascible part becomes agitated, psalmody, patience, and mercy 
calm it.62 
 
Each part of the soul, then, has its own remedies. 
 
In On the Vices Opposed to the Virtues, he considers the virtue opposed to each vice: 
• Gluttony v Abstinence 
• Fornication v Chastity 
• Avarice v Freedom from Possessions 
• Sadness v Joy 
• Anger v Patience 
• Acedia v Perseverance 
• Vainglory v Freedom from Vainglory 
• Jealousy v Freedom from Jealousy 
• Pride v Humility 
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In each case, he lists a series of consequences, descriptions and metaphors applicable 
to the practice of the vice or virtue concerned. Here, then, the remedy for each 
vice/passion is its corresponding virtue. 
 
In Eight Thoughts, and in Praktikos, more specific or practical advice is given. 
Evagrios identifies practical remedies for dealing with each of the eight thoughts in 
turn (see Table 4.1). Whilst there are some parallels with Stoic methods (eg ascetic 
discipline and meditation on death) and measures based on the principles of humoral 
medicine (eg a dry diet) this would not appear to be an approach that is primarily 
attributable to the classical tradition. In part, it shows evidence of Judeo-Christian 
reasoning, as in the suggestion that hospitality provides a remedy for anger, based 
upon the story of Jacob and Esau.63 However, much of what is proposed here 
appears to be based upon Evagrios’ own analysis of the eight thoughts. Thus his 
radical approach to avoiding contact with women, or even thinking about 
fornication, reflects his underlying philosophy that fornication is fed by such things 
in the way that oil fuels a lamp, or water feeds a plant. More originally, we find here 
his observation that one passion may be used to drive out another (eg vainglory as a 
remedy for fornication) or that anger may be turned back and used as a weapon 
against the demons. 
 
In Praktikos, and On Thoughts, as well as in other works, Evagrios also offers some 
more general remedies for the passions: 
 
1. Observation of thoughts involves attention to the varying intensity, 
incidence, and inter-relationships of thoughts so as to better understand how 
they operate and thus be able to identify and rebuff them earlier.64 
2. Ascetic lifestyle65 is a remedy which is basic to the Evagrian system and is 
therefore discussed in virtually all his works (see also Table 4.1, where it is 
invoked as a remedy for most of the eight thoughts individually, although not 
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for vainglory and pride, as it can easily become a new focus for these 
passions). 
3. Examination of thoughts, so that the sinful element(s) within them may be 
identified and dissipated.66 
4. Natural contemplation, especially of the relationship between incorporeal 
beings and the material world. This is only recommended for relatively 
advanced (or intermediate) practitioners.67 
5. Transfer of the mind from an impure thought to a pure one.68 
6. The importance of scripture as an Evagrian remedy for the passions is 
reflected in his writing of an entire book containing scriptural texts to be 
used against each of the eight thoughts. Antirrhetikos contains 492 such 
texts, arranged in eight chapters (one for each thought), with a brief 
introduction to each, indicating the kind of thought against which it is 
considered useful.69 Luke Dysinger notes that some of these verses are 
directed against the demons, as a kind of exorcism, some are directed as 
prayers to God, and others (the majority) are directed at the tempted soul, as 
a kind of encouragement.70 
7. Psalmody is understood by Evagrios as having an important role in 
preparing the mind for prayer, part of which is achieved by its effect of 
calming the passions.71 This will be discussed further, below, when 
psalmody is considered as a remedy for the passions in the Philokalia.  
8. Evagrios describes prayer as invigorating and purifying the mind for the 
struggle against the passions/demons.72 However, as has already been seen in 
Chapter 2, for Evagrios, prayer is much more than simply a remedy for the 
passions. It is the goal of the Christian life, and the reason for which a 
remedy for the passions is sought in the first place. 
 
Evagrios, then, left details of a more systematic and detailed store of remedies for 
the passions than may be found in the sayings of the Desert Fathers. Elements of this 
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therapeutic armamentarium show points of close contact with Stoic thinking. 
However, this should not be allowed to obscure the specifically Christian methods 
that he employed, nor that he was in places highly original. More especially, his 
remedies were radical. If the passions were a kind of disease, then Evagrios saw this 
disease as life threatening, and he was prepared to take all measures necessary in 
order to address it. 
 
 
4. The Philokalia 
 
Many and varied remedies for the passions are provided by many and different 
authors within the pages of the Philokalia. These include, for example, tears for 
sins,73 meditation on death,74 the “commandment of love”,75 patient endurance,76 
trials and sufferings,77 and obedience,78 as well as the almost ubiquitous injunctions 
to ascetic lifestyle, virtue and prayer. There is warning from Evagrios that a remedy 
for passion can itself become a passion,79 and instruction from Maximos the 
Confessor on how passions can be turned into remedies.80 Maximos also urges that 
the remedies for different passions vary according to the cause of those passions,81 
and that some remedies may merely stop the passions from growing, whilst others 
may actually cause them to diminish.82 Thalassios the Libyan warns that some 
remedies are more painful to bear than others and that if we do not avail ourselves of 
those that are easy to bear, God may impose that which is more painful.83 Many 
more such examples could be given, for there is hardly an author or a work included 
within the Philokalia that does not touch on this subject in one way or another. 
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The Philokalia is, effectively, a compendium of remedies for the passions; this being 
an assertion which should perhaps be qualified by a reminder that, in the Philokalia, 
as in the works of Evagrios, overcoming the passions is merely a means to an end of 
a life of prayer and union with God. This pharmacopoeia of remedies for the 
passions is therefore only provided within the pages of the Philokalia insofar as it is 
a necessary tool to enable the achieving of that aim. 
 
What, then, are the primary remedies included within this pharmacopoeia? Whilst 
many remedies are listed, it would seem that four deserve especial mention and that 
most of the rest fall under one or other of these headings: 
• A practical life of asceticism and virtue 
• Watchfulness 
• Psalmody 
• Prayer 
 
These will now be considered in turn. 
 
i. The Practical Life 
 
Running throughout the Philokalia is a basic assumption that victory over the 
passions depends upon an ascetic way of life. This emphasises both renunciation of 
basic comforts and pleasures, such as food, sleep and possessions, and also pursuit 
of a practical life of virtue. Whilst many of the works were clearly written primarily 
with monks in mind, references to life in the world make clear that a similar 
principle is expected of lay people as well. 
 
As has already been noted in Chapter 2, the Philokalia opens within the tradition of 
the Desert Fathers, a tradition which (as we have seen) strongly emphasised an 
ascetic way of life. The first four works included in the Greek edition were all 
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originally considered to have arisen within this tradition.84 The third text originally 
included in the Greek Philokalia (the second in the English translation) was 
Evagrios’ Foundations85, which, as we have also seen, provides an introduction to 
the basics of the ascetical life that Evagrios espoused for combating the eight 
thoughts and, eventually, finding inner stillness, or hesychia. This emphasis upon a 
practical life of asceticism and virtue, established at the outset, and drawn from the 
desert tradition, continues throughout the Philokalia although, unsurprisingly, 
emphases vary slightly from place to place. It may therefore be helpful to take just 
one example from each of the subsequent volumes of the Philokalia. 
 
a. Maximos the Confessor 
 
Maximos urges obedience and practice of virtue as important for those who have 
“just begun to follow a holy way of life”.86 For the body “entangled in the 
defilements of the passions”, he urges active pursuit of the virtuous life, and passive 
acceptance of the sufferings that God allows for our good.87 He is a little more 
cautious about some aspects of asceticism. He sees it as unduly focussed upon the 
body and limited in value.88 But this appears to be more reflective of a concern to 
ensure moderation and balance than of any suggestion that he disagrees with the 
underlying tradition. Like Evagrios (by whom he was strongly influenced) he warns, 
for example, that laxity about diet and encounters with women easily lead to 
thoughts of unchastity.89 
 
For Maximos, ascetical practice is founded upon the theology of self-emptying 
(kenosis) of the Logos in Christ. Thus, in On the Lord’s Prayer, writing of those 
who attain to the grace of deification, he writes: 
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by emptying themselves of the passions they lay hold of the divine to the 
same degree as that to which, deliberately emptying Himself of His own 
sublime glory, the Logos of God truly became man.90 
 
For Maximos, the aspects of asceticism concerned with renunciation are “virtues of 
the body” and those concerned with acquisition of virtue are “virtues of the soul”: 
There are virtues of the body and virtues of the soul. Those of the body 
include fasting, vigils, sleeping on the ground, ministering to people’s needs, 
working with one’s hands so as not to be a burden or in order to give to 
others (cf. 1 Thess. 2:9, Ephes. 4:28). Those of the soul include love, long-
suffering, gentleness, self-control and prayer (cf. Gal, 5:22).91 
 
Although Maximos adopts much of the Evagrian schema of the spiritual life, a major 
difference is the great emphasise which he places upon the virtue of love. For 
Maximos, the remedy for the passions is not simply their elimination, but rather their 
complete transformation and reintegration.92 For Maximos, apatheia is a state of 
love, and love is itself a passion – but a holy and blessed passion: 
Just as passion-free thought of human things does not compel the intellect to 
scorn divine things, so passion-free knowledge of divine things does not fully 
persuade it to scorn human things. For in this world truth exists in shadows 
and conjectures. That is why there is need for the blessed passion of holy 
love, which binds the intellect to spiritual contemplation and persuades it to 
prefer what is immaterial to what is material, and what is intelligible and 
divine to what is apprehended by the senses.93 
 
b. Peter of Damaskos 
 
Volume 3 of the Philokalia is dominated by Book I and Book II of the works of Peter 
of Damaskos (11th/12th Century), which amount to a mini-Philokalia within the 
Philokalia itself. After the introduction to Book I, Peter begins by considering the 
Seven Forms of Bodily Discipline.94 The first three of these forms of discipline are 
removal from the distractions of human society, moderate fasting, and moderate 
vigils. Later, in regard to fasting, he clarifies what is meant here by “moderation”: 
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It is abstention and dissipation that bring on illness, while self-control and a 
change of foods each day are conducive to health. The body then remains 
impervious to pleasure and sickness and co-operates in the acquisition of the 
virtues.95 
 
Peter also includes in Book I a discourse on The Bodily Virtues as Tools for the 
Acquisition of  the Virtues of the Soul.96 Here, he links “excision of desires” with 
ascetic practice and other tools necessary for the acquisition of virtue. However, it is 
in a Short Discourse on the Acquisition of the virtues and on Abstinence from the 
Passions97 that we get a more detailed idea of the kinds of things that Peter expects 
his reader to engage in as remedies for the passions. In the space of slightly more 
than only two pages, he includes under this heading: 
 
• Spiritual reading in stillness 
• The thought of death 
• Self-reproach 
• The excising of our own will 
• Solitary life 
• Meditation 
• Reflection on God’s gifts 
• Reflection on our own wickedness 
• Trials and temptations 
• Avoidance of excess and deficiency 
• Humility 
• Abandoning every personal thought and desire 
• Pure prayer 
• Endurance of affliction 
• Trying for one day to do something good 
• To bear with the neighbour who wrongs us 
• Faith, hope and love 
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In Book II, under the title Mortification of the Passions,98 Peter urges detachment 
from material things through mortification of the body. For Peter, overcoming the 
passions is inextricably linked with overcoming the attraction to sensory objects.99 
Desire for comfort from such things is “non-spiritual” and in conflict with the life of 
virtue.100 But, it is not that these things are bad in themselves and, like Maximos, his 
view of the passions is not entirely negative. Indeed, for the one who has restraint 
and judgement, it is possible: 
to discern the intention of God hidden in the six passions that surround him – 
those, that is, above him and below, to his right and to his left, within him 
and without. Whether it relates to the practice of the virtues or to spiritual 
knowledge, there is some good purpose lying within the six passions that 
oppose him.101 
 
c. Gregory of Sinai: On Commandments & Doctrines 
 
In Volume 4, a work of Gregory of Sinai (c1265-1346) is included under the title On 
Commandments and Doctrines, Warnings and Promises; on Thoughts, Passions and 
Virtues, and also on Stillness and Prayer: One Hundred and Thirty-Seven Texts.102 
In this work, Gregory proposes for the would-be hesychast a demanding regime of 
fasting, night vigils and prayer, built upon a foundation of five virtues: silence, self-
control, vigilance, humility and patience.103 Thus, for example, he advises: 
A pound of bread is sufficient for anyone aspiring to attain the state of inner 
stillness. You may drink two cups of undiluted wine and three of water. Your 
food should consist of whatever is at hand - not whatever your natural 
craving seeks, but what providence provides, to be eaten sparingly. The best 
and shortest guiding rule for those who wish to live as they should is to 
maintain the threefold all-embracing practices of fasting, vigilance and 
prayer, for these provide a most powerful support for all the other virtues.104 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly given the austerity of this regime, he notes that it is not 
uncommon for those on the spiritual path to find ascetic practice hard. For these, he 
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recommends obedience as a virtue that will provide an effective remedy for the 
passions.105 But the one who has achieved union with God, who is a “true friend of 
God”, he understands as being one who will have undergone ascetic purification, as 
well as noetic contemplation.106 For those who refuse ascetic discipline, the danger 
is that of delusion due to unchecked self-indulgence. Such individuals imagine that 
they are recipients of divine revelation when, in fact, they are “intoxicated and 
befuddled with passion”.107 
 
d. Kallistos and Ignatius: Directions to Hesychasts 
 
Finally, in Volume 5, we find that Kallistos (d.1397) and Ignatius (14th Century), in 
their Directions to Hesychasts,108 in charting the path to pure prayer and 
passionlessness, emphasise (amongst other things) the need for ascetic practice and a 
practical life of virtue as more or less fundamental first steps. Divine grace remains 
present in all who have been baptised, they say, but is “buried under the 
passions”.109 The solution is to strive to keep the commandments, a striving which is 
met with God’s grace to help us. In particular, Kallistos and Ignatius emphasise the 
importance of striving after three virtues within which, they argue, all the others are 
subsumed: faith, love, and peace. They also especially recommend complete 
obedience to a well-chosen spiritual guide, self-renunciation, silence and solitude, 
and an ascetic regime including a meagre diet and limited sleep. 
 
e. The Practical Life: Some Conclusions 
 
Throughout the Philokalia, then, ascetic lifestyle and pursuit of a practical life of 
virtue are emphasised as fundamental remedies for the passions. At times, it can 
seem as though there is a circularity in the argument. People are not virtuous 
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because of the passions – they must therefore be virtuous in order to defeat the 
passions. However, this apparent circularity overlooks both the grace of God and the 
importance of self-control. Thus, for example, Maximos writes: 
The person who has come to know the weakness of human nature has gained 
experience of divine power. Such a man, having achieved some things and 
eager to achieve others through this divine power, never belittles anyone. For 
he knows that just as God has helped him and freed him from many passions 
and difficulties, so, when God wishes, He is able to help all men, especially 
those pursuing the spiritual way for His sake. And if in His providence He 
does not deliver all men together from their passions, yet like a good and 
loving physician He heals with individual treatment each of those who are 
trying to make progress.110 
 
There is, of course, a danger of passivity if we imagine, then, that there is nothing 
that we can do but hope and pray for God’s grace. But Maximos argues that God 
heals those “who are trying to make progress”. Similarly, at the outset of his 
Treasury of Divine Knowledge, Peter of Damaskos emphasises the importance of 
divinely bestowed knowledge, which reminds us of the divine commandments, and 
in addition: 
alongside this knowledge, there is our capacity to choose. This is the 
beginning of our salvation; by our free choice we abandon our own wishes 
and thoughts and do what God wishes and thinks. If we succeed in doing 
this, there is no object, no activity or place in the whole of creation that can 
prevent us from becoming what God from the beginning has wished us to be: 
that is to say, according to His image and likeness, gods by adoption through 
grace, dispassionate, just, good and wise….111 
 
Gregory of Sinai also recognises that a combination of human effort and divine 
grace is required. Appearing if anything to err towards a view that grace alone may 
be all that is needed in some cases, he warns against any shadows of virtue that lack 
that grace: 
The pursuit of the virtues through one's own efforts does not confer complete 
strength on the soul unless grace transforms them into an essential inner 
disposition. Each virtue is endowed with its own specific gift of grace, its 
own particular energy, and thus possesses the capacity to produce such a 
disposition and blessed state in those who attain it even when they have not 
consciously sought for any such state. Once a virtue has been bestowed on us 
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it remains unchanged and unfailing. For just as a living soul activates the 
body's members, so the grace of the Holy Spirit activates the virtues. Without 
such grace the whole bevy of the virtues is moribund; and in those who 
appear to have attained them, or to be in the way of attaining them, solely 
through their own efforts they are but shadows and prefigurations of beauty, 
not the reality itself.112 
 
The truly beautiful, then, is that virtue which arises where human choice and striving 
meld with the grace of God. In this, is to be found the first remedy for the passions 
that the Philokalia recommends. 
 
ii. Watchfulness 
 
Watchfulness (
) is another remedy for the passions which clearly builds upon 
the Evagrian tradition, and which permeates many, if not most, of the pages of the 
Philokalia. Indeed, the full title of the Greek Philokalia is “The Philokalia of the 
Niptic Fathers”.113  In other words, watchfulness (“nipsis”) is almost a defining 
characteristic of the texts of the Philokalia, and one wonders whether the concept 
may not have been amongst the inclusion criteria that, by design or consensus, 
determined inclusion of particular texts within its pages. 
 
Watchfulness is defined by the English translators of the Philokalia as: 
literally, the opposite to a state of drunken stupor; hence spiritual sobriety, 
alertness, vigilance. It signifies an attitude of attentiveness (		 - 
prosochi), whereby one keeps watch over one's inward thoughts and 
fantasies (q.v.), maintaining guard over the heart and intellect (

/	 - phylaki kardias/nou; 
 
/	 - tirisis 
kardias/nou).114 
 
The author of a 13th Century text attributed in the Philokalia to Symeon the New 
Theologian115 notes that essentially the same practices are variously referred to as: 
• Attentiveness 
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• Guarding of the heart 
• Guarding of the intellect 
• Investigation of thoughts 
• Rebuttal 
• Stillness of the heart 
• Watchfulness 
 
Nikiphoros the Monk (13th Century)116 produces a slightly different list of 
synonyms, and indicates that the list is not complete: 
• Attentiveness 
• Custody of the heart 
• Guarding of the intellect 
• Noetic stillness 
• Watchfulness 
 
Similarly, the English translators of the Philokalia suggest that watchfulness, inner 
attentiveness, and guarding of the intellect are “virtually synonymous”.117 However, 
there are hints in places that some of these terms should be distinguished. 
 
Hesychios the Priest (? 8th or 9th Century) hints that watchfulness and guarding of 
the intellect may be distinguished by absence of mental images associated with the 
latter.118 More importantly, he also distinguishes between watchfulness and rebuttal: 
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text of The Ladder of Divine Ascent (Luibheid, Russell and Ware, 1982, pp.239-240) does not make 
things much clearer. Although John goes on to make a distinction between praying for rescue from 
bad thoughts, resisting them, and despising them, it is not clear how (or even whether) these three 
categories relate to the two categories of guarding and watchfulness. As John emphasises that 
watching is more “significant and laborious” than guarding, and as the despising of bad thoughts is 
the more advanced of the three categories of dealing with bad thoughts, we might imagine that 
watchfulness is equivalent to the latter.. 
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It is the task of unceasing watchfulness - and one of great benefit and help to 
the soul - to see the mental images of evil thoughts as soon as they are 
formed in the intellect. The task of rebuttal is to counter and expose such 
thoughts when they attempt to infiltrate our intellect in the form of an image 
of some material thing.119 
 
Similarly, the English translators of the Philokalia define rebuttal (	,

) as: 
the repulsing of a demon or demonic thought at the moment of provocation 
(q.v.); or, in a more general sense, the bridling of evil thoughts.120 
 
It would seem that rebuttal at least, then, might usually be expected to denote a 
process of countering, repulsing or bridling evil thoughts, rather than simply being 
attentive to, or being vigilant in observation of, such thoughts. However, any 
differences between the other terms (especially watchfulness and guarding of the 
heart/intellect, which are the most commonly used) are much less clear. 
 
Four texts from the Philokalia on watchfulness will be considered here: 
• Watchfulness & Holiness 
by Hesychios the Priest (?8th or 9th Century) 
• Forty Texts on Watchfulness 
by Philotheos of Sinai (? 9th or 10th Century) 
• Three Methods of Prayer 
attributed to Symeon the New Theologian (942-1022) but actually by an 
anonymous author (? 10th or 11th Century) 
• Watchfulness & Guarding 
by Nikiphoros the Monk (13th Century) 
 
In passing, however, it is interesting to note that the Extracts from the Texts on 
Watchfulness, by Evagrios, included in the first volume of the Philokalia, is actually 
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a compilation of texts taken from Praktikos.121 These texts are, in fact, more about 
the practical and ascetic life than they are about watchfulness in the specific sense 
defined above. As we shall see, ascetic practice is, more or less, considered by other 
authors in the Philokalia as a foundation for watchfulness. We might speculate, 
therefore, that Nikodimos and Makarios wanted readers of the Philokalia to 
understand watchfulness in a broad sense, and for it to be understood that the 
practical life is a foundation for watchfulness in the specific sense. Nonetheless, the 
selection of five paragraphs from the 100 paragraphs of Praktikos, and their 
reordering under this particular heading, is curious.122 
 
a. Hesychios the Priest: Watchfulness & Holiness 
Watchfulness and Holiness, by Hesychios the Priest, is an important contribution to 
the Philokalia on the subject of watchfulness. Hesychios opens this work with a 
sweeping vista of the landscape that watchfulness surveys: 
Watchfulness is a spiritual method which, if sedulously practised over a long 
period, completely frees us with God's help from impassioned thoughts, 
impassioned words and evil actions. It leads, in so far as this is possible, to a sure 
knowledge of the inapprehensible God, and helps us to penetrate the divine and 
hidden mysteries. It enables us to fulfil every divine commandment in the Old 
and New Testaments and bestows upon us every blessing of the age to come. It 
is, in the true sense, purity of heart, a state blessed by Christ when He says: 
'Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God' (Matt. 5:8); and one which, 
because of its spiritual nobility and beauty - or, rather, because of our negligence 
- is now extremely rare among monks. Because this is its nature, watchfulness is 
to be bought only at a great price. But once established in us, it guides us to a 
true and holy way of life. It teaches us how to activate the three aspects of our 
soul correctly, and how to keep a firm guard over the senses. It promotes the 
daily growth of the four principal virtues, and is the basis of our 
contemplation.123 
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As the English translators note, this is a broad definition.124 As Hesychios himself 
notes, it “is a way [of] embracing every virtue”.125 He clearly considers it 
fundamental to the whole monastic vocation, for he later says: “A true monk is one 
who has achieved watchfulness; and he who is truly watchful is a monk in his heart 
“.
126
 He sees watchfulness as beginning with ascetic practice, and as involving (or 
perhaps culminating in) hesychastic stillness. 
The fruit starts in the flower; and the guarding of the intellect begins with 
self-control in food and drink, the rejection of all evil thoughts and 
abstention from them, and stillness of heart.127 
 
For Hesychios, watchfulness is a remedy for the passions, but it is also much more 
than this, it is the gateway to contemplative prayer and opens the way to a vision of 
the divine light.128 
 
At the core, Hesychios describes watchfulness as a process of self awareness, and 
attentiveness to one’s own thoughts: 
Watchfulness is a continual fixing and. halting of thought at the entrance to 
the heart. In this way predatory and murderous thoughts are marked down as 
they approach and what they say and do is noted; and we can see in what 
specious and delusive form the demons are trying to deceive the intellect. If 
we are conscientious in this, we can gain much experience and knowledge of 
spiritual warfare.129 
 
Although some attempts within the Philokalia to find a scriptural basis for this 
practice might seem excessively allegorical,130 Hesychios appeals to Christ’s 
temptation in the wilderness as the model for Christians to follow.131 
 
Hesychios identifies five methods of watchfulness:132 
1. “closely scrutinizing every mental image or provocation” 
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2. “freeing the heart from all thoughts, keeping it profoundly silent and still, 
and in praying” 
3. “continually and humbly calling upon the Lord Jesus Christ for help” 
4. “always to have the thought of death in one's mind” 
5. “to fix one's gaze on heaven and to pay no attention to anything material” 
 
Hesychios later gives a more detailed account of how some of these methods might 
work: 
Now when the provocation has taken the form of a mental image of a sensory 
object, the evil thought behind it can be identified. For instance, if the image 
is of the face of someone who has angered us, or of a beautiful woman, or of 
gold or silver, it can at once be shown that it is the thought of rancour, or of 
unchastity, or of avarice that fills our heart with fantasies. And if our intellect 
is experienced, well-trained and used to guarding itself; and to examining 
clearly and openly the seductive fantasies and deceits of the demons, it will 
instantly ‘quench the fiery darts of the devil’ (cf. Eph. 6:16), counter-
attacking by means of its power of rebuttal and the Jesus Prayer. It will not 
allow the impassioned fantasy to consort with it or allow our thoughts 
passionately to conform themselves to the fantasy, or to become intimate 
with it, or be distracted by it, or give assent to it. If anything like this 
happens, then evil actions will follow as surely as night follows day.133 
Watchfulness, therefore, provides a mental remedy against the process of the 
passions. In this case, a number of stages might be identified:134 
1. Awareness of a mental image, or “fantasy” 
2. Recognition that, behind this image, there lays an evil thought, or passion 
3. Response by way of “rebuttal”, or mental rejection of the thought/image – 
including a resistance to dwelling on it, being distracted by it, giving assent 
to it, or in any other way engaging with it 
4. Response by way of prayer (in this case, the Jesus Prayer – which we will 
consider later) 
Hesychios later emphasises that following the first three of these stages alone would 
be insufficient. He considers invocation of the name of Jesus to be vital to the whole 
process.135 
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b. Philotheos of Sinai: Forty Texts on Watchfulness 
Whilst Philotheos of Sinai, like Hesychios, recognises watchfulness as being a 
remedy for the passions, he sees it as much more than just this. Like Hesychios, he 
finds its beginnings in ascetic practice, and its end in a vision of contemplative 
prayer: 
If, then, we seek - by guarding our intellect and by inner watchfulness - to 
engage in the noetic work that is the true philosophy in Christ, we must begin by 
exercising self-control with regard to our food, eating and drinking as little as 
possible. Watchfulness may fittingly be called a path leading both to the 
kingdom within us and to that which is to be; while noetic work, which trains 
and purifies the intellect and changes it from an impassioned state to a state of 
dispassion, is like a window full of light through which God looks, revealing 
Himself to the intellect.136 
 
It is this vision of contemplative prayer, or to use Philotheos’ own terminology this 
“noetic vision” or “perfect remembrance of God in [the] heart”, with which he opens 
his Forty Texts and this is, for him, the goal of watchfulness.137 
Philotheos138 identifies three “gateways” to watchfulness: 
1. “Silencing of [the] tongue” (“Nothing is more unsettling than talkativeness 
and more pernicious than an unbridled tongue, disruptive as it is of the soul’s 
proper state.”139) 
2. “balanced self-control in food and drink” 
3. “ceaseless mindfulness of death” 
Although he does not refer to it as a “gateway”, Philotheos also considers humility 
to be a fundamental requirement. In order to engender this, he encourages the 
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remembrance of sins, mindfulness of death, remembrance of Christ’s passion, and 
review of God’s blessings.140 
Philotheos also shares with Hesychios a Christological emphasis, and he combines this with a vivid 
depiction of the mental turmoil that watchfulness seeks to address: 
Be extremely strict in guarding your intellect. When you perceive an evil 
thought, rebut it and immediately call upon Christ to defend you; and while 
you are still speaking, Jesus in His gentle love will say: 'Behold, I am by 
your side ready to help you.' When this whole detachment of the enemy has 
been put out of action through prayer, again turn your attention to your 
intellect. There you will see a succession of waves worse than before, with 
the soul swimming among them. But again, awakened by His disciple, Jesus 
as God will rebuke the winds of evil (cf. Matt. 8:23-27). Having found 
respite for an hour perhaps, or for a moment, glorify Him who has saved you, 
and meditate on death.141 
 
It has been suggested that Philotheos has a greater emphasis on bodily ascetic 
practice in his account of watchfulness, as compared with that of Hesychios.142 
However, the similarities between these two accounts are much greater than any 
differences. 
 
c. [Symeon the New Theologian]: Three Methods of Prayer 
The author of Three Methods of Prayer143 offers a somewhat different account to 
Hesychios and Philotheos. The first two methods of prayer described by the author 
of this work fail to address the need to guard the heart. The first of these turns the 
focus of the intellect heavenwards and, in the opinion of the author, leads inevitably 
to pride and delusion. The second turns the focus of the intellect inward and away 
from sensory things. Here, the author sees again the danger of self-esteem, but with 
no peace or end to the mental conflict that is entailed, for it fails “to observe the 
enemies who attack from within”.144 
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The third method of prayer, which the author of this work enthusiastically endorses, 
begins with obedience to a spiritual guide, and attention to purity of conscience. 
Having addressed these rather important preliminaries, the author turns to a 
description of the characteristics of attentiveness: 
True and unerring attentiveness and prayer mean that the intellect keeps 
watch over the heart while it prays; it should always be on patrol within the 
heart, and from within - from the depths of the heart - it should offer up its 
prayers to God. Once it has tasted within the heart that the Lord is bountiful 
(cf. Ps. 34:8. LXX), then the intellect will have no desire to leave the heart, 
and it will repeat the words of the Apostle Peter, 'It is good for us to be here' 
(Matt. 17:4). It will keep watch always within the heart, repulsing and 
expelling all thoughts sown there by the enemy. To those who have no 
knowledge of this practice it appears extremely harsh and arduous; and 
indeed it is oppressive and laborious, not only to the uninitiated, but also to 
those who, although genuinely experienced, have not yet felt the delight to be 
found in the depths of the heart. But those who have savoured this delight 
proclaim with St Paul, 'Who will separate us from the love of Christ?' (Rom. 
8:35).145 
 
The scriptural basis that is offered for this approach is based upon references to the 
teaching of Christ in Matthew’s gospel – particularly on the evil thoughts that 
proceed from the heart (Matthew 15:19-20) and Jesus injunction to the Pharisees on 
the need for inner cleanliness (Matthew 23:26). On the basis of this teaching, he 
claims, the holy fathers: 
abandoned all other forms of spiritual labour and concentrated wholly on this 
one task of guarding the heart, convinced that through this practice they 
would also possess every other virtue, whereas without it no virtue could be 
firmly established.146 
This author thus places guarding of the heart147 as the necessary precondition for 
attaining virtue. It is not simply one remedy for the passions, but rather the remedy, 
or at least the remedy which must be applied before any other remedies can be 
expected to produce any real or lasting benefit. Accordingly, at the end of the work, 
when the author describes four stages of the spiritual life, guarding of the heart is the 
first and fundamental stage:148 
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1. Curtailment of the passions (guarding of the heart) – the stage of beginners 
2. Practice of psalmody – referred to as growing up “spiritually from 
adolescence to youth” 
3. Persevering in prayer – “the spiritual transition from youth to manhood” 
4. Undeviating absorption in contemplation – the stage of “the old man with 
grey hairs” 
As a means of facilitating guarding of the heart, the author describes a technique of 
prayer that gives attention to bodily posture, breathing, and an inner searching with 
the intellect, “so as to find the place of the heart, where all the powers of the soul 
reside”.149 Once this state has been achieved, distractive thoughts are driven away 
and destroyed by invocation of Jesus Christ. 
 
d. Nikiphoros the Monk: Watchfulness & Guarding 
Our fourth example of a text in the Philokalia that is dedicated to watchfulness 
begins with a collection of extracts from writings of the saints, including an extract 
from Athanasius’ Life of Antony the Great, other lives and writings of the desert 
fathers, a brief compilation of extracts from John Climacus’ Ladder of Divine 
Ascent, and also extracts of several other works included in the Philokalia.150 These 
writings generally endorse the importance of watchfulness, rather than providing 
much detail about what exactly it entails. There then follows a brief account “From 
Nikiphoros Himself”.151 
Nikiphoros describes attentiveness152 as follows: 
Attentiveness is the sign of true repentance. It is the soul's restoration, hatred 
of the world, and return to God. It is rejection of sin and recovery of virtue. It 
is the unreserved assurance that our sins are forgiven. It is the beginning of 
contemplation or, rather, its presupposition, for through it God, descrying its 
presence in us reveals Himself to the intellect. It is serenity of intellect or, 
rather, the repose bestowed on the soul through God's mercy. It is the 
subjection of our thoughts, the palace of the mindfulness of God, the 
                                                 
149
 Philokalia 4:72-73 
150
 Philokalia 4:195-204 
151
 Philokalia 4:204-206 
152
 He first clarifies that this is synonymous with watchfulness, guarding of the intellect, etc. 
 149
stronghold that enables us patiently to accept all that befalls. It is the ground 
of faith, hope and love. For if you do not have faith you cannot endure the 
outward afflictions that assail you; and if you do not bear them gladly you 
cannot say to the Lord, 'Thou art my helper and my refuge' (Ps 91:2).153 
 
This is clearly a very broad picture of what watchfulness entails. It provides none of 
the detail about the inner experience of watchfulness that is found in Hesychios or 
Philotheos, but rather speaks in metaphors of “the palace of the mindfulness of God” 
and “the stronghold that enables us patiently to accept all that befalls”. It would 
appear that Nikiphoros expects that details will be filled in by face to face instruction 
from a teacher, and this appearance is confirmed by his immediately subsequent 
reference to the importance of finding such a spiritual guide. 
Nikiphoros goes on to describe (apparently for the benefit of those who cannot find a 
suitable guide or teacher) a psychosomatic technique of prayer which is not 
dissimilar to that described by the author of Three Methods of Prayer (see above). 
However, Nikiphoros is rather more anatomically specific. After describing the 
function of the heart (according to humoural theory) in maintaining homeostasis of 
body temperature, he continues: 
concentrate your intellect, and lead it into the respiratory passage through 
which your breath passes into your heart. Put pressure on your intellect and 
compel it to descend with your inhaled breath into your heart. Once it has 
entered there, what follows will be neither dismal nor glum. Just as a man, 
after being far away from home, on his return is overjoyed at being with his 
wife and children again, so the intellect, once it is united with the soul, is 
filled with indescribable delight.154 
 
Once the intellect is “firmly established in the heart”, then Nikiphoros recommends 
repetition of, and meditation on, the Jesus Prayer (which we shall discuss further, 
below).155 This, he says, will protect the intellect from distraction, protect it against 
attacks of the demons, and increase its love for God.156 
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This process is clearly more similar to that of the author of Three Methods of Prayer 
than it is to either of the accounts of Hesychios or Philotheos. As the English 
translators of the Philokalia speculate, it is likely that the method had a long history 
on Mount Athos prior to being written down first by Nikiphoros and then others 
(including the author of Three Methods of Prayer).157 
The scriptural support adduced by Nikiphoros is (cf Luke 17:21) “the kingdom of 
heaven is within us”. The emphasis in the process that he describes is 
correspondingly more on the location of the intellect in the heart, and by this means 
finding God within, than it is on mental vigilance and guarding against distractive 
thoughts (although these elements are not entirely lacking). 
The text as a whole clearly still understands watchfulness as a remedy for the 
passions. However, this is largely expressed in the anthology of other writings with 
which it begins. Nikiphoros himself does not speak of this aspect, except to refer to 
it (in only one place, in the introduction) as a means to achieve dispassion.158 Rather, 
one is left with the impression that the (very long) opening sentence summarises the 
primary purpose of watchfulness in Nikiphoros’ understanding: 
to attain the wondrous divine illumination of our Saviour Jesus Christ; to 
experience in your heart the supracelestial fire and to be consciously 
reconciled with God….159 
 
e. Watchfulness: Some Conclusions 
What conclusions may we draw, then, in regard to these four different accounts of 
watchfulness? 
Firstly, we must note the holistic understanding that each of these authors brings. 
Bodily concerns are not neglected. For Hesychios and (especially) Philotheos this is 
found in the ascetic context within which watchfulness is firmly located. For the 
author of the Three Methods of Prayer, and for Nikiphoros, the somatic elements of 
their methods of prayer (posture and breathing in particular) ensure that this is not 
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seen as a purely psychological or spiritual exercise. All four authors also emphasise 
psychological processes. Although this is more evident in the first three as a process 
of mental vigilance over thoughts, it is represented by Nikiphoros as a concern with 
bringing the intellect to reside in the heart. But none of these authors describe a 
purely psychosomatic process. In each case, prayer is seen as a vital component of 
watchfulness, and this receives a particular Christological emphasise from 
Hesychios and Philotheos. 
Secondly, watchfulness is clearly described in various ways, and with varying 
emphasise by different authors within the Philokalia. This is evident in the 
theological and scriptural under-pinning of the process, in descriptions of it, and in 
methods prescribed for its realisation. Doubtless, had more examples been 
considered here, we might have identified even greater variety. 
Thirdly, watchfulness is clearly an important remedy for the passions. This is set in 
the context of a vision or goal of contemplative prayer, and is not an end in itself. 
However, there is no doubt that watchfulness is perceived as a powerful remedy, 
which the Philokalia highly commends. 
 
iii. Psalmody 
 
We have already noted in passing (above) that psalmody was one of the remedies for 
the passions prescribed by Evagrios. Evagrios listed psalmody (along with 
longsuffering and compassion) as being of particular value as a remedy for passions 
associated with the incensive power of the soul (the thumos), and one of the texts in 
which he makes this link is included in the Philokalia in Extracts from Texts on 
Watchfulness.160 
 
Apart from some quotations from Psalms by Isaiah the Solitary, Evagrios is the first 
contributor to the Philokalia to address psalmody as a remedy for the passions. 
Given also the importance of the Evagrian tradition generally as formative of the 
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authors of the Philokalia, it will therefore be helpful to give some further 
consideration to what Evagrios has to say on this subject. 
 
Five principal texts by Evagrios on psalmody are extant, and four of these, from On 
Prayer, are included in the Philokalia.161 The relevant passage in which these four 
texts appear (taken here from the English translation of the Philokalia) is as follows: 
82. Pray gently and calmly, sing with understanding and rhythm; then you will 
soar like a young eagle high in the heavens. 
83. Psalmody calms the passions and curbs the uncontrolled impulses in the 
body; and prayer enables the intellect to activate its own energy. 
84. Prayer is the energy which accords with the dignity of the intellect; it is the 
intellect's true and highest activity. 
85. Psalmody appertains to the wisdom of the world of multiplicity; prayer is the 
prelude to the immaterial knowledge of the One. 
86. Spiritual knowledge has great beauty: it is the helpmate of prayer, awakening 
the noetic power of the intellect to contemplation of divine knowledge. 
87. If you have not yet received the gift of prayer or psalmody, persevere 
patiently and you will receive it.162 
 
 
The immediately preceding chapters of On Prayer are concerned with the 
importance of imageless prayer (66-73) and the assistance offered by angels to those 
who pray (74-81). The chapters in question (82-87, and particularly 82, 83, 85 and 
87) then turn to the relationship between psalmody and prayer. The theme of prayer 
is continued in Chapter 88. Chapters 89-105 are concerned with various kinds of 
trials and sufferings, including attacks of the demons.163 
 
Dysinger’s helpful commentary on this passage,164 to which I am indebted here, 
concludes that it shows how Evagrios understood psalmody and prayer as mutually 
supportive. He argues that it shows psalmody as preparing the whole person (body, 
soul and nous) for prayer. One aspect of the support that psalmody provides for 
prayer (although by no means the only consideration here) is its remedial effect 
against the passions. 
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A key word here, in Chapter 82, is “rhythmically” (
). This adverb has been 
variously translated as “with rhythm” (as here, in the Philokalia), “with good 
rhythm”, “with attention to the requirements of music”, “in a well ordered way”, or 
“well rhythmed”.165 Whilst the primary reference is to the proper cadence and 
rhythm of chanting the psalms, it seems possible (if not likely) that Evagrios is also 
hinting at an inner harmony of psalmody which parallels the calmness of prayer. 
 
In Chapter 83, Evagrios uses the verb  to indicate the calming effect of 
psalmody on the passions. This can mean “to put to bed”, “to lull [to sleep]”, “to 
quiet or calm”, or (in theological usage) “to appease”.  It can also refer to the 
soothing of a wound or physical disorder, the soothing of emotions, and the soothing 
effect of music.166 There would appear to be allusions here to an ancient pagan 
understanding of the soothing effects of music on animals, and on the irrational part 
of the human soul, which was taken up by the Christian tradition. Evagrios’ use of 
the term in this way is consistent with similar usage by Basil of Caesarea and 
Gregory of Nyssa. 
 
Another key term in Chapter 83 is . This may variously be translated 
“uncontrolled impulses” (as here), “intemperance”, or “imbalance”. In the 
Septuagint and New Testament it invariable refers to lack of self-control, or self-
indulgence. It is thus the vice opposed to the virtue of temperance, a vice of 
indulgence or excess. However, there is an alternative possible meaning, which is 
less common and more specific. Here, in a more physiological, psychological or 
medical sense, it can mean “bad mixture”, “failure of mixture”, “disharmony” or 
“imbalance”. This imbalance would then be taken to refer to an imbalance of the 
four humours, or incomplete digestion of food. This usage is not common in 
Christian texts. However, given Evagrios’ proclivity for medical metaphors, it 
cannot be ruled out. Thus, psalmody may be understood as exerting either a moral or 
a physical/psychological restoration of balance, or perhaps both.167 
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Evagrios understood anger as a “boiling up” of the thumos, or incensive power,168 a 
definition which draws on elements of definitions previously offered by Plato, 
Aristotle and Galen.169 In various places, Evagrios links psalmody specifically with 
calming of the thumos.170 In Antirrhetikos, Evagrios specifically describes the effect 
of psalmody as an effect on temperament (that is 
 or humoural balance, in this 
translation “condition of the body”): 
Against the thought that does not know that the melody that accompanies the 
Psalms alters the condition of the body and drives away the demon that touches 
it on the back, chills its sinews, and troubles all its members: 
And it happened that when the evil spirit was upon Saul, David took 
his harp and played with his hand, and Saul was refreshed, and it was 
good with him, and the evil spirit departed from him (1 Kgdms 
16:23).171 
 
Psalmody thus appears to have been understood by Evagrios as exerting a remedial 
effect, at least on passions of the incensive part of the soul, via a soothing influence 
which restored humoral balance. The remedy for passions of the thumos that 
Evagrios found in the practice of psalmody was important not only because of its 
direct effect on these passions, but also because a restored thumos itself has a part to 
play in combating the passions. Anger, properly directed against the demons, used 
“in accordance with nature”, is thus itself a remedy for the passions.172 
 
However, Evagrios perceived the Psalms as being a remedy for the passions in at 
least two further ways. The first of these is hinted at in Chapter 85 of On Prayer. 
Here, psalmody is associated with the multiplicity of the created order, and prayer 
with the divine unity. The multiplicity (		
), or diversity, of the created order is 
understood by Evagrios as a manifestation of divine wisdom (cf Ephesians 3:10: 
			
 	 	 	). In Dysinger’s translation of this chapter, this is 
referred to as “multiform wisdom”.173 Multiform wisdom appears to be understood 
by Evagrios as denoting the opportunity that the Psalms afford for contemplation of 
God through the logoi (meanings) concealed behind the appearance of created 
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things. However, created things also have the potential to provide distractions during 
prayer. Pure prayer, for Evagrios, is without any images of such things. 
 
In Praktikos 69-71, Evagrios writes in more detail of the importance of undistracted 
psalmody:174 
69. To pray without distraction is a considerable achievement, but greater 
still is the ability to practise psalmody also without distraction. 
70. The person who has established the virtues within himself and has 
become wholly mingled with them no longer remembers the law or the 
commandments or punishment, but says and does those things which this 
excellent state dictates to him. 
71. The demonic songs set our desire in motion and cast the soul into 
shameful fantasies , but psalms, hymns, and spiritual songs (Eph 5:19) call 
the mind to the constant remembrance of virtue, cooling our boiling 
irascibility and extinguishing our desires.175 
 
The problem that he appears to be grappling with here is that undistracted prayer 
requires a laying aside of images, but that the Psalms present a multiplicity of 
images and can thus be distracting. However, in Chapter 70 he goes on to speak of 
the person who is “entirely permeated” with the virtues. The word that is used for 
this is 
. This is strongly reminiscent of his reference to the power of 
psalmody to affect a restoration of the 
 of humoral balance. In Chapter 71, he 
goes on to write of the beneficial effect of psalmody on all three parts of the soul: 
thumos, epithumia, and nous. Thus, meditation on the content of the Psalms, 
according to Evagrios, has the potential bring about a mingling or permeation of the 
soul with virtues. 
 
A fuller understanding of what undistracted psalmody entails is to be found in his 
Scholia on Psalms where, commenting on verse 1 of Psalm 137, he writes: 
To chant psalms before the angels is to sing psalms without distraction: 
either our mind is imprinted solely by the realities symbolised by the psalm, 
or else it is not imprinted. Or perhaps the one who chants psalms before the 
angels is he who apprehends the meaning of the psalms.176 
 
                                                 
174
 I am indebted again to Dysinger for his comments on these chapters, upon which the following 
reflections are largely based (Ibid., pp.98-100) 
175
 Praktikos 69-71. Translation: Sinkewicz, 2003, p.109 
176
 Scholia on Psalms 137:1. Translation from Dysinger, 2005, pp.100-101 
 156
Undistracted psalmody can thus mean three things: 
1. The mind is passively imprinted with the inner meaning of the psalm 
2. The mind receives no such impression (presumably because it is attentive to 
God) 
3. The mind actively searches for the meaning of the psalm 
 
Dysinger suggests that Evagrios intends that undistracted psalmody requires the 
ability to move backwards and forwards between these different meanings.177 It is a 
form of contemplative prayer which is impressionable, focussed on God, and 
actively searching, all at the same time – or at least in a dynamic interplay, one after 
the other. Whilst this is another way in which psalmody provides a remedy for the 
passions, by bringing about a “mingling” of the soul with virtue, this is clearly not 
its most important function. Rather, it is a reflection of the way in which psalmody 
merges with contemplative prayer. The focus here is on contemplation of the inner 
meanings of things, and on God himself.  
 
However, Evagrios also understood the Psalter, if not also the practice of 
psalmody,178 as a remedy for the passions in yet another way. Here, the metaphor 
that Dysinger employs is one of a spiritual weapon, rather than a medical remedy.179 
However, as we have seen, multiple metaphors may be applied in this arena, and we 
may return to the medical imagery shortly. 
 
The Psalter provided Evagrios with a spiritual weapon in various ways. Most 
fundamentally, it could be used for 
 (antirrhesis), that is “refutation” or 
“contradiction” of demons, thoughts, people, and sinful tendencies or behaviours. It 
also provided him with a source of spiritual comfort, and prayers.180 In all these 
ways, it could be used similarly to many other biblical texts. We have already seen 
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(above) that the book of Psalms was cited more frequently by Evagrios in his 
Antirrhetikos (a collection of biblical texts to be used for antirrhesis) than any other 
book of scripture. Interestingly, the Psalms are used most often not in the section 
devoted to anger (where 5 such quotations appear) but in the sections on sadness (22 
quotations) and acedia (18 quotations).181 Antirrhetic texts are found in Evagrios’ 
Scholia on Psalms, as well as in Antirrhetikos.182 
 
Returning to our theme of psalmody as a remedy for the passions, this “spiritual 
weapon” might better be understood in medical terms as being an antidote, a 
prophylactic medicine, or perhaps a form of cognitive psychotherapy. 
 
To review what has been said here on the Evagrian understanding of psalmody as a 
remedy for the passions, we are left with at least three models or processes: 
1. Psalmody as restorative of a balance in the thumos, perhaps primarily 
through the calming effect of the rhythm of psalmody 
2. Psalmody as bringing about a merging of the soul with the virtues, through a 
complex process of both active and passive contemplative prayer 
3. Psalmody as a cognitive and spiritual “antidote” for the passions 
 
Only the first of these might properly be said to be evident in texts included in the 
Philokalia, the second is merely hinted at, and the third is only to be found 
elsewhere in the Evagrian corpus. We must therefore now proceed to consider how 
other authors whose works are included in the Philokalia understand this remedy for 
the passions. 
 
Firstly, it must be said that there are surprisingly few references to psalmody (as 
opposed to references to the Psalms) in the Philokalia. Only 37 references are listed 
in Stapakis’ master index to the first four volumes of the English translation.183 This 
is surprising not only because of the length of the Philokalia (there being over 1500 
pages in these four volumes) but also because the Psalter occupied a central place in 
monastic life by the end of the 4th Century. Psalmody was virtually a universal 
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practice amongst the Desert Fathers, and occupied many of their waking hours.184 
Nor was the practice discontinued. Gregory of Sinai (c1265-1346), for example, 
describes a daily routine in which psalmody occupied three hours each day.185 
 
Secondly, it is evident that there is a heterogeneity of views on the subject of 
psalmody represented and addressed within the pages of the Philokalia. This is 
evident within one text by Gregory of Sinai, where he specifically addresses himself 
to the question: 
Why do some teach that we should psalmodize a lot, others a little, and 
others that we should not psalmodize at all but should devote ourselves only 
to prayer and to physical exertion such as manual labour, prostrations or 
some other strenuous activity?186 
 
However, it is not simply a question of varying views on quantity. Maximos the 
Confessor writes of psalmody as a means of acquiring love and cleaving to God.187 
Thalassios the Libyan refers to psalmody along with moderate fasting and vigils as a 
means of “achieving a balance in the body’s temperament”(presumably reflecting a 
humoral understanding similar to that of Evagrios).188 Ilias the Presbyter understands 
prayer as better than psalmody, and natural contemplation as better still.189 Nikitas 
Stithatos, who addresses himself to the problems of distraction in psalmody, 
emphasises psalmody as prayer of the intellect, and itself a form of contemplation.190 
 
Evagrios is not alone amongst contributors to the Philokalia in understanding 
psalmody as a remedy for the passions. John of Karpathos (? 5th to 7th Century), 
quoting Ephesians 5:19, refers to the use of psalms to destroy the passions within.191 
Maximos the Confessor, although making more references to psalmody in relation to 
love of God, does also refer to it as a means of repelling impassioned thoughts.192 
Thalassios the Libyan refers to psalmody as a means of preventing delusion of the 
intellect by the passions. Given his reference also the effect of psalmody upon the 
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temperament of the body (see above), or in other words the humoral balance of the 
body, we may wonder whether he shared an Evagrian sense of the capacity of 
psalmody to subdue the passions via a mediating effect at this level. 
 
We noted (above) that the Seven Forms of Bodily Discipline considered by Peter of 
Damaskos begin with three measures focussed on the development of the practical 
life. The fourth measure is the recital of psalms, which Peter understands as being 
directed at “purification of the intellect”.193 
 
The author of Three Methods of Prayer194 appears to take a different view. As we 
saw above, he proposes four stages of the spiritual life, of which the second stage is 
concerned with the practice of psalmody. However, according to this schema of the 
spiritual life, this second stage can only be reached after the passions have been 
curtailed (in the first stage) by guarding of the heart: 
For when the passions have been curtailed and laid to rest, psalmody brings 
delight to the tongue and is welcomed by God, since it is not possible to sing 
to the Lord in a strange land (cf. Ps. 137:4), that is to say, from an 
impassioned heart. This is the mark of those who are beginning to make 
progress.195 
 
So, not all texts in the Philokalia that refer to psalmody and the passions understand 
the former as being a remedy for the latter. However, as we have seen in the section 
on watchfulness (above) the Three Methods of Prayer does provide a somewhat 
different view of watchfulness as well. The Philokalia is not a uniform collection of 
texts that have been edited so as to be in complete agreement with each other, but 
rather they provide a variety of views around a central concern with the purification, 
illumination and perfection of the Christian soul. 
 
Psalmody cannot be understood as playing such a central role in the pharmacopaeia 
of remedies for the passions provided by the Philokalia as does, for example, ascetic 
practice or watchfulness. On the other hand, practice of psalmody was probably as 
universally observed as either of these practices were, at least in the 4th or 5th 
                                                 
193
 Philokalia 3:91, cf 3:119 
194
 Attributed to Symeon the New Theologian, but not actually written by him – see above. 
195
 Philokalia 4:73-74 
 160
Centuries.196 If we assume (pace the question on varied practice addressed by 
Nikitas Stithatos nearly a millennium later) that psalmody remained a fairly 
universal monastic practice more or less consistently during the period covered by 
the Philokalia, we must ask what argument can reliably be made from silence? 
Either psalmody was not considered by most writers to be a remedy for the passions, 
but rather was understood as something else (a form of contemplative prayer, for 
example) or else it might have been so widely understood that psalmody was a 
remedy for the passions that nothing need be said about it. Neither of these 
hypotheses would seem very secure. However, where the subject of the relationship 
between psalmody and the passions is directly addressed within the Philokalia it 
would seem to support the latter rather than the former. 
 
iv. Prayer 
 
Like watchfulness, prayer is so much at the heart of what the Philokalia is all about 
that it permeates almost every page. In fact, Stapakis’ master index to the English 
translation of the Philokalia includes almost 250 references to prayer.197 That the 
number is not even higher than this presumably relates only to the specificity of the 
use of the word “prayer”. It is difficult to imagine being able to find any page of the 
Philokalia that does not have something to do with prayer, either directly or 
indirectly. 
 
The Philokalia also has a diverse and broad understanding of what prayer might 
include, or how it might be defined. Thus, for example, it includes Evagrios’ 
definition that “Prayer is communion of the intellect with God”,198 Maximos the 
Confessor’s definition of prayer as “petition for the blessings given by the incarnate 
Logos”,199 and Gregory Palamas’ definition (quoting St Isaac) that “prayer is purity 
of the intellect”.200 
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Most contributors actually recognise a variety of kinds or levels of prayer. Thus, for 
example, Peter of Damaskos writes: 
For it is said of God that He ‘gives prayer to him who prays’ (1 Sam. 2:9. 
LXX); and indeed to one who truly prays the prayer of the body God gives 
the prayer of the intellect; and to one who diligently cultivates the prayer of 
the intellect, God gives the imageless and formless prayer that comes from 
the pure fear of Him. Again, to one who practises this prayer effectively, God 
grants the contemplation of created beings. Once this is attained - once the 
intellect has freed itself from all things and, not content with hearing about 
God at second hand, devotes itself to Him in action and thought - God 
permits it to be seized in rapture, conferring on it the gift of true theology and 
the blessings of the age to be. 201 
 
Peter seems to understand 5 stages of prayer: 
1. “prayer of the body” 
2. “prayer of the intellect” 
3. “imageless and formless prayer” 
4. “contemplation of created beings” 
5. complete devotion to God “in action and thought”, a “gift of true theology” 
 
We might imagine that the higher stages of this schema correspond approximately to 
Evagrios’ “pure prayer” (which is imageless and formless) and his categories of 
natural contemplation (of created beings) and theological contemplation (of God), 
although things cannot be quite that simple as, for Evagrios, pure prayer is imageless 
and natural contemplation is not.202 However, the idea that the prayers of beginners 
will be different to those of people advanced in prayer is common to both Evagrios 
and Peter.203 
 
Presumably, therefore, the first two stages of Peter’s hierarchy would relate to the 
kind of prayer that Evagrios would have expected of the readers of Praktikos – that 
is, those engaged in establishing the practical life. For Peter, “prayer of the body” 
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seems to have been psalmody.204 As we have already seen, Peter understood 
psalmody as having a purifying effect upon the intellect. We might imagine, 
therefore, that he understood psalmody as purifying the intellect in preparation for 
the second stage of prayer, “prayer of the intellect”. 
 
If prayer is to be understood as a remedy for the passions, we might then expect 
those prayers that effect this remedial action to be those most needed by beginners 
engaged with the issues and struggles of the practical life. In the Evagrian schema, 
those advanced in prayer, who are engaged in “pure prayer” or theological 
contemplation, have largely left the passions behind. This is not to say that they are 
immune or need not be aware of further attacks from the thoughts/passions/demons, 
but rather that they are more proficient in dealing with such things, and that having 
more or less achieved apatheia, their primary concern is now with contemplation of 
God. 
 
What kind of prayer, then, is required of beginners as a remedy for the passions? 
Both Evagrios and Peter seem to understand psalmody as playing an important part 
here. For Evagrios, as we have seen, psalmody has a bridge like quality, which takes 
prayer from concern with the multiform created order into the imagelessness of the 
divine unity. Its role for Peter (although we have not considered this in depth) would 
appear to be somewhat similar - in purifying the intellect in preparation for 
imageless prayer. Not that either Evagrios or Peter prescribe psalmody alone. 
Rather, as we have seen above, each of them emphasises the broader context of the 
need for engagement with the practical life.205 
 
But does the Philokalia offer any other kinds of prayer that exert this remedial 
efficacy against the passions? One in particular requires further consideration here, 
for it has become very important in the spiritual tradition with which the Philokalia 
is associated, and this is “the Jesus Prayer”. This is by no means only a prayer for 
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beginners, but it does assume an important place within the Philokalia as a remedy 
for the passions. 
 
The Jesus Prayer, in its full form, consists of the words “Lord Jesus Christ, Son of 
[the living] God, have mercy upon me [a sinner]”. However, it may be abbreviated 
in various ways (eg “Lord Jesus Christ, have mercy”, etc) and in its simplest form 
may involve only the name of “Jesus”. It is repeated many times, sometimes using a 
prayer rope with knots, which acts rather like a rosary, and it is usually 
recommended that repetition of the prayer be synchronised with breathing. For 
example, the first half of the prayer might be recited during inspiration, and the 
second half during expiration.206 
 
The repetition of this prayer is an ancient practice. Diadochos of Photiki (c400-
c486), in On Spiritual Knowledge, a work included in the Philokalia,207 attaches 
some importance to unceasing “remembrance” of “the Lord Jesus” although he does 
not invoke the precise formula of the Jesus Prayer in its fully developed form. Neilos 
the Ascetic (d c430) also refers to invocation of the name of Jesus in his writings, 
although not in the text on Ascetic Discourse included within the Philokalia.208 
Dorotheos of Gaza (c506-c560) is known to have used a prayer of the form “Lord 
Jesus Christ our God, have mercy on me! Son of God, save me!”.209 
 
The anonymous Discourse on Abba Philimon (? 6th to 7th Century), which is 
included in the Philokalia, is the earliest source to cite the precise formula “Lord 
Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy upon me”.210 The author cites Diadochos as 
authority for this prayer.211 Hesychios (? 8th or 9th Century), in a work included in 
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the Philokalia (Watchfulness & Holiness), seems to have been the first to refer to 
“the Jesus Prayer”.212 
 
The Jesus Prayer provides a bridge from prayer expressed in words to the silence of 
prayer that is listening to God. It also provides a bridge between formal times of 
prayer and prayer undertaken during the course of everyday amidst the routine of 
work and other activities. It is thus a means of making it possible to “pray without 
ceasing”.213 It can be undertaken (more commonly) alone, or in groups. It provides a 
means to focus thoughts in prayer, in the present moment, “laying aside” other 
thoughts and distractions,214 in the presence of God. It provides a bridge between 
oral prayer and prayer “of the heart”, between “our” prayer and the prayer of Jesus 
“in us”.215 
 
The Jesus Prayer is linked with the Philokalia in the popular 19th Century Russian 
story (or, more correctly, series of stories) commonly known as The Way of the 
Pilgrim.216 In these narratives a wandering pilgrim, who carries with him a copy of 
the Dobrotolubiye which he reads devotedly, recites the Jesus Prayer continuously. 
The text of the Philokalia is quoted and alluded to frequently within the text of The 
Way of the Pilgrim. The “pilgrim” provides a model for the spiritual life of every 
Christian. 
 
The English translators of the Philokalia suggest that “it is the recurrent references 
to the Jesus Prayer which more than anything else confer on [the Philokalia] its 
inner unity”.217 Although the Jesus Prayer is undoubtedly an important theme 
running through the Philokalia, this assertion would seem to go too far. Depending 
upon exactly how one might define references to the Jesus Prayer, it would seem 
that less than half of the contributing authors might be considered to make any kind 
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of reference to the Jesus Prayer.218 However, in places it does indeed assume 
particular importance, and one aspect of this importance is its place as a remedy for 
the passions. To that we must now turn. As the use of the Jesus Prayer is closely 
related to the subject of watchfulness, we shall consider again here the same four 
texts that we studied, above, under that heading. 
 
a. Hesychios the Priest: Watchfulness & Holiness 
We have already seen that Hesychios considers watchfulness and the Jesus Prayer to 
be closely related considerations. “[C]ontinually and humbly calling upon the Lord 
Jesus Christ for help” was, in fact, the third of his five methods of watchfulness. Not 
only this, but he considered invocation of the name of Jesus to be a vital component 
of the overall process. He writes: 
Watchfulness and the Jesus Prayer, as I have said, mutually reinforce one 
another; for close attentiveness goes with constant prayer, while prayer goes 
with close watchfulness and attentiveness of intellect.219 
 
and again: 
The Jesus Prayer requires watchfulness as a lantern requires a candle.220 
 
The Jesus Prayer is not only a part of watchfulness in Hesychios’ view of things. It 
is, rather, a form of prayer which reinforces, and is reinforced by, watchfulness, and 
which requires watchfulness, just as watchfulness requires the Jesus Prayer. 
 
The Jesus Prayer is, however, also a remedy for the passions in its own right. In fact, 
Hesychios goes so far as to say that: 
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it is impossible to cleanse our heart from impassioned thoughts and to expel 
its spiritual enemies without the frequent invocation of Jesus Christ221 
 
and again: 
Just as snow will not produce a flame, or water a fire, or the thorn-bush a fig, 
so a person's heart will not be freed from demonic thoughts, words and 
actions until it has first purified itself inwardly, uniting watchfulness with the 
Jesus Prayer, attaining humility and stillness of soul, and eagerly pressing 
forward on its path.222 
 
Elsewhere he refers to invocation of the name of Jesus as making the mind 
“invulnerable” to its enemies.223 He refers to calling upon the name of Jesus as a 
means of conquering demonic fantasy.224 He refers to the “venerable name of Jesus” 
as a means of breaking and routing the devil,225 and to invocation of Jesus Christ by 
the intellect as a means of routing the demons and putting them to flight.226 
Invocation of Jesus Christ is also a cure for forgetfulness,227 and a means of 
dispersing evil thoughts.228 Although many of the metaphors used here are military 
rather than medical, it is clear that Hesychios sees the Jesus Prayer as a powerful and 
uniquely effective remedy for the passions. 
 
b. Philotheos of Sinai: Forty Texts on Watchfulness 
Like Hesychios, Philotheos of Sinai also perceives a close connection between 
watchfulness and calling on Jesus Christ in prayer. After introducing his “noetic 
vision” in the first of his Forty Texts, he links watchfulness and the Jesus Prayer in 
his second text as means of achieving this vision: 
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From dawn we should stand bravely and unflinchingly at the gate of the 
heart, with true remembrance of God and unceasing prayer of Jesus Christ in 
the soul; and, keeping watch with the intellect, we should slaughter all the 
sinners of the land (cf. Ps. 101:8. LXX). Given over in the intensity of our 
ecstasy to the constant remembrance of God, we should for the Lord’s sake 
cut off the heads of the tyrants (cf. Hab. 3:14. LXX), that is to say, should 
destroy hostile thoughts at their first appearance.229 
 
Already, the nature of the relationship that Philotheos understands between 
watchfulness and the Jesus Prayer is hinted at here. The “true remembrance of God 
and unceasing prayer of Jesus Christ” hints both at the vision of the preceding 
paragraph, and also that such prayer is a weapon to be used in guarding that vision. 
In fact, Philotheos later employs a phrase which is uniquely his within the Philokalia 
– “to guard the heart with Jesus”.230 This is both a watching with and a fighting with. 
Jesus is vision, companion and weapon at the gateway to our hearts. 
 
Later this relationship between watchfulness and prayer is spelled out in a little more 
detail: 
You must direct your wrath only against the demons, for they wage war upon us 
through our thoughts and are full of anger against us. As regards the manner of 
the hourly warfare within us, listen and act accordingly. Combine prayer with 
inner watchfulness, for watchfulness purifies prayer, while prayer purifies 
watchfulness. It is through unceasing watchfulness that we can perceive what is 
entering into us and can to some extent close the door against it, calling upon our 
Lord Jesus Christ to repel our malevolent adversaries. Attentiveness obstructs 
the demons by rebutting them; and Jesus, when invoked, disperses them together 
with all their fantasies.231 
 
Watchfulness perceives the approach of the demons or evil thoughts and “to some 
extent” is effective in rebutting them. The incensive power of the soul, “wrath”, is 
also a weapon that Philotheos encourages us to us against them. But it is only 
invocation of the name of Jesus that effectively repels and disperses them. 
 
In addition to repulsion and dispersal of demons/thoughts, Philotheos of Sinai refers 
to the use of “unceasing prayer of Jesus Christ” to “destroy hostile thoughts at their 
                                                 
229
 Philokalia 3:16, #2 
230
 Philokalia 3:18, #8 
231
 Philokalia 3:26, #25. See also #26 – quoted above. 
 168
first appearance”,232 and to “remembrance of Jesus Christ” to “concentrate your 
scattered intellect”.233 We saw (above – in the section on watchfulness) that he also 
speaks of the enemy being “put out of action”. Later he writes: 
The blessed remembrance of God - which is the very presence of Jesus - with 
a heart full of wrath and a saving animosity against the demons, dissolves all 
trickeries of thought, plots, argumentation, fantasies, obscure conjectures 
and, in short, everything with which the destroyer arms himself and which he 
insolently deploys in his attempt to swallow our souls. When Jesus is 
invoked, He promptly burns up everything. For our salvation lies in Christ 
Jesus alone. The Saviour Himself made this clear when He said: 'Without Me 
you can do nothing' (John 15:5).234 
 
As with Hesychios, the primary metaphors used here are military rather than medical 
but, again, it is clear that Philotheos sees invocation of the name of Jesus as a 
powerful remedy for the passions. This remedy is applied as a means to an end of 
contemplative prayer, but in the process of its application that end is in part 
achieved, for it sees us standing side by side with Jesus. Conversely, the end in sight 
– perfect remembrance of God in the heart - is itself also large part of the remedy. 
 
 
c. [Symeon the New Theologian]: Three Methods of Prayer 
When considering the understanding of watchfulness offered by the author of Three 
Methods of Prayer (above) we noted that the method recommended concludes with 
invocation of Jesus Christ. Here, watchfulness seems to precede the use of the Jesus 
Prayer, and the latter is referred to mainly as a means of dealing with distractive 
thoughts. Here is the full description of the method: 
Then sit down in a quiet cell, in a corner by yourself, and do what I tell you. 
Close the door, and withdraw your intellect from everything worthless and 
transient. Rest your beard on your chest, and focus your physical gaze, 
together with the whole of your intellect, upon the centre of your belly or 
your navel. Restrain the drawing-in of breath through your nostrils, so as not 
to breathe easily, and search inside yourself with your intellect so as to find 
the place of the heart, where all the powers of the soul reside. To start with 
you will find there darkness and an impenetrable density. Later, when you 
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persist and practice this task day and night, you will find, as though 
miraculously, an unceasing joy. For as soon as the intellect attains the place 
of the heart, at once it sees things of which it previously knew nothing. It 
sees the open space within the heart and it beholds itself entirely luminous 
and full of discrimination. From then on, from whatever side a distractive 
thought may appear, before it has come to completion and assumed a form, 
the intellect immediately drives it away and destroys it with the invocation of 
Jesus Christ. From this point onwards the intellect begins to be full of 
rancour against the demons and, rousing its natural anger against its noetic 
enemies, it pursues them and strikes them down. The rest you will learn for 
yourself, with God's help, by keeping guard over your intellect and by 
retaining Jesus in your heart. As the saying goes, 'Sit in your cell and it will 
teach you everything.’235 
 
Although the Jesus Prayer does appear to be a part of this method, the emphasis is 
more on the location of the intellect in the heart, as a way of guarding the heart, and 
less on the invocation of the name of Jesus. The latter also occurs after the former 
has been established, rather than (as with Hesychios) being integral and mutually 
reinforcing. After his description of the method of prayer, the author returns to the 
theme of his four stages of prayer. Here, in the third stage,236 “invocation of the Lord 
Jesus Christ” is used to rout the evil spirits that cause further “blasts of passion”. 
 
 
d. Nikiphoros the Monk: Watchfulness and Guarding 
We saw, above, that Nikiphoros the Monk recommends a psychosomatic form of 
guarding of the heart similar to that of the author of the Three Methods, and that he 
also refers to use of the Jesus Prayer only after the establishing of the intellect in the 
heart as the method of guarding the heart: 
Moreover, when your intellect is firmly established in your heart, it must not 
remain there silent and idle; it should constantly repeat and meditate on the 
prayer, 'Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have mercy on me', and should never 
                                                 
235
 Philokalia 4:72-73 
236
 The description is a little confusing, and appears to locate this description in the second stage. 
However, in order to be congruent with the previous description of the four stages, and in order to 
make sense of the progression described, it would appear that the invocation of Jesus Christ must be 
located in the third stage. This is still somewhat confusing, as the method of prayer described 
appeared to be offered for use from the first stage onwards. All that can be said with any degree of 
certainty is that, both in the description of the method itself, and in the description of the four stages 
of the spiritual life (as offered on p74) invocation of the name of Jesus appears to be something that 
comes into play after guarding of the heart has been established, rather than as being integral to it. 
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stop doing this. For this prayer protects the intellect from distraction, renders 
it impregnable to diabolic attacks, and every day increases its love and desire 
for God.237 
 
The emphasis here is already more clearly on establishing the intellect in the heart so 
as to pray – rather than an end in itself. The role of the Jesus Prayer is also expanded 
here (in comparison with the description in Three Methods) to defend against 
diabolic attacks and to increase love for God. However, more importantly, it also 
assumes a role where the initiate experiences difficulty with the method of 
establishing the intellect in the heart: 
If, however, in spite of all your efforts you are not able to enter the realms of 
the heart in the way I have enjoined, do what I now tell you and with God's 
help you will find what you seek. You know that everyone's discursive 
faculty is centred in his breast; for when our lips are silent we speak and 
deliberate and formulate prayers, psalms and other things in our breast. 
Banish, then, all thoughts from this faculty - and you can do this if you want 
to - and in their place put the prayer, 'Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, have 
mercy on me', and compel it to repeat this prayer ceaselessly. If you continue 
to do this for some time, it will assuredly open for you the entrance to your 
heart in the way we have explained, and as we ourselves know from 
experience.238 
 
The Jesus Prayer therefore appears to assume greater importance here than it is 
given by the author of Three Methods. 
 
 
e. The Jesus Prayer: Some Conclusions 
In conclusion, the Jesus Prayer clearly plays an important part in the Philokalia. Its 
use is closely related to the also important process of watchfulness, and the authors 
studied here generally seem to understand a mutually supportive relationship 
between the two. The nature of that relationship varies, with some accounts 
emphasising more the process of watchfulness (eg as in Three Methods of Prayer), 
and others the Jesus Prayer (eg Hesychios). However, in general, it must be 
concluded that the Jesus Prayer represents another important remedy provided 
within the therapeutic repertoire of the Philokalia. 
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5. Remedies for the Passions - Conclusions 
 
The classical world, the Desert Fathers (including Evagrios), and the other authors of 
the Philokalia all sought remedies for the passions. In various ways, they understood 
the passions as enslaving, as hostile pleasures, which should at least be curbed if not 
completely eliminated. 
 
Classical philosophy emphasised the importance of reason, and so tended to find 
reasonable remedies, although it has to be said that the Stoics were so radical in this 
quest that some readers may feel that the extremity of some of their measures, and of 
the quest to eliminate even human emotions that our society would value, might 
make them seem unreasonable. 
 
Evagrios and the Desert Fathers were also radical. Whilst the influence of classical 
philosophy is evident, especially in the writings of Evagrios, their motivation for 
elimination of the passions was clearly different. For them, the passions were a part 
of a world in which evil thoughts and demonic entities were not always easy to 
distinguish, and the quest to eliminate the passions was as much (perhaps more) 
theologically motivated than it was concerned with human flourishing, although of 
course they would not have distinguished between these aims. Radical evil called for 
radical measures, and some of the remedies that they applied would clearly be 
judged harmful, psychologically or physically, by our society. But this is to overlook 
an equally radical vision of prayer, which, for them, was so inspiring as to make all 
other sacrifices worthwhile. 
 
These are the traditions that the authors of the Philokalia inherited and interpreted, 
each for their own day. If we are correct in assuming that the Philokalia was 
compiled as a “guide to the practice of the contemplative life”, then the remedies 
that it sought to provide for the passions were each included with a view to the 
fundamental vision of prayer which made radical sacrifice worthwhile. But the 
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Philokalia also spans such a broad swathe of history that it is not surprising that it 
also includes considerable reflection and variation upon the inherited influences of 
the classical world and, more importantly, the Christian traditions that emerged from 
the Egyptian desert in the 4th Century. 
 
The remedies for the passions that are found within the Philokalia are based upon 
perceptive psychological insights, and a depth of theological reflection. They are 
holistic, taking into account physical, psychological and spiritual aspects of what it 
means to be human. They are not cures which will simply make the problem go 
away, but they offer a way of life which may subdue and overcome the hostile 
pleasures that are the passions. 
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Table 4.1 Remedies against the Passion in Eight 
Thoughts and Praktikos 
 
Passion Remedies 
 
Eight 
Thoughts 
Praktikos 
Gluttony Abstinence/Fasting 
 
1.1, 1.9, 1.14, 
1.15, 1.20, 
1.24, 1.26, 
1.31 
 
Dry diet 1.13  
Avoiding heavy consumption 1.5, 1.16   
Avoiding satiety 1.17, 1.28, 
1.33 
16 
Avoiding banquets 1.21  
Avoiding rich foods 1.34  
Avoid variety of foods  16 
Fornication Abstinence 2.1  
Avoid encounters with women 2.2, 2.6, 2.8-
10, 2.13, 2.15 
 
Avoid satiety 2.4, 2.11-12  
Avoid crowds 2.5, 2.7  
Avoid prolonged thinking about 
women 
2.19-20  
Avoid thinking about 
fornication 
 23 
Restrained use of water  17 
Vainglorious thoughts  58 
Avarice Freedom of possessions 3.3-7, 3.10-13  
Avoid thinking about 
possessions 
3.7  
Charity  18 
Anger Avoid resentment 4.6, 4.14, 
4.16, 4.19, 
4.21 
 
Avoid angry thoughts 4.7, 4.16 23 
Compassion & gentleness  20 
Resist temptation to withdraw  21 
Turn anger against the demons  24 
Avoid provoking others to 
anger 
 25 
Hospitality  26 
Sadness Abstinence 5.12  
Impassibility 5.8-15  
Avoid worldly pleasure  19 
Acedia Perseverance 6.3, 6.5, 6.17  
Stay in your cell 6.5 28 
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Passion Remedies 
 
Eight 
Thoughts 
Praktikos 
Avoid distracting activity 6.6-7  
Avoid distracting thoughts 6.8, 6.14  
Work 6.17-18  
Prayer 6.18  
Tears  27 
Thoughts of death  29 
Abstinence  29 
Vainglory Prayer in private 7.12  
Keep virtue secret 7.13, 7.18-19  
Avoid boasting 7.15  
Do not seek the esteem of 
others 
7.20-21  
Dishonour & sadness 8.30, 8.31 58 
Keep in mind purpose and goal 
of spiritual contemplation 
 32 
Pride Avoid confidence in own 
strength 
8.5-6, 8.31  
Give credit to God 8.12 33 
Avoid presumption 8.16, 8.21  
Avoid boasting 8.18  
Welcome instruction 8.23-26  
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Chapter 5: Mental Well-Being 
 
If the Philokalia provides a pharmacopoeia of remedies for the passions, then a little 
more needs to be said about the goal of the programme of treatment in support of 
which they are applied. Or, to put things a little differently, what does it mean to be a 
healthy and flourishing human being? In particular, what understanding of mental 
well-being does the Philokalia convey? 
 
As in previous chapters, it will be helpful first to consider what the traditions of 
understanding were in the classical world and amongst the Desert Fathers, especially 
Evagrios. However, at this point some complicating problems of language, 
philosophy and history can no longer be avoided. Firstly, the overarching title of this 
work has been The Philokalia and the Inner Life. But what does it mean to speak of 
an “inner” life? 
 
Charles Taylor1 has pointed out that there is a language of inwardness in relation to 
the self which we imagine to be universal but which is actually a specific feature of 
self understanding in modern western civilisation. This is not to say that there are 
not universal ways in which human beings understand “inner” and “outer” 
dimensions to their lives, but rather that these universals are always embedded in 
historically and culturally richer and more specific understandings which rarely 
share many of the other features of our own sense of an inner “self”: 
 
There is a sense of “inside” which designates the thought or desires or intentions 
which we hold back for ourselves, as against those which we express in speech and 
action. When I refrain from saying what I think about you, the thought remains 
inner, and when I blurt it out, then it is in the public domain. This distinction seems 
to be a common theme to many different cultures, one which is woven into a richer 
notion of what “inner” and “outer” mean, which expresses in each case the specific 
moral/spiritual vision of the civilization.2 
 
                                                 
1
 Taylor, 1989, p.7 
2
 Ibid., p.113 
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For Taylor, the richer understanding of what “inner” and “outer” mean in our society 
has been formed by such processes as disengagement, radical reflexivity and 
expressivism. However important an understanding of these processes might be to 
the hermeneutical process of applying the insights of the Philokalia to contemporary 
western life, we must beware any uncritical tendency towards finding them in its 
pages.  
 
The history of inwardness which Taylor traces begins with Plato, but we should 
immediately notice that he chooses this starting point because it is clearly different 
to our own. Further, the next step in Taylor’s history is concerned with Augustine of 
Hippo, to whom he attributes a major part in developing the language of inwardness 
that we know and use today. But Augustine of Hippo did not influence the history or 
thought of the Philokalia. The inner life of which the Philokalia speaks is therefore 
not necessarily the same in all respects, indeed is quite probably not at all the same 
in many respects, as the inner life of which we are used to speaking. 
 
The second problem that we face is the use of the word “mental” in relation to well-
being. This word, which has a 15th Century Latin etymology, may now be defined 
as: 
of or involving the mind or an intellectual process3 
 
We have already seen (in Chapter 2) that the “intellect” (or TLHJ[b`c ) has a specific 
meaning to the authors of the Philokalia which is significantly different than that of 
common contemporary western usage. “Mind” is also a word which does not have a 
direct equivalent in the Philokalia, but rather overlaps with the fields of meaning of 
words such as intellect (TLHJ[b`c ), reason (dKReiSUTLHJKfe ) and soul (). Furthermore, 
contemporary western understandings of the mind are overlaid with further strata of 
philosophical meaning, notably those of René Descartes and his later critics, all of 
which are completely alien to the Philokalia. All of this behoves us to be careful in 
our terminology. 
 
                                                 
3
 Anderson, Butterfield, Daintith, Holmes, Isaacs, Law, Lilly, Martin, McKeown, Stibbs and 
Summers, 2004 
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It might be argued that well-being of the soul, or spiritual well-being, would be 
better terms to use here, but this would simply shift the ground of debate, rather than 
avoid confusion altogether. In any case, it is already clear that the spiritual and 
psychological aspects of human well-being (not to mention also the physical and 
social) are so closely intertwined that no discussion of one can avoid discussion of 
the other without loss of something important to an overall understanding of what 
human well-being is all about. 
 
The third problem that needs to be identified here is with the use of the word “well-
being” itself. Here, the dictionary definition refers to 
the condition of being contented, healthy, or successful; welfare4 
 
Health is in turn somewhat difficult to define. Definitions in terms of the absence of 
disease are generally considered to be inadequate. The standard contemporary 
definition of the World Health Organisation, which somewhat controversially does 
not recognise a spiritual dimension to the concept, defines it in a rather circular 
fashion in terms of well-being.5 Contemporary academic notions of well-being have 
in turn taken rather subjectivist, psychological and economic perspectives which 
would be largely anachronistic to ancient authors (although some interesting 
parallels with Epicureanism might be explored).6 
 
It is interesting that our contemporary dictionary definition of well-being does not 
refer to happiness (although arguably contentment is not unrelated to happiness), or 
virtue, or the “good life”. Previous generations of philosophers might find this 
completely incomprehensible. For example, Darrin McMahon7 has traced a history 
of The Pursuit of Happiness which shows, amongst other things, that thinking about 
happiness and well-being have been inextricably linked since ancient times. 
                                                 
4
 Ibid. 

 “Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of 
disease or infirmity”. (Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by 
the International Health Conference, New York, 19-22 June, 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the 
representatives of 61 States (Official Records of the World Health Organization, no. 2, p. 100) and 
entered into force on 7 April 1948.) 
6
 Eid and Larsen, 2008, Searle, 2008 
7
 MacMahon, 2006 
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Furthermore, the Greek word 	is capable of translation as either happiness 
or well-being (although arguably the latter is more appropriate than the former). 
 
The approach taken here, in regard to discussions of mental well-being, will 
therefore be one of exploring a range of terminology and concepts which appear to 
be characteristic of the literature concerned (firstly that of the Classical world, then 
that of the Desert Fathers and then, most importantly, that of the Philokalia itself). It 
will become apparent that well-being is a somewhat chameleon like concept (if 
indeed it might be regarded as a concept with any coherent or consistent meaning at 
all) that reflects the values, philosophies and theologies of the individuals and 
communities that have sought to find it. The aim in this chapter is not so much to 
critique those values and philosophies so much as to understand what they might 
have been. 
 
   
 
1. The Classical Tradition 
 
In the classical tradition, health was understood as being concerned with appeals to 
natural norms and to a balance or blending of the qualities (moist and dry, hot and 
cold).8 However, the philosopher Democritus of Abdera (fl 420 BCE), for example, 
noted that lifestyle was also important to an understanding of health, and that desires 
of the soul (eg for wine) could impair the health of the body.9 Furthermore, human 
happiness does not depend upon physical health alone. What was (and is) more 
important than health in a narrowly medical sense therefore came to be recognised 
as human flourishing, or “eudaimonia” (	).10 Eudaimonia, although it is 
sometimes translated as “happiness” actually implies activity rather than a passive 
state or feeling. It also carries a sense of the “completeness” of life, and thus cannot 
properly be assessed until a human life has been lived from birth through to death. 
                                                 
8
 Nutton, 2006, p.47 
9
 Ibid., p.50 
10
 Nussbaum, 1994, p.15. As Nussbaum notes, translation of eudaimonia as “happiness” is 
misleading. Her preferred translation is “human flourishing”. 
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In Herodotus’ The History,11 the story is recounted of (an almost certainly fictional) 
encounter between the fabulously rich king of Lydia, Croesus, and the sage Solon. 
Croesus wished to know who the happiest man in the world might be, although it is 
clear that he thought he must be that man himself. He is shocked when Solon 
suggests that the happiest man is a dead father from Athens, killed in battle in the 
prime of life. Solon’s suggested equal contenders for second place are also dead: two 
brothers who died in their sleep. Croesus concludes that Solon is “assuredly a stupid 
man”12, but lives to repent of this and, having lost his son and a battle, and thinking 
that he is about to lose his own life as well, he asserts that “No one who lives is 
happy”.13 
 
The story of Croesus and Solon is a reminder that none of us know what turn our 
lives will take in the future, and that the ways in which we negotiate tragedy and 
death are important components of well-being or “happiness”. Important to note 
here, however, is that Herodotus employs at least three Greek words in order to refer 
to what it was that Croesus desired. Eudaimonia was to become the centrally 
important term in Greek philosophy, but here it is used alongside two words which 
might be translated “blessed”: olbios (	 	
) and makarios (	
). All three of 
these words might be translated as “happiness”. Olbios and makarios might also be 
rendered as “fortunate”14 although in the latter case (as we shall see later) 
considerable theological reflection has subsequently been added by Christians to its 
original classical sense. 
 
For Plato, eudaimonia was a matter of the harmony of the soul.15 As health was to 
the body, eudaimonia was to the soul. This healthy, or harmonious, functioning of 
the soul was concerned with the ruling of the appetitive and incensive parts by the 
rational part. It was therefore not primarily a matter of feelings, but of the exercise 
of reason and self-mastery, and thus of virtuous living. Taylor16 notes that this is not 
to be understood as mastery of the inner world over the outer (although undoubtedly 
                                                 
11
 The account here is based on MacMahon, 2006, pp.1-9 
12
 Ibid., p.2 
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 Ibid., p.7 
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 Ibid., pp.2-4 
15
 Lee, 2003, pp.40, 149-150 
16
 Taylor, 1989, pp.115-126 
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Plato did think it better to live according to virtue, and to suffer for it, than to act 
contrary to virtue and be successful). Rather it was an affirmation of the soul over 
the body, the immaterial over the material, and the eternal over the changing. More 
importantly, the Platonic conception of reason was not one of the autonomously 
exercised reason of an individual, so much as conformity with a universal order of 
reason. It was about a vision of a cosmic order of reason. It was concerned with 
accession to an order of things outside oneself. 
 
For Aristotle, eudaimonia was defined in terms of both a life of virtue and adequate 
availability of external goods.17 As we have already seen in Chapter 4, Aristotle (like 
Plato) did not imagine that this required elimination of the passions – but rather their 
moderation. Aristotle also placed an emphasis on practical wisdom (phronesis) 
exercised by the individual in particular circumstances, but this was combined with 
an appreciation (common to Plato and Aristotle) of the importance of contemplation 
() of the eternal order. Contemplation brought human beings closer to the 
divine order, it was concerned with a striving for perfection. And because human 
beings are uniquely endowed with reason, the exercise of reason was understood as 
being a particularly important part of this striving. 
 
For the Epicureans and Skeptics, eudaimonia was concerned with freedom from 
disturbance by the passions or “ataraxia”. For the Skeptics this was concerned with 
eschewing commitment to particular beliefs.18 For the Epicureans, it was held 
important to see through the illusions of divine order in order to appreciate the 
pleasures of present reality.19  
 
For the Stoics, complete elimination of the passions was necessary for eudaimonia, 
which was defined in terms of the right activity of reason, or wisdom and virtue in 
thought.20 The Stoics retained a vision of a cosmic order but (in distinction to Plato 
and Aristotle) not of contemplation of this order for its own sake.21 For the Stoics, 
virtue was everything. 
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 Thomson, Treddenick and Barnes, 1983, p.84, Taylor, 1989, p.125 
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 Sorabji, 2002, pp.182, 208, Nussbaum, 1994, pp.300-306, 500 
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 Taylor, 1989, p.126 
20
 Nussbaum, 1994, pp.344, 366 
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Classical notions of human flourishing were therefore diverse, but generally 
included an important place for the proper use of reason to eschew, or adopt, proper 
beliefs as a basis for behaviour. 
 
 
 
2. The Desert Fathers 
 
In the Apophthegmata human flourishing, happiness, health and well-being do not 
seem to be predominant concerns. In fact, any understanding of such that might be 
found here is rather turned upside down. Things are actually often said to be well 
when they appear to be quite the opposite. Thus, for example, Abba Nilus says: 
Happy is the monk who thinks he is the outcast of all.22 
 
However, other related themes do emerge as important. Thus, inner peace (or 
hesychia) is highly prized. For example, Antony the Great warns against losing it,23 
Abba Doulas urges that it should be protected24, and Abba Joseph exhorts a brother 
to go wherever his soul will most be at peace.25 Abba Rufus, in response to a 
brother’s question, says that inner peace is: 
sitting in one’s cell with fear and knowledge of God, holding far off the 
remembrance of wrongs suffered and pride of spirit. Such interior peace 
brings forth all the virtues, preserves the monk from the burning darts of the 
enemy, and does not allow him to be wounded by them.26 
 
He goes on not only to urge the brother to acquire it, but to exhort him to keep in 
mind his future death. In Rufus’s estimation it is therefore clearly not an easy 
accommodation with comfortable feelings, but rather a challenging confrontation 
with one’s own contingency upon God. It is also not singled out as an unique goal. 
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 Ibid., p.55 
25
 Ibid., p.103, #8 
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 Ibid., p.210, #1 
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For example, Abba Poemen sees it as an equivalent work to giving thanks to God 
despite illness, or serving God with purity of mind.27 
 
Similarly, the thematic collection of sayings has a whole section on progress in 
perfection. As is so typical of the Apophthegmata, perfection does not appear to be 
understood here in any consistent fashion. We find Antony telling us how to please 
God,28 Zacharias telling us what makes a monk,29 John the Short imagining a man 
with all the virtues,30 Sisois telling us how to find peace,31 and an anonymous hermit 
urging us to seek inner grief and humility,32 amongst a variety of other sayings. 
Perfection may be found here in various, and often paradoxical, ways. Perhaps this is 
not surprising if we recall that these sayings emerged from a tradition which had 
sought peace and perfection by a living martyrdom in the Egyptian desert. Here, 
health and well-being are found only when they are lost.33 
 
 
3. Evagrios of Pontus 
 
Evagrios generally seems to regard health as being the antithesis of the passions. 
Thus, for example, in Gnostikos he states: 
Those, therefore, who are still afflicted with the passions and who peer into 
the logoi of bodies and incorporeal [beings] resemble invalids who [carry on] 
discuss[ions] concerning health.34 
 
Here, he refers to those who are afflicted by the passions as resembling “invalids”. 
More usually, he refers metaphorically, analogically, or otherwise to passions as 
states of sickness or disease, and occasionally to wounds or injuries.35 
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Elsewhere, virtually all of the eight thoughts are explicitly contrasted to a state of 
health. Thus, for example, he refers to gluttony as “unbridled madness, a receptacle 
of disease, envy of health” and abstinence he associates with health.36 Similarly, 
anger, fornication, sadness, acedia, vainglory and pride are all contrasted with health 
of the soul.37 
 
If the passions are contrasted with health, it is therefore no surprise to discover that 
Evagrios associates impassibility with health. In Praktikos, he even goes so far as to 
say that impassibility is the health of the soul. 38 In Chapter 2 we noted that Evagrios 
understood demonic thoughts as entering the soul through mental representations or 
images,39 and so it is also no surprise to find that he understands the formation of 
images in sleep as an indication of ill health.40 
 
There are occasional hints that Evagrios does not necessarily see health of the body 
and health of the soul as always going together. Thus, for example, we find him 
saying (at the beginning of a series of chapters on acedia) that “what is food for the 
healthy body constitutes a temptation for the noble soul”.41 He also acknowledges 
that illness and health do not distinguish between the just and the unjust.42 However, 
elsewhere (and perhaps more commonly), he appears to see what is healthy for the 
soul as being good also for the body.43  
 
                                                                                                                                         
reference to being wounded see On Thoughts 36; for reference to infirmity and injury see Kephalaia 
Gnostika 3.46 
36
 Sinkewicz, 2003, p62 and p103, #29 
37
 Ibid., pp82 (#5.15), 86 (#7.20), 163 (#15), 178 (#36); Antirrhetikos 7.9, 7.39, 7.41. Kephalaia 
Gnostika 6.63. I have not been able to find a specific reference contrasting avarice to health. 
However, Evagrios refers to avarice as “an abundance of illnesses….insatiable madness” (On the 
Vices Opposed to the Virtues 3) and also to wounds inflicted by the demon of avarice (On Thoughts 
1). 
38
 Eight Thoughts 5:15; Praktikos 56. However, note that it is possible to experience degrees of 
impassibility, and that a small degree of impassibility does therefore not imply that a person can no 
longer be afflicted by the passions (see On Thoughts 15). 
39
 See On Thoughts 2 
40
 Praktikos 55 
41
 Sinkewicz, 2003, p.83, #6.1 
42
 Scholia on Ecclesiastes 3:21 
43
 Eg Praktikos 29 
184 
 
Whilst the health of the soul is an important concept in the Evagrian literature, it is 
not the only one of relevance to our exploration of mental well-being or human 
flourishing. In particular stillness (hesychia), peace and blessedness are important. 
 
Stillness is the fruit of the ascetic life44 and psalmody.45 Its preservation requires 
guarding of the senses, a “war on thoughts”,46 and perseverance.47 It confers 
blessings and is “full of joy and beauty”.48 It is the “criterion for testing the value of 
everything”.49 
 
Evagrios urges that peace is to be sought in body, soul and spirit.50 Peace with God 
is found through tears of penitence.51 Peace is related both to impassibility and also 
to pure prayer, or contemplation.52 
 
In at least two places in the Philokalia, dispassion is referred to by Evagrios as a 
blessing.53 Prayer is also referred to as a blessed gift and a blessed path.54 In To 
Eulogios, but not included in the Philokalia, Evagrios allegorically applies one of 
the beatitudes from Jesus’ sermon on the mount (“Blessed are the peacemakers for 
they shall be called sons of God”, Matthew 5:9) to the need for bringing about peace 
of body, spirit and soul.55 In particular he urges his reader to apply ascetic discipline 
in the task of bringing about peace between body and spirit, and contemplative 
prayer to achieve peace and joy in the intellect. 
 
An interesting set of seven beatitudes are included in On Prayer (see Table 5.2) 
which appear to be original to Evagrios.56 The first four of these beatitudes are 
concerned with the blessedness of the intellect in relationship to God in prayer, a 
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blessedness which is associated with a series of freedoms: from forms (or mental 
images), from distractions, from material things, and from sensations. Positively 
these freedoms (or at least the second of them) are associated with a greater desire 
for God. The remaining three of these beatitudes are concerned with blessedness of 
the monk in relation to self and others. Respectively, they are concerned with the 
ability of the monk to see God in others, to rejoice in the spiritual progress of others 
of others as though it were his own, and to regard himself as “the off-scouring of all 
things”.57 Positively these three beatitudes (or at least the first of them) are 
associated with an encounter with God in others. 
 
The Evagrian beatitudes invert our understanding of happiness and well-being in a 
similar way to the sayings recorded in the Apophthegmata or the beatitudes 
attributed to Jesus in two of the synoptic gospels (Matthew 5:3-11 and Luke 6:20-
22), all of which Evagrios was presumably very familiar with. Perhaps most 
especially they are evocative of Mathew 5:8, “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they 
will see God”. 
 
As we saw in Chapter 2, for Evagrios, the goal in life was “pure prayer” or 
contemplative knowledge of God. Impassibility and inner peace, or hesychia, were 
merely preparatory for this. In a very real sense, for Evagrios, human flourishing 
was not so much about health, peace, or impassibility but rather about contemplative 
prayer and, ultimately, union with God. In Chapter 2 we considered the 
Christological context of this. Because God, in Christ, has both descended and 
ascended, so the contemplative who has (like all human beings) fallen from a state 
of health58 is enabled to ascend to contemplative knowledge of God, a state of 
perfect health59 and well-being. 
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4. The Philokalia 
 
For Evagrios, then, human well-being was ultimately “pure prayer” or contemplative 
knowledge of God. This is, more or less, the tradition that the Philokalia adopted. 
Remedies for the passions are understood in the Philokalia as being applied with a 
view to attaining a state of contemplative prayer, or union with God, which is 
desirable above all other things. Even hesychia or apatheia are only objectives which 
are necessary as a means of achieving this goal. However, the exact nature of human 
well-being in the Philokalia is complex and multi-faceted and needs to be 
considered in more detail. 
 
 
i. Deification 
 
We have noted that Nikodimos understood the Philokalia as being “an instrument of 
theosis”.60 Theosis, or deification,61 was a key doctrine of Byzantine theology. It has 
been defined as: 
the doctrine that the destiny of humankind, or indeed of the cosmos as a 
whole, is to share in the divine life, and actually to become God, though by 
grace rather than by nature62 
 
The explicit scriptural foundation for this doctrine is arguably more or less limited to 
2 Peter 1:4: 
Thus he has given us, through these things, his precious and very great 
promises, so that through them you may escape from the corruption that is in 
the world because of lust, and may become participants of the divine nature. 
 
However, much wider implicit support is found in the Old and New Testaments, 
such as references to the intimate relationship between God and his people (eg 
Deuteronomy 4:7), the sonship of the people of God (eg Exodus 4:22, Romans 8:14-
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17), the transformation of the people of God into the divine likeness (eg 2 
Corinthians 3:18, 1 John 3:2), and the eventual gathering together of all things in 
Christ (Ephesians 1:10).  Early support for the doctrine is found in the writings of 
Irenaeus (c130-c200) and Clement of Alexandria (c150-c215), possibly influenced 
by the Platonic ideal of assimilation to God: 		
!.
 
The central idea is that as God in Christ became human so, by grace, human beings 
are called to participate in Christ’s divinity. Athanasius writes: 
the Word became flesh….  that we, partaking of His Spirit, might be 
deified63 
 
Christ is the epitome of human deification and the model of perfect humanity. The 
doctrine thus rests on an essential Christological foundation, without which it does 
not make sense. John Meyendorff writes that deification is: 
a Christocentric and eschatological concept, expressed in Platonic language 
but basically independent of philosophical speculation64 
 
The definitive formulation of the doctrine was to be established by Gregory 
Palamas. In the hesychast controversy of the 14th Century, it was alleged that the 
doctrine of deification blurred the boundaries between creator and created beyond 
that which was acceptable. Gregory defended the doctrine as referring to a 
participation in the divine energies (which are uncreated but knowable), but not the 
divine essence (which is unknowable).65  
 
The topic of deification is in fact treated explicitly by relatively few authors of the 
Philokalia, and specifically only by: the author(s) of the text attributed to Antony the 
Great, Theodoros the Great Ascetic, Maximos the Confessor, Thalassios the Libyan, 
Theognostos, Ilias the Presbyter, Nikitas Stithatos, Theoliptos, Gregory of Sinai, and 
Gregory Palamas. Of these Maximos has much the most to say. 
 
                                                 
63
 Quoted in Cross and Livingstone, 1997, p.465 
64
 Meyendorff, 1996, p.471 
65
 Philokalia 4, 393, #105 
188 
 
Deification is a characteristic theme of Maximos, for whom it represents the only 
proper goal of human existence.66 In On the Lords’ Prayer, he grounds the doctrine 
in an understanding of the self-emptying (kenosis) of Christ. Although deification 
comes only by grace,67 it depends on human acceptance, an acceptance which is 
accomplished by the discipline of an ascetic life, which is itself a form of human 
self-emptying: 
 
The Logos bestows adoption on us when He grants us that birth and deification 
which, transcending nature, comes by grace from above through the Spirit, The 
guarding and preservation of this in God depends on the resolve of those thus born: 
on their sincere acceptance of the grace bestowed on them and, through the practice 
of the commandments, on their cultivation of the beauty given to them by grace. 
Moreover, by emptying themselves of the passions they lay hold of the divine to the 
same degree as that to which, deliberately emptying Himself of His own sublime 
glory, the Logos of God truly became man.68 
 
A little further on, he also grounds the basis for deification in sacramental life,69 in 
the movement of the intellect towards God,70 and in the life of prayer.71 Here and 
elsewhere Maximos’ argument is deeply Christological, being rooted in the 
incarnation of God in Christ,72 and the eventual perfection of the “person created 
according to Christ” is manifested thus: 
he is not in the least perturbed by any of the things that afflict the body, nor 
does he stamp his soul with any trace of distress, thereby disrupting his joy-
creative state. For he does not regard what is painful in the senses as a 
privation of pleasure: He knows only one pleasure, the marriage of the soul 
with the Logos. To be deprived of this marriage is endless torment, extending 
by nature through all the ages. Thus when he has left the body and all that 
pertains to it, he is impelled towards union with the divine; for even if he 
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were to be master of the whole world, he would still recognize only one real 
disaster: failure to attain by grace the deification for which he is hoping.73 
 
Deification is thus supremely desirable and inverts the natural understandings of 
pain and pleasure. 
 
Elsewhere, in Various Texts: C4, Maximos grounds deification in a soteriological 
framework that makes reference to the divine “energy” to which Gregory Palamas 
would later appeal in his defence of the doctrine some seven centuries later. Faith, 
Maximos concludes, brings about an ineffable union of the believer with his or her 
origin and consummation in God. The argument by means of which Maximos 
reaches this conclusion refers to an “inexpressible interpenetration of the believer 
with the object of belief” which is both the consummation of faith and a return to the 
believer’s origin in God. This interpenetration brings about a fulfilment of the desire 
of the believer, an “ever-active repose in the object of desire”, which in turn is an 
“eternal uninterrupted enjoyment” of this object and entails “participation in supra-
natural divine realities”.74 This participation results in the believer becoming like 
that in which he participates and, as far as is possible, an identity of energy between 
the believer and that in which he participates. The argument concludes with a 
definition of deification which takes in, in one broad sweep, all of creation and the 
beginning and end of all things in God. 
 
This identity with respect to energy constitutes the deification of the saints. 
Deification, briefly, is the encompassing and fulfilment of all times and ages, and of 
all that exists in either. This encompassing and fulfilment is the union, in the person 
granted salvation, of his real authentic origin with his real authentic consummation. 
This union presupposes a transcending of all that by nature is essentially limited by 
an origin and a consummation. Such transcendence is effected by the almighty and 
more than powerful energy of God, acting in a direct and infinite manner in the 
person found worthy of this transcendence. The action of this divine energy bestows 
a more than ineffable pleasure and joy on him in whom the unutterable and 
                                                 
73
 Philokalia 2, 297 
74
 Philokalia 2, 239, #19 
190 
 
unfathomable union with the divine is accomplished. This, in the nature of things, 
cannot be perceived, conceived or expressed.75 
 
Deification thus has an eschatological dimension for Maximos, as well as being 
Christological. It is ultimately ineffable and unfathomable. But it is also the 
fulfilment of the deepest human desire for God. Elsewhere, he even refers to the 
“passion of deification”. Rejection of passions which are superficial, false and alien 
to human nature lays open the way for a deeper, more authentic and fulfilling 
passion for God in Christ: 
Thus the intelligence, after rejecting everything alien, discovers what is 
desirable according to our true nature; and the intellect, after passing beyond 
the things that are known, apprehends the Cause of created things that 
transcends being and knowledge. Then the passion of deification is 
actualized by grace: the intelligence’s power of natural discrimination is 
suspended, for there is no longer anything to discriminate about; the 
intellect’s natural intellection is brought to a halt, for there is no longer any-
thing to be known; and the person found worthy to participate in the divine is 
made god and brought into a state of rest.76 
 
Although there is a degree of ambiguity in some passages, it is clear from the broad 
sweep of Maximos’ eschatological arguments that he understands deification as 
something which is to be hoped for in this world and realised fully only in the world 
to come. Nonetheless, deification is a process,77 something towards which we may 
be led by God in this life.78 
 
Nikitas Stithatos suggests that there are three stages to attaining deification: 
When through the practice of the virtues we attain a spiritual knowledge of 
created things we have achieved the first stage on the path of deification. We 
achieve the second stage when – initiated through the contemplation of the 
spiritual essences of created things -we perceive the hidden mysteries of 
God. We achieve the third stage when we are united and interfused with the 
primordial light. It is then that we reach the goal of all ascetic and 
contemplative activity.79 
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The first two of these stages, the ascetic life and contemplative prayer, are clearly 
anchored in life in this world. It might be supposed that the third stage refers to a 
goal achieved only after death. However, the hesychasts believed that the vision of 
Divine light could be achieved in this life, and in the following paragraph Nikitas 
refers to the way in which, “by means of these three stages”, intellects may provide 
illumination to others. Then, in the next paragraph, he writes: 
Deification in this present life is the spiritual and truly sacred rite in which 
the Logos of unutterable wisdom makes Himself a sacred offering and gives 
Himself, so far as is possible, to those who have prepared themselves.80 
 
Here, then, deification is anchored “in this present life”. Nikitas goes on, later in the 
same paragraph, to speak of these individuals as becoming “gods to other men on 
earth”. 
 
In contrast, Gregory of Sinai appears to distinguish between stages of spiritual 
perfection in this life and the corresponding state of deification to be achieved in the 
life to come: 
55. A person is perfect in this life when as a pledge of what is to come he 
receives the grace to assimilate himself to the various stages of Christ's life. 
In the life to come perfection is made manifest through the power of 
deification.  
56. If by passing through the different stages of spiritual growth you become 
perfect in virtue during this life, you will attain a state of deification in the 
life hereafter equal to that of your peers.81 
 
Gregory also refers to “degree[s] of deification”,82 which appear to correspond to the 
degrees of spiritual progress made in this life. 
 
Deification therefore appears as a broad and somewhat varied doctrine within the 
Philokalia. Maximos the Confessor has by far the most to say on the subject and, 
although it re-emerges in writings contemporary to the 14th Century hesychast 
controversy, it is not as prominent as one might have expected even here. 
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ii. Health & Well-Being 
 
Returning to our themes of health and well-being, relatively little may be found 
explicitly on these subjects. Health of the soul is associated with the ascetic life by 
John Cassian and Ilias the Presbyter,83 and with dispassion by Thalassios the 
Libyan.84 Ilias the Presbyter warns that outward appearances of health can be 
deceptive and that sickness may lay hidden within, “in the depths of 
consciousness”.85 Evidence of health of the powers of the soul, he says, may be 
found in its absorption in the Jesus Prayer, in “opportune speech”, and in “simplicity 
in taste”.86 Similarly, Peter of Damaskos finds evidence of health of the soul in 
contrition and humility.87 Gregory Palamas finds the source of illness of the 
incensive power of the soul in unsatisfied desire, and the source of illness of the 
intelligence in distractions caused by sickness of the incensive and appetitive 
powers. He therefore counsels that healing of the incensive power is required first, 
then of the appetitive power, and finally of the intelligence, in order that full health 
may be restored.88 
 
Neilos the Ascetic urges that well-being of the soul should be pursued first by 
guarding against mental preoccupation with material things, then by ascetic lifestyle, 
and finally by devotion to God.89 Diadochos contrasts “natural well-being” with a 
state of being “energised by the Holy Spirit”. The former is associated with 
“delusory joy” and the latter with “spiritual tears” and “a delight that loves 
stillness”.90 For Nikitas Stithatos, the capacity for well-being is located in wisdom 
and spiritual knowledge.91 However, it is (again) Maximos the Confessor who has 
most to say on this subject. 
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For Maximos, the source of all well-being is found in God, but human creatures are 
free to accept or reject the gracious gift of well-being.92 Maximos distinguishes 
between being, well-being and eternal being. Creatures with intellect and 
intelligence may participate in God in each of these kinds of being. The capacity for 
well-being is found in goodness and wisdom. Eternal being is a matter of grace 
alone.93 In an allegorical interpretation of the first Genesis account of creation, in 
which he moves beyond the seven days explicitly referred to in the text and adds an 
“eighth day” of his own, Maximos argues that the sixth day represents fulfilment of 
the ascetic life and the attaining of virtue, the seventh day represents the 
contemplative life, and an end to natural thoughts about spiritual knowledge, and the 
eighth day represents the transformation which results in deification. Again, the 
sixth day represents the being of created things, the seventh day the well-being and 
the eighth day eternal well-being.94 In this way, Maximos seems to suggest that a 
state of well-being is one of contemplative prayer. A state of eternal well-being, 
however, is one of deification.95 
 
At this point we might conclude that both health and well-being in the Philokalia are 
concerned with achieving a life of dispassion and virtue. Well-being, however, 
appears to be the broader concept of the two, and it connects in turn with the 
doctrine of deification. Deification is a state of well-being, but it is much more than 
just this. It is an eternal, largely eschatological, but also very present and real, 
participation in God through Christ. 
 
 
iii. Purification, Illumination and Perfection of the Intellect 
 
The full title of the Philokalia refers to it as being that “through which, by means of 
the philosophy of ascetic practice and contemplation” the purification, illumination 
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and perfection of the intellect may be achieved. What does this tell us, if anything, 
about the nature of well-being that it envisages?  
 
a. Purification of the Intellect 
Purification of the intellect, which appears not to receive much explicit attention 
from most authors of the Philokalia, is achieved through ascetic discipline,96 and 
tears of penitence, grief or fear.97 Purity of intellect is evidenced by visions,98 union 
with God in prayer,99 spiritual perception and contemplative knowledge.100 
Presumably the compilers of the Philokalia understood a broader, implicit, sense in 
which its instructions on “ascetic practice and contemplation” would bring about 
purification of the intellect. The authors of the Philokalia, however, appear more 
often to have addressed matters of purity and purification not so much specifically in 
relation to the intellect but rather more broadly (eg to purity of the heart,101 purity of 
conscience,102 or purity of prayer103). In general, these references would seem to 
support what has already been said, that is, that well-being is concerned with 
dispassion and contemplation of God in prayer. 
 
b. Illumination of the Intellect 
With regard to illumination of the intellect, however, some rather different, and 
often somewhat obscure, things seem to be said. Firstly, Evagrios refers in various 
places to visions of light,104 although he also warns against something that might 
sound like “illumination of the intellect” as a deceit of demons.105 In fact, this 
appears to be a warning against pride associated with mental or perceptual images 
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taken as evidence of spiritual progress. Diadochos provides similar warnings and, 
like Evagrios, seems to preserve an understanding of an illumination of the intellect 
by Divine light which in some way enables the intellect to “see” its own light.106 It is 
not exactly clear how this should be understood. Nevertheless, Diadochos (unlike 
Evagrios) appears to see this as occurring at a relatively early stage of spiritual 
progress and expects it to be followed by experiences of abandonment by God, 
which he expects will prevent arrogance and instil hope.107 
 
John of Karpathos urges continued struggle “to preserve unimpaired the light that 
shines within your intellect”.108 In contrast to Diadochos, he appears to see any 
subsequent withdrawal of this light (now referred to as darkness of the intellect) as 
indicating a resurgence of passion. Something similar seems to be implied by 
Maximos the Confessor. First he refers to “continual participation in the Divine 
radiance”, which leads to the intellect being “totally filled with light”.109 Later, 
however, he implies that failure to keep the passions at bay by means of love and 
self-control might lead to a diminishing or darkening of this light.110 A not dissimilar 
dynamic is also described by the author of Abba Philimon.111 
 
Exactly how these references to “illumination” should be understood is somewhat 
unclear. However, Thalassios the Libyan mixes a similarly mysterious reference to 
the “light” of the intellect with more obviously metaphorical and analogical 
references to light.112 Ilias the Presbyter helpfully distinguishes between sensible and 
spiritual (or intelligible) light in a passage113 which seem to suggest that the latter is 
not to be understood by way of visionary or sensory experience, but rather that this 
language is being used to contrast sensory/physical and spiritual experiences. 
Perhaps more important than considerations of the phenomenology of the 
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experiences referred to are their meaning. Illumination of the intellect in the 
passages referred to above generally appears to be associated with control over the 
passions. It is also associated with perception of the love of God, meditation on the 
name of Jesus, and the action of grace (in Diadochos), intense longing for God, 
unceasing love and contemplation of God (in Maximos), natural contemplation and 
holy knowledge (in Thalassios), the revealing of hidden mysteries (Abba Philimon), 
and preoccupation with prayer (Ilias the Presbyter).  
 
In the writings of Nikitas Stithatos, greater care seems to be taken to qualify exactly 
what is meant by illumination of the intellect. Thus, in On Virtues: 100 Texts, 
Stithatos draws an explicit analogy between the outer senses and “their inner 
counterparts”. Within this framework the intellect is referred to as “beholder of the 
light of divine life”. The pure intellect is then characterised as giving assent only to 
thoughts that are divine. Finally, the whole process (including those parts relating to 
the other “senses” of the soul) culminates in the transcending of sense perception, 
the attainment of what lies beyond the senses, and the savouring of the “delight of 
things unseen”.114 Again, in On the Inner Nature of Things, Stithatos refers to the 
way in which the pure intellect “illumines the soul with lucid intellections”, and is 
itself enlightened with divine knowledge.115 
 
Gregory of Sinai also makes explicit reference to the illumination of the intellect in 
pure prayer. Not only is the vision of the intellect free from mental images, but the 
light within it draws it away from sensory images and towards an ineffable spiritual 
union with God: 
According to theologians, noetic, pure, angelic prayer is in its power wisdom 
inspired by the Holy Spirit. A sign that you have attained such prayer is that 
the intellect's vision when praying is completely free from form and that the 
intellect sees neither itself nor anything else in a material way. On the 
contrary, it is often drawn away even from its own senses by the light acting 
within it; for it now grows immaterial and filled with spiritual radiance, 
becoming through ineffable union a single spirit with God (cf. 1 Cor. 
6:17).116 
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Finally, the subject of illumination of the intellect is dealt with at some length by 
Gregory Palamas in To Xenia.117 The illumination of the intellect that Gregory 
describes is referred to as ineffable, and presumably therefore it is neither a vision 
involving the senses nor a mental image of any usual kind. (In fact, in #59, Gregory 
appears to specifically exclude both possibilities). Rather it perfects the “inner 
being” and confers miraculous vision of “supramundane” things. Gregory provides 
supportive quotations from Saints Neilos, Diadochos and Isaac, presumably to 
reinforce the orthodoxy of his own position. However, he appears to differ from 
most of the earlier writers in the Philokalia by asserting that, rather than being 
vulnerable to any recrudescence of the passions, this illumination of the intellect 
confers stability of virtue and disinclination to sin. It is also associated with 
perception of the inner essences (the logoi) of created things, the apprehension of 
supernatural realities, and visionary insight into past, present and distant things. In 
conclusion of this passage Gregory writes: 
But their main concern is the return of the intellect to itself and its 
concentration on itself. Or, rather, their aim is the reconvergence of all the 
soul's powers in the intellect - however strange this may sound - and the 
attaining of the state in which both intellect and God work together. In this 
way they are restored to their original state and assimilated to their 
Archetype, grace renewing in them their pristine and inconceivable beauty. 
To such a consummation, then, does grief bring those who are humble in 
heart and poor in spirit.118 
 
Such a consummation of the relationship between God and the soul begins to sound 
very similar to the doctrine of deification. 
 
c. Perfection of the Intellect 
As with purification (above), references are very often made to perfection in a more 
general sense, and in regard to related but different or overlapping concepts, rather 
than specifically and explicitly to perfection of the intellect itself. For example 
perfection of the soul,119 spiritual perfection,120 perfection in love,121 perfection of 
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the saints,122 perfection of people,123 a state of perfection,124 or simply perfection 
(unspecified)125 are all addressed in various places in the Philokalia. The 
relationship of these more general, or different, forms of perfection to the intellect is 
varied and interesting. For example, John Cassian tells of how he and his friend 
Germanos begged Abba Moses to tell them how they might approach perfection. In 
his reply, Abba Moses speaks of the ascetic life as a means towards achieving purity 
of heart (which he appears to understand as being perfection). In conclusion he says: 
Whoever has achieved love has God within himself and his intellect is 
always with God.126 
 
For Abba Moses, perfection is a matter of purity of heart and of love of God and 
these in turn are affairs of the intellect. 
 
Maximos the Confessor, in For Thalassios: C2, speaks of the soul that has reached 
perfection and deification as “ceasing from all activity of intellect and sense”.127 
Elsewhere he speaks of the intellect being on a journey to God which culminates in 
perfection and deification, a state that is “not subject to change or mutation”.128 Yet, 
in On the Lord’s Prayer, he speaks of the intellect of the “person created according 
to Christ” as moving “incessantly towards God”.129 This person is described both as 
having achieved perfection (constituted by humility and gentleness of heart) and as 
still hoping for deification. 
 
Nikitas Stithatos, in On the Inner Nature of Things, describes a process beginning 
with repentance, which leads to extinguishing of the passions, and then Divine 
illumination: 
God, who is above nature, descends with light and ineffable joy into the soul 
and sits on the heights of its intellect as upon a throne of glory, bestowing 
peace on all its inner powers130 
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This peace brings healing of the three powers of the soul, perfection of the soul, and 
union with God. 
 
In On Spiritual Knowledge, Stithatos gives an allegorical interpretation of the 
transfiguration, within which perfection in love (along with advancement in faith 
and restoration of hope) provides the basis for a vision of the Divine light. This 
Divine light is manifest as “intellections of [God’s] unutterable wisdom”.131 
Intellections, within the vocabulary of the Philokalia,132 are not abstract concepts but 
rather represent the active apprehension of spiritual realities by the intellect. 
 
A very similar dynamic to this second example from the writings of Nikitas Stithatos 
is found in the Texts of Theoliptos. Here it is continual prayer that arouses love for 
God, and then the intellect, united with love, gives birth to wisdom. In response to 
the cry of prayer, the divine Logos: 
lays hold of the noetic power of the intellect as though it were Adam's rib 
and fills it with divine knowledge; and in its place, bringing to perfection 
your inner state. 133 
 
Here again, then, love for God leads to a kind of transfiguration of the intellect with 
divine knowledge. Neither is explicit reference to illumination of the intellect 
completely absent for, later in the same paragraph, Theoliptos refers to love as “light 
generating”. Here, however, perfection (of “inner state”) is the outcome of the 
process. This appears to be similar to the first example taken from Nikitas Stithatos 
(On the Inner Nature of Things, see above), where perfection (of the soul) is the 
outcome of the descent of the light of God upon the intellect. In the second example 
from the writings of Stithatos (taken from On Spiritual Knowledge) perfection (in 
love) appears to be what starts the process off. 
 
In To Xenia, Gregory Palamas describes another dynamic of love, illumination of the 
intellect and perfection. Here, he concludes that: 
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no one can acquire spiritual love unless he experiences fully and clearly the 
illumination of the Holy Spirit. If the intellect does not receive the perfection 
of the divine likeness through such illumination, although it may have almost 
every other virtue, it will still have no share in perfect love.134 
 
Here, then, illumination seems to be the basis for acquiring love, rather than the 
other way around. Perfection (of the divine likeness and of love) is again the result 
of, rather than the starting point for, this illumination of the intellect. 
 
It would appear, then, that perfection and the intellect are related in some 
complicated and varied ways, with very different approaches being taken by 
different authors of the Philokalia, and even by the same author in different places. 
But what about explicit and specific references to perfection of the intellect? Again, 
there are diverse relationships to other concepts that have already been discussed, 
and especially to purity and illumination of the intellect. For example in Abba 
Philimon, Philimon is quoted as saying: 
Let us, then, do all we can to cultivate the virtues, for in this way we may 
attain true devoutness, that mental purity whose fruit is natural and 
theological contemplation. As a great theologian puts it, it is by practising the 
virtues that we ascend to contemplation. Hence, if we neglect such practice 
we will be destitute of all wisdom. For even if we reach the height of virtue, 
ascetic effort is still needed in order to curb the disorderly impulses of the 
body and to keep a watch on our thoughts. Only thus may Christ to some 
small extent dwell in us. As we develop in righteousness, so we develop in 
spiritual courage; and when the intellect has been perfected, it unites wholly 
with God and is illumined by divine light, and the most hidden mysteries are 
revealed to it. Then it truly learns where wisdom and power lie, and that 
understanding which comprehends everything, and ‘length of days and life, 
and the light of the eyes and peace’ (Baruch 3:14). While it is still fighting 
against the passions it cannot as yet enjoy these things. For virtues and vices 
blind the intellect: vices prevent it from seeing the virtues, and virtues pre-
vent it from seeing vices. But once the battle is over and it is found worthy of 
spiritual gifts, then it becomes wholly luminous, powerfully energized by 
grace and rooted in the contemplation of spiritual realities. A person in 
whom this happens is not attached to the things of this world but has passed 
from death to life.135 
 
Here purity of the intellect (in this case translated as “mental purity”) is the fruit of 
the ascetic life and leads in turn to contemplation, perfection of the intellect, union 
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with God (cf deification), and illumination by divine light. Elsewhere, Theognostos 
associates purification, perfection, inward illumination, and the raising of the 
intellect “to the heights of contemplation”.136 Theophanis identifies a sequence of 
purging of the intellect, illumination of the heart, and “perfection that is endless”.137 
Symeon Metaphrastis seems to imply that perfection of the intellect results from 
purification of the intellect.138 Doubtless many other similar links could be cited 
which connect not only purification, illumination, and perfection of the intellect, but 
also contemplation, deification and other aspects of well-being. 
 
A final example from Gregory Palamas, taken this time from On Prayer & Purity, 
specifically tackles the relationship between purity, illumination and perfection of 
the intellect. Firstly, Gregory suggests that we consider someone who has purified 
their intellect through diligence in prayer and has, as a consequence, received at least 
partial illumination of the intellect. The dangers against which Gregory counsels at 
this point are those of delusion, presumption and pride. Rather, Gregory urges that 
this person should recognise the enduring impurity of the other powers of his soul, 
exercise humility, and grieve inwardly, in order that he might find healing of the 
other powers of his soul. He concludes this passage by writing: 
He will cleanse its moral aspect with the right kind of ascetic practice, its 
power of spiritual apperception with spiritual knowledge, its power of 
contemplation with prayer, and in this way he will attain perfect, true and 
enduring purity of heart and intellect - a purity that no one can ever 
experience except through perfection in the ascetic life, persistent practice, 
contemplation and contemplative prayer.139  
 
 
This is perhaps a helpful place to conclude this section on purity, illumination and 
perfection of the intellect, for it is a reminder that these aspects of well-being are all 
inter-related, and also that (in this world at least) great caution should be exercised 
against assuming that final perfection has been achieved in any of them, or that there 
is no longer any need for the ascetic life or for prayer. 
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iv. Hesychia 
 
The English translators of the Philokalia define hesychia (), or stillness, as: 
a state of inner tranquillity or mental quietude and concentration which arises 
in conjunction with, and is deepened by, the practice of pure prayer and the 
guarding of heart (q.v.) and intellect (q.v.). Not simply silence, but an 
attitude of listening to God and of openness towards Him.140 
 
In their introduction,141 they also note that the word bears a sense of being “seated” 
or “fixed”. This meaning is reflected in the sense of mental “concentration” that they 
include in their definition. However, they also note that the spiritual path of 
hesychasm cannot be followed in a vacuum. It is anchored in the doctrine, 
ecclesiology, soteriology, sacramental and liturgical life of the Eastern Church, and 
also (although not exclusively) within a monastic tradition located within the wider 
life of that church. Hesychia also involves a bodily dimension, as well as being a 
state of mind, the inner tranquillity being mirrored by an outer state of withdrawal 
from the world.142 
 
How is this term, hesychia, used in the pages of the Philokalia? 
 
Firstly, this term is used extremely widely in the Philokalia. In fact, it is employed 
by every author of the Philokalia,143 except the author(s) of the text attributed to 
Antony the Great, the author of the text attributed to Theognostos, Theophanis, and 
Symeon the Studite (in a text attributed to Symeon the New Theologian). 
 
Secondly, although it is in the nature of these things that there can be no surveys or 
statistics to quantify the matter, hesychia is a state which is almost certainly attained 
by very few people.144 
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Thirdly, hesychia is closely related to a number of other subjects of importance. For 
example it is related to the practice of theology (in the strict hesychastic sense of 
participation in divine realities and prayer), which presupposes attainment of 
hesychia. It also overlaps with the practice of watchfulness.145 
 
Fourthly, hesychia is achieved by a variety of means, variously described by 
different authors of the Philokalia. These include: watchfulness,146 detachment,147 
obedience,148 courage149, inner grief, patience and humility,150 attentive waiting on 
God,151 prayer,152 and psalmody.153  
 
Fifthly, hesychia frees the intellect from impure thoughts,154 destroys hidden 
passions,155 and removes “impassioned craving” from the soul156 
 
Sixthly, hesychia opens the intellect to divine knowledge,157 is full of wisdom and 
benediction,158 brings about fear and love of God,159 is the pathway to heaven,160 
initiates the soul’s purification,161 is associated with dispassion,162 leads towards 
perfection,163 and gives birth to an “unceasing aspiration towards [God]”,164 to 
contemplation,165 and to prayer.166 
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It may be helpful to examine a few passages a little more closely. 
 
Peter of Damaskos, who includes hesychia as the first of his list of seven forms of 
bodily discipline, understands it as: 
living a life without distraction, far from all worldly care167 
 
This is unusual, in that it emphasises the bodily aspect (referred to above) without 
any reference to the soul (unless this is implied by the reference to “worldly care”). 
The definition provided by Nikitas Stithatos is more typical, in that it defines 
hesychia in terms of the intellect, but is much fuller than most other accounts. He 
writes that hesychia is: 
an undisturbed state of the intellect, the calm of a free and joyful soul, the 
tranquil unwavering stability of the heart in God, the contemplation of light, 
the knowledge of the mysteries of God, consciousness of wisdom by virtue 
of a pure mind, the abyss of divine intellections, the rapture of the intellect, 
intercourse with God, an unsleeping watchfulness, spiritual prayer, 
untroubled repose in the midst of great hardship and, finally, solidarity and 
union with God.168 
 
The extent of overlap with, and relationship to, other concepts is apparent here, 
including notably prayer, illumination of the intellect, watchfulness, and deification 
(or at least union with God). Elsewhere, Nikitas describes hesychia (here translated 
as stillness) as a state of centring on God: 
Souls whose intelligence has been freed from material preoccupation, and in 
whom the self-warring appetitive and incensive aspects have been restored to 
harmony and harnessed to their heaven-bound well-reined chariot, both 
revolve around God and yet stand fixedly. They revolve incessantly around 
God as the centre and cause of their circular movement. They stand steadfast 
and unwavering as fixed points on the circumference of the circle, and 
cannot be diverted from this fixed position by the sense-world and the 
distraction of human affairs. This is therefore the perfect consummation of 
stillness, and it is to this that stillness leads those who truly achieve it, so that 
while moving they are stationary, and while steadfast and immobile they 
move around the divine realities. So long as we do not experience this we 
can only be said to practise an apparent stillness, and our intellect is not free 
from materiality and distraction.169 
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These passages from Nikitas Stithatos both emphasise that hesychia is about a 
certain kind of relationship towards God as much as, if not more than, being 
anything to do with tranquillity and concentration. This orientation towards the 
Divine, as well as the relationship with other important concepts such as 
illumination of the intellect, is also brought out in a passage taken from one of the 
works of Gregory of Sinai: 
Noetic prayer is an activity initiated by the cleansing power of the Spirit and 
the mystical rites celebrated by the intellect. Similarly, stillness is initiated by 
attentive waiting upon God, its intermediate stage is characterized by 
illuminative power and contemplation, and its final goal is ecstasy and the 
enraptured flight of the intellect towards God.170 
 
It is clear here that hesychia is closely related to contemplative prayer. Gregory also 
emphasises that it is apophatic in form, involving a “shedding” of all thoughts, even 
those which might normally be considered helpful in prayer: 
For stillness means the shedding of all thoughts for a time, even those which 
are divine and engendered by the Spirit; otherwise through giving them our 
attention because they are good we will lose what is better.171 
 
In this chapter, our interest has been in the extent to which hesychia might be 
considered an aspect of health or well-being of the soul. With this in mind, it may be 
helpful to close with a quotation relevant to this theme. In Abba Philimon, Philimon 
tells Paulinos (another monk) that it is impossible to “conform to God” without 
hesychia, and that hesychia: 
gives birth to ascetic effort, ascetic effort to tears, tears to awe, awe to 
humility, humility to foresight, foresight to love; and [that] love restores the 
soul to health and makes it dispassionate, so that one then knows that one is 
not far from God.172 
 
Hesychia, then, is the basis for health of the soul. 
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v. Blessedness 
 
The word “blessed” (	
) and its derivatives are also extremely widely used in 
the Philokalia. In fact, it is virtually ubiquitous. We have already noted its classical 
usage, and have seen some of the ways in which it is used by Evagrios in his 
contributions to the Philokalia and elsewhere. How is it employed by other authors 
of the Philokalia? In this section, the following answers to this question will be 
explored: 
• The Theoretikon provides us with a definition of blessedness 
• God, or the attributes of God, are referred to as blessed in numerous places 
• Virtues, qualities and practices are described as blessed 
• People, souls, lives or ways of life are described as blessed 
• Eternal life or heaven or the “age to come” are described as blessed 
• There are comments on, or interpretations of, beatitudes taken from scripture 
• The Philokalia has some beatitudes of its own 
 
a. Blessedness according to the Theoretikon 
In the Theoretikon, attributed to Theodoros the Great Ascetic, the purpose of human 
life is defined as blessedness. The following account provides us with a significant 
insight into his understanding of the nature of blessedness: 
To come to another point: everything may be understood in terms of its 
purpose. It is this that determines the division of everything into its 
constituent parts, as well as the mutual relationship of those parts. Now the 
purpose of our life is blessedness or, what is the same thing, the kingdom of 
heaven or of God. This is not only to behold the Trinity, supreme in 
Kingship, but also to receive an influx of the divine and, as it were, to suffer 
deification; for by this influx what is lacking and imperfect in us is supplied 
and perfected. And the provision by such divine influx of what is needed is 
the food of spiritual beings. There is a kind of eternal circle, which ends 
where it begins. For the greater our noetic perception, the more we long to 
perceive; and the greater our longing, the greater our enjoyment; and the 
greater our enjoyment, the more our perception is deepened, and so the 
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motionless movement, or the motionless immobility, begins again. Such then 
is our purpose, in so far as we can understand it.173 
 
According to this text, we discover that blessedness is to be understood as “the same 
thing” as the kingdom of heaven/God. It is “to behold the Trinity” and to suffer 
deification. A dynamic is set up whereby “noetic perception” creates ever greater 
desire for God, which in turn leads to greater enjoyment of God, which in turn leads 
to even greater desire, and so-on. 
 
A little further on, a “characterisation” of blessedness is described, within which a 
little more detail is given: 
Blessedness - of which any significant life on earth is not only an overture 
but also a prefigurement - is characterized by both energies; by both 
intellection and willing, that is, by both love and spiritual pleasure. Whether 
both these energies are supreme, or one is superior to the other, is open to 
discussion. For the moment we shall regard both of them as supreme. One 
we call contemplative and the other practical. Where these supreme energies 
are concerned, the one cannot be found without the other, in the case of the 
lower energies, sequent to these two, each may be found singly. Whatever 
hinders these two energies, or opposes them, we call vice. Whatever fosters 
them, or frees them from obstacles, we call virtue. Energies that spring from 
the virtues are good; those that spring from their opposites are distorted and 
sinful. The supreme goal, whose energy, as we know, is compound of 
intellection and willing, endows each particular energy with a specific form, 
which may be used for either good or evil.174 
 
Here, the “already but not yet” character of blessedness is emphasised by describing 
life on earth as being an overture and prefigurement of blessedness. By implication, 
blessedness will be fully realised only after death. Blessedness is then described as 
being characterised by two energies: intellection (or love), which is contemplative, 
and willing (or spiritual pleasure), which is practical. Where these energies occur in 
their supreme form (again, by implication, this is in heaven, after death) they are 
always found together. However, they also occur in lower and specific forms (by 
implication in life on earth) which may occur separately and which may be put to 
good or evil purposes. 
 
                                                 
173
 Philokalia 2, 43 
174
 Philokalia 2, 47 
208 
 
Although this dynamic is somewhat complex and obscure, it appears to put 
blessedness in this world in the context of a perfect state of blessedness which (by 
implication) will be finally achieved in heaven. It also provides a model of the 
energies motivating the contemplative and practical life as of equal importance and 
each open to use or misuse, leading to virtue or vice respectively. 
 
Other authors of the Philokalia also refer to a state of blessedness, but do not offer 
the detail of definition that is found in the Theoretikon. Sometimes, these references 
appear also to relate to deification, or something similar.175 Maximos the Confessor 
refers to blessedness as being a work of God which has its origins outside of time – 
it has always existed176 – which indicates at least that he did not understand 
blessedness as limited either to the Divine essence/energies or to human beings. 
 
The overall picture here is one of scope for ever greater blessedness in this life, a 
process which is integrally related to, in fact virtually identical with, deification. The 
process is characterised by deepening love and pleasure, but it is not unopposed and 
it is anchored in the ascetic realities of a life of practical virtue. 
 
a. The Blessedness of God 
The intimate relationship between blessedness and deification, as described in the 
Theoretikon, is hinted at elsewhere in the Philokalia by references to both God and 
people as being blessed. Perfect and uncontingent blessedness, however, is clearly 
found in God alone. Thus, for example, in Holy Fathers of Sketis, John Cassian 
records Abba Moses as saying that knowledge of God in his “blessed and 
incomprehensible being” is reserved for the saints in the age to come, but that he 
may still be known in indirect and lesser ways here and now, in the world of his 
creation.177  
 
Similarly, the attributes (or energies) of God are blessed in a unique way, but in a 
way which may be apprehended (at least in part) by human beings, and which is 
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related to the process of their deification. Thus, Hesychios refers to the “blessed 
light of the Divinity”, which illuminates the human heart to the extent that it is freed 
from images and thoughts (ie “form” and “concepts”).178 
 
Maximos the Confessor refers to God’s essence as blessed.179 The person who 
achieves deification, in the life to come, experiences “the blessed life of God”, 
which is the only true life.180 Similarly, Nikitas Stithatos refers to God as the source 
of “blessed light” and to the “image of divine blessedness” which may appear in the 
one who is “commixed with God”.181 Gregory Palamas refers to God who “alone is 
blessed” but who makes others partakers in his blessedness.182 
 
b. Blessed Virtues, Qualities and Practices 
We have already seen that Evagrios refers to dispassion and prayer as blessed. 
References to virtues, human qualities and spiritual practices as blessed are widely 
employed in the Philokalia. Thus ascetic practice,183 aspirations,184 attentiveness,185 
contemplation,186 dispassion,187 expectation of perfection,188 goodness,189 grief,190 
handiwork,191 humility,192 joy,193 love,194 mortification of the passions,195 poverty,196 
prayer,197 psalmody,198 purity,199 remembrance of God,200 self control,201 spiritual 
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knowledge,202 stillness,203 transformation (of union with God),204 truth,205 
wisdom,206 and words (of God’s wisdom)207 are all referred to as blessed (or as 
blessings). These might, therefore, be taken as specific signs or indicators of what 
the blessed, or spiritually healthy, life might look like. 
 
c. Blessed People, Lives, and Ways of Life 
Sometimes people are referred to as blessed by virtue of displaying a particular 
quality or virtue. Thus, for example, Hesychios refers to those who practice stillness 
as being blessed by the Holy Spirit,208 and to those who force themselves to abstain 
from sin as being blessed by God, angels and men.209 An extension of this form of 
reference is where a whole way of life is referred to as blessed, as for example where 
Neilos the Ascetic urges a return to the “blessed way of life followed by the first 
monks”,210 or where Symeon the New Theologian says that many have called the 
eremitic life blessed, but then indicates that he considers the life lived “for God and 
according to God” the most blessed.211 A variation on this is where a person is called 
blessed for having achieved virtue or holiness of life of a wide ranging order.212 This 
kind of reference sometimes becomes explicitly or implicitly a reference to 
deification.213 A life free from the passions is also described as blessed.214 
 
d. Blessedness of Eternal Life 
After death, Christians believe, lies the hope of resurrection and eternal life. 
However, as has been discussed above, the distinction between life in this world and 
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eternal life is not always so clear cut. Deification or blessedness might, at least 
partly, be realisable in this world, even if the full experience of their divine realities 
is not experienced until after the resurrection. The English translators of the 
Philokalia, in their glossary, point out that a distinction is frequently made in the 
Philokalia between the “present age” and the “age to come” (or the “new age”). But 
the realities of the age to come (	 – the “blessings held in store”) can, by 
grace, be experienced in the present age.215 
 
It is not surprising, then, that the Philokalia understands the age to come, and eternal 
life, as blessed. Hesychios refers to the blessings of the age to come.216 The author(s) 
of On the Character of Men (attributed to St Antony the Great) refer(s) to the 
“eternal blessedness and peace” to be enjoyed “after death” by those who “detach 
themselves from worldly things”.217 In Spiritual Texts, Theodoros writes: 
Truly, when pure souls leave the body they are guided by angels who lead 
them to the life of blessedness.218 
 
Later he talks of the purification of the novice, in order that he be made: 
fit for heavenly treasures, for a life of immortality and a blessed repose 
whence ‘pain and sorrow have fled away’ (Isa. 35:10. LXX), and where 
gladness and continual joy flourish.219 
 
Again, Theognostos refers to the blessedness “held in store” for those who calm the 
passions, and which “awaits” those who engage in pure prayer.220 Theoliptos speaks 
of living this present life “in the expectation of blessedness”, so that “at death you 
will leave this world with confidence”.221  
 
However, where Diadochos speaks of Christ leading “back to the blessedness of 
eternal life all who live in obedience”222 he is clearly speaking of a blessedness that 
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is to be experienced in the present age. Eternal life is something into which 
Christians enter in this world, and not only in the age to come. Similarly, we noted 
above that the author of the Theoretikon understood “any significant life on earth” as 
being an “overture” and “prefigurement” of blessedness. 
 
Speaking of the need for the intelligence to control the incensive and desiring parts 
of the soul, and for the latter two parts to be made to conform to their true nature, 
John of Damaskos writes: 
He who has acquired a spiritual understanding of this truth will share, even 
here on earth, in the kingdom of heaven and will live a blessed life in 
expectation of the blessedness that awaits those who love God. May we too 
be worthy of that blessedness through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ. 
Amen.223 
 
There is, then, a blessed life to be lived “here on earth” which is a sharing in the 
kingdom of heaven in the present, but also an “expectation of the blessedness that 
awaits”. Ilias the Presbyter conveys a similar idea, by way of reference to the 
blessings of “the kingdom within us” as a “pledge and foretaste” of “the kingdom 
that is to come”.224 
 
Maximos the Confessor writes: 
If the divine Logos of God the Father became son of man and man so that He 
might make men gods and the sons of God, let us believe that we shall reach 
the realm where Christ Himself now is; for He is the head of the whole body 
(cf. Col. 1:18), and endued with our humanity has gone to the Father as 
forerunner on our behalf. God will stand ‘in the midst of the congregation of 
gods’ (Ps. 82:1. LXX) - that is, of those who are saved - distributing the 
rewards of that realm’s blessedness to those found worthy to receive them, 
not separated from them by any space.225 
 
There is considerable ambiguity here as to whether this passage refers only to the 
age to come, or also to those who are alive in the present age. The emphasis here is 
on the realm of blessedness as being that place “where Christ Himself now is”, but 
this Christological emphasis is linked to a soteriological theme. The realm of 
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blessedness is the realm of “those who are saved”, “the congregation of gods”. 
Blessedness is participation in God in Christ. This realm of eternity is the realm in 
which all Christians currently live – albeit they may not yet have been found worthy 
to be made gods or to receive its rewards. 
 
A similar idea is conveyed by Nikitas Stithatos: 
The restitution that will be consummated in the age to come after the 
dissolution of the body becomes clearly evident even now, through the 
inspiration and inner activity of the Spirit, in those who have truly striven, 
have traversed the midpoint of the spiritual path, and been made perfect 
according to 'the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ' (Eph. 4:13). 
Their joy is eternal, in eternal light, and their blessedness is of that final 
state.226 
 
Perfection is “the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ”, and the 
blessedness that is enjoyed by the perfect is of the “final state” to be consummated 
in the “age to come after the dissolution of the body”. But the restitution to be 
effected in that age is “clearly evident even now”. The blessedness of the age to 
come is, at least for the perfect, already here. 
 
e. The Beatitudes of Jesus in the Philokalia 
As indicated in Chapter 2, the Philokalia draws extensively upon scripture, making 
reference or allusion to scripture on virtually every page. Amongst the verses of 
scripture quoted, referred to or alluded to, the beatitudes recorded by the gospel 
writers as being spoken by Jesus are included. The comments made by the authors of 
the Philokalia in relation to these verses are illuminating for the present purpose. A 
summary of the references found in the Philokalia to these beatitudes is found in 
Table 5.1.227 
 
It will be seen that twelve228 authors of the Philokalia make a total of 44 references 
to the beatitudes. Maximos the Confessor and Peter of Damaskos are represented 
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most frequently, as would be expected from the two largest contributors to the 
Philokalia. Peter of Damaskos is unique in commenting on all the Matthean 
beatitudes verse by verse, but Maximos also provides a succinct summary of the 
Matthean beatitudes in On Love: C3. Only Gregory Palamas comments on the 
Lukan beatitudes. Only John of Karpathos comments on the beatitude recorded in 
John 20:29. Only John Cassian comments on the beatitude recorded as a saying of 
Jesus in Acts 20:35. Most comments and references therefore relate to the Matthean 
beatitudes. 
 
The verses most commonly referred to are Matthew 5:3 and 5:8, which are, 
respectively: “Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven” and 
“Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God”. These verses lend themselves 
especially well to the themes of the Philokalia. Thus, for example, commenting on 
Matthew 5:3, Peter of Damaskos sees the first stage of contemplation as being 
concerned with acquiring “inexpressible contrition of soul”, and thus becoming poor 
in spirit. Symeon Metaphrastis, in his Paraphrase of Makarios, understands the soul 
that is poor in spirit as being the one that is aware of the darkness of the passions. 
The author of Three Methods of Prayer, in a similar line of thought, understands the 
poor in spirit to be those who are “destitute of every worldly thought”. A similar 
understanding, concerned with the poverty that results from a humble and prayerful 
response to awareness of the passions within, is also found in texts from Gregory 
Palamas.  
 
There are also hints in Gregory’s writings on this verse of a recognition of the 
blessedness associated with the age to come. In To Xenia, he sees a choice presented 
– between earthly treasure (ie of the present age) and the treasure of the kingdom of 
heaven (ie of the age to come). For Gregory, this beatitude is both about the 
blessedness of addressing the passions in this present world, and about a 
contemplative gaze upon the blessedness of Divine glory in the age to come. 
 
In comments made on Matthew 5:8, similar themes recur. However, the theme of 
purity of heart (as contrasted with poverty of heart in 5:3) attracts more comments 
on watchfulness, guarding of the intellect, detachment, dispassion, love, virtue, self 
control, and a contemplative vision of God. 
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The theme of deification and the blessedness of the age to come are made most 
explicit in Peter of Damaskos’ overall comments on the beatitudes. They “make man 
a god by grace”, and offer rewards both “in this world and in the world to be”. 
Imitation of Christ in this world is connected with a vision of God in heaven, who 
“dwells in unapproachable light” and “alone is blessed”. But although such themes 
are most explicit here, they crop up elsewhere also. Gregory Palamas, in his 
comments on Matthew 5:4, affirms that God makes those who grieve “partakers of 
his own blessedness”. Symeon Metaphrastis, commenting on Matthew 5:6, urges 
that we should not deny the possibility of perfection. Hesychios the Priest, 
commenting on Matthew 5:8, sees purity of heart as the “means through which God 
is known to man”, the “ground for the vision of God”. And further examples are not 
hard to find. 
 
The paradoxes that are inherent in many of the beatitudes are also inherent in the 
understanding of blessedness that is embedded in the Philokalia. Each paradox finds 
its parallel in the understanding of the inner life that the Philokalia offers. Thus, for 
example, the beatitudes tell us that the poor are actually rich. The Philokalia tells us 
that those who find contrition, darkness and destitution in their awareness of the 
passions that lay within their hearts are actually those to whom the kingdom of 
heaven, in all its blessedness, belongs. Again, the beatitudes tell us that the hungry 
and thirsty are actually those who are filled. The Philokalia (here, mainly Nikitas 
Stithatos) tells us that those who most long for virtue will find themselves the best 
nourished to survive the hardships that they will face. 
 
Sometimes, the beatitudes are not paradoxical, but the Philokalia is. So, for 
example, we might not be surprised to learn that the pure in heart will see God. But 
the Philokalia tells us that those who are pure in heart are only those who first 
acknowledged just how impure their hearts were, and then took steps with God’s 
help to address this. The blessed, those who gain the vision of the blessedness of 
God, therefore are those who have first seen the “true nature of things” – including 
their own impurity and shamefulness.  
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f. The Beatitudes of the Philokalia 
The general structure of the beatitudes attributed to Jesus in the New Testament is: 
 
Blessed are…. [A] for…. [B] 
 
[A] describes or defines the characteristics of those who are blessed. It may be a 
virtue or personal characteristic, an action that is undertaken as a subject, or an 
action that is suffered at the hands of another. 
 
Sometimes the “for” is replaced by a full stop and [B] is presented in a new sentence 
in which we are told something (usually something unexpected) about those who 
have (in the first sentence) been described as blessed. Sometimes (as in John 20:29 
and Acts 20:35229) the “for… [B]” component is missing altogether. 
 
A similar structure is encountered in a number of places in the texts of the Philokalia 
(see Table 5.2). We saw above that Evagrios introduces a set of seven beatitudes in 
On Prayer. Most other examples are of single beatitudes, although Maximos the 
Confessor presents a group of three in On Love: C1, and a group of two in Various 
Texts: C3, and Peter of Damaskos presents a group of two in Book I. Most of the 
beatitudes of the Philokalia lack the “for… [B]” component and most are in the 
singular rather than the plural: 
 
Blessed is…. [A] 
 
Some of these beatitudes are quite lengthy, although most are only a single sentence 
and only two are more than three sentences. 
 
What do these beatitudes tell us about blessedness in the Philokalia? 
 
Most of them are concerned in one way or another with remedies for the passions. 
Thus, the person is blessed who pursues a life of virtue and ascetical discipline, who 
prays and engages in psalmody, and who achieves dispassion and stillness. Blessed 
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also are the contemplative vision of Divine beauty and of Divine darkness, and the 
“knowledge of the celestial mysteries of the Spirit”. Blessed is the soul that “enter[s] 
into God himself”, and blessed is the man who “reposes in God”. 
 
The pattern that emerges here, then, reinforces the picture that has already been 
painted of blessedness in the Philokalia as being concerned with a life of ascetic 
discipline, virtue and prayer, watchfulness and stillness, overcoming the passions 
and advancing towards deification. Blessedness, ultimately, is to be found in God 
alone, but because God in Christ became human, the possibility emerges for human 
beings, in Christ, to participate in God. 
 
 
vi. The Multifaceted Nature of Mental Well-being in the Philokalia 
 
How does the Philokalia understand mental well-being? To some extent, we might 
argue that this question has already been answered in Chapter 4. The Philokalia is 
realistic about the human condition. All human beings are afflicted by the passions, 
which are a dynamic process rather than a state of being, and it is in the application 
of the remedies that the Philokalia prescribes that well-being is to be found. 
Individuals in a state of complete apatheia or perfect hesychia are few and far 
between. For most of us, well-being comprises engagement with the remedial 
process itself. Well-being is the process of being in treatment, rather than a state of 
perfect health. 
 
However, if well-being might be understood as a process of this kind, questions still 
arise as to what well-being might look like in the individual who had (even if only 
exceptionally or theoretically) followed it through to completion. The concern also 
arises that settling too readily for a “process of treatment” model of well-being 
might engender a kind of acceptance of the status quo, or resignation to something 
less than perfection, which is not a sign of well-being at all. Thus, Symeon 
Metaphrastis warns: 
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Those who deny the possibility of perfection inflict the greatest damage on 
the soul in three ways. First, they manifestly disbelieve the inspired 
Scriptures. Then, because they do not make the greatest and fullest goal of 
Christianity their own, and so do not aspire to attain it, they can have no 
longing and diligence, no hunger and thirst for righteousness (cf. Matt. 
5:6)230 
 
So what does mental well-being, as portrayed in the Philokalia, look like? Our 
survey has taken us through the subjects of deification, health and well-being as 
directly referred to, the processes of purification, illumination and perfection of the 
intellect, and the states of hesychia and blessedness. It has become clear that these 
topics are all inter-related and all tell us something about what mental well-being 
looks like. It has also become clear that the “well-being as treatment in process” 
model has much to commend it. All of these subjects have engaged with the 
underlying need to employ radical treatments for the disease of the passions. It has 
become clear that not many people attain the state of hesychia. Furthermore, the key 
doctrine of deification allows for degrees of progress (at least according to some 
authors), and is also presented as a process which may begin in the present age, but 
will only be completed, at least for most people, in the age to come. 
 
However, the warning given in Symeon Metaphrastis’ paraphrase of the Macarian 
homilies is still well made. The processes of purification, illumination and perfection 
of the intellect require that we be vigilant for signs of anything that sets itself against 
God. Much more importantly, the Christological basis for the doctrine of deification 
suggests that the focus should not be so much on the remedies for the passions 
themselves as on the therapeutic goal towards which they are orientated. And as this 
goal is hidden in God it will either be expressed as an ineffable, mystical and 
apophatic destination, to be found only in contemplative prayer, and then only in 
part, or it will be seen in Christ. The source of all well-being and blessedness is 
found in God. As only Christ is both fully human and fully divine (as eastern and 
western Christians have traditionally believed) only in Christ may a visible image of 
human well-being be found. 
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5. Mental Well-Being – Some Reflections and Conclusions 
 
Well-being considered only as a therapeutic goal will always simply be a question of 
the absence of disease. However, Classical and early Christian understandings have 
looked beyond this instrumental approach to ask what it is that makes a good life. 
When may we say that a human being is flourishing, rather than simply struggling 
along? This question poses further important philosophical and theological questions 
which are not at all irrelevant to defining the therapeutic goals of counselling, 
psychotherapy or the spiritual life. 
 
In this chapter some answers to these questions have been considered. Firstly, those 
provided in the Classical world have been considered briefly. Rather more attention 
has then been given to early Christian answers, as provided in the 4th Century by the 
Desert Fathers, and especially by Evagrios. Most attention has been focussed on the 
answers which may be found in the collection of writings which is the focus of this 
work – the Philokalia. Although, as one would expect of an anthology spanning the 
writings of more than a millennium, there is some diversity of style, expression and 
doctrine, some key features do emerge. 
 
Perhaps the central feature to emerge from the Christian texts that have been 
considered here is the understanding that human well-being is contingent upon the 
only non-contingent source of well-being, which is God. This has important 
Christological implications for what it means to be a flourishing human being, and 
these hinge on traditions of interpretation of the key foundational texts of 
Christianity, especially the canonical gospels. Not all of these links have been 
followed through here, as the objective has been to assess what the Philokalia has to 
say, rather than to tease out all the textual sources or to critically assess their 
validity. However, it does not seem too much of a leap from what has been 
ascertained here to suggest that, according to this tradition, to be a flourishing 
human being is to participate as fully as human beings may in the life of God in 
Christ. 
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To focus exclusively on theological conclusions would be to miss the important 
contribution that Classical philosophy has made. Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic 
ideas about human well-being have all been apparent in the tradition of scriptural 
interpretation that the Philokalia represents. This is not to say that these are not 
Christian ideas, and no critical attempt has been made here to affirm or reject the 
precise role that they have played in forming the Philokalia. However, it is 
important to be aware that they are there. Similarly, there is much wisdom about the 
workings of the human mind which appears to derive from the original, first hand, 
reflections of the Desert Fathers, the authors of the Philokalia, and especially 
Evagrios. These genuinely original insights have stood the test of time, even if in 
some cases they have been reinvented under different names. In a very real sense, 
the Philokalia represents a hermeneutic of the processes of human thought, as much 
as it represents a hermeneutic of scripture. 
 
In this sense, we can say that the Philokalia is concerned primarily with flourishing 
or well-being of the inner life of human beings. However, this is an inner life of a 
different kind than we know. Although the Philokalia exercises a kind of reflexivity, 
it is not the radical reflexivity that Taylor traces back to Augustine. Although it 
offers an objectification of (what we would call) emotions, desires and feelings, it is 
not Taylor’s Cartesian disengagement. Perhaps most importantly, the expressivism 
that gives us positive cause to articulate our own unique understanding of the voice 
of nature within us is completely inverted in the world of the Philokalia, which is 
much more concerned with our awareness of the negativity of the passions within 
and reaching out to the “measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ” beyond. But 
this is only to acknowledge its situation within an anthropology formed by Platonic 
philosophy and Christian theology in relative isolation from many of the trends that 
Taylor identifies. The Philokalia is nonetheless concerned with a radical vision of 
the inner life which shows as much perceptiveness of the subtleties, deceptions, 
intricacies and aspirations of human thoughts as anything that has come after it.  
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ad
u
al
ly
 
th
ro
u
gh
 
th
e 
o
th
er
 
st
ag
es
 
o
f c
o
n
te
m
pl
at
io
n
,
 
H
e 
w
ill
 
m
ak
e 
it 
po
ss
ib
le
 
fo
r 
th
em
 
to
 
ke
ep
 
th
e 
B
ea
tit
u
de
s 
u
n
til
 
th
ey
 
at
ta
in
 
pe
ac
e 
in
 
th
ei
r 
th
o
u
gh
ts
.
 
Th
is 
pe
ac
e 
is 
th
e 
‘
re
al
m
’
 
o
r 
‘
dw
el
lin
g-
pl
ac
e 
o
f G
o
d’
,
 
as
 
Ev
ag
rio
s 
sa
ys
,
 
re
fe
rr
in
g 
to
 
th
e 
Ps
al
te
r:
 
‘
In
 
pe
ac
e 
is 
H
is 
dw
el
lin
g-
pl
ac
e’
 
(P
s.
 
76
 
: 
2.
 
LX
X
). 
Sy
m
eo
n
 
M
et
ap
hr
as
tis
 
Pa
ra
ph
ra
se
 
o
f M
a
ka
rio
s 
3,
 
32
9,
 
#1
00
 
Th
e 
so
u
l t
ha
t i
s 
'po
o
r 
in
 
sp
iri
t' 
(M
at
t. 
5:
3) 
is 
aw
ar
e 
o
f i
ts
 
o
w
n
 
w
o
u
n
ds
,
 
pe
rc
ei
v
es
 
th
e 
en
co
m
pa
ss
in
g 
da
rk
n
es
s 
o
f t
he
 
pa
ss
io
n
s,
 
an
d 
al
w
ay
s 
ca
lls
 
u
po
n
 
th
e 
Lo
rd
 
fo
r 
de
liv
er
an
ce
.
 
[S
ym
eo
n
 
th
e 
N
ew
 
Th
eo
lo
gi
an
] 
Th
re
e
 
M
e
th
o
ds
 
o
f P
ra
ye
r 
4,
 
71
 
El
se
w
he
re
 
H
e 
al
so
 
sa
ys
,
 
'B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
po
o
r 
in
 
sp
iri
t’
 
(M
at
t. 
5:
3);
 
th
at
 
is 
to
 
sa
y,
 
bl
es
se
d 
ar
e 
th
o
se
 
w
ho
 
ar
e 
de
st
itu
te
 
o
f e
v
er
y 
w
o
rld
ly
 
th
o
u
gh
t. 
G
re
go
ry
 
Pa
la
m
as
 
To
 
Xe
n
ia
 
4,
 
30
3,
 
#2
7 
th
e 
Lo
rd
 
bl
es
se
s 
th
e 
o
pp
o
sit
e 
o
f w
ha
t t
he
 
w
o
rld
 
ca
lls
 
bl
es
se
d,
 
sa
yi
n
g,
 
'B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
po
o
r 
in
 
sp
iri
t, 
fo
r 
th
ei
rs
 
is 
th
e 
ki
n
gd
o
m
 
o
f t
he
 
he
av
en
s'
 
(M
at
t. 
5:
3).
 
In
 
sa
yi
n
g 
'B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
po
o
r'
,
 
w
hy
 
di
d 
H
e 
ad
d 
'in
 
sp
iri
t'?
 
So
 
as
 
to
 
sh
o
w
 
th
at
 
H
e 
bl
es
se
s 
an
d 
co
m
m
en
ds
 
hu
m
ili
ty
 
o
f s
o
u
l. 
A
n
d 
w
hy
 
di
d 
H
e 
n
o
t s
ay
,
 
'B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
o
se
 
w
ho
se
 
sp
iri
t i
s 
po
o
r'
,
 
th
u
s 
in
di
ca
tin
g 
th
e 
m
o
de
st
y 
o
f t
he
ir 
m
an
n
er
 
o
f t
hi
n
ki
n
g,
 
bu
t '
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
po
o
r 
in
 
sp
iri
t'?
 
So
 
as
 
to
 
te
ac
h 
u
s 
th
at
 
po
v
er
ty
 
o
f b
o
dy
 
is 
al
so
 
bl
es
se
d 
an
d 
fo
st
er
s 
th
e 
ki
n
gd
o
m
 
o
f h
ea
v
en
…
 
B
y 
ca
lli
n
g 
th
e 
po
o
r 
in
 
sp
iri
t b
le
ss
ed
 
H
e 
w
o
n
de
rfu
lly
 
de
m
o
n
st
ra
te
d 
w
ha
t i
s 
th
e 
ro
o
t, 
as
 
it 
w
er
e,
 
an
d 
m
ai
n
sp
rin
g 
o
f t
he
 
o
u
tw
ar
d 
po
v
er
ty
 
o
f t
he
 
sa
in
ts
,
 
n
am
el
y,
 
th
ei
r 
hu
m
ili
ty
 
o
f s
pi
rit
.
 
4,
 
30
6,
 
#3
4 
B
u
t a
s 
th
e 
Lo
rd
 
sa
ys
,
 
'W
he
re
 
yo
u
r 
tr
ea
su
re
 
is,
 
th
er
e 
w
ill
 
yo
u
r 
in
te
lle
ct
 
be
 
al
so
' 
(M
at
t. 
6:
21
). H
o
w
,
 
th
en
,
 
ca
n
 
yo
u
 
ga
ze
 
n
o
et
ic
al
ly
 
at
 
H
im
 
w
ho
 
sit
s 
in
 
he
av
en
 
o
n
 
th
e 
rig
ht
 
ha
n
d 
o
f t
he
 
di
v
in
e 
M
aje
st
y 
(cf
.
 
H
eb
.
 
1:
3) 
w
hi
le
 
yo
u
 
ar
e 
st
ill
 
am
as
sin
g 
tr
ea
su
re
 
u
po
n
 
th
e 
ea
rt
h?
 
H
o
w
 
w
ill
 
yo
u
 
in
he
rit
 
th
at
 
ki
n
gd
o
m
 
w
hi
ch
 
th
is 
pa
ss
io
n
 
en
tir
el
y 
pr
ev
en
ts
 
yo
u
 
ev
en
 
fro
m
 
co
n
ce
iv
in
g 
in
 
yo
u
r 
m
in
d?
 
'B
le
ss
ed
',
 
th
er
ef
o
re
,
 
'a
re
 
th
e 
po
o
r 
in
 
sp
iri
t, 
fo
r 
th
ei
rs
 
is 
th
e 
ki
n
gd
o
m
 
o
f h
ea
v
en
.
' 
D
o
 
yo
u
 
se
e 
ho
w
 
m
an
y 
pa
ss
io
n
s 
th
e 
Lo
rd
 
ha
s 
cu
t a
w
ay
 
w
ith
 
o
n
e 
be
at
itu
de
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1  
R
ef
 
=
 
R
ef
er
en
ce
 
22
2 
 
B
ea
tit
u
de
 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
Au
th
o
r/T
e
x
t 
R
e
f1  
Ex
tr
ac
t f
ro
m
 
te
x
t 
4,
 
31
0,
 
#4
2 
Th
u
s 
al
l t
he
 
pa
ss
io
n
s 
o
f t
he
 
fle
sh
 
ar
e 
he
al
ed
 
so
le
ly
 
by
 
bo
di
ly
 
ha
rd
sh
ip
 
an
d 
pr
ay
er
 
iss
u
in
g 
fro
m
 
a 
hu
m
bl
e 
he
ar
t, 
w
hi
ch
 
in
de
ed
 
is 
th
e 
po
v
er
ty
 
in
 
sp
iri
t t
ha
t t
he
 
Lo
rd
 
ca
lle
d 
bl
es
se
d.
 
4,
 
31
1,
 
##
43
-
44
 
Th
en
 
in
 
tr
u
th
 
yo
u
 
w
ill
 
be
 
po
o
r 
in
 
sp
iri
t a
n
d 
w
ill
 
ga
in
 
do
m
in
io
n
 
o
v
er
 
th
e 
pa
ss
io
n
s 
an
d 
cl
ea
rly
 
be
 
ca
lle
d 
bl
es
se
d 
by
 
H
im
 
w
ho
 
sa
id
,
 
'B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
po
o
r 
in
 
sp
iri
t, 
fo
r 
th
ei
rs
 
is 
th
e 
ki
n
gd
o
m
 
o
f h
ea
v
en
.
' 
[4
4.
]H
o
w
,
 
in
de
ed
,
 
ca
n
 
th
o
se
 
n
o
t 
be
 
ca
lle
d 
bl
es
se
d 
w
ho
 
ha
v
e 
ab
so
lu
te
ly
 
n
o
 
tr
u
ck
 
w
ith
 
m
at
er
ia
l w
ea
lth
 
an
d 
pl
ac
e 
al
l t
he
ir 
tr
u
st
 
in
 
H
im
? 
W
ho
 
w
ish
 
to
 
pl
ea
se
 
o
n
ly
 
H
im
? 
W
ho
 
w
ith
 
hu
m
ili
ty
 
an
d 
th
e 
o
th
er
 
v
irt
u
es
 
liv
e 
in
 
H
is 
pr
es
en
ce
? 
v
4 
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
o
se
 
w
ho
 
m
o
u
rn
,
 
fo
r 
th
ey
 
w
ill
 
be
 
co
m
fo
rt
ed
.
 
Pe
te
r 
o
f D
am
as
ko
s 
Bo
o
k 
I 
3,
 
94
 
So
 
it 
is 
th
at
 
G
o
d 
gr
an
ts
 
u
s 
th
e 
bl
es
sin
g 
o
f i
n
w
ar
d 
gr
ie
f, 
w
hi
ch
 
co
n
st
itu
te
s 
th
e 
se
co
n
d 
co
m
m
an
dm
en
t. 
Fo
r,
 
as
 
Ch
ris
t 
sa
ys
,
 
‘
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
o
se
 
w
ho
 
gr
ie
v
e’
 
(M
at
t. 
5:
4) 
-
 
w
ho
 
gr
ie
v
e 
fo
r 
th
em
se
lv
es
 
an
d 
al
so
,
 
o
u
t o
f l
o
v
e 
an
d 
co
m
pa
ss
io
n
,
 
fo
r 
o
th
er
s 
as
 
w
el
l. 
W
e 
be
co
m
e 
as
 
o
n
e 
w
ho
 
m
o
u
rn
s 
a 
de
ad
 
pe
rs
o
n
,
 
be
ca
u
se
 
w
e 
pe
rc
ei
v
e 
th
e 
te
rr
ib
le
 
co
n
se
qu
en
ce
s 
th
at
 
th
e 
th
in
gs
 
w
e 
ha
v
e 
do
n
e 
be
fo
re
 
o
u
r 
de
at
h 
w
ill
 
ha
v
e 
fo
r 
u
s 
af
te
r 
w
e 
ar
e 
de
ad
…
 
3,
 
20
1 
W
e 
pr
ay
 
th
at
 
th
ro
u
gh
 
th
e 
sa
cr
am
en
t w
e 
m
ay
 
en
te
r 
in
to
 
co
m
m
u
n
io
n
 
w
ith
 
th
e 
H
o
ly
 
Sp
iri
t; 
fo
r 
in
 
th
is 
w
o
rld
 
an
d 
in
 
th
e 
n
ex
t t
he
 
Pa
ra
cl
et
e 
H
im
se
lf 
so
la
ce
s 
th
o
se
 
w
ho
 
ar
e 
fil
le
d 
w
ith
 
go
dl
ik
e 
gr
ie
f (
cf
.
 
M
at
t. 
5:
4),
 
an
d 
w
ho
 
w
ith
 
al
l t
he
ir 
so
u
l a
n
d 
w
ith
 
m
an
y 
te
ar
s 
ca
ll 
u
po
n
 
H
im
 
fo
r 
he
lp
 
G
re
go
ry
 
Pa
la
m
as
 
To
 
Xe
n
ia
 
4,
 
31
2,
 
##
47
-
48
 
A
fte
r 
fir
st
 
ca
lli
n
g 
bl
es
se
d 
th
o
se
 
w
ho
 
ga
in
 
im
pe
ris
ha
bl
e 
w
ea
lth
 
be
ca
u
se
 
o
f t
he
ir 
po
v
er
ty
 
in
 
sp
iri
t. 
G
o
d,
 
w
ho
 
al
o
n
e 
is 
bl
es
se
d,
 
n
ex
t m
ak
es
 
th
o
se
 
w
ho
 
gr
ie
v
e 
pa
rt
ak
er
s 
o
f H
is 
o
w
n
 
bl
es
se
dn
es
s,
 
sa
yi
n
g,
 
'B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
o
se
 
w
ho
 
gr
ie
v
e,
 
fo
r 
th
ey
 
w
ill
 
be
 
co
n
so
le
d' 
(M
at
t. 
5:
4).
 
48
.
 
W
hy
 
di
d 
Ch
ris
t t
hu
s 
joi
n
 
gr
ie
f t
o
 
po
v
er
ty
? 
B
ec
au
se
 
it 
al
w
ay
s 
co
ex
ist
s 
w
ith
 
it.
 
B
u
t w
hi
le
 
so
rr
o
w
 
o
v
er
 
w
o
rld
ly
 
po
v
er
ty
 
in
du
ce
s 
th
e 
so
u
l's
 
de
at
h,
 
gr
ie
f o
v
er
 
po
v
er
ty
 
em
br
ac
ed
 
in
 
G
o
d's
 
n
am
e 
in
du
ce
s 
th
e 
's
av
in
g 
re
pe
n
ta
n
ce
 
th
at
 
is 
n
o
t t
o
 
be
 
re
gr
et
te
d' 
(2 
Co
r.
 
7:
10
). 
4,
 
31
4,
 
#5
3 
To
ge
th
er
 
w
ith
 
gr
ie
f c
o
m
pu
n
ct
io
n
 
cr
u
sh
es
 
th
e 
pa
ss
io
n
s 
an
d,
 
ha
v
in
g 
fre
ed
 
th
e 
so
u
l f
ro
m
 
th
e 
w
ei
gh
t t
ha
t o
pp
re
ss
es
 
it,
 
fil
ls 
it 
w
ith
 
bl
es
se
d 
joy
.
 
Th
at
 
is 
th
e 
re
as
o
n
 
w
hy
 
Ch
ris
t s
ay
s,
 
'B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
o
se
 
w
ho
 
gr
ie
v
e,
 
fo
r 
th
ey
 
w
ill
 
be
 
co
n
so
le
d' 
(M
at
t. 
5:
4) 
v
5 
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
m
ee
k,
 
fo
r 
th
ey
 
w
ill
 
in
he
rit
 
th
e 
ea
rt
h.
 
M
ax
im
o
s 
th
e 
Co
n
fe
ss
o
r 
O
n
 
th
e
 
Lo
rd
’s
 
Pr
a
ye
r 
2,
 
29
2 
‘
Fo
r 
o
n
 
w
ho
m
 
sh
al
l I
 
re
st
,
’
 
sa
ys
 
Sc
rip
tu
re
,
 
‘
bu
t o
n
 
hi
m
 
w
ho
 
is 
ge
n
tle
 
an
d 
hu
m
bl
e,
 
an
d 
tr
em
bl
es
 
at
 
m
y 
w
o
rd
s?
’
 
(cf
.
 
Is
a,
 
66
:2
). I
t i
s 
cl
ea
r 
fro
m
 
th
is 
th
at
 
th
e 
ki
n
gd
o
m
 
o
f G
o
d 
th
e 
Fa
th
er
 
be
lo
n
gs
 
to
 
th
e 
hu
m
bl
e 
an
d 
th
e 
ge
n
tle
.
 
Fo
r 
‘
bl
es
se
d 
ar
e 
th
e 
ge
n
tle
,
 
fo
r 
th
ey
 
w
ill
 
in
he
rit
 
th
e 
ea
rt
h’
 
(M
at
t. 
5:
5).
 
Pe
te
r 
o
f D
am
as
ko
s 
Bo
o
k 
I 
3,
 
94
 
In
 
th
is 
w
ay
 
G
o
d’
s 
gr
ac
e,
 
o
u
r 
u
n
iv
er
sa
l m
o
th
er
,
 
w
ill
 
gi
v
e 
u
s 
ge
n
tle
n
es
s,
 
so
 
th
at
 
w
e 
be
gi
n
 
to
 
im
ita
te
 
Ch
ris
t. 
Th
is 
co
n
st
itu
te
s 
th
e 
th
ird
 
co
m
m
an
dm
en
t; 
fo
r 
th
e 
Lo
rd
 
sa
ys
,
 
‘
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
ge
n
tle
’
 
(M
at
t. 
5:
5).
 
Th
u
s 
w
e 
be
co
m
e 
lik
e 
a 
fir
m
ly
-
ro
o
te
d 
ro
ck
…
 
v
6 
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
o
se
 
w
ho
 
hu
n
ge
r 
an
d 
th
irs
t f
o
r 
Pe
te
r 
o
f D
am
as
ko
s 
Bo
o
k 
I 
3,
 
96
 
Th
at
 
is 
w
hy
 
m
an
 
ha
s 
be
en
 
gi
v
en
 
th
e 
fo
u
rt
h 
co
m
m
an
dm
en
t, 
th
at
 
is,
 
lo
n
gi
n
g 
to
 
ac
qu
ire
 
th
e 
v
irt
u
es
: 
‘
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
ey
 
th
at
 
hu
n
ge
r 
an
d 
th
irs
t a
fte
r 
rig
ht
eo
u
sn
es
s’
 
(M
at
t. 
5:
6).
 
H
e 
be
co
m
es
 
as
 
o
n
e 
w
ho
 
hu
n
ge
rs
 
an
d 
th
irs
ts
 
fo
r 
al
l 
rig
ht
eo
u
sn
es
s,
 
th
at
 
is,
 
bo
th
 
fo
r 
bo
di
ly
 
v
irt
u
e 
an
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
m
o
ra
l v
irt
u
e 
o
f t
he
 
so
u
l. 
22
3 
 
B
ea
tit
u
de
 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
Au
th
o
r/T
e
x
t 
R
e
f1  
Ex
tr
ac
t f
ro
m
 
te
x
t 
rig
ht
eo
u
sn
es
s,
 
fo
r 
th
ey
 
w
ill
 
be
 
fil
le
d.
 
Sy
m
eo
n
 
M
et
ap
hr
as
tis
 
Pa
ra
ph
ra
se
 
o
f M
a
ka
rio
s 
3,
 
29
6,
 
#3
0 
Th
o
se
 
w
ho
 
de
n
y 
th
e 
po
ss
ib
ili
ty
 
o
f p
er
fe
ct
io
n
 
in
fli
ct
 
th
e 
gr
ea
te
st
 
da
m
ag
e 
o
n
 
th
e 
so
u
l i
n
 
th
re
e 
w
ay
s.
 
Fi
rs
t, 
th
ey
 
m
an
ife
st
ly
 
di
sb
el
ie
v
e 
th
e 
in
sp
ire
d 
Sc
rip
tu
re
s.
 
Th
en
,
 
be
ca
u
se
 
th
ey
 
do
 
n
o
t m
ak
e 
th
e 
gr
ea
te
st
 
an
d 
fu
lle
st
 
go
al
 
o
f 
Ch
ris
tia
n
ity
 
th
ei
r 
o
w
n
,
 
an
d 
so
 
do
 
n
o
t a
sp
ire
 
to
 
at
ta
in
 
it,
 
th
ey
 
ca
n
 
ha
v
e 
n
o
 
lo
n
gi
n
g 
an
d 
di
lig
en
ce
,
 
n
o
 
hu
n
ge
r 
an
d 
th
irs
t f
o
r 
rig
ht
eo
u
sn
es
s 
(cf
.
 
M
at
t. 
5:
6);
 
N
ik
ita
s 
St
ith
at
o
s 
O
n
 
Vi
rtu
e
s:
 
10
0 
te
xt
s 
4,
 
94
-
95
, 
#6
0 
Th
e 
so
rr
o
w
 
pr
o
m
pt
ed
 
by
 
G
o
d,
 
ho
w
ev
er
,
 
is 
ex
tr
em
el
y 
sa
lu
ta
ry
,
 
en
ab
lin
g 
o
n
e 
pa
tie
n
tly
 
to
 
en
du
re
 
ha
rd
sh
ip
s 
an
d 
tr
ia
ls.
 
It 
is 
a 
so
u
rc
e 
o
f c
o
m
pu
n
ct
io
n
 
fo
r 
th
o
se
 
st
ru
gg
lin
g 
an
d 
th
irs
tin
g 
fo
r 
G
o
d's
 
rig
ht
eo
u
sn
es
s 
(cf
.
 
M
at
t. 
5:
6),
 
an
d 
n
o
u
ris
he
s 
th
ei
r 
he
ar
t w
ith
 
te
ar
s.
 
v
7 
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
m
er
ci
fu
l, 
fo
r 
th
ey
 
w
ill
 
re
ce
iv
e 
m
er
cy
.
 
M
ax
im
o
s 
th
e 
Co
n
fe
ss
o
r 
Va
rio
u
s 
Te
xt
s:
 
C1
 
2 ,
 
17
3,
 
#4
5 
B
ec
au
se
 
H
e 
w
ish
es
 
to
 
u
n
ite
 
u
s 
in
 
n
at
u
re
 
an
d 
w
ill
 
w
ith
 
o
n
e 
an
o
th
er
,
 
an
d 
in
 
H
is 
go
o
dn
es
s 
u
rg
es
 
al
l h
u
m
an
ity
 
to
w
ar
ds
 
th
is 
go
al
,
 
G
o
d 
in
 
H
is 
lo
v
e 
en
tr
u
st
ed
 
H
is 
sa
v
in
g 
co
m
m
an
dm
en
ts
 
to
 
u
s,
 
o
rd
ai
n
in
g 
sim
pl
y 
th
at
 
w
e 
sh
o
u
ld
 
sh
o
w
 
m
er
cy
 
an
d 
re
ce
iv
e 
m
er
cy
 
(cf
.
 
M
at
t. 
5:
7).
 
Pe
te
r 
o
f D
am
as
ko
s 
Bo
o
k 
I 
3,
 
96
 
Th
e 
gr
ea
te
r 
o
u
r 
de
v
o
tio
n
 
to
 
th
e 
pr
ac
tic
e 
o
f t
he
 
v
irt
u
es
,
 
th
e 
m
o
re
 
o
u
r 
in
te
lle
ct
 
is 
ill
u
m
in
ed
 
by
 
kn
o
w
le
dg
e.
 
It 
is 
in
 
th
is 
w
ay
 
th
at
 
w
e 
ar
e 
ac
co
u
n
te
d 
w
o
rt
hy
 
o
f m
er
cy
,
 
th
at
 
is,
 
th
ro
u
gh
 
th
e 
fif
th
 
co
m
m
an
dm
en
t: 
‘
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
m
er
ci
fu
l, 
fo
r 
th
ey
 
w
ill
 
re
ce
iv
e 
m
er
cy
’
 
(M
at
t. 
5:
7).
 
Th
e 
m
er
ci
fu
l p
er
so
n
 
is 
he
 
w
ho
 
gi
v
es
 
to
 
o
th
er
s 
w
ha
t h
e 
ha
s 
hi
m
se
lf 
v
8 
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
pu
re
 
in
 
he
ar
t, 
fo
r 
th
ey
 
w
ill
 
se
e 
G
o
d.
 
H
es
yc
hi
o
s 
th
e 
Pr
ie
st
 
W
a
tc
hf
u
ln
e
ss
 
& 
H
o
lin
e
ss
 
1,
 
16
2,
 
#1
 
[W
at
ch
fu
ln
es
s]…
 
is,
 
in
 
th
e 
tr
u
e 
se
n
se
,
 
pu
rit
y 
o
f h
ea
rt
,
 
a 
st
at
e 
bl
es
se
d 
by
 
Ch
ris
t w
he
n
 
H
e 
sa
ys
: 
'B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
pu
re
 
in
 
he
ar
t, 
fo
r 
th
ey
 
sh
al
l s
ee
 
G
o
d' 
(M
at
t. 
5:
8);
 
an
d 
o
n
e 
w
hi
ch
,
 
be
ca
u
se
 
o
f i
ts
 
sp
iri
tu
al
 
n
o
bi
lit
y 
an
d 
be
au
ty
 
-
 
o
r,
 
ra
th
er
,
 
be
ca
u
se
 
o
f o
u
r 
n
eg
lig
en
ce
 
-
 
is 
n
o
w
 
ex
tr
em
el
y 
ra
re
 
am
o
n
g 
m
o
n
ks
.
 
1,
 
17
1,
 
#5
2 
If 
 
 
be
ca
u
se
 
o
f p
rid
e,
 
se
lf-
es
te
em
 
o
r 
se
lf-
lo
v
e 
w
e 
ar
e 
de
pr
iv
ed
 
o
f J
es
u
s'
 
he
lp
,
 
w
e 
sh
al
l l
o
se
 
th
at
 
pu
rit
y 
o
f h
ea
rt
 
th
ro
u
gh
 
w
hi
ch
 
G
o
d 
is 
kn
o
w
n
 
to
 
m
an
.
 
Fo
r,
 
as
 
th
e 
B
ea
tit
u
de
 
st
at
es
,
 
pu
rit
y 
o
f h
ea
rt
 
is 
th
e 
gr
o
u
n
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
v
isi
o
n
 
o
f 
G
o
d 
(cf
.
 
M
at
t. 
5:
8) 
1,
 
17
5,
 
#7
5 
H
u
m
ili
ty
 
an
d 
as
ce
tic
 
ha
rd
sh
ip
 
fre
e 
a 
m
an
 
fro
m
 
al
l s
in
,
 
fo
r 
th
e 
o
n
e 
cu
ts
 
o
u
t t
he
 
pa
ss
io
n
s 
o
f t
he
 
so
u
l, 
th
e 
o
th
er
 
th
o
se
 
o
f t
he
 
bo
dy
.
 
It 
is 
fo
r 
th
is 
re
as
o
n
 
th
at
 
th
e 
Lo
rd
 
sa
ys
: 
'B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
pu
re
 
in
 
he
ar
t, 
fo
r 
th
ey
 
sh
al
l s
ee
 
G
o
d' 
(M
at
t. 
5:
8).
 
1,
 
18
8,
 
#1
50
 
Fo
r 
H
e 
ha
s 
bl
es
se
d 
th
e 
pu
re
 
o
f h
ea
rt
 
an
d 
gi
v
en
 
th
e 
co
m
m
an
dm
en
ts
; a
n
d 
so
 
Je
su
s,
 
w
ho
 
al
o
n
e 
is 
tr
u
ly
 
pu
re
,
 
in
 
a 
di
v
in
e 
w
ay
 
re
ad
ily
 
en
te
rs
 
in
to
 
he
ar
ts
 
th
at
 
ar
e 
pu
re
 
an
d 
dw
el
ls
 
in
 
th
em
.
 
Th
eo
do
ro
s 
th
e 
G
re
at
 
A
sc
et
ic
 
Sp
iri
tu
a
l T
e
xt
s 
2,
 
33
, 
#8
6 
If 
a 
m
an
’
s 
he
ar
t d
o
es
 
n
o
t c
o
n
de
m
n
 
hi
m
 
(cf
.
 
1 
Jo
hn
 
3:
21
) f
o
r 
ha
v
in
g 
re
jec
te
d 
a 
co
m
m
an
dm
en
t o
f G
o
d,
 
o
r 
fo
r 
n
eg
lig
en
ce
,
 
o
r 
fo
r 
ac
ce
pt
in
g 
a 
ho
st
ile
 
th
o
u
gh
t, 
th
en
 
he
 
is 
pu
re
 
in
 
he
ar
t a
n
d 
w
o
rt
hy
 
to
 
he
ar
 
Ch
ris
t s
ay
 
to
 
hi
m
: 
‘
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
pu
re
 
in
 
he
ar
t, 
fo
r 
th
ey
 
sh
al
l s
ee
 
G
o
d’
 
(M
at
t. 
5:
8).
 
M
ax
im
o
s 
th
e 
Co
n
fe
ss
o
r 
O
n
 
lo
ve
: 
C4
 
2,
 
10
9,
 
#7
2 
It 
is 
fo
r 
th
is 
re
as
o
n
 
th
at
 
th
e 
Sa
v
io
u
r 
sa
ys
,
 
‘
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
pu
re
 
in
 
he
ar
t, 
fo
r 
th
ey
 
sh
al
l s
ee
 
G
o
d’
 
(M
at
t. 
5:
8) 
fo
r 
H
e 
is 
hi
dd
en
 
in
 
th
e 
he
ar
ts
 
o
f t
ho
se
 
w
ho
 
be
lie
v
e 
in
 
H
im
.
 
Th
ey
 
sh
al
l s
ee
 
H
im
 
an
d 
th
e 
ric
he
s 
th
at
 
ar
e 
in
 
H
im
 
w
he
n
 
th
ey
 
ha
v
e 
pu
rif
ie
d 
th
em
se
lv
es
 
th
ro
u
gh
 
lo
v
e 
an
d 
se
lf-
co
n
tr
o
l; 
an
d 
th
e 
gr
ea
te
r 
th
ei
r 
pu
rit
y,
 
th
e 
m
o
re
 
th
ey
 
w
ill
 
se
e.
 
22
4 
 
B
ea
tit
u
de
 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
Au
th
o
r/T
e
x
t 
R
e
f1  
Ex
tr
ac
t f
ro
m
 
te
x
t 
M
ax
im
o
s 
th
e 
Co
n
fe
ss
o
r 
Va
rio
u
s 
Te
xt
s:
 
C2
 
2,
 
19
9,
 
#5
8 
W
he
n
 
th
ro
u
gh
 
se
lf-
co
n
tr
o
l y
o
u
 
ha
v
e 
st
ra
ig
ht
en
ed
 
th
e 
cr
o
o
ke
d 
pa
th
s 
o
f t
he
 
pa
ss
io
n
s…
.
.
 
yo
u
 
w
ill
 
ha
v
e 
be
co
m
e 
pu
re
 
in
 
he
ar
t. 
In
 
th
is 
st
at
e 
o
f p
u
rit
y,
 
th
ro
u
gh
 
th
e 
v
irt
u
es
 
an
d 
th
ro
u
gh
 
ho
ly
 
co
n
te
m
pl
at
io
n
,
 
yo
u
 
w
ill
 
at
 
th
e 
en
d 
o
f y
o
u
r 
co
n
te
st
 
be
ho
ld
 
G
o
d,
 
in
 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 
w
ith
 
Ch
ris
t’
s 
w
o
rd
s:
 
‘
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
pu
re
 
in
 
he
ar
t, 
fo
r 
th
ey
 
sh
al
l s
ee
 
G
o
d’
 
(M
at
t. 
5:
8).
 
A
n
d 
be
ca
u
se
 
o
f t
he
 
su
ffe
rin
gs
 
yo
u
 
ha
v
e 
en
du
re
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
sa
ke
 
o
f v
irt
u
e 
yo
u
 
w
ill
 
re
ce
iv
e 
th
e 
gi
ft 
o
f 
di
sp
as
sio
n
.
 
To
 
th
o
se
 
w
ho
 
po
ss
es
s 
th
is 
gi
ft 
th
er
e 
is 
n
o
th
in
g 
w
hi
ch
 
re
v
ea
ls 
G
o
d 
m
o
re
 
fu
lly
.
 
Pe
te
r 
o
f D
am
as
ko
s 
Bo
o
k 
I 
3,
 
97
 
It 
is 
th
ro
u
gh
 
de
ta
ch
m
en
t t
ha
t o
n
e 
is 
en
ab
le
d 
to
 
fu
lfi
l t
he
 
six
th
 
co
m
m
an
dm
en
t: 
‘
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
pu
re
 
in
 
he
ar
t’
 
(M
at
t. 
5:
8).
 
Th
e 
pu
re
 
in
 
he
ar
t a
re
 
th
o
se
 
w
ho
 
ha
v
e 
ac
co
m
pl
ish
ed
 
ev
er
y 
v
irt
u
e 
re
fle
ct
iv
el
y 
an
d 
re
v
er
en
tly
 
an
d 
ha
v
e 
co
m
e 
to
 
se
e 
th
e 
tr
u
e 
n
at
u
re
 
o
f t
hi
n
gs
.
 
Sy
m
eo
n
 
M
et
ap
hr
as
tis
 
Pa
ra
ph
ra
se
 
o
f M
a
ka
rio
s 
3,
 
28
5,
 
#2
 
W
ha
t i
s 
th
e 
w
ill
 
o
f G
o
d 
th
at
 
St
 
Pa
u
l u
rg
es
 
an
d 
in
v
ite
s 
ea
ch
 
o
f u
s 
to
 
at
ta
in
 
(cf
.
 
1 
Th
es
s.
 
4:
3)?
 
It 
is 
to
ta
l c
le
an
sin
g 
fro
m
 
sin
,
 
fre
ed
o
m
 
fro
m
 
th
e 
sh
am
ef
u
l p
as
sio
n
s 
an
d 
th
e 
ac
qu
isi
tio
n
 
o
f t
he
 
hi
gh
es
t v
irt
u
e.
 
In
 
o
th
er
 
w
o
rd
s,
 
it 
is 
th
e 
pu
rif
ic
at
io
n
 
an
d 
sa
n
ct
ifi
ca
tio
n
 
o
f t
he
 
he
ar
t t
ha
t c
o
m
es
 
ab
o
u
t t
hr
o
u
gh
 
fu
lly
 
ex
pe
rie
n
ce
d 
an
d 
co
n
sc
io
u
s 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n
 
in
 
th
e 
pe
rfe
ct
 
an
d 
di
v
in
e 
Sp
iri
t. 
‘
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
pu
re
 
in
 
he
ar
t,’
 
it 
is 
sa
id
,
 
‘
fo
r 
th
ey
 
sh
al
l s
ee
 
G
o
d’
 
(M
at
t. 
5:
8) 
Sy
m
eo
n
 
th
e 
N
ew
 
Th
eo
lo
gi
an
 
Pr
a
ct
ic
a
l &
 
Th
e
o
lo
gi
ca
l 
Te
xt
s 
4,
 
39
, 
#7
3 
'B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
pu
re
 
in
 
he
ar
t,'
 
sa
ys
 
G
o
d,
 
'fo
r 
th
ey
 
sh
al
l s
ee
 
G
o
d' 
(M
at
t. 
5:
8).
 
B
u
t p
u
rit
y 
o
f h
ea
rt
 
ca
n
n
o
t b
e 
re
al
iz
ed
 
th
ro
u
gh
 
o
n
e 
v
irt
u
e 
al
o
n
e,
 
o
r 
th
ro
u
gh
 
tw
o
,
 
o
r 
te
n
; i
t c
an
 
o
n
ly
 
be
 
re
al
iz
ed
 
th
ro
u
gh
 
al
l o
f t
he
m
 
to
ge
th
er
,
 
as
 
if 
th
ey
 
fo
rm
ed
 
bu
t a
 
sin
gl
e 
v
irt
u
e 
br
o
u
gh
t t
o
 
pe
rfe
ct
io
n
.
 
[S
ym
eo
n
 
th
e 
N
ew
 
Th
eo
lo
gi
an
]  
Pr
a
ct
ic
a
l &
 
Th
e
o
lo
gi
ca
l 
Te
xt
s 
4,
 
53
, 
#1
26
 
w
e 
sh
o
u
ld
 
re
ga
rd
 
al
l a
s 
sa
in
ts
,
 
an
d 
sh
o
u
ld
 
st
riv
e 
th
ro
u
gh
 
in
w
ar
d 
gr
ie
f t
o
 
be
 
pu
rif
ie
d 
o
f o
u
r 
pa
ss
io
n
s,
 
so
 
th
at
,
 
ill
u
m
in
ed
 
by
 
gr
ac
e,
 
w
e 
m
ay
 
lo
o
k 
o
n
 
al
l a
s 
eq
u
al
s 
an
d 
at
ta
in
 
th
e 
bl
es
sin
g 
o
f t
ho
se
 
w
ho
 
ar
e 
pu
re
 
in
 
he
ar
t (
cf
.
 
M
at
t. 
5:
8).
 
[S
ym
eo
n
 
th
e 
N
ew
 
Th
eo
lo
gi
an
]  
Th
re
e
 
M
e
th
o
ds
 
o
f P
ra
ye
r 
4,
 
72
 
In
 
sh
o
rt
,
 
if 
yo
u
 
do
 
n
o
t g
u
ar
d 
yo
u
r 
in
te
lle
ct
 
yo
u
 
ca
n
n
o
t a
tta
in
 
pu
rit
y 
o
f h
ea
rt
,
 
so
 
as
 
to
 
be
 
co
u
n
te
d 
w
o
rt
hy
 
to
 
se
e 
G
o
d 
(cf
.
 
M
at
t. 
5:
18
2 ).
 
G
re
go
ry
 
Pa
la
m
as
 
In
 
D
e
fe
n
ce
 
o
f S
til
ln
e
ss
 
4,
 
33
3,
 
#2
 
W
he
n
 
th
ro
u
gh
 
se
lf-
co
n
tr
o
l w
e 
ha
v
e 
pu
rif
ie
d 
o
u
r 
bo
dy
,
 
an
d 
w
he
n
 
th
ro
u
gh
 
di
v
in
e 
lo
v
e 
w
e 
ha
v
e 
m
ad
e 
o
u
r 
in
ce
n
siv
e 
po
w
er
 
an
d 
o
u
r 
de
sir
e 
in
ce
n
tiv
es
 
fo
r 
v
irt
u
e,
 
an
d 
w
he
n
 
w
e 
o
ffe
r 
to
 
G
o
d 
an
 
in
te
lle
ct
 
cl
ea
n
se
d 
by
 
pr
ay
er
,
 
th
en
 
w
e 
w
ill
 
po
ss
es
s 
an
d 
se
e 
w
ith
in
 
o
u
rs
el
v
es
 
th
e 
gr
ac
e 
pr
o
m
ise
d 
to
 
th
e 
pu
re
 
in
 
he
ar
t (
cf
.
 
M
at
t. 
5:
8).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
Th
is 
is 
cl
ea
rly
 
an
 
er
ro
r 
in
 
th
e 
En
gl
ish
 
tr
an
sla
tio
n
 
an
d 
m
u
st
 
re
fe
r 
to
 
v
er
se
 
8,
 
n
o
t v
er
se
 
18
 
22
5 
 
B
ea
tit
u
de
 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
Au
th
o
r/T
e
x
t 
R
e
f1  
Ex
tr
ac
t f
ro
m
 
te
x
t 
v
9 
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
pe
ac
em
ak
er
s,
 
fo
r 
th
ey
 
w
ill
 
be
 
ca
lle
d 
ch
ild
re
n
 
o
f G
o
d.
 
Pe
te
r 
o
f D
am
as
ko
s 
Bo
o
k 
I 
3,
 
84
 
Fo
r 
if 
th
e 
fle
sh
 
is 
n
o
t c
o
n
su
m
ed
 
an
d 
if 
a 
m
an
 
is 
n
o
t w
ho
lly
 
le
d 
by
 
th
e 
Sp
iri
t o
f G
o
d,
 
he
 
w
ill
 
n
o
t d
o
 
th
e 
w
ill
 
o
f G
o
d 
u
n
le
ss
 
he
 
is 
fo
rc
ed
 
to
.
 
B
u
t w
he
n
 
th
e 
gr
ac
e 
o
f t
he
 
Sp
iri
t r
u
le
s 
w
ith
in
 
hi
m
,
 
th
en
 
he
 
n
o
 
lo
n
ge
r 
ha
s 
a 
w
ill
 
o
f h
is 
o
w
n
,
 
bu
t w
ha
te
v
er
 
he
 
do
es
 
is 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
G
o
d’
s 
w
ill
.
 
Th
en
 
he
 
is 
at
 
pe
ac
e.
 
M
en
 
lik
e 
th
at
 
w
ill
 
be
 
ca
lle
d 
so
n
s 
o
f G
o
d 
(cf
.
 
M
at
t. 
5:
9),
 
be
ca
u
se
 
th
ey
 
w
ill
 
th
e 
w
ill
 
o
f t
he
ir 
Fa
th
er
,
 
as
 
di
d 
th
e 
So
n
 
o
f G
o
d 
w
ho
 
is 
al
so
 
G
o
d.
 
3,
 
97
 
In
 
th
is 
w
ay
 
th
ey
 
fin
d 
pe
ac
e 
in
 
th
ei
r 
th
o
u
gh
ts
.
 
Fo
r,
 
as
 
th
e 
se
v
en
th
 
co
m
m
an
dm
en
t p
u
ts
 
it,
 
‘
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
pe
ac
em
ak
er
s’
 
(M
at
t. 
5:
9),
 
th
at
 
is,
 
th
o
se
 
w
ho
 
ha
v
e 
se
t s
o
u
l a
n
d 
bo
dy
 
at
 
pe
ac
e 
by
 
su
bje
ct
in
g 
th
e 
fle
sh
 
to
 
th
e 
sp
iri
t 
3,
 
11
5 
W
he
re
 
is 
di
sp
as
sio
n
 
an
d 
pe
rfe
ct
 
lo
v
e,
 
th
e 
pe
ac
e 
th
at
 
ex
ce
ls 
al
l i
n
te
lle
ct
 
(cf
.
 
Ph
il.
 
4:
7),
 
w
he
re
by
 
I s
ho
u
ld
 
ha
v
e 
be
en
 
ca
lle
d 
a 
so
n
 
o
f G
o
d 
(cf
.
 
M
at
t. 
5:
9)?
 
v
10
 
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
o
se
 
w
ho
 
ar
e 
pe
rs
ec
u
te
d 
fo
r 
rig
ht
eo
u
sn
es
s'
 
sa
ke
,
 
fo
r 
th
ei
rs
 
is 
th
e 
ki
n
gd
o
m
 
o
f h
ea
v
en
.
 
Pe
te
r 
o
f D
am
as
ko
s 
Bo
o
k 
I 
3,
 
98
 
th
e 
fle
sh
 
n
o
 
lo
n
ge
r 
ris
es
 
ag
ai
n
st
 
th
e 
sp
iri
t (
cf
.
 
G
al
.
 
5:
17
). I
n
st
ea
d,
 
th
e 
gr
ac
e 
o
f t
he
 
H
o
ly
 
Sp
iri
t r
ei
gn
s 
in
 
th
ei
r 
so
u
l 
an
d 
le
ad
s 
it 
w
he
re
 
it 
w
ill
,
 
be
st
o
w
in
g 
th
e 
di
v
in
e 
kn
o
w
le
dg
e 
w
he
re
by
 
m
an
 
ca
n
 
en
du
re
 
pe
rs
ec
u
tio
n
,
 
v
ili
fic
at
io
n
 
an
d 
m
al
tr
ea
tm
en
t ‘
fo
r 
rig
ht
eo
u
sn
es
s’
 
sa
ke
’
 
(M
at
t. 
5:
10
), 
v
v
11
-
12
 
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
yo
u
 
w
he
n
 
pe
o
pl
e 
re
v
ile
 
yo
u
 
an
d 
pe
rs
ec
u
te
 
yo
u
 
an
d 
u
tte
r 
al
l 
ki
n
ds
 
o
f e
v
il 
ag
ai
n
st
 
yo
u
 
fa
lse
ly
 
o
n
 
m
y 
ac
co
u
n
t. 
R
ejo
ic
e 
an
d 
be
 
gl
ad
,
 
fo
r 
yo
u
r 
re
w
ar
d 
is 
gr
ea
t i
n
 
he
av
en
,
 
fo
r 
in
 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
w
ay
 
th
ey
 
pe
rs
ec
u
te
d 
th
e 
pr
o
ph
et
s 
w
ho
 
w
er
e 
be
fo
re
 
yo
u
.
 
Pe
te
r 
o
f D
am
as
ko
s 
Bo
o
k 
I 
3,
 
98
 
th
e 
gr
ac
e 
o
f t
he
 
H
o
ly
 
Sp
iri
t r
ei
gn
s 
in
 
th
ei
r 
so
u
l a
n
d 
le
ad
s 
it 
w
he
re
 
it 
w
ill
,
 
be
st
o
w
in
g 
th
e 
di
v
in
e 
kn
o
w
le
dg
e 
w
he
re
by
 
m
an
 
ca
n
 
en
du
re
 
pe
rs
ec
u
tio
n
,
 
v
ili
fic
at
io
n
 
an
d 
m
al
tr
ea
tm
en
t ‘
fo
r 
rig
ht
eo
u
sn
es
s’
 
sa
ke
’
 
(M
at
t. 
5:
10
), r
ejo
ic
in
g 
be
ca
u
se
 
hi
s 
‘
re
w
ar
d 
is 
gr
ea
t i
n
 
he
av
en
’
 
(M
at
t. 
5:
12
)…
.
 
Fo
r 
th
e 
B
ea
tit
u
de
s 
ar
e 
gi
fts
 
fro
m
 
G
o
d 
an
d 
w
e 
sh
o
u
ld
 
th
an
k 
H
im
 
gr
ea
tly
 
fo
r 
th
em
 
an
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
re
w
ar
ds
 
pr
o
m
ise
d:
 
th
e 
ki
n
gd
o
m
 
o
f h
ea
v
en
 
in
 
th
e 
ag
e 
to
 
be
,
 
sp
iri
tu
al
 
re
fre
sh
m
en
t i
n
 
th
is 
w
o
rld
,
 
th
e 
fu
lln
es
s 
o
f a
ll 
G
o
d’
s 
bl
es
sin
gs
 
an
d 
m
er
ci
es
,
 
H
is 
m
an
ife
st
at
io
n
 
w
he
n
 
w
e 
co
n
te
m
pl
at
e 
th
e 
hi
dd
en
 
m
ys
te
rie
s 
fo
u
n
d 
in
 
th
e 
H
o
ly
 
Sc
rip
tu
re
s 
an
d 
in
 
al
l 
cr
ea
te
d 
th
in
gs
,
 
an
d 
th
e 
gr
ea
t r
ew
ar
d 
in
 
he
av
en
 
(cf
.
 
M
at
t. 
5:
12
). 
22
6 
 
B
ea
tit
u
de
 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
Au
th
o
r/T
e
x
t 
R
e
f1  
Ex
tr
ac
t f
ro
m
 
te
x
t 
v
v
3-
12
 
 
M
ax
im
o
s 
th
e 
Co
n
fe
ss
o
r 
O
n
 
lo
ve
: 
C3
 
2,
 
90
, 
#4
7 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
m
an
y 
pe
o
pl
e 
in
 
th
e 
w
o
rld
 
w
ho
 
ar
e 
po
o
r 
in
 
sp
iri
t, 
bu
t n
o
t i
n
 
th
e 
w
ay
 
th
at
 
th
ey
 
sh
o
u
ld
 
be
; t
he
re
 
ar
e 
m
an
y 
w
ho
 
m
o
u
rn
,
 
bu
t f
o
r 
so
m
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 
lo
ss
 
o
r 
th
e 
de
at
h 
o
f t
he
ir 
ch
ild
re
n
; m
an
y 
ar
e 
ge
n
tle
,
 
bu
t t
o
w
ar
ds
 
u
n
cl
ea
n
 
pa
ss
io
n
s;
 
m
an
y 
hu
n
ge
r 
an
d 
th
irs
t, 
bu
t o
n
ly
 
to
 
se
iz
e 
w
ha
t d
o
es
 
n
o
t b
el
o
n
g 
to
 
th
em
 
an
d 
to
 
pr
o
fit
 
fro
m
 
in
jus
tic
e 
; 
m
an
y 
ar
e 
m
er
ci
fu
l, 
bu
t t
o
w
ar
ds
 
th
ei
r 
bo
di
es
 
an
d 
th
e 
th
in
gs
 
th
at
 
se
rv
e 
th
e 
bo
dy
; m
an
y 
ar
e 
pu
re
 
in
 
he
ar
t, 
bu
t f
o
r 
th
e 
sa
ke
 
o
f s
el
f-e
st
ee
m
; m
an
y 
ar
e 
pe
ac
e-
m
ak
er
s,
 
bu
t b
y 
m
ak
in
g 
th
e 
so
u
l s
u
bm
it 
to
 
th
e 
fle
sh
; m
an
y 
ar
e 
pe
rs
ec
u
te
d,
 
bu
t 
as
 
w
ro
n
gd
o
er
s;
 
m
an
y 
ar
e 
re
v
ile
d,
 
bu
t f
o
r 
sh
am
ef
u
l s
in
s.
 
O
n
ly
 
th
o
se
 
ar
e 
bl
es
se
d 
w
ho
 
do
 
o
r 
su
ffe
r 
th
es
e 
th
in
gs
 
fo
r 
th
e 
sa
ke
 
o
f C
hr
ist
 
an
d 
af
te
r 
H
is 
ex
am
pl
e.
 
W
hy
? 
B
ec
au
se
 
th
ei
rs
 
is 
th
e 
ki
n
gd
o
m
 
o
f h
ea
v
en
,
 
an
d 
th
ey
 
sh
al
l s
ee
 
G
o
d 
(cf
.
 
M
at
t. 
5:
3-
12
). I
t i
s 
n
o
t b
ec
au
se
 
th
ey
 
do
 
o
r 
su
ffe
r 
th
es
e 
th
in
gs
 
th
at
 
th
ey
 
ar
e 
bl
es
se
d,
 
fo
r 
th
o
se
 
o
f w
ho
m
 
w
e 
ha
v
e 
sp
o
ke
n
 
ab
o
v
e 
do
 
th
e 
sa
m
e;
 
it 
is 
be
ca
u
se
 
th
ey
 
do
 
th
em
 
an
d 
su
ffe
r 
th
em
 
fo
r 
th
e 
sa
ke
 
o
f C
hr
ist
 
an
d 
af
te
r 
H
is 
ex
am
pl
e.
 
Pe
te
r 
o
f D
am
as
ko
s 
Bo
o
k 
I 
3,
 
98
 
A
ll 
th
e 
B
ea
tit
u
de
s 
m
ak
e 
m
an
 
a 
go
d 
by
 
gr
ac
e;
 
he
 
be
co
m
es
 
ge
n
tle
,
 
lo
n
gs
 
fo
r 
rig
ht
eo
u
sn
es
s,
 
is 
ch
ar
ita
bl
e,
 
di
sp
as
sio
n
at
e,
 
a 
pe
ac
em
ak
er
,
 
an
d 
en
du
re
s 
ev
er
y 
pa
in
 
w
ith
 
joy
 
o
u
t o
f l
o
v
e 
fo
r 
G
o
d 
an
d 
fo
r 
hi
s 
fe
llo
w
 
m
en
.
 
Fo
r 
th
e 
B
ea
tit
u
de
s 
ar
e 
gi
fts
 
fro
m
 
G
o
d 
an
d 
w
e 
sh
o
u
ld
 
th
an
k 
H
im
 
gr
ea
tly
 
fo
r 
th
em
 
an
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
re
w
ar
ds
 
pr
o
m
ise
d:
 
th
e 
ki
n
gd
o
m
 
o
f h
ea
v
en
 
in
 
th
e 
ag
e 
to
 
be
,
 
sp
iri
tu
al
 
re
fre
sh
m
en
t i
n
 
th
is 
w
o
rld
,
 
th
e 
fu
lln
es
s 
o
f a
ll 
G
o
d’
s 
bl
es
sin
gs
 
an
d 
m
er
ci
es
,
 
H
is 
m
an
ife
st
at
io
n
 
w
he
n
 
w
e 
co
n
te
m
pl
at
e 
th
e 
hi
dd
en
 
m
ys
te
rie
s 
fo
u
n
d 
in
 
th
e 
H
o
ly
 
Sc
rip
tu
re
s 
an
d 
in
 
al
l 
cr
ea
te
d 
th
in
gs
,
 
an
d 
th
e 
gr
ea
t r
ew
ar
d 
in
 
he
av
en
 
(cf
.
 
M
at
t. 
5:
12
). F
o
r 
if 
w
e 
le
ar
n
 
w
hi
le
 
o
n
 
ea
rt
h 
to
 
im
ita
te
 
Ch
ris
t a
n
d 
re
ce
iv
e 
th
e 
bl
es
se
dn
es
s 
in
he
re
n
t i
n
 
ea
ch
 
co
m
m
an
dm
en
t, 
w
e 
sh
al
l b
e 
gr
an
te
d 
th
e 
hi
gh
es
t g
o
o
d 
an
d 
th
e 
u
lti
m
at
e 
go
al
 
o
f o
u
r 
de
sir
e.
 
A
s 
th
e 
ap
o
st
le
 
sa
ys
,
 
G
o
d,
 
w
ho
 
dw
el
ls 
in
 
u
n
ap
pr
o
ac
ha
bl
e 
lig
ht
,
 
al
o
n
e 
is 
bl
es
se
d 
(cf
.
 
1 
Ti
m
.
 
6:
15
-
16
). 
W
e,
 
fo
r 
o
u
r 
pa
rt
, 
ha
v
e 
th
e 
du
ty
 
o
f k
ee
pi
n
g 
th
e 
co
m
m
an
dm
en
ts
-
o
r,
 
ra
th
er
,
 
o
f b
ei
n
g 
ke
pt
 
by
 
th
em
; b
u
t t
hr
o
u
gh
 
th
em
 
G
o
d 
in
 
H
is 
co
m
pa
ss
io
n
 
w
ill
 
gi
v
e 
to
 
th
e 
be
lie
v
er
 
re
w
ar
ds
 
bo
th
 
in
 
th
is 
w
o
rld
 
an
d 
in
 
th
e 
w
o
rld
 
to
 
be
.
 
W
he
n
 
th
ro
u
gh
 
bl
es
se
d 
in
w
ar
d 
gr
ie
f a
ll 
th
is 
ha
s 
be
en
 
re
al
iz
ed
,
 
th
en
 
th
e 
in
te
lle
ct
 
fin
ds
 
re
lie
f f
ro
m
 
th
e 
pa
ss
io
n
s;
 
an
d 
th
ro
u
gh
 
th
e 
m
an
y 
bi
tte
r 
te
ar
s 
th
at
 
it 
sh
ed
s 
o
v
er
 
its
 
sin
s 
it 
is 
re
co
n
ci
le
d 
to
 
G
o
d.
 
Pe
te
r 
o
f D
am
as
ko
s 
Bo
o
k 
II 
3,
 
23
1 
Fr
o
m
 
fa
ith
 
co
m
es
 
fe
ar
,
 
an
d 
fro
m
 
fe
ar
 
co
m
es
 
tr
u
e 
pi
et
y,
 
o
r 
se
lf-
co
n
tr
o
l, 
th
e 
en
du
ra
n
ce
 
o
f g
rie
f, 
an
d 
th
e 
o
th
er
 
th
in
gs
 
o
f w
hi
ch
 
th
e 
Lo
rd
’
s 
B
ea
tit
u
de
s 
sp
ea
k 
(cf
.
 
M
at
t. 
5:
3-
12
) -
 
ge
n
tle
n
es
s,
 
hu
n
ge
r 
an
d 
th
irs
t f
o
r 
rig
ht
eo
u
sn
es
s,
 
th
at
 
is,
 
fo
r 
al
l t
he
 
v
irt
u
es
,
 
ac
ts
 
o
f m
er
cy
 
-
 
an
d 
al
so
 
de
ta
ch
m
en
t. 
[S
ym
eo
n
 
th
e 
N
ew
 
Th
eo
lo
gi
an
]  
Th
re
e
 
M
e
th
o
ds
 
o
f P
ra
ye
r 
4,
 
72
 
W
ith
o
u
t s
u
ch
 
w
at
ch
fu
ln
es
s 
yo
u
 
ca
n
n
o
t b
ec
o
m
e 
po
o
r 
in
 
sp
iri
t, 
o
r 
gr
ie
v
e,
 
o
r 
hu
n
ge
r 
an
d 
th
irs
t a
fte
r 
rig
ht
eo
u
sn
es
s,
 
o
r 
be
 
tr
u
ly
 
m
er
ci
fu
l, 
o
r 
pu
re
 
in
 
he
ar
t, 
o
r 
a 
pe
ac
em
ak
er
,
 
o
r 
be
 
pe
rs
ec
u
te
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
sa
ke
 
o
f ju
st
ic
e 
(cf
.
 
M
at
t. 
5:
3-
10
). 
Lu
ke
 
6 
 
 
 
 
v
20
 
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
yo
u
 
w
ho
 
ar
e 
po
o
r,
 
fo
r 
yo
u
rs
 
is 
th
e 
ki
n
gd
o
m
 
o
f G
o
d.
 
G
re
go
ry
 
Pa
la
m
as
 
To
 
Xe
n
ia
 
4 ,
 
30
4,
 
#2
8 
B
u
t i
f y
o
u
 
po
ss
es
s 
a 
co
n
tr
ite
,
 
lo
w
ly
 
an
d 
hu
m
bl
e 
sp
iri
t y
o
u
 
ca
n
n
o
t b
u
t r
ejo
ic
e 
in
 
o
u
tw
ar
d 
sim
pl
ic
ity
 
an
d 
se
lf-
ab
as
em
en
t, 
be
ca
u
se
 
yo
u
 
w
ill
 
re
ga
rd
 
yo
u
rs
el
f a
s 
u
n
w
o
rt
hy
 
o
f p
ra
ise
,
 
co
m
fo
rt
,
 
pr
o
sp
er
ity
 
an
d 
al
l s
u
ch
 
th
in
gs
.
 
Th
e 
po
o
r 
m
an
 
de
em
ed
 
bl
es
se
d 
by
 
G
o
d 
is 
he
 
w
ho
 
co
n
sid
er
s 
hi
m
se
lf 
u
n
w
o
rt
hy
 
o
f t
he
se
 
th
in
gs
.
 
It 
is 
he
 
w
ho
 
is 
re
al
ly
 
po
o
r,
 
be
in
g 
po
o
r 
in
 
fu
ll 
m
ea
su
re
.
 
It 
w
as
 
o
n
 
th
is 
ac
co
u
n
t t
ha
t S
t L
u
ke
 
al
so
 
w
ro
te
,
 
'B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
po
o
r'
 
(6:
20
), w
ith
o
u
t 
ad
di
n
g 
'in
 
sp
iri
t'.
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7 
 
B
ea
tit
u
de
 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
Au
th
o
r/T
e
x
t 
R
e
f1  
Ex
tr
ac
t f
ro
m
 
te
x
t 
v
21
 
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
yo
u
 
w
ho
 
ar
e 
hu
n
gr
y 
n
o
w
,
 
fo
r 
yo
u
 
w
ill
 
be
 
fil
le
d.
 
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
yo
u
 
w
ho
 
w
ee
p 
n
o
w
,
 
fo
r 
yo
u
 
w
ill
 
la
u
gh
.
 
 
 
 
v
v
22
-
23
 
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
yo
u
 
w
he
n
 
pe
o
pl
e 
ha
te
 
yo
u
,
 
an
d 
w
he
n
 
th
ey
 
ex
cl
u
de
 
yo
u
,
 
re
v
ile
 
yo
u
,
 
an
d 
de
fa
m
e 
yo
u
 
o
n
 
ac
co
u
n
t o
f t
he
 
So
n
 
o
f M
an
.
 
R
ejo
ic
e 
in
 
th
at
 
da
y 
an
d 
le
ap
 
fo
r 
joy
,
 
fo
r 
su
re
ly
 
yo
u
r 
re
w
ar
d 
is 
gr
ea
t 
in
 
he
av
en
; f
o
r 
th
at
 
is 
w
ha
t t
he
ir 
an
ce
st
o
rs
 
di
d 
to
 
th
e 
pr
o
ph
et
s.
 
G
re
go
ry
 
Pa
la
m
as
 
To
 
Xe
n
ia
 
4,
 
31
6,
 
#5
7 
W
e 
ar
e 
w
el
l a
w
ar
e 
th
at
 
at
 
th
is 
po
in
t c
er
ta
in
 
pe
o
pl
e 
o
u
t o
f m
al
ic
e 
ar
e 
re
ad
y 
to
 
ce
n
su
re
 
u
s,
 
te
lli
n
g 
u
s,
 
in
 
ef
fe
ct
,
 
'Y
o
u
 
ar
e 
n
o
t t
o
 
sp
ea
k 
in
 
th
e 
n
am
e 
o
f t
he
 
Lo
rd
 
(cf
.
 
Je
r.
 
11
:2
1),
 
an
d 
if 
yo
u
 
do
 
w
e 
w
ill
 
re
pu
di
at
e 
yo
u
r 
n
am
e 
as
 
ev
il 
(cf
.
 
Lu
ke
 
6:
22
), d
ev
isi
n
g 
an
d 
sp
re
ad
in
g 
sla
n
de
rs
 
an
d 
fa
lse
ho
o
ds
 
ab
o
u
t y
o
u
.
' 
B
u
t l
et
 
u
s 
ta
ke
 
n
o
 
n
o
tic
e 
o
f t
he
se
 
pe
o
pl
e,
 
an
d 
le
t u
s 
n
o
w
 
co
n
tin
u
e 
w
ith
 
w
ha
t w
e 
w
er
e 
sa
yi
n
g,
 
be
lie
v
in
g 
in
 
an
d 
af
fir
m
in
g 
th
e 
te
ac
hi
n
gs
 
o
f t
he
 
ho
ly
 
fa
th
er
s,
 
di
re
ct
in
g 
o
u
r 
at
te
n
tio
n
 
to
 
th
em
 
an
d 
co
n
v
in
ci
n
g 
o
th
er
s 
th
ro
u
gh
 
th
em
.
 
Jo
hn
 
20
 
 
 
 
 
v
29
 
B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
o
se
 
w
ho
 
ha
v
e 
n
o
t s
ee
n
 
an
d 
ye
t h
av
e 
co
m
e 
to
 
be
lie
v
e.
 
Jo
hn
 
o
f K
ar
pa
th
o
s 
Fo
r 
th
e
 
M
o
n
ks
 
in
 
In
di
a
 
1,
 
31
5,
 
#7
1 
'B
le
ss
ed
 
ar
e 
th
o
se
 
w
ho
 
ha
v
e 
n
o
t s
ee
n
,
 
an
d 
ye
t h
av
e 
be
lie
v
ed
' 
(Jo
hn
 
20
:2
9).
 
B
le
ss
ed
 
al
so
 
ar
e 
th
o
se
 
w
ho
,
 
w
he
n
 
gr
ac
e 
is 
w
ith
dr
aw
n
,
 
fin
d 
n
o
 
co
n
so
la
tio
n
 
in
 
th
em
se
lv
es
,
 
bu
t o
n
ly
 
co
n
tin
u
in
g 
tr
ib
u
la
tio
n
 
an
d 
th
ic
k 
da
rk
n
es
s,
 
an
d 
ye
t d
o
 
n
o
t 
de
sp
ai
r;
 
bu
t, 
st
re
n
gt
he
n
ed
 
by
 
fa
ith
,
 
th
ey
 
en
du
re
 
co
u
ra
ge
o
u
sly
,
 
co
n
v
in
ce
d 
th
at
 
th
ey
 
do
 
in
de
ed
 
se
e 
H
im
 
w
ho
 
is 
in
v
isi
bl
e.
 
Ac
ts
 
20
 
 
 
 
 
v
35
 
It 
is 
m
o
re
 
bl
es
se
d 
to
 
gi
v
e 
th
an
 
to
 
re
ce
iv
e.
 
Jo
hn
 
Ca
ss
ia
n
 
O
n
 
th
e
 
Ei
gh
t V
ic
e
s 
1,
 
80
-
81
 
So
m
e,
 
im
pe
lle
d 
by
 
th
ei
r 
o
w
n
 
de
ce
it 
an
d 
av
ar
ic
e,
 
di
st
o
rt
 
th
e 
m
ea
n
in
g 
o
f t
he
 
sc
rip
tu
ra
l s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
'It
 
is 
m
o
re
 
bl
es
se
d 
to
 
gi
v
e 
th
an
 
to
 
re
ce
iv
e'
 
(A
ct
s 
20
:3
5).
 
Th
ey
 
do
 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
w
ith
 
th
e 
Lo
rd
's
 
w
o
rd
s 
w
he
n
 
H
e 
sa
ys
,
 
'If
 
yo
u
 
w
an
t t
o
 
be
 
pe
rfe
ct
,
 
go
 
an
d 
se
ll 
al
l y
o
u
 
ha
v
e 
an
d 
gi
v
e 
to
 
th
e 
po
o
r,
 
an
d 
yo
u
 
w
ill
 
ha
v
e 
tr
ea
su
re
 
in
 
he
av
en
; a
n
d 
co
m
e 
an
d 
fo
llo
w
 
M
e'
 
(M
at
t. 
19
:2
1).
 
Th
ey
 
jud
ge
 
th
at
 
it 
is 
m
o
re
 
bl
es
se
d 
to
 
ha
v
e 
co
n
tr
o
l o
v
er
 
o
n
e'
s 
pe
rs
o
n
al
 
w
ea
lth
,
 
an
d 
to
 
gi
v
e 
fro
m
 
th
is 
to
 
th
o
se
 
in
 
n
ee
d,
 
th
an
 
to
 
po
ss
es
s 
n
o
th
in
g 
at
 
al
l. 
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Table 5.2 Beatitudes of the Philokalia 
 
Author/Title Reference Beatitude 
Evagrios of Pontus 
On Prayer 
1, 68-69, 
#117-#123 
117. I shall say again what I have said elsewhere: blessed is the 
intellect that is completely free from forms during prayer. 
118. Blessed is the intellect that, undistracted in its prayer, acquires 
an ever greater longing for God. 
119. Blessed is the intellect that during prayer is free from 
materiality and stripped of all possessions. 
120. Blessed is the intellect that has acquired complete freedom from 
sensations during prayer. 
121. Blessed is the monk who regards every man as God after God. 
122. Blessed is the monk who looks with great joy on everyone's 
salvation and progress as if they were his own. 
123. Blessed is the monk who regards himself as 'the off-scouring of 
all things' (1 Cor. 4:13). 
Hesychios the Priest 
Watchfulness & 
Holiness 
1, 197, #196 Truly blessed is the man whose mind and heart are as closely 
attached to the Jesus Prayer and to the ceaseless invocation of His 
name as air to the body or flame to the wax. The sun rising over the 
earth creates the daylight; and the venerable and holy name of the 
Lord Jesus, shining continually in the mind, gives birth to countless 
intellections radiant as the sun.  
John of Karpathos 
For the Monks in 
India 
1, 317-318, 
#83 
Blessed is he who, with a hunger that is never satisfied, day and night 
throughout this present life makes prayer and the psalms his food and 
drink, and strengthens himself by reading of God's glory in Scripture. 
Such communion will lead the soul to ever-increasing joy in the age 
to come. 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C1 
2, 54-55, 
##17-19 
17. Blessed is he who can love all men equally. 
18. Blessed is he who is not attached to anything transitory or 
corruptible. 
19. Blessed is the intellect that transcends all sensible objects and 
ceaselessly delights in divine beauty 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
For Thalassios: C2 
2, 145, #31 Blessed is he who like Joshua (cf. Josh. 10:12-13) keeps the Sun of 
righteousness from setting in himself throughout the whole day of 
this present life, not allowing it to be blotted out by the dusk of sin 
and ignorance. In this way he will truly be able to put to flight the 
cunning demons that rise up against him. 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C3 
2, 215, ##24-
25 
 
24. Truly blessed is the intellect that dies to all created beings: to 
sensible beings by quelling the activity of the senses, and to in-
telligible beings by ceasing from noetic activity. Through such a 
death of the intellect the will dies to all things. The intellect is 
then able to receive the life of divine grace and to apprehend, in 
a manner that transcends its noetic power, not simply created 
beings, but their Creator. 
25. Blessed is he who has united his practice of the virtues to natural 
goodness and his contemplative life to natural truth. For all 
practice of the virtues is for the sake of goodness and all 
contemplation seeks spiritual knowledge solely for the sake of 
truth. When goodness and truth are attained, nothing can afflict 
the soul’s capacity for practicing the virtues, or disturb its 
contemplative activity with outlandish speculations; for the soul 
will now transcend every created and intelligible reality, and will 
enter into God Himself, who alone is goodness and troth and 
who is beyond all being and all intellection 
2, 216, #28 Blessed is he who knows in truth that we are but tools in God’s 
hands; that it is God who effects within us all ascetic practice and 
contemplation, virtue and spiritual knowledge, victory and wisdom, 
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Author/Title Reference Beatitude 
goodness and truth; and that to all this we contribute nothing at all 
except a disposition that desires what is good. 
Thalassios 
For Paul: C1 
2, 310, #56 Blessed is he who has attained boundless infinity, transcending all 
that is transitory.  
Ilias 
Gnomic Anthology: 2 
3, 44, #86 Blessed, therefore, is the man who regards spiritual work as superior 
to physical work: through the first he makes up for any deficiency 
where the second is concerned, because he lives the hidden life of 
prayer that is manifest to God. 
3, 46, #106 Blessed is he who in this life is granted the experience of this state1 
and who sees his body, which by nature is of clay, become 
incandescent through grace. 
Ilias 
Gnomic Anthology: 4 
3, 60, #102 Blessed is the soul that, because it expects its Lord daily, thinks 
nothing of the day's toil or of the night's, since He is going to appear 
in the morning. 
3, 60, #103 Blessed is the man who believes that he is seen by God; for his foot 
will not slip (cf. Ps. 73:2) unless this is God's will. 
Peter of Damaskos 
Book I 
3, 103-104 Blessed are they who are completely devoted to God, either through 
obedience to someone experienced in the practice of the virtues and 
living an ordered life in stillness, or else through themselves living in 
stillness and total detachment, scrupulously obedient to God’s will, 
and seeking the advice of experienced men in everything they say or 
think. 
Blessed above all are those who seek to attain dispassion and spiritual 
knowledge unlaboriously through their total devotion to God: as God 
Himself has said through His prophet, ‘Devote yourselves to stillness 
and know that I am God’ (Ps. 46:10). 
Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of 
Makarios 
3, 329, #101 Truly blessed and zealous for life and for surpassing joy are those 
who through fervent faith and virtuous conduct receive consciously 
and experientially the knowledge of the celestial mysteries of the 
Spirit and whose citizenship is in heaven (cf. Phil. 3:20). Clearly they 
excel all other men; for who among the powerful or the wise or the 
prudent could ascend to heaven while still on earth, and perform 
spiritual works there and have sight of the beauty of the Spirit? 
Nikitas Stithatos 
On the Inner Nature 
of Things 
4, 121, #51 Blessed in my eyes is the man who, changed through the practice of 
the virtues, transcends the encompassing walls of the passion-
embroiled state and rises on the wings of dispassion - wings silver-
toned with divine knowledge (cf. Ps. 68:13) - to the spiritual sphere 
in which he contemplates the essences of created things, and who 
from there enters the divine darkness of theology where in the life of 
blessedness he ceases from all outward labours and reposes in God. 
For he has become a terrestrial angel and a celestial man; he has 
glorified God in himself, and God will glorify him (cf. John 13:31-
32). 
 
                                                 
1
 “This state” refers to the previous paragraph, where Ilias describes a state of concentrated prayer in 
which a flame surrounds the soul, “as fire surrounds iron”, making it “wholly incandescent”. 
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Chapter 6: Psychotherapy 
 
If the Philokalia offers a diagnosis of the pathology of the human soul, a 
pharmacopoeia of remedies for the passions, and a vision of what a healthy and 
flourishing human-being (soul and body) can aspire to, then it begins to sound as 
though the Philokalia is really all about the health and therapy of the soul or psyche 
(). Furthermore, some of the subjects tackled by the Philokalia sound very 
similar to the concerns of psychological medicine: Evagrios seems to be very aware 
of unconscious processes, acedia bears a marked apparent resemblance to 
depression, the ensnaring hostile pleasures of the passions sound very much like 
contemporary notions of addiction, and some of the more Stoic aspects of the theory 
of the Philokalia, especially the mastery of the passions by reason, sound very akin 
to some forms of cognitive behavioural therapy. But do these superficial 
resemblances stand up to closer scrutiny? 
 
Unfortunately, any attempt at scrutiny of these apparent resemblances immediately 
encounters some very significant problems. Three issues in particular need to be 
addressed: 
1. The Philokalia is first and foremost a collection of texts. Although different 
translations have more or less varied the boundaries of the “canon” of this 
collection, there exists a core assembly of texts of recognised spiritual and 
patristic authority that has relatively clear boundaries. This situation contrasts 
greatly with the world of psychotherapy, in which no assembly of texts has 
universally recognised authority. One might look to the complete works of 
Freud, perhaps, or Jung, as providing a comparable corpus of texts for 
psychotherapy as that provided by the Philokalia for the Orthodox spiritual 
life. However, this comparison only works as long as one remains within a 
relatively confined theoretical or historical discipline of psychotherapy. The 
total literature on psychotherapy of all kinds is now vast, and perhaps more 
akin to the totality of all Christian (or even all religious) texts on spirituality 
rather than to a limited and defined anthology such as that of the Philokalia. 
And even if one is to remain within a single tradition of psychotherapy, it 
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must be remembered that the collected works of Freud or Jung are defined by 
single authorship. No accepted multi-author canon of Freudian or Jungian 
texts exists to represent these schools of psychotherapy as they have been 
expounded or practised over the period of their history to date, a history 
which is in any case very short in comparison to that of the Philokalia. 
2. The Philokalia and psychotherapy ostensibly address different questions, 
with different purposes in view. In a sense, to ask this question is to prejudge 
the outcome of the scrutiny and comparison that are being proposed: Are 
both the Philokalia and psychotherapy talking about fundamentally the same 
thing? However, if any scrutiny or comparison is possible, it must at least be 
acknowledged at the outset that they each developed with very different 
applications and outcomes in mind. The former arose from the experiences of 
practitioners of the spiritual life, whose expressed goal was concerned with 
the advancement of the life of prayer and finding spiritual salvation. The 
latter developed in order to treat psychological disorder and improve mental 
well-being. The qualifications offered at the beginning of the last chapter 
already provide (I hope) sufficient grounds for suggesting that we can make 
no assumptions about the sameness of these quests, even where terminology 
overlaps. But, in fact, the terminology is often very different, and it is not 
immediately obvious that the spiritual and religious quest is at all the same as 
the psychological and medical one. However, this does at least draw 
attention to one important commonality. Both the Philokalia and 
psychotherapy are traditions supportive of the living of human life. They are 
not merely theoretical bodies of theological doctrine, philosophy or science. 
They both exist for the purpose of improving human life, of promoting 
human flourishing and achieving or restoring human well-being – even if 
they conceive of these things in different ways, and even if they set about the 
task differently.1 
                                                 
1
 Were it not for this common ground, it is acknowledged that the comparison would be invalidated 
altogether. Although reference will be made repeatedly here to comparisons “between the Philokalia 
and psychotherapy”, this is really shorthand for what might be more adequately described as a 
comparison between therapeutic relationships based upon the rationale and procedures of the 
Philokalia and those based upon the rationale and procedures of contemporary psychotherapy. 
However, even this wording would need more careful analysis. What is meant by “therapeutic”, 
“rationale” and “procedures”? Do any of these terms borrow too much more from the philosophy and 
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3. There are problems of epistemology and terminology which derive from the 
different times, cultures and philosophies within which the Philokalia was 
written and psychotherapy developed. The texts comprising the Philokalia 
were written between the 4th and 15th Centuries, formed into a more or less 
acknowledged collection of texts over a period of almost three subsequent 
centuries, and the Philokalia itself was then compiled and edited for 
publication in the late 18th Century. Since then new translations have 
emerged and enlarged editions have been published in Russian and 
Romanian, but the primary texts by definition have not changed and 
remarkably little secondary literature has been published. The history of 
psychotherapy, in contrast, is almost the inverse of this process. Although it 
is acknowledged that psychotherapy has drawn on classical philosophy and 
religious tradition, its recent history more or less starts at the point at which 
the Philokalia was published. The Philokalia, and the world of 
psychotherapy, are therefore situated in quite different historical periods. 
Added to this, we find that the former has developed within the culture, 
philosophy and theology of eastern Christendom – and especially eastern 
Europe – whilst the latter has a history situated primarily in western Europe 
and north America, and thus has engaged primarily with the concerns of 
western society and the western (Protestant and Catholic) Church. 
 
It will be proposed that there are possible ways of taking forward a critical 
comparison which might be able to address these problems. However, before 
outlining a methodology for this task, it may be helpful to give further consideration 
to some of the relevant historical, philosophical and terminological issues at hand.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
culture of the world of psychotherapy than that of the Philokalia (or vice-versa) to make any 
comparison invalid? If so, can more value neutral terms be found? 
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1. A Brief History of Psychotherapy 
 
A comprehensive history of psychotherapy would represent a formidable 
undertaking. However, a very brief and selective account, orientated towards the 
task at hand, is necessary at this point. In offering the following account, I have 
drawn especially on Brown and Pedder (1980), Bloch and Harari (2006), Allen 
(2006), Drummond and Kennedy (2006), and Frank (2006). 
 
Although it is often acknowledged that psychotherapy finds its origins in the ancient 
world, in classical philosophy, magic, and religion, historical accounts usually begin 
in earnest in the late 18th Century with the work of Anton Mesmer (1734-1815). 
Mesmer developed a theory of “animal magnetism” according to which magnets and 
(what we would now call) hypnotism were used for the treatment of a range of 
medical conditions. Mesmer was eventually discredited, but the apparent success of 
his treatments led to interest in how, if they were flawed, they might still have 
helped people. The work was taken up, amongst others, by the eminent French 
neurologist Jean Martin Charcot (1835-1893) and his pupil Pierre Janet (1859-1947). 
Following in this line, Josef Breuer (1842-1925) and Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) 
published their seminal Studies on Hysteria in 1895. Along with four other cases 
treated by Freud, this work described the treatment of Anna O, a young woman with 
various hysterical symptoms. Studies on Hysteria described the use of hypnotism, 
suggestion, catharsis and free association as therapeutic techniques in the course of 
talking with patients over a period of time about their lives. Anna O described her 
treatment as her “talking cure”. Freud’s theoretical system, and the process of 
treatment with which it was associated, became known as psychoanalysis. From 
psychoanalysis a multitude of different kinds of psychotherapy developed – all of 
which are now known as dynamic psychotherapies. 
  
Dynamic therapies stress therapeutic processes of understanding (insight) and 
empathy, and involve talking about memories of (often early) life associated with 
the development of the condition being treated. They usually involve recognition of 
unconscious processes which may explain and maintain that condition. In particular, 
Freud noted that feelings and thoughts associated with relationships in early life may 
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be transferred onto relationships in the present – especially the relationship with a 
therapist. This process, which Freud labelled “transference”, came to be seen as a 
key opportunity for using the present therapeutic relationship to bring healing to the 
wounds left by past psychological trauma. 
 
Although Freud revised his theories through the course of his lifetime, he proved 
unable to tolerate the dissent of his pupils and colleagues. In particular, Carl Jung 
(1875-1961) and Alfred Adler (1870-1937) both moved away and developed their 
own models of psychotherapy (analytical psychology and individual psychology 
respectively). Karen Horney (1885-1952), Erich Fromm (1900-1980), and “Harry” 
Stack Sullivan (1892-1949) established their own, neo-Freudian, schools in the 
United States of America. Donald Winnicott (1896-1971) and Melanie Klein (1882-
1960), working in Britain, developed a focus on significant early life relationships 
which became known as the Object Relations School. Since then, numerous further 
branches and offshoots of the psychotherapeutic tree have developed. Amongst these 
are approaches which focus on the use of small groups, or family groups, as the 
basis within which to conduct therapy. 
 
The theory and methods of dynamic psychotherapy have come under considerable 
scientific scrutiny since the 1950s, and are now claimed by some to be highly 
unscientific, but Freud never abandoned his fundamentally scientific outlook. 
Eventually, he hoped, all psychological disorders could potentially be explained on 
the basis of physical and chemical processes. 
 
The other major approach to psychotherapy, behaviour therapy, contrasts with 
dynamic psychotherapy in various ways. It has an even more recent history and its 
foundations are in the world of experimental psychology. In the 1920s research 
based on the work of Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936) suggested that some neurotic 
disorders might be a result of classical conditioning – the process of developing an 
association of a stimulus and response in such a way that the stimulus reliably 
evokes a learned – or “conditioned” response. Most famously this was demonstrated 
with Pavlov’s experimental dogs, which salivated on hearing the sound of a bell that 
had routinely been rung when they were fed. Conditioning, it was alleged, might 
also be the basis of some neurotic disorders. In this model, anxiety (rather than 
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salivation) was the conditioned human response to stimuli such as the objects of a 
phobia. Although this simple model was subsequently significantly modified in the 
light of further research, it led to the development of treatments such as systematic 
desensitisation, which did not require a “talking cure”. Thus, for example, a patient 
might be exposed repeatedly, in graded and increasing “doses”, to the object of their 
phobia over a period of time. At each exposure anxiety inevitably subsides, until the 
patient is relatively relaxed. Over time, it becomes possible to approach the object of 
the phobia without fear. In keeping with its experimental scientific foundations, 
behaviour therapy eschews subjective experience and confines itself to observable 
and objective phenomena. 
 
In the 1960s Aaron Beck (b.1921), Albert Ellis (1913-2007) and others concluded 
that the tenets of psychodynamic therapy could not be upheld. For example, patients 
engaging in dynamic therapy not infrequently seemed to gain insight and yet not 
improve symptomatically. From the work of Beck, Ellis and others developed a 
model of cognitive psychotherapy according to which feelings and behaviour are 
understood as causally related to underlying thoughts, or cognitions. On this basis, it 
is possible to pursue therapy to alter feelings and behaviour by identifying and 
modifying underlying faulty, irrational or erroneous cognitions. Like behaviour 
therapy, this model owes much to scientific psychology and does not require 
analysis of unconscious processes or the material and memories of early life history. 
Its focus is very much in the “here and now”. However, it goes further than does 
behaviour therapy to address the complexities of human (as opposed to animal) 
behaviour. Cognitive psychology is now arguably the dominant paradigm within 
psychology, and is hugely influential in the clinical practice of psychotherapy. 
However, because of its common ground with behavioural psychotherapy, reference 
is often made to cognitive behaviour therapy (or CBT) as encapsulating both 
approaches. 
 
Whilst the theoretical and practical gulf between dynamic and cognitive behaviour 
approaches to psychotherapy remains large, this is not to say that there are not 
bridges across it. Cognitive Analytic Therapy (CAT), for example, provides an 
evidence based approach to psychotherapy which restates psychoanalytic concepts 
in behavioural terms (Kerr and Ryle, 2006). 
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2. Soul and Self 
 
The history of psychotherapy, all too briefly related here, is intimately associated 
with broader streams of human thought, which have both given rise to it and 
influenced its course, and have also been influenced by it. In particular, it is 
associated with the history of ideas concerned with the soul or self.2 
 
Platonic understandings of the soul or psyche have had enduring influence. 
According to Plato, the soul – an immaterial thing – provided continuity of personal 
identity during life, and after death. Christianity largely adopted this model, and it is 
still widely popular amongst ordinary Christians, and others, today. It was largely 
retained by René Descartes (1596-1650), who identified the soul with the mind, 
albeit he no longer identified the soul with the “life force” that confers life upon the 
body. However, the concept of the soul began to wane as scientific thinking came 
into the ascendant, and the mind was increasingly understood as located in the brain. 
By the end of the 19th Century it was all but entirely abandoned in scientific and 
philosophical circles, although more recently new understandings of the soul, such 
as “emergent” models, have attracted renewed interest (Warren S. Brown, 1998). 
 
The idea of the “self” also has a long history – arguably also stretching back to 
classical civilisation. However, the self represents an idea rather than a substance. 
The self is concerned more with the persistent identity of an individual human being 
(and potentially also other higher animals) which has both a body and psychological 
states such as emotions, thoughts or feelings. According to John Locke (1632-1704) 
personal identity, or the self, is grounded primarily in continuing psychological 
links, such as memory and consciousness. For David Hume (1711-1766), however, 
in A Treatise of Human Nature, the persisting self was simply an illusion. Here, he 
compares the human mind to a theatre, where actors who successively appear on 
stage are perceptions that come and go. But he qualifies this analogy by stating that 
                                                 
2
 I am indebted to Martin and Barresi, 2006 and Sorabji, 2006, on whose works in this field I have 
drawn extensively here. 
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there is no such thing as a mind, and therefore no theatre. We are left only with 
perceptions that come and go. 
 
In Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) distinguished between 
knowledge of things as they appear to be (phenomenon) and as they are in 
themselves (noumenon). The soul, or self, can only be known as phenomenon – not 
as noumenon.3 Despite this, philosophical speculation about the concept of a unified 
soul continued, but scientific speculation, from the late 19th Century onwards, tended 
to divide the self into more manageable units of study. It is within this realm that 
both psychotherapeutic and neuro-scientific understandings of the self are largely 
located. Thus, for example, Martin and Barresi draw attention to the Freudian model 
of id, ego and superego, and neuro-physiological concepts of a “neural self” as being 
examples of this kind.4 But the proliferation of models and aspects of the self has led 
Martin and Barresi, and others, to conclude that the self is now irretrievably 
fragmented – both within individual theories, and also between different theories.5 
 
At this point, it might be tempting to abandon any quest for a unified self. However, 
Charles Taylor6 has pointed out that the self does not fulfil the basic criteria for 
being an object of scientific study. It cannot be studied completely objectively, it is 
not independent of descriptions or interpretations it makes of itself, it is not 
amenable to fully explicit description, and it cannot be described independently of 
its surroundings, for a self is only a self in relation to other selves. Taylor’s7 thesis is 
that our identity, and thus our selfhood, is actually defined by our stance on moral 
and spiritual questions, and by our belonging to a community:  
our being selves is essentially linked to our sense of the good, and that we 
achieve selfhood among other selves8 
 
Taylor identifies a number of aspects of the modern identity which he considers 
(although by no means uncritically) to be important. These include a sense of 
inwardness, an affirmation of ordinary life (work, marriage and family), and an 
                                                 
3
 Mackey, 2000, pp.21-30 
4
 Martin and Barresi, 2006, pp.279-281, 296-297 
5
 Ibid., pp.295-305 
6
 Taylor, 1989, pp.33-35 
7
 Ibid., p.50 
8
 Ibid., p.51 
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understanding of nature as source of truth or goodness. Each of these has been 
important in its own way to the development of psychotherapy. By way of example 
of this, it may be illuminating to consider briefly the relevance of one these aspects, 
namely inwardness. We noted in the introduction to Chapter 5 that Taylor 
understands inwardness as having been formed in our society by such processes as 
radical reflexivity, disengagement and expressivism. 
 
As subjective agents, human beings experience the world, have knowledge and 
awareness of it, and find meaning in it as an object of their attention. “Radical 
reflexivity” (or the “first person standpoint”) is a term introduced by Taylor9 to refer 
to the stance from which this subjectivity itself becomes the object of attention, a 
stance which he understands as originating in the work of Augustine. It is the 
experience of experiencing, the knowledge of having knowledge and the awareness 
of awareness. It is a focus on the way that the world is for us. It is to be 
distinguished from non-radical reflexivity in which human beings attend to 
themselves (for example to their physical or spiritual well-being) but without 
adopting a first-person standpoint. It is concerned with being present to ourselves, 
the agents of our own experience. It is thus something to which every human agent 
has unique and privileged access. No one else can know exactly what it is like to be 
me in the way that I can. 
 
Taylor suggests that, both Freudian and behavioural theories find their basis in the 
“disengagement” of human subjects from the world around them.10 The disengaged 
subject is capable not only of objectifying the world around her, but also her own 
emotions, desires and other feelings, in such a way as to enable objective and 
rational judgements to be made concerning them.11 The identity of the disengaged 
subject is constituted in memory of the narrative of her own, unique, life story.12 
Disengagement, a process which Taylor understands as attributable primarily to the 
                                                 
9
 .:#58## 
10
 Ibid., p.174 
11
 Ibid., p.21 
12
 Ibid., pp.288-289 
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work of Descartes, involves a kind of stepping out of the first person standpoint so 
as to adopt theories or ideas of how things really are.13 
 
The “punctual self” is a term adopted by Taylor in reference to a stance of radical 
disengagement which finds its origins in the work of Locke. This radical 
disengagement allows the extension of rational control to the possibility of 
reformation. The punctual self is thus not to be identified with any of a variety of 
possible objects of change, but rather with “the power to objectify and remake” and 
this power resides in consciousness. The punctual self is defined independently of 
concerns about the good, and independently of relationship to a wider community or 
environment. Its only constitutive property is self-awareness. 14 
 
According to Taylor, the Freudian ego is: 
in essence a pure steering mechanism, devoid of instinctual force of its own 
(though it must draw power from the id to function). Its job is to manoeuvre 
through the all-but-unnavigable obstacle course set by id, super-ego, and 
external reality. Its powers are incomparably less than Locke’s punctual 
self,15 but like its ancestor it is fundamentally a disengaged agent of 
instrumental reason.16  
 
Taylor contrasts this with both the Platonic view of reason as located in the cosmic 
order, and the Stoic view of reason as the prioritising of human goals, neither of 
which required introspection. The disengaged self, however, is aware both of its own 
activities and the processes which form it. Furthermore, it takes charge of its own 
construction of reality and the associations which form it, and it remakes them.17 
 
Taylor18 identifies as a central feature of Romanticism the idea of “nature as source”. 
Whilst the idea of “nature as source” is central to Romanticism, Taylor notes that it 
is also encountered apart from Romanticism, and may be understood as a context 
within which Romanticism arose in the 18th Century. 
                                                 
13
 Paradoxically, this requires that we be able to adopt the first person standpoint in the first place, in 
order that we can step out of it (Ibid., pp.162-163). 
14
 Ibid., pp.49-50, 171-172 
15
 Taylor sees the Freudian ego as “imprisoned… in the gigantic conflict of instincts, and distorted… 
by condensations and displacements” (Ibid., p.446) 
16
 Ibid., p.174 
17
 Ibid., pp.174-175 
18
 Ibid., pp.368-374 
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[T]he Romantics affirmed the rights of the individual, of the imagination, 
and of feeling.19  
 
The Romantics attributed importance to the “inner voice or impulse” and to feelings 
as a source of truth. This could be understood on an individual basis, particular to 
the person, where the voice is the voice of the “self”, or it could be understood on a 
wider basis as the impulse of nature. However, in either case, it is this inner voice or 
impulse which becomes definitive of the good life. The good life thus becomes a 
“fusion of the sensual and the spiritual” and the boundaries between the ethical and 
the aesthetic are blurred. 
 
“Expressivism” is a term adopted by Taylor20 to refer to the idea that, if nature is an 
inner élan, voice, or principle unique to each person, then this inner nature can only 
be known or made manifest by articulation or expression. This process of expression 
is not merely a revelation of something already existing, but is a bringing into being 
of something inchoate and incompletely formed. 
 
Expressivism gives rise to the idea that there are “inner depths” within each of us, 
which can be explored by (for example) psychotherapy. Taylor writes: 
Freud’s is a magnificent attempt to regain our freedom and self-possession, 
the dignity of the disengaged subject, in face of the inner depths…. The very 
terms of Freudian science and the language of his analyses require an 
articulation of the depths. And Freud certainly had a sense of the great power 
of the human symbolic capacity, even imprisoned as it most often is in the 
gigantic conflict of instincts, and distorted as it is by condensations and 
displacements. It may turn out that Freud’s project, a kind of natural science 
of the mind, is impossible in the stringent terms in which he conceived it…. 
But there is no doubt that as self-interpretation the Freudian theory has its 
power…21 
 
Psychotherapy, then, must be seen within the context of the philosophical concerns, 
and the developing modern sense of identity, alongside which it emerged. Like 
Taylor, we must be careful about making assertions of causal relationships where 
they cannot easily be proven.22 However, radical reflexivity would clearly appear to 
                                                 
19
 Ibid., p.368 
20
 Ibid., pp.374-375 
21
 Ibid., pp.446-447 
22
 Ibid., pp.199-207 
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be conducive to therapies which seek to make the self an object of scrutiny by itself. 
Disengagement takes this further and sees the possibility of self expression in the 
process of bringing about self change. Expressivism, however, gives rise to a notion 
of “hidden depths” within which we do not easily know ourselves, except after much 
searching. 
 
For the Philokalia, on the other hand, much of the above account must seem 
immediately foreign. Operating, as it does, with a primarily Platonic understanding 
of the soul, it has not engaged with any of the major strands of western philosophical 
discourse that have been alluded to. Descartes and Locke were both undertaking 
their work during the period between the writing in the 15th Century of the last text 
that would be included in the Philokalia, and the publication of the Philokalia, in the 
18th Century. Hume and Kant were undertaking their work during the same century 
in which the Philokalia was first published. Andrew Louth23 notes that in 1781, the 
year before the publication of the Philokalia, Kant published the first edition of his 
Critique of Pure Reason. Was the publication of the Philokalia, then, a kind of 
response to philosophical developments elsewhere in Europe? Even if it was only 
seen as a reassertion of more ancient and traditional views of the nature of the soul, 
or perhaps to be reasserting eastern perspectives that had been neglected by western 
Christianity, it might be understood as providing a response of this kind. In fact, its 
teachings offer a kind of reflexivity and disengagement of their own – albeit not 
emerging from the same currents of thought as those with which Taylor deals in his 
search for sources of the modern self. It offers a marked rebuttal of any kind of 
expressivism which is unduly optimistic about the hidden depths of human nature. 
But, it does share with Augustine a sense that God can be found within. 
 
3. Terminology 
 
In his book, From Passions to Emotions, Thomas Dixon24 traces the way in which 
discourse on “passions” and “affections” was transformed during the first half of the 
                                                 
23
 Louth, 2003 
24
 Dixon, 2003 
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19th Century (at least in psychological thought in the English language) to discourse 
on “emotions”. 
 
According to Descartes,25 passions in a broad sense included all perceptions, 
including those arising from stimuli originating in the external world. Passions in a 
narrow sense, however, he understood as being internal to the human body and due 
to “animal spirits” in the blood. Dixon takes Augustine and Aquinas as his starting 
point,26 and so he sees here a transition from a traditional Christian understanding of 
passions as a movement of the soul, which acted upon the body, to a new view of a 
change in the body which acted upon the soul. Thus, passions of the body 
(Augustine and Aquinas) became passions of the soul (Descartes). 
 
The second change that Dixon understands Descartes as making is towards a more 
dualistic view of body and mind as separate substances (“extended” and “thinking” 
respectively). Dixon acknowledges that the “classical Christian view” was also 
dualistic, but he argues that there was “always a strong metaphorical element to such 
dualism”. Whether Descartes was as dualistic as he is generally assumed to be, and 
how much of a deviation this represents from traditional Christian thought, might be 
debated.27 However, it must be noted in passing that the “classical Christian view” 
which Dixon outlines is a western one and different in important ways from the view 
outlined in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. In particular, the model of the passions 
found in the Philokalia is heterogeneous, and includes elements of understanding 
which reflect passions as being both “of the soul” and “of the body”. 
 
Dixon identifies Hume, in Treatise of Human Nature, as providing the “earliest 
sustained use of the term [emotions] in the English language in a way that is similar 
to present-day usage”.28 Hume’s understanding of the passions was different again. 
First, perceptions of the mind were classified into “impressions” and “ideas”. Then, 
impressions were further subdivided into primary and secondary. Primary 
impressions constituted (what we would refer to as) perceptions – of external and 
bodily stimuli. Secondary impressions, however, are those that proceed from 
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primary impressions. These include both those that directly arise from primary sense 
impressions, and those that arise indirectly, with the “interposition of an idea”. It is 
these indirect secondary impressions that Hume understood as including “the 
passions and other emotions resembling them”. On this basis, passions were to be 
understood as the combination of a sensation and an idea - a model not entirely 
dissimilar to that proposed by Maximos the Confessor (see Chapter 3). 
Unfortunately, Hume’s use of the term “emotions” is somewhat inconsistent, 
sometimes contrasting with the passions, and sometimes including them. 29 
 
The remainder of the history charted by Dixon will not be pursued here. However, 
he notes that it was not until the period of the 1850s to 1870s that physical science 
assumed a dominant role and emotions were understood as a physical effect of the 
central and peripheral nervous systems upon the body. Whilst some Christian 
thinkers were still using the term “passions” in the 1870s, others adopted the new 
language much earlier than this. The story is one of “gradual, complex and 
incomplete secularisation”.30 Importantly, Dixon notes that many contemporary 
writers continue to understand “passions” and “emotions” as historically 
interchangeable terms – which they clearly are not. He identifies difference both in 
terms of the extensions (items included as belonging to the category) and intensions 
(definitions) of the terms. In regard to the latter he suggests that definitions of the 
passions tended to be concerned with more morally and theologically relevant 
movements of the soul. Definitions of the emotions tend to be understood as amoral 
physical or mental states.31 
 
Dixon provides a valuable historical account of the transition from language of the 
passions to a language of the emotions in the western, English speaking, world. 
However, it is clear that what he has to say about “classical Christian” 
understandings applies inexactly, or perhaps not at all, to eastern Christian 
understandings of the passions such as those encountered in the Philokalia. 
Interestingly, some more recent conceptions, such as those of Hume, may be closer 
in some ways to some of those found in the Philokalia than to those of traditional 
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western Christianity. Furthermore, the Philokalia is still consulted, at least in 
Orthodox Christian communities, as a source of guidance for the spiritual life. In this 
arena at least, the language of the passions is a living one, not necessarily the same 
as either the “passions” of early and medieval western Christianity or the “emotions” 
of contemporary scientific discourse.  
 
But the language of the emotions upon which psychotherapy has based its theories 
and practices is largely the language that Dixon identifies as having evolved, 
through Augustine and Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Hume, and others, to that which 
is in use today. Unfortunately, this language still finds itself in search of clear 
definitions. 
 
 
4. Defining Psychotherapy 
 
In responding to the question “What is psychotherapy?” Brown and Pedder suggest 
that it is: 
essentially a conversation which involves listening to and talking with those 
in trouble with the aim of helping them understand and resolve their 
predicament.32 
 
This seems like a very broad definition, and these authors do acknowledge that, at 
one level, psychotherapy includes informal conversations, friendly encouragement, 
and attempts to reassure those in distress. In a narrower sense, however, these 
authors quote Sutherland’s (1968) definition: 
By psychotherapy I refer to a personal relationship with a professional 
person in which those in distress can share and explore the underlying nature 
of their troubles, and possibly change some of the determinants of these 
through experiencing unrecognized forces in themselves.33 
 
Here the emphasis is on a professional relationship and on the bringing about of 
change through “experiencing unrecognised forces”, but this still doesn’t seem 
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entirely satisfactory. A family doctor, for example, might offer a simple 
interpretation of a patient’s problem which brings about change through the bringing 
to recognition of emotions that had previously been avoided. But this kind of 
interaction seems much closer to Brown and Pedder’s more general definition than it 
does to a narrower sense of what psychotherapy is usually thought to be about. 
 
Bloch and Harari offer a different definition: 
Psychotherapy – the systematic application of psychological principles to 
accomplish systematic or more substantial personality change34 
 
This, much narrower, definition focuses on the systematic application of 
psychological theory and the nature and degree of change effected. However, here, 
the change that is expected is in the “personality” – a definition which would 
probably exclude much professional behaviour therapy that (for example) reduces 
phobic anxiety, or even brief dynamic psychotherapy with more limited therapeutic 
goals than personality change. 
 
A solution to the difficulty of balancing broader and narrower definitions of 
psychotherapy may be found in Jerome Frank’s classic paper entitled “What is 
psychotherapy?” Jerome Frank (1910-2005) undertook extensive study of 
psychotherapy, including comparison with forms of religious healing. His studies led 
him to formulate theories concerning the common features between different kinds 
of psychotherapy and healing rituals. In responding to the question “What is 
psychotherapy?”, he therefore refers to the importance of historical/cultural 
perspectives, he lists the kinds of professional roles within which its practitioners are 
found, considers the kinds of psychotherapy available, and the kinds of people to 
whom it is offered, addresses the question of how effective psychotherapy is, and 
considers some features that all psychotherapies have in common.35 Perhaps the 
question about what psychotherapy is can only adequately be answered in this kind 
of way and at this kind of length. However, Frank does also suggest two criteria by 
which broader and narrower definitions might be distinguished. Firstly, he notes the 
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training and sanctioning by society that psychotherapists receive. Secondly, he refers 
to what they actually do: 
their activity is systematically guided by an articulated theory that explains 
the sources of the patients’ distress and disability, and prescribes methods for 
alleviating them.36 
 
This would seem to offer a good balance between unduly narrow and unhelpfully 
broad definitions, although it might still be argued that in practice matters of suitable 
training, social sanctioning and articulable theory are not always clear cut. 
 
Frank recognises that much psychotherapy is aimed at “demoralisation”: 
A common source of distress may be termed ‘demoralization’ – a state of 
mind that ensues when a person feels subjectively incompetent, that is, 
unable to cope with a problem that he and those about him expect him to be 
able to handle… The individual suffers a loss of confidence in himself and in 
his ability to master not only external circumstances but his own feelings and 
thoughts. The resulting sense of failure typically engenders feelings of guilt 
and shame. The demoralised person frequently feels alienated or isolated, as 
well as resentful because others whom he expects to help him seem unable or 
unwilling to do so…. With the weakening of his ties often goes a loss of faith 
in the group’s values and beliefs, which have formerly helped to give him a 
sense of security and significance. The psychological world of the 
demoralised person is constricted in space and time. He becomes self-
absorbed, loses sight of his long-term goals, and is preoccupied with 
avoiding further failure. His dominant moods are usually anxiety, ranging 
from mild apprehension to panic and depression, ranging in severity from 
being mildly dispirited to feeling utterly hopeless.”37 
 
Demoralisation occurs in many degrees of severity. The milder forms are self-
limiting and respond to psychotherapy of the broader kind, provided by friends and 
family, or perhaps to other life changes, such as a change of employment. More 
severe forms are self-perpetuating and may include symptoms which could lead to 
diagnosis of mental disorder. Frank suggests that it is usually those in the middle 
range who are likely to seek psychotherapy. 
The features of psychotherapies which are effective against demoralisation are:38 
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1. An intense, emotionally charged, confiding relationship with a helping 
person 
2. A healing setting 
3. A rationale or conceptual scheme that explains the cause of the patient’s 
symptoms and prescribes a ritual or procedure for resolving them. 
4. Linked to the rationale is a procedure that requires active participation of 
both patient and therapist and which is believed by both to be the means for 
restoring the patient’s health. 
 
Frank argues that the articulated theories, or rationales, of psychotherapy and the 
methods or procedures involved share six therapeutic functions, irrespective of 
differences in the actual content of these rationales and procedures: 
1. They strengthen the therapeutic relationship 
2. They inspire and maintain hope for help 
3. The provide opportunities for cognitive and experiential learning 
4. They allow or enable emotional arousal 
5. They enhance a sense of mastery, self-control, competence or effectiveness 
through success experiences 
6. They encourage a working through and practice of what has been learned 
amidst the activities of everyday life 
 
Thus, Frank proposes a model in which the rationale and procedures of therapy 
determine effectiveness not by virtue of their specific merits or content but rather by 
virtue of the extent to which they fulfil these six functions. In this way, he argues, 
psychotherapies of widely differing rationale and method might be equally effective. 
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5. Psychotherapy and the Philokalia 
 
The foregoing definitions of psychotherapy leave ample scope for understanding the 
rationale and methods of the Philokalia as providing a kind of psychotherapy. 
 
Whilst the Philokalia itself is a collection of texts, the spiritual life which it 
promotes affirms and encourages conversations which more than fulfil the 
requirements of the broader definitions of what psychotherapy is. Fragments of such 
conversations seem to provide the bulk of the Apophthegmata Patrum. They are 
frequently related also in the pages of the Philokalia. The “troubles” that are referred 
to in these definitions might be understood here either as the particular challenges of 
hunger, social isolation, poverty, etc, or else the more theologically defined and 
universal trouble of the human predicament as understood in traditional Christian 
terms as the need for salvation from sin, suffering and life without God. 
In terms of the narrower definitions of psychotherapy, it is also not difficult to see 
ways in which the criteria are fulfilled. Although perhaps “professional” (as in 
Sutherland’s definition) would not be a good word to describe the role of spiritual 
instructors, elders or priests offering guidance to young monks, there are clearly 
ways in which the former have gained experience, have been instructed themselves, 
and are sanctioned and recognised by a Christian community in fulfilment of a 
particular role, which are not at all dissimilar to the professional training and 
recognition of a psychotherapist. The “articulated theory”, psychological principles, 
conferring of understanding, and orientation towards change referred to in the 
definitions of Bloch and Harari, and Frank, are also all evident, and hardly need 
further comment. 
 
To take in turn Frank’s four features of psychotherapies that combat demoralisation, 
we might note that: 
1. A close confiding relationship with a spiritual instructor (an elder, or starets) 
has many of the characteristics of a psychotherapeutic relationship. The 
instructor has authority, conferred by experience and recognised by the 
Church, albeit not necessarily a professional training in the usual sense. 
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2. The “healing setting” of spiritual instruction envisaged in the Apophthegmata 
was usually the desert. In the Philokalia it is most often the monastery. 
Today it might be a room in which spiritual direction is provided. Frank sees 
this setting as “heightening the therapist’s prestige” and containing evidence 
of training.39 The desert and the monastery must both have had this effect in 
a most powerful way, both providing visible evidence of the ability of the 
instructor to live a life of ascetic virtue and self denial.40 Frank also notes 
that the setting is a place of safety, where things can be said that have not 
previously been vocalised. 
3. The rationale offered by the Philokalia is to be found in its own teachings, as 
expounded by a suitable instructor, and also the wider framework of 
Christian faith as affirmed in scripture and the creeds, and as taught by the 
catholic Church. Frank notes that this rationale must be shared by patient and 
therapist, that it must be affirmed by the culturally dominant world view 
(which we may here take to be that of the Church), and that it must not be 
shaken by therapeutic failures. His examples are both interesting and highly 
relevant here: 
In the Middle Ages, the belief system underlying what we today call 
psychotherapy was demonology. In many primitive societies it is 
witchcraft. In the Western world today it is science. 41 
4. The procedures of the Philokalia include, but are not limited to, the remedies 
for the passions described in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Frank notes that 
belief in their efficacy and active participation in them by both therapist and 
patient are important. 
 
Similarly, the six therapeutic functions of the rationale and procedures of the 
Philokalia can be identified: 
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1. The relationship with an abbot or other spiritual instructor is strengthened by 
the emphasis in the teachings of the Philokalia on obedience, the belief 
system that they share, the evidence (in his own life and that of other monks 
or disciples) that the instructor has practical experience of how to help, and 
by a sharing in the rule of life (its practices and “procedures”) that the 
Philokalia provides. 
2. The hope for help, which Frank sees as a powerful healing force, may be 
conveyed in a variety of ways, but not least in the vision of human well-
being, and ultimately deification, outlined in Chapter 5. 
3. There are clearly many opportunities for cognitive and experiential learning. 
Simply reading the Philokalia, especially if this task is to be undertaken 
meditatively and prayerfully, is a major learning exercise in itself. However, 
Frank emphasises that this is not a purely intellectual exercise. The remedies 
for human living prescribed in the Philokalia ensure that the true disciple 
will engage with its rationale ascetically, prayerfully, and in relationship with 
other members of a community. This is a way of life, and not simply a 
theoretical or dogmatic framework for faith. 
4. Emotional arousal might be seen as a point of deviation from Frank’s 
psychotherapeutic model. Setting a goal of dispassion could be understood as 
discouraging emotional expressions. However, leaving aside for the moment 
the important terminological distinction to be made between “passion” and 
“emotion”, it is clear that the Philokalia does not anticipate that any new 
disciple will immediately attain dispassion. Rather, it directs attention to the 
challenges to the spiritual life that passion will present and it provides 
procedures for dealing with these. Furthermore, the establishing of the 
“intellect in the heart”, the experience in the heart of “supracelestial fire”, 
and prayer of the heart (see Chapter 4) all suggest that there is an important 
affective or emotional element to the life of prayer that the Philokalia 
describes. 
5. The sense of enhancement of self-mastery, and the provision of success 
experiences, that the Philokalia offers may be seen in relation to instructions 
given for the ascetic life and the life of prayer. The Evagrian corpus also 
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provides a good example of this, taking initiates as it does from simpler 
levels of learning (at which they are likely to succeed) to more complex 
levels of learning in a graded fashion. One would expect instructors to guide 
new disciples through the Philokalia in a similar way, in order that they may 
achieve success in simpler tasks before progressing to more complex or 
challenging ones. Frank also notes the importance of naming phenomena as a 
means of gaining mastery over them (cf the naming of the animals by Adam 
in Genesis 2). The extensive and sophisticated vocabulary of the inner life 
offered by the Philokalia might be seen as assisting the new disciple to gain 
confidence in their ability to master their thoughts and passions. 
6. The working through of teachings in the practice of everyday life is 
everywhere apparent in the Philokalia. Indeed, its general assumption is that 
its teachings will be put into practice in religious life – that the whole of life 
will be lived according to its rationale and devoted to adopting its 
procedures. 
 
On this basis, then, there would appear to be good grounds firstly for seeing the 
Philokalia as offering a kind of psychotherapy, and secondly for seeing it as 
incorporating a rationale and procedures which might be highly likely to effect 
change in people’s lives. However, this is really only the beginning of an answer to 
the question posed at the outset of this chapter, in that it looks back at a collection of 
ancient texts, in the light of current thinking, and finds evidence that their rationale 
and procedures are not entirely dissimilar to those identified by contemporary 
psychotherapists as likely to effect change in people’s lives. It does not engage with 
the second and third issues identified above as potentially important in any critical 
comparison of the Philokalia and psychotherapy.42 Consideration must therefore 
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now be given to these issues – and firstly to that of the purposes for which the 
Philokalia and psychotherapy were intended, and the outcomes to which they aspire. 
 
 
6. Purpose and Outcome 
 
Frank observes that it is difficult to compare outcomes even between different forms 
of psychotherapy, as they intend different things.43 Dynamic psychotherapies aim to 
bring to awareness previously unconscious thoughts and feelings. Behavioural 
therapists look for reduction of symptom severity. Even between dynamic therapies 
important differences in treatment goals may be observed. How, then, may different 
psychological therapies, let alone also theological or spiritual “therapies” be 
compared?  
 
We have already seen that contemporary theories of the self are fragmented. If no 
unified view of the self can be agreed, can any comparisons be made between 
therapies concerned with healing of the self? Robert Innes suggests that an even 
more radical answer to this question might be identified in postmodern views of the 
self as enslaving. His review of the work of Foucault, Lacan, Deleuze, and Guattari 
draws attention to the ways in which notions of the self may be used to exert social 
control over human desires and freedoms.44 On this basis, views of a unified self 
need to be deconstructed and comparisons of the kind suggested here are 
invalidated, or at least made worthless. However, Innes himself does not concur with 
this view. He suggests that postmodernism is, in this context, a self defeating protest 
against the order and discipline suggested by Platonic and later models which 
emphasise discipline and rationality. Innes therefore proposes a way of approaching 
wholeness which still values those parts of the self which are not ordered or rational. 
So, according to Innes: 
theologies and psychologies can be evaluated in terms of their ability to 
supply resources for unifying the self.45 
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In his comparison: 
• Augustinian spirituality aims at integration of the self through the pursuit of 
desire for God. 
• Freudian therapy aims at extending the power of the ego over the id. 
• Jungian therapy aims for individuation, which requires reorientation and 
integration of the Self,46 gained through increasing insight into those parts of 
the self that reside in the personal unconscious 
• Humanistic psychology aims at integration of the self through self-
actualisation, a process that requires self-awareness and self-acceptance 
 
Innes goes on to evaluate these resources for unifying the self in terms of their 
integrative power, their freedom from contradiction, and their relevance. His 
conclusion is that Augustine succeeds where the others fail, because of the 
integrative power of his reference of the self to God.47 
 
We might question whether or not unification of the self is the most appropriate 
basis for comparison of psychologies and theologies. Had Innes included 
behavioural or cognitive psychotherapy amongst his comparisons, it would be 
difficult to imagine how they might have fared. Freedom from contradiction and 
relevance might not have been difficult to assess, but how would integrative power 
be assessed? Since behavioural and cognitive therapies seek symptom reduction 
rather than self-integration, assessment of the latter would appear to be relatively 
meaningless in relation to outcome. 
 
Another approach to comparison might involve recent philosophical and scientific 
research on subjective well-being.48 Amongst the advantages of this might be the 
multi-disciplinary emphasis, which is informed by both philosophy and the social 
and natural sciences, and the extent to which research has been undertaken on 
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spirituality and religion as predictors of well-being. If a spiritual way of life, such as 
that offered by the Philokalia, and psychotherapy are both concerned with human 
well-being, then this might provide a promising way to allow comparisons to be 
made between what each may have to offer.  
 
Haybron identifies five categories of well-being theory:49 
1. Hedonistic theories 
2. Desire theories 
3. Authentic happiness theories 
4. Eudaimonistic (or “nature-fulfilment”) theories 
5. List theories  
 
Hedonistic theories more or less identify well-being with pleasure. Desire theories 
identify well-being with the extent to which a person’s desires are actually satisfied. 
Authentic happiness theories assess happiness in relation to a person’s own values 
(free of social pressure) and the actual conditions of one’s life. Eudaimonistic 
theories usually refer to ancient theories (such as those of Aristotle), incorporating 
ethical values and judgements of how the good life should be lived. Finally, list 
theories identify well-being with more or less ad hoc lists of goods such as 
knowledge, pleasure, and friendship. 
 
It might immediately be presumed that the spirituality of the Philokalia should be 
associated with Eudaimonistic theories of well-being, although desire theories might 
actually distinguish well between individuals with desire for God and those whose 
desires actually lay elsewhere. It is a little more difficult to assess which approach 
might be most useful to evaluate well-being as a goal of psychotherapy.50 However, 
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a rather bigger problem arises insofar as this approach tends to make well-being a 
utilitarian good, conferred by any of a number of means, amongst which means the 
spiritual life (according to the Philokalia or any other tradition) is but one available 
means to the personal end. The danger here is that spirituality is made into a self-
serving process aimed at achieving well-being. In fact, neither the Philokalia nor any 
other major strand of traditional Christian spirituality understands things in this way. 
Rather, the good is pursued out of love for God alone and (at least ideally) whether 
or not it leads to any measure of well-being in this world.51  
 
However, the purpose here is not to design a measure for an empirical outcome 
study comparing spiritual instruction based on the Philokalia with one or more 
different kinds of psychotherapy. Neither is the purpose at hand Innes’ somewhat 
different task of evaluating different discourses that all promise wholeness of the 
self. Rather the question is – do the Philokalia and psychotherapy have a purpose in 
common? In order to answer this, we might want to ask a number of subsidiary 
questions: 
• To whom might each be offered, and who might benefit? 
• What does each hope to achieve? 
• If we were evaluating their success empirically, what would we want to 
measure? 
 
 
i. Who might Benefit? 
 
In one way or another, both the Philokalia and psychotherapy potentially have 
something to offer to anyone and everyone. At least, for those who wish to find 
benefit in them, there are insights to be gained from the Philokalia and from 
psychotherapy concerning the mental and spiritual life. Neither is it the case that the 
Philokalia only has things to say about the spiritual life, and psychotherapy only 
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about the mental life. The Philokalia takes very seriously the world of thoughts and 
feelings and has much to say about them. Similarly, most forms of psychotherapy 
have had something to say about spirituality or religion. In some cases, as with 
Freud (who understood religion as essentially a form of neurosis), this has been very 
negative, but in other cases, as with Jung, religion has been perceived as a very 
important part of mental well being. Mental and spiritual life are inextricably bound 
up with each other. 
 
However, the Philokalia was clearly compiled with a view to it being read by those 
wishing to make progress in the spiritual life. In The Way of the Pilgrim, it is given 
to the pilgrim in response to his expressed desire to achieve unceasing prayer.52 
Psychotherapy, in contrast, is offered primarily to those suffering from various 
forms of mental disorder, those who are psychologically overwhelmed by life 
stresses, and those whose behaviour is disturbed (eg due to family stress in 
childhood, or due to addiction).53 
 
 
ii. What might be Achieved? 
 
We might again identify a very general level of answer which affirms that both the 
Philokalia and psychotherapy are offered with a hope of achieving change. This 
might be change in (including better self awareness of) thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviours, or perhaps in other ways. Both have much to say about relationships. 
Again, the close connection between mental and spiritual life would behove us to be 
careful about assuming that psychotherapy would have nothing to do with 
relationship with God. 
 
However, we saw in Chapter 5 that the ultimate goal of the Philokalia is to assist 
people in making progress towards deification – or union with God. It might be 
understood as a manual for living the Christian life, and especially for contemplative 
prayer. As a means to this end, the Philokalia is very realistic. Thoughts, feelings 
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and behaviour must all change. Generally, the pattern seems to be one of changing 
behaviour (towards a more ascetic lifestyle) first. However, this lifestyle change is 
intimately bound up with an understanding of how patterns of thought need to be 
changed as a basis for changing the way that we feel about things. At this level, the 
objective is dispassion. 
 
Psychotherapy, however, will be evaluated in relation to the presenting problem for 
which it has been offered. Indeed, for behavioural psychotherapy this might be the 
only therapeutic goal. However, for dynamic therapies “wholeness”, or integration 
of the self, will usually be seen as an important means for achieving this goal and 
sometimes even as more important than alleviation of the presenting symptoms. As 
we saw from our brief consideration of Innes’ work on Freudian, Jungian and 
humanistic therapies, the form that this wholeness or integration takes will be very 
different from one therapy to another. For cognitive therapies, wholeness and 
integration are not usually considered important. Rather, changing patterns of faulty, 
irrational or inappropriate thoughts is seen as necessary to changing feelings. None 
of these therapies would be likely to aim at “dispassion” as an objective, but usually 
rational processes will be seen as important to mental well-being. 
 
 
iii. How might Outcome be Measured? 
 
Measurement of outcome is really a scientific question, although it might be 
reframed in more theological language. For example, we might ask the question as 
to whether and in what ways we would expect prayer or faith to change the life of a 
person who prays.54 However, the theological measure of “change” is never likely to 
be primarily a scientific one. Although some changes which occur in the life of a 
person who prays might be scientifically measurable,55 many will probably not be. 
                                                 
54
 Note that this is a rather different question than that addressed by controlled scientific trials of 
whether or not prayer “works”. These trials (eg Harris, Gowda, Kolb, Strychacz, Vacek, Jones, 
Forker, O'Keefe and McCallister, 1999) usually measure scientific outcomes in those being prayed 
for. The question here is more about whether the lives of those who pray might be discernibly 
different in any way from those who don’t. 
55
 We might note, for example, scientific scales of “spirituality” or spiritual well-being which are 
used as outcome measures in treatment research programmes (eg Cook 2009, In press). 
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Empirical evaluation of the “success” of life lived according to the teachings of the 
Philokalia might be virtually impossible to achieve. Others may notice a change in 
behaviour – perhaps in regard to virtues such as humility, patience, kindness, etc. A 
wise and more experienced person, advanced in the spiritual life, might be able to 
make judgments about the degree of progress a person is making in the interior life. 
The person themselves could report on progress that they felt that they were making. 
However, ultimately, the Philokalia would only allow that God knows what lies in 
the very depths of the heart and mind of each man or woman. It would be this most 
interior level of orientation toward God that would be the ultimate test. 
 
Whilst psychotherapy outcomes may be difficult to evaluate, the difficulties would 
be far less than this. Numerous scales for measuring symptom severity, by 
observation or self-rating, have been validated, as well as global measures of social, 
physical and psychological functioning. Measurement of integration of the self 
might be somewhat more difficult, but certainly not impossible for an experienced 
therapist to assess. 
 
These very real differences in the measurability of outcome must not be allowed to 
disguise the fact that many psychological and behavioural changes might be 
scientifically measurable in the life of a person following the teachings of the 
Philokalia. Similarly, psychotherapy might (and sometimes does) lead to the posing 
of deep existential and spiritual questions which lead to a change in orientation 
towards the Divine. It is therefore not so much that changes brought about by 
reading the Philokalia can’t be measured, whilst those brought about by 
psychotherapy can, but rather that the changes that the compilers of the Philokalia 
hoped to bring to people’s lives are not ultimately ones that are amenable to 
scientific measurement. 
 
 
In broad terms, then, the Philokalia and psychotherapy have very different purposes 
and goals in mind. However, both are orientated, at some level, towards changing 
thoughts, feelings and behaviours. This is not the final destination towards which the 
Philokalia provides a map, but it is a necessary part of the journey, and to this extent 
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it might be said that the purpose of the Philokalia is to provide a kind of 
psychotherapy. 
 
 
7. Inwardness and the Philokalia 
 
It will be recalled that Taylor suggests that all cultures employ a language of 
inwardness, but that this universal language is embedded within culturally specific 
notions of “inner” and “outer” which reflect something of the spiritual and moral 
vision of that culture. As inwardness is such an important feature of our own culture, 
and of that of Christianity and the Philokalia, and is also so important to 
contemporary notions of what psychotherapy is all about, we must now turn to a 
closer consideration of it. 
 
Stephen Sykes has suggested that: 
It is undeniable, from even a cursory knowledge of the Christian tradition, 
that ‘inwardness’ has played an important role in the development of 
Christian identity.56 
 
Sykes suggests that commitment is an important concern for all religions, and for 
society in general, because it anchors in the individual emotional life a system of 
meaning common to the whole society or group. This in turn, because it guides the 
choices that individuals make, provides the consistency of intention which is so 
necessary for good social order and family life. But the need for commitment places 
emphasis on the interior life. Because we can never know for certain what another 
person’s intentions were, or even what our own intentions are, this in turn leads to a 
recognition that God alone is able to judge our intentions with unfailing accuracy.57 
 
For Christianity, Sykes suggests that the extensive teaching on the heart in Judeo-
Christian scripture has been a significant source of its inwardness tradition. In the 
Psalms, he notes that the heart is associated with a range of psychological functions, 
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not least those concerned with the emotions, intellectual activity, and the will. But 
the heart is somewhat mysterious and inaccessible. A form of self-examination is 
therefore required which “amounts to a seeing of the heart as God himself sees it”.58 
In the Pauline corpus of the New Testament, the heart is a frequently recurring term 
applied to the seat of thoughts, emotions, affect and will, but is also the place in 
which the Holy Spirit dwells. Ultimately, human intentions are known to God alone, 
and where they are in need of change, this may be something that God alone can 
bring about.59 
 
Sykes recognises that this inwardness tradition has profoundly affected the use of 
ritual, sacrament, worship and ethical teaching, for in all of these areas what really 
matters is not what is visible to other people, but rather the inner intention of the 
individual human being in relation to God. 
 
Sebastian Brock, writing on the prayer of the heart in the Syriac tradition, suggests 
that there is a different perspective on the heart in eastern and western traditions. He 
attributes this to the influence of Dionysius the Areopagite, drawing on Platonic and 
neo-Platonic thought, who virtually ignored the heart and referred to the nous as the 
centre of spiritual life. Dionysius having been somewhat more influential in the west 
than the east, Brock sees this as explaining a tendency amongst western writers to 
contrast heart as the seat of affective prayer with the mind (nous) as the seat of 
intellectual prayer.60 Brock writes that, in the biblical account: 
the ‘heart’ is regarded as the focal point of every aspect of the ‘inner person’, 
as St Paul calls it (Rom. 7:22), the focal point of the intellect as well as of the 
emotions and feelings61 
 
He further contrasts this “inner heart” with the physical heart. The one is the centre 
of spiritual life, the other of physical life, but the wholeness of human beings is such 
that each requires the other. 
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 Ibid., p.39 
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 We might note that there was no evidence of such a “western” tendency in Sykes’ account, 
discussed above. 
61
 Brock, 1982, p.133 
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Brock goes on to quote Isaac of Nineveh’s (c700) distinction between purity of mind 
and purity of heart. The former is relatively easily achieved, through study of 
scripture, fasting, and avoidance of distraction. The latter, however, is only achieved 
through “great afflictions”.62 The heart is thus a place of sacrifice – a kind of altar. 
 
The heart is also a place of revelation, or theophany. Brock quotes an 8th Century 
mystic, Abdisho the Seer: 
True love…. does not leave anything in your mind apart from the awareness 
of God which constitutes the spiritual key with which the inner door of the 
heart is opened – and inside is hidden Christ our Lord.63 
 
Brock sees purity of heart, in the Syriac tradition at least, as being pure prayer. 
Prayer of the heart in this tradition64 is characterised by remembrance, or total 
awareness, of God in “the very centre of our innermost being”.65 
 
It is a very similar process, in a somewhat different language, which Taylor 
identifies as the radical reflexivity of Augustinian thought: 
Augustine shifts the focus from the field of objects known to the activity 
itself of knowing; God is to be found here.66 
 
And again: 
Augustine’s turn to the self was a turn to radical reflexivity, and that is what 
made the language of inwardness irresistible. The inner light is the one which 
shines in our presence to ourselves; it is the one inseparable from our being 
creatures with a first person standpoint. What differentiates it from the outer 
light is just what makes the image of inwardness so compelling, that it 
illuminates the space where I am present to myself.67 
 
This tradition of inwardness, which Sykes describes in relation to Christianity in 
general, which Brock identifies in the Syriac tradition, and which Augustine is 
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 Brock distinguishes the prayer of the heart in the Syriac tradition from that in the Greek tradition, 
chiefly on the basis of absence of a formula sufficiently resembling the Jesus Prayer. 
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credited by Taylor with having introduced to the west, finds a particularly strong and 
distinctive expression in the Philokalia. 
 
Before turning to examples of inner and outer aspects of human experience, it is 
important to recall that all created things are understood in the tradition of the 
Philokalia as having an inner “essence” or “principle”. These logoi, or “thoughts of 
God”, are contained within the Logos and are manifested in the created order of the 
universe. They provide the focus for natural contemplation.68 This is particularly 
evident, although by no means confined to, the writings of Maximos the Confessor. 
For example, Maximos writes: 
If, instead of stopping short at the outward appearance which visible things 
present to the senses, you seek with your intellect to contemplate their inner 
essences, seeing them as images of spiritual realities or as the inward 
principles of sensible objects, you will be taught that nothing belonging to 
the visible world is unclean. For by nature all things were created good (cf. 
Gen. 1:31; Acts 10:15).69 
 
What is “within” any created thing is thus not so much a matter of physical location 
or spatial orientation as the essence or principle of the thing as created by God. 
 
However, when we turn to human beings specifically, inwardness language is 
virtually ubiquitous. Table 6.1 shows a listing of inwardness language drawn from 
the English translation of the Philokalia.70 
 
There are countless examples in the Philokalia of contrasts between inner and outer. 
For example, we find in the writings of Mark the Ascetic: 
When a man outwardly praises someone, while accusing and disparaging 
him in his heart, it is hard for the simple to detect this. Similarly a person 
may be outwardly humble but inwardly arrogant. For a long time such men 
present falsehood as truth, but later they are exposed and condemned.71 
 
Or, again, Thalassios the Libyan writes: 
                                                 
68
 See entry under “Logos” in the glossary to the English translation of the Philokalia. 
69
 Philokalia 2, 185, #92 
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 A search was made using the The Philokalia Concordance CD-ROM, compiled by Basileios S. 
Stapakis. This is based on the first four volumes of the English translation. The search included 
“inner” and “inward” and their derivatives. 
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 Philokalia 1, 113, #36 
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Prove yourself a monk, not outwardly, but inwardly, by freeing yourself from 
the passions.72 
 
The general rule seems to be, it is not what other people see (on the outside) that 
matters, it is what God sees (on the inside) that is important. So, inwardness is again 
not so much to do with physical space as with Divine perspective. 
 
The inner place is also spoken of as being a place of encounter with Christ as, for 
example, in the writings of Theoliptos: 
Copy the wisdom of the bees; when they become aware of an encircling 
swarm of wasps, they remain inside their hive and so escape the attacks with 
which they are threatened. Wasps signify commerce with the world: avoid 
such commerce at all costs, stay in your cell, and there try to re-enter the 
innermost citadel of the soul, the dwelling-place of Christ, where you will 
truly find the peace, joy and serenity of Christ the spiritual Sun - gifts that He 
irradiates and with which He rewards the soul that receives Him with faith 
and devotion.73 
 
However, the distinction is not a simple duality between inner (good) and outer 
(evil). For example, we find in the writings of Philotheos of Sinai: 
The soul is walled off, fenced in and bound with chains of darkness by the 
demonic spirits. Because of the surrounding darkness she cannot pray as she 
wants to, for she is fettered inwardly, and her inner eyes are blind. Only 
when she begins to pray to God, and to acquire watchfulness while praying, 
will she be freed from this darkness through prayer. Otherwise she will 
remain a prisoner. For through prayer the soul discovers that there is in the 
heart another fight and another hidden type of opposition, and a different 
kind of warfare against the thoughts provoked by the evil spirits.74 
 
Here we see that it is only prayer and watchfulness which redeem inner regions of 
the soul from the bondage to demonic spirits. Similarly, in the writings of Hesychios 
the Priest: 
104. The heart which is constantly guarded, and is not allowed to receive the 
forms, images and fantasies of the dark and evil spirits, is conditioned by 
nature to give birth from within itself to thoughts filled with light. For just as 
coal engenders a flame, or a flame lights a candle, so will God, who from our 
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baptism dwells in our heart, kindle our mind to contemplation when He finds 
it free from the winds of evil and protected by the guarding of the intellect.  
 
105. The name of Jesus should be repeated over and over in the heart as 
flashes of lightning are repeated over and over in the sky before rain. Those 
who have experience of the intellect and of inner warfare know this very 
well. We should wage this spiritual warfare with a precise sequence: first, 
with attentiveness; then, when we perceive the hostile thought attacking, we 
should strike at it angrily in the heart, cursing it as we do so; thirdly, we 
should direct our prayer against it, concentrating the heart through the 
invocation of Jesus Christ, so that the demonic fantasy may be dispersed at 
once, the intellect no longer pursuing it like a child deceived by some 
conjuror….  
 
108. Just as he who looks at the sun cannot but fill his eyes with light, so he 
who always gazes intently into his heart cannot fail to be illumined.75 
 
Again, here, we see that guarding of the heart/intellect, and the Jesus Prayer,76 
transform the heart from a place of inner warfare against evil spirits into a place of 
Divine illumination. 
 
In both of these quotations, from Philotheos and Hesychios, we see that the heart is 
implicitly “within”. Elsewhere, Hesychios explicitly identifies the heart as the “inner 
self”. Similarly, John of Karpathos refers to “the inward heaven of the heart where 
Jesus dwells”.77 
 
Other references to the heart in the Philokalia include metaphors of an 
“immeasurable abyss”78 or, in the writings of Symeon Metaphrastis, as a “tomb”: 
When you hear that Christ descended into hell in order to deliver the souls 
dwelling there, do not think that what happens now is very different. The 
heart is a tomb and there our thoughts and our intellect are buried, 
imprisoned in heavy darkness. And so Christ comes to the souls in hell that 
call upon Him, descending, that is to say, into the depths of the heart; and 
there He commands death to release the imprisoned souls that call upon Him, 
for He has power to deliver us. Then, lifting up the heavy stone that 
                                                 
75
 Philokalia 1, 180 
76
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oppresses the soul, and opening the tomb, He resurrects us - for we were 
truly dead - and releases our imprisoned soul from its lightless prison.79 
 
In addition to conveying a sense of “depth” these metaphors (abyss, tomb, burial, 
darkness, etc) remind us that we often don’t know ourselves what lays within our 
own hearts – let alone those of other people. Symeon Metaphrastis further leaves us 
in no doubt that we are unable of our own efforts to unbury what lays hidden there. 
 
The glossary to the English translation of the Philokalia includes the following 
entry: 
HEART (

 - kardia): not simply the physical organ but the spiritual 
centre of man's being, man as made in the image of God, his deepest and 
truest self, or the inner shrine, to be entered only through sacrifice and 
death, in which the mystery of the union between the divine and the 
human is consummated. ‘“I called with my whole heart", says the 
psalmist - that is, with body, soul and spirit' (John Klimakos, The Ladder 
of Divine Ascent, Step 28, translated by Archimandrite Lazarus [London, 
1959], pp. 257-8). 'Heart' has thus an all-embracing significance: 'prayer 
of the heart' means prayer not just of the emotions and affections, but of 
the whole person, including the body. 
 
On the one hand, this further expounds the tradition of the heart as being the 
“innermost centre”, where God is encountered. However, it also affirms a tradition 
of the heart as the “whole person”: body, soul and spirit. It is difficult to locate this 
idea within the Philokalia, and it is interesting that the English translators of the 
Philokalia choose to illustrate it from The Ladder of Divine Ascent, rather than from 
within the writings of the Philokalia itself. However, we do find in the writings of 
Gregory Palamas a quotation from Makarios the Great, which refers to the heart as 
ruling over the whole body and soul, and (in Gregory’s own words) the reference to 
the heart as the “innermost body within the body”. Earlier in the chapter in which 
these references are made, taken from In Defence of Stillness, Gregory also reflects 
on the location of the soul in the body: 
Since our soul is a single entity possessing many powers, it utilizes as an 
organ the body that by nature lives in conjunction with it. What organs, then, 
does the power of the soul that we call 'intellect' make use of when it is 
active? No one has ever supposed that the mind resides in the finger-nails or 
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the eye-lashes, the nostrils or the lips. But we all agree that it resides within 
us, even though we may not all agree as to which of our inner organs it 
chiefly makes use of. For some locate it in the head, as though in a sort of 
acropolis; others consider that its vehicle is the centremost part of the heart, 
that aspect of the heart that has been purified from natural life. We know 
very well that our intelligence is neither within us as in a container - for it is 
incorporeal - nor yet outside us, for it is united to us; but it is located in the 
heart as in its own organ. 80 
 
This passage is very interesting – if not also very unusual – in that it fleetingly 
recognises that inward and outward imagery are merely metaphorical. Almost 
immediately, as though retracting the scandal of what he has said, Gregory reverts to 
asserting that the intelligence has its own organ – the heart.81 However, this passage 
at least draws our attention to the difficulty of relying purely on spatial imagery. 
Inwardness and outwardness are not really any more adequate as literal terms than is 
“heart”. That they have endured so well, and that Taylor is able to identify a 
universal aspect to their use which appears to be maintained across time and 
cultures, presumably reflects the sense that all human beings have that they (ie their 
souls or selves) are at least associated with, if not actually to be identified with, their 
(spatially located and boundaried) bodies. But when we – or Gregory Palamas – talk 
about exactly where our souls (or minds, or intelligence, or selves) are “located” the 
language begins to break down, and especially so in a post-Cartesian world. 
 
What, then, might we say about the specific or characteristic aspects of inwardness 
language in the Philokalia (as opposed, that is, to universal aspects of inwardness 
language which may be identified in all cultures)? The brief foregoing study, and the 
earlier chapters of this dissertation, would suggest that the following might be 
important: 
1. Inwardness often seems to refer to places of encounter with, or dwelling of, 
the Divine. 
2. Inwardness also refers to a place of encounter with demons, or passions. 
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3. The difference between 1. & 2. seems to be concerned with our 
contemplative awareness and our ability to make use of the remedies for the 
passions described in Chapter 3 – especially prayer. Inwardness refers to a 
place of prayer. 
4. The more that we do make use of the remedies for the passions, the closer we 
come to the possibility of deification. The place of union with God is either 
within us, or else to be found only after death (see Chapter 5). 
5. Inwardness often seems to imply hiddenness, inaccessibility and mystery. 
Perhaps this is a universal aspect of inwardness. (It is certainly universal 
within the Judeo-Christian tradition.) However, it serves here to emphasise 
the ensnaring, imprisoning, blinding nature of the passions. Because of this, 
we can have no confidence to see clearly what our own intentions are, or 
those of other people, except through grace. 
6. Inwardness seems to imply the essence of self – what it is to be the unique 
individual that God created each of us to be. Again, this touches on a 
universal aspect of inwardness that Taylor deals with at length. However, 
what seems to be a specific emphasis here is the finding within of the divine 
essence or principle that is uniquely “me” – an essence or principle which is 
yet also hidden within the intentions of God. 
 
8. Orthodox Psychotherapy 
 
The term “Orthodox Psychotherapy” appears to have first been adopted by 
Hierotheos Vlachos, in his book of the same name.82 In this work, Vlachos outlines 
the nature of the human malady and its treatment according to the Orthodox patristic 
texts, including the Philokalia. In particular he describes the relationship between 
soul, nous, heart and mind, the pathology of the passions, and the remedies that are 
to be found in the Church, in the patristic teachings, and in the practice of hesychia. 
However, he is careful to distinguish his use of the term “psychotherapy” from that 
of contemporary psychiatry and he explicitly does not engage in specific discussion 
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about the ways in which the two uses of the term might find areas of agreement 
and/or disagreement. 
 
It might be possible to leave the discussion here, and to note that there are two kinds 
of psychotherapy, the one concerned with spiritual teachings of the Philokalia and 
other patristic writings, and the other concerned with contemporary psychological 
therapies. However, we have already noted that there are important ways in which 
the former might still be understood as “psychotherapy” in terms of the latter, even 
if there are also important differences in terms of purpose and intended outcome. 
There are also at least three further reasons why these two kinds of psychotherapy 
might appear to be concerned with common themes that could profit from mutual 
discourse: 
1. At a theoretical level these two kinds of psychotherapy often appear to be 
talking about the nature of the human condition in similar terms. This is not 
to overlook the very significant anthropological, theological and other 
differences that exist between them, but it does appear that there is a 
significant expanse of common ground which might benefit from mutual 
discussion and a more integrative perspective. Thus, for example, Vasileios 
Thermos has explored the ways in which Donald Winnicott (the Object 
Relations therapist) and Gregory Palamas might both explore concepts of the 
“true” and “false” self.83 
2. The Philokalia describes some conditions which sound very similar to 
contemporary diagnostic categories. Thus, for example, the sadness that 
Evagrios includes amongst his eight thoughts could well describe someone 
who is depressed. Gluttony could appear to be the kind of thought 
experienced by someone with Bulimia. And the concept of the passions is 
itself in many ways similar to what today might be called addiction, 
especially in the way in which passions engage people in continuing 
behaviour which is harmful to themselves and others. 
3. The kinds of remedies that are prescribed by the Philokalia appear to overlap 
significantly in places with the kinds of remedies prescribed by 
                                                 
83
 Thermos, 2002 
269 
 
contemporary psychological psychotherapies, both in appearance of 
technique and in philosophical underpinning. For example, both draw on the 
insights of Stoic philosophy. Ann Hackman, a psychologist, writes: 
It is well known that the basic tenet of cognitive therapy is that ‘Men 
are not moved by things, but by the views they take of them’ 
(Epictetus)84 
 
If, as has been argued in this chapter, there are ways in which these two kinds of 
psychotherapy overlap conceptually, and if they are concerned with significant 
common themes in terms of theory, diagnosis and therapeutic practice, does this 
imply that the theory and practices of the Philokalia might have a therapeutic 
function which would be of benefit in the kinds of conditions that contemporary 
psychological therapies are usually used to treat? 
 
In answering this question it is first helpful to recall that the term “remedy”, in 
relation to the passions, was considered in Chapter 3 as a helpful metaphor. The 
remedies for the passions are therefore metaphorical rather than literal remedies. 
However, it was also noted there that psychotherapy also relies heavily on 
metaphor.85 Psychotherapy is itself a metaphorical “therapy” of the psyche, unless of 
course one adopts a very strongly medical model within which “demoralisation” (as 
defined by Frank) is literally understood as a disease. However, as a heavily medical 
model of this kind is normally not considered helpful or appropriate, it is important 
to remember that psychotherapy and the Philokalia both offer metaphorical 
therapies. They offer these metaphorical therapies for very different indications, with 
the aim of achieving different kinds of well-being, albeit with some overlapping 
understandings of the nature and interpretation of thoughts. But could they offer 
therapy for the same indications, with benefit being measured in terms of the same 
kind of well-being? 
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A full answer to this question is beyond the scope of this chapter. In particular it 
suggests the need to test various possible scenarios, either empirically or in some 
other way. For example: 
• Does conventional psychotherapy produce benefit in terms of spiritual well-
being? 
• Do the therapeutic methods recommended in the Philokalia offer benefit in 
terms of psychological well-being? 
• Does conventional psychotherapy produce any measurable benefit in terms 
of psychological well-being? (ie Is it possible to demonstrate in empirical 
research that it is effective on its own terms?) 
• Do the therapeutic methods recommended in the Philokalia produce benefit 
in terms of spiritual well-being? (ie Does the Philokalia do what it says it 
does, and can this be tested in an empirical fashion, or is it a purely non-
empirical theological question?) 
 
The question that is of most relevance here is whether or not the methods and 
principles of the Philokalia could be used to treat demoralisation, or any other 
definable mental disorder, with demonstrable benefit (spiritual and/or 
psychological). This question raises a whole series of subsidiary questions. Which 
conditions might we expect this therapy to be effective for? Is it possible to measure 
spiritual outcomes empirically? In what ways might we expect to see benefit? What 
kinds of people might it be effective for? (In particular, would therapy be confined 
to Christians, and if so which Christian traditions might suitable subjects best be 
selected from?) However, leaving aside all of these questions for a moment, an even 
more fundamental question arises as to whether spirituality of any kind can be made 
to serve a utilitarian purpose of improving physical or mental health? 
 
As more and more empirical research has shown benefits of religiosity and 
spirituality in healthcare,86 this question has been raised as of general importance. 
Should anyone be encouraged to follow a spiritual path, purely for the benefits that it 
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might bring to their physical or mental health? As the whole ethos of spirituality is 
concerned with relational and transcendent goals (as, for example, outlined by 
Sandra Schneiders’ definition, above) can it ethically, practicably or theologically be 
pressed to the purpose of a very practical, non-transcendent, goal of improving 
health?87 These are very serious questions, which cannot adequately be addressed 
here. However, in passing, it is interesting to note that mindfulness, a state of mental 
awareness deriving from Buddhism, which has various features in common with 
hesychia, has been of growing interest to mental health professionals over recent 
years and has been subjected to empirical research with very positive results.88 
 
The central problem in respect of our specific instance of the general questions that 
are posed here is that the understanding of well-being offered by the Philokalia is so 
radically different to, and so much more transcendent than, the kind of well-being 
that most people receiving psychotherapy are currently seeking.89 However, with all 
of these qualifications in mind, it is well not to completely evade the question of 
whether the Philokalia offers therapy for the Christian struggling with 
demoralisation or mental disorder, over and above the therapy that it offers to any 
and every Christian soul. 
 
Firstly, the Philokalia has much to say about suffering, adversity, afflictions and 
trials90 that are involuntarily experienced, and how they may be managed. Amongst 
such experiences we might include demoralisation and mental or physical ill health. 
However, much of what the Philokalia has to say on these subjects would be 
difficult to introduce to someone experiencing mental suffering who was not already 
well advanced in Christian spirituality. Indeed, it could even seem very pastorally 
insensitive. For example, Peter of Damaskos writes: 
Just as sick people need surgery and cautery to recover the health they have 
lost, so we need trials, and toils of repentance, and fear of death and 
punishment, so that we may regain our former health of soul and shake off 
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the sickness which our folly has induced. The more the Physician of our 
souls bestows upon us voluntary and involuntary suffering, the more we 
should thank Him for His compassion and accept the suffering joyfully; For 
it is to help us that He increases our tribulation, both through  the sufferings 
we willingly embrace in our repentance and through the trials and 
punishments not subject to our will. In this way, if we voluntarily accept 
affliction, we will be freed from our sickness and from the punishments to 
come, and perhaps even from present punishments as well. Even if we are 
not grateful, our Physician in His grace will still heal us, although by means 
of chastisement and manifold trials. But if we cling to our disease and persist 
in it, we will deservedly bring upon ourselves agelong punishment.91 
 
Note that the imagery presented here completely reverses the usual idea of what 
constitutes sickness. Here, sickness is subjection to the passions. A mental disorder, 
or a form of demoralisation, which brings unwanted suffering could constitute the 
kind of trial or suffering which “the Physician of souls bestows upon us” as a means 
of healing. The therapy that is advised here is therefore one of acceptance and 
thanksgiving, but it is aimed at the condition of the soul rather than the relief of 
suffering. All of this might well be helpful to someone who has embarked upon the 
spiritual path that the Philokalia prescribes, and who then encounters mental trials or 
sufferings of some kind. But it would be a difficult, if not highly insensitive, place 
with which to start pastoral care for someone who came asking for help with such 
trials and sufferings who was either not a Christian, or else was beginning from a 
very different tradition or starting point of Christian spirituality. 
 
Do the remedies offered by the Philokalia therefore offer a therapy appropriate to 
these contemporary disorders? 
 
It would seem that the answer to this question should probably be a cautious “yes”, 
but this answer immediately invites qualification. For example, Archbishop 
Chrysostomos provides a clear example of an insensitive and inappropriate 
application of such a model to the case of depressive disorder.92 The Archbishop, 
who is himself a qualified and experienced psychologist as well as an Orthodox 
priest, argues that spiritual depression and clinical depression should be 
                                                 
91
 Philokalia 3, 77-78 
92
 Chrysostomos, 2007, pp.104-105 
273 
 
distinguished.93 Whilst I have much sympathy with this view, and would agree that 
clinical depression needs to be distinguished from the more everyday (in a medical 
sense, non-pathological) depression that Evagrios seems to have been talking about, 
I am not sure that this means that the Philokalia has nothing to offer the person who 
is clinically depressed. Rather, it might be argued, all kinds of depression are 
spiritual concerns – to which the teachings of the Philokalia (or John of the Cross) 
do have great relevance. The danger is in imagining that no other kind of therapy 
will ever be needed, and thus that antidepressants or cognitive therapy (or other 
appropriate medical and psychological treatments) will not be employed when 
necessary. 
 
There is, of course, the possibility of combining the kind of therapy that the 
Philokalia espouses with more psychologically and medical informed therapies. This 
may either take the form of spiritual direction offered in parallel to psychotherapy 
(for example) or else of some kind of integration of the two. Examples of the latter 
kind are provided by in publications arising from conferences of the Orthodox 
Christian Association of Medicine, Psychology and Religion.94 Much more 
empirical and theological research on such approaches is required. 
 
The kinds of issues that are presented in terms of the tension between different 
theoretical and therapeutic models are well illustrated in the case of addiction. The 
concept of addiction has important similarities with the concept of the passions. 
Both concepts are concerned with the way in which human beings find themselves 
“enslaved” to inner forces (and outer objects), from which they struggle to be free. 
This applicability of similar metaphors reflects an underlying phenomenological 
similarity between traditional Christian concerns and the concerns of contemporary 
scientific and medical endeavour.95 Both recognise social, psychological, physical 
and spiritual elements, and neither are adequate when applied in a completely 
reductive fashion. 
 
                                                 
93
 It is interesting to note in passing that similar distinctions have been made in respect of the teaching 
of John of the Cross on the dark night of the soul, and that similar considerations apply there also 
(Turner, 1999, pp.226-251). 
94
 Chirban, 2001, Muse, 2004 
95
 Cook, 2006 
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The spiritual approach to addictive disorders has been made popular particularly by 
the 12 Step programme of Alcoholics Anonymous. So influential has this been that it 
has made the spiritual component of treatment an important focus for contemporary 
medical and scientific research on addiction, as well as an important consideration in 
clinical care.96 The 12 Step programme drew historically upon Christian and 
psychological/psychotherapeutic thinking, but has become a mutual help programme 
which adopts a secular spirituality that is open to people from all faith traditions, as 
well as agnostics and atheists.97 Regardless of this process of secularisation, a 
process which was engaged with in order to ensure that the programme was open to 
people from any/every spiritual background, it still shows a deep consonance with a 
broad range of Christian spiritual traditions, from the Desert Fathers to Ignatian 
spirituality and Julian of Norwich.98 
 
Victor Mihailoff, in Breaking the Chains of Addiction, has produced a book which is 
explicitly targeted at “members of the Orthodox Church who want to conquer 
addictions such as smoking, alcohol abuse and any drug/substance abuse or 
addictive behaviour, such a gambling, eating disorders, exhibiting a bad temper, 
obsessive compulsive disorder, some psychological behavioural problems and any 
bad habits”.99 In keeping with this intention, Mihailoff argues that “atheists and 
agnostics will have to become believers during the course of reading in order to gain 
benefit”.100 Whilst Mihailoff has narrowed the target audience in this way, so as to 
restrict the potential therapeutic benefits of his approach to those who are willing to 
accept Christian faith, he has widened the scope of what constitutes “addiction” 
beyond the usual boundaries of internationally accepted diagnostic criteria, so as to 
include a wide range of behavioural problems and habits, as well as obsessive 
compulsive disorder. This is in keeping with his definition of passions as “the object 
of any strong desire or fondness”,101 and his practice of more or less identifying 
passion and addiction as the same phenomenon. Amongst the remedies for 
addiction/passion that Mihailoff recommends are the examination of thoughts, 
reading of scripture, confession, holy communion and prayer. Overall, although 
                                                 
96
 Cook, 2007a, Cook, 2004, Cook, 2007b, Jackson and Cook, 2005 
97
 Kurtz, 1996 
98
 Thyer, 2004 
99
 Mihailoff, 2005, p.2 
100
 Ibid. 
101
 Ibid., p.12 
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Mihailoff includes reference to the 12 Steps of Alcoholics Anonymous, and to 
scientific accounts of addiction, his approach is strongly formed by the traditions of 
the Philokalia (which he quotes throughout) and other patristic writings. It is 
therefore only partially integrative. 
 
Meletios Webber, in Steps of Transformation, takes a somewhat different approach. 
The two express purposes of his book are to explore and explain the 12 Step 
programme for those who are unfamiliar with it, and to present that programme in 
such a way “that members of the Orthodox Church might find [it] a valuable 
resource for their own personal spiritual development, should they choose to use 
[it]”.102 Webber also has a broad approach to addiction: 
It is possible that everyone alive, particularly anyone who lives in relative 
affluence, is affected by addiction in one form or another.103 
 
However, his approach to treatment is much more centred on the 12 Step programme 
than is Mihailoff’s. It is this programme that provides the structure for the second 
half of his book, and he achieves his second expressed purpose of writing (above) on 
the basis of the premise that “the Twelve Steps can be shown to share some element 
in the thought and experience, the Scripture and prayer life, of the Orthodox 
Church”.104 The spirituality of the 12 Step programme and of Orthodoxy thus find a 
more equal balance in the book and its therapeutic approach is more dominated by 
the former than the latter. 
 
A third approach might be found in a very different kind of book, the Handbook of 
Psychotherapy and Religious Diversity.105 Although this book is not about the 
treatment of addiction specifically, it provides a handbook for psychotherapists and 
other mental health professionals to support better awareness of religious and 
spiritual traditions, and to enable more effective working with clients/patients from 
particular faith traditions. The chapter on working with Eastern Orthodox 
Christians106 provides helpful information on the beliefs, spirituality and practices of 
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 Webber, 2003, p.11 
103
 Ibid., p.12 
104
 Ibid., p.13 
105
 Richards and Bergin, 2000 
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 Young, 2001 
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Orthodoxy and their implications for counselling or psychotherapy. Close working 
with clergy is encouraged. Here, the model is one of secular psychotherapy which 
endeavours to be sensitive to, and compatible with, the spirituality and faith of the 
Orthodox person. 
 
This brief series of examples simply illustrates that there are various ways of 
integrating Orthodox psychotherapy with contemporary psychological therapies in 
the clinical context. These vary from a hegemony of one approach or the other to a 
more integrative assimilation of both approaches, but the possible variations in 
practice are doubtless innumerable. 
 
 
9. Therapy of the Soul: Inwardness, Prayer and the Talking 
Cure 
 
Based upon what has been said thus far, a simple answer to our question of whether 
or not the Philokalia offers a kind of psychotherapy would seem to be that it does, 
but that this needs to be qualified. It needs to be qualified not so much because it is 
possible to identify ways in which it does not go far enough with the inner world of 
thoughts and feelings to qualify as psychotherapy, for it is difficult to identify any 
such shortcomings. Neither is the qualification simply a concern about it having 
ventured beyond those domains that contemporary realms of psychology and 
psychotherapy might usually address, for all psychotherapy has its spiritual and 
religious implications, even if these are left unspoken of in therapy or in the 
psychology classroom (and increasingly such things are not left unspoken at all). 
Rather, the qualification is that the Philokalia insists on discussing everything in 
primarily theological terms. The effect of this is not simply to broaden the discussion 
in such a way that God must be included, but rather to make the inner world of 
thoughts and feelings something that must be discussed when a conversation about 
prayer is begun. 
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If the question that we began this chapter with might be reframed as a question as to 
whether or not the Philokalia is inviting us to discuss psychotherapy, the answer 
might well be no. The Philokalia invites us to discuss prayer, and then advises that 
in order to have that conversation we will need to talk about things which are usually 
considered the domain of psychotherapy. Whereas Anna O saw the treatment that 
she was offered as a “talking cure”, the Philokalia might be said to offer a “praying 
cure”. But, just as talking about the psyche might lead eventually to existential or 
spiritual questions, so praying (in the language of the Philokalia, at least) will 
necessarily start with questions of our inner thoughts and feelings. 
 
It would appear, then, that the Philokalia is deeply concerned with matters which are 
usually considered the province of psychotherapy. Herein lies a challenge, for the 
world of psychotherapy exists in a post-Cartesian, post-Kantian philosophical age 
where dualism is frowned upon and the nature of the subjective self is no longer 
universally agreed upon. How may the Philokalia be interpreted for this age? 
 
The deep modern (or even postmodern) concern with inwardness would seem to 
offer a promising way forward. The language of inwardness is common to 
psychotherapy and the Philokalia, even if they have different emphases and 
interpretations to offer. Both worlds of discourse recognise that the psyche is in need 
of a cure, even if they have different diagnoses and prescriptions to offer. At least 
here there is scope for a conversation – even if the starting point will have to be 
exactly what the conversation is going to be about.   
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Table 6.1: Inwardness language in the Philokalia1  
 
Inwardness Language Philokalia Reference2 
  
Isaiah the Solitary  
Inwardly, blessing (God)  1, 24, #13 
Inward meditation   1, 28, #26 
  
Evagrios  
Inwardly divided   1, 31 
Inner watchfulness and vigilance  1, 37 
Inward sorrow   1, 61, #43 
Inner prayer   1, 68, #112 
  
John Cassian  
Inner house (wisdom)  1, 100 
Inner desert  1, 101 
  
Mark the Ascetic  
Inwardly arrogant  1, 113, #36 
Inward enjoyment  1, 117, #97 
Inward intention  1, 126, #15 
Inner state  1, 131, #67 
Inward struggle  1, 139, #161 
Inner progress  1, 139, #165 
Inwardly, grieve  1, 140, #176 
Inner dwelling place of Christ  1, 145, #224 
Inward assent  1, 147 
Inwardly, defiling/defiled  1, 149, 150 
Inward action (of passion)  1, 154 
Inner man 1, 154 
Inner law 1, 154 
  
Hesychios the Priest  
Inner struggle  1, 163, #5 
Inner stability  1, 163, #7 
Inwardly anticipates  1, 163-164, #8 
Inner ambuscades  1, 164, #8 
Inner vigilance  1, 164, #10 
Inner shrine of the soul  1, 165, #21 
Inner struggle  1, 168, #32; 171, #52 
Inner warfare  1, 168, #34; 180, #105; 188, #148 
Inner self  1, 168, #34; 174-175, #70; 177, #87; 
181, ##111-112; 193, ##172-173; 194, 
#178 
Inner knowledge  1, 172, #61 
                                                 
1
 This list was compiled by searching for references to the passions in the Philokalia Concordance on 
CD-ROM, compiled by Basileios S. Stapakis. For full details, see the footnote in the relevant section 
of Chapter 6. 
2
 All references to the English translation 
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Inwardness Language Philokalia Reference2 
Inner life  1, 174,#68 
Inwardly, be a monk  1, 174, #70 
Inner monk  1, 175, #71 
Inward parts  1, 176, ##85-86 
Inward spiritual warfare  1, 179, #99 
Inner attention  1, 183, #120 
Inwardly, purified itself  1, 183, #122 
Inner eyes  1, 185,#130 
Inwardly chastened  1, 185, #130 
Inwardly, sin  1, 193, #173 
  
Neilos the Ascetic  
Inner stability  1, 202 
Inwardly at peace  1, 218 
Inward parts  1, 220 
Inward state  1, 221 
Inner watchfulness  1, 227 
Inwardly restrain  1, 238 
Inner truth  1, 242 
  
Diadochos of Photiki  
Inner energies  1, 255, #9 
Inner shrine of the soul  1, 260, #28 
Inward sense  1, 264, #37 
Inner shrine of [the] heart  1, 269, #29 
Inner man  1, 266, #42; 288, #89 
Inner shrine [of] the intellect  1, 270, #69 
Inward calm  1, 272, #62 
Inward man  1, 282 
Inward point… of sensitivity [of] the soul  1, 285 
Inward martyrdom  1, 292, #94 
Inward awareness  1, 295, #100 
  
John of Karpathos  
Inward resolution  1, 302, #19 
Inwardly, grows  1, 303, #23 
Inward state  1, 304, #25; 314/#67 
Inward heaven of the heart  1, 310, #52 
Inward sanctuary  1, 311, #55 
Inwardly, spoke (to God)  1, 311, #56 
Inwardly confused  1, 315, #70 
Inwardly, full of turmoil  1, 318, #87 
Inwardly, full of agitation  1, 319, #88 
Inner room (the shrine of [the] heart)  1, 319, #91 
Inner sanctuary  1, 320, #91 
Innermost self  1, 320, #91 
Inwardly, the Lord always speaks to us  1, 326 
  
Antony the Great (Attrib)  
Inward discipline  1, 331, #10 
Inner beauty  1, 332, #20 
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Inwardness Language Philokalia Reference2 
Inward character  1, 332, #21 
Inner freedom  1, 334, #37 
  
Theodoros the Great Ascetic  
Inward faith  2, 22, #47 
Inwardly, acquiring  2, 34, #91 
Inner wakefulness  2, 36, #99 
  
Maximos the Confessor  
Inner states  2, 80, #87, #89; 161, ##91-92; 177, #61; 
207, #94; 226, #61; 240, #20; 258, #92; 
261, #2; 263, #10; 301-302 
Inner practice of the virtues  2, 105,#43 
Inwardly, practicing the virtues  2, 106, #49 
Inner self  2, 106, #50 
Inwardly, be a monk  2, 106, #50 
Inner monk  2, 106, #51 
Inner life  2, 108, #64 
Inner man  2, 110, #78 
Inner vision  2, 131, #80 
Inwardly, rejoice  2, 143, #24 
Inner teaching  2, 166-167, #10 
Inward resolution  2, 169, #17 
Inner disposition  2, 177, #61; 252, ##65-66; 254, #74 
Inwardly longs  2, 185, #893 
Inward disposition  2, 205, #82 
Inner attitude  2, 214,  #20 
Inwardly subject (to deceit)  2, 239, #18 
Inner quality  2, 255, #81 
Inwardly sustains  2, 255, #81 
Inward quality or disposition  2, 256, #82 
Inwardly lays hold of  2, 275, #62 
Inner hunger  2, 268, #354 
Inner being  2, 273, #49 
Inward state  2, 280, #84; 301 
Inward law  2, 285 
Inner stability  2, 292 
Inward unity  2, 294 
Inwardly sunders  2, 301 
  
Thalassios the Libyan  
Inwardly, curses  2, 307, #3 
Inner work  2, 308 
Inward stillness  2, 313, #11 
Inwardly, cleave  2, 319, #3 
Inwardly, prove [to be] a monk  2, 320, #22 
  
A Discourse on Abba Philimon (Anon)  
                                                 
3
 Attributed to Maximos, but actually from the anonymous scholia on To Thalassios: Various 
Questions 
4
 This chapter is partly by Maximos and partly by the anonymous author of the scholia. 
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Inwardness Language Philokalia Reference2 
Inwardly, meditate/meditating 2, 347-349, 351 
Inward meditation  2, 347 
Inner work  2, 348 
Inner watchfulness  2, 350 
Inner thoughts  2, 351 
  
Theognostos (Attrib)  
Inward self-renunciation  2, 361, #11 
Inner beauty  2, 363, #18 
Inwardly… fill  2, 363, #18 
Inward illumination  2, 363, #23 
Inward state  2, 265, #26 
Inward meditation  2, 366, #32 
  
Philotheos of Sinai  
Inner watchfulness  3, 17, #3; 26, #25 
Inner state  3, 21, #14; 29, #35 
Inwardly, operates  3, 22, #17 
Inner eyes  3, 23, #19; 29, #33 
Inwardly, fettered  3, 23, #19 
Inwardly, tell us  3, 27, #28 
Inward man  3, 28, #31 
  
Ilias the Presbyter  
Inwardly, suffers  3, 41, #73 
Inward… aspects (of the soul)  3, 51, #32 
Inwardly, guard  3, 55, #59 
Inwardly purify  3, 61, #109 
Inwardly, unites with  3, 63, #123 
Inwardly, activated  3, 64, #133 
  
Theophanis the Monk  
Inwardly experience  3, 68 
  
Peter of Damaskos  
Inward grief  3, 78, 88, 94, 98, 115, 119, 121, 123, 
126, 183, 168, 197, 217, 219, 231, 234, 
245, 275 
Inwardly, grieve  3, 107 
Inwardly, taught  3, 133 
Inner state  3, 152, 243 
Inner wisdom  3, 204 
Inward… virtues  3, 220 
Inwardly, master  3, 221 
Inner self  3, 244 
  
Symeon Metaphrastis  
Inwardly… regard  3, 288, #9 
Inner disposition  3, 289 
Inward… travail  3, 290, #13 
Inward struggle  3, 290, #14 
Inner union (with the hidden energy of God’s 3, 292, #18 
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Inwardness Language Philokalia Reference2 
holiness)  
Inwardly, signifies  3, 297 
Inwardly… annulled  3, 300, #36 
Inwardly, encountered  3, 300, #37 
Inner warfare  3, 305-306, #49; 351/#146 
Inwardly, make it clear  3, 308, #55 
Inwardly, stretched  3, 309, #55 
Inwardly, possess  3, 312, #62 
Inwardly…  (with unveiled face)… reflect  3, 312, #62 
Inwardly… attain  3, 317, #73 
Inner being  3, 317-318, #74; 321, #82; 348, #137; 
349, #141 
Inner chambers of [the] soul  3, 321, #83 
Inner lawlessness  3, 321, #83 
Inner prepossessions  3, 322, #84 
Inner attitudes  3, 322, #84 
Inner treasure house  3, 323, #88 
Inwardly spotless  3, 325, #90 
Inwardly, carried away  3, 325, #91 
Inward… light  3, 326, #92 
Inner communion  3, 334, #112 
Inner buildings  3, 335, #115 
Inner chambers  3, 335, #115 
Inwardly, stored up  3, 349, #141 
Inner bonds  3, 351, #145 
Inner fetters  3, 351, #145; 352, #146 
Inner struggle  3, 351, #146 
Inner passions  3, 352, #146 
Inwardly… brings afflictions  3, 352, #147 
  
Symeon the New Theologian  
Inwardly… present  4, 20 
Inwardly illumined  4, 38, #68 
Inward grief  4, 38, #69; 53, #126; 56, #140 
Inwardly, are  4, 39, #70 
Inner working of the Spirit  4, 39, #73 
Inner disposition  4, 40, #75 
Inward self  4, 46, #103 
Inner state of [the] soul  4, 62, #1535 
  
Nikitas Stithatos  
Inner counterparts (of the activities of the outer 
senses)  
4, 80-81, #8 
Inner state of the soul  4, 87, #31; 92, #52 
Inner activities (of the soul)  4, 87, #32 
Inner state  4, 95, ##61-62; 123, #60 
Inner consciousness  4, 97, #72 
Inwardly assent  4, 98, #74 
Inner stillness  4, 103, #89 
Inner sanctuary  4, 104, ##94-95 
                                                 
5
 Attributed in the Philokalia to Symeon, but actually by Nikitas Stithatos 
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Inwardness Language Philokalia Reference2 
Inner stronghold  4, 113, #21 
Inwardly humble  4, 113, #25; 116, #35 
Inward humility  4, 114, #25 
Inner stability  4, 114, #25 
Inner humility  4, 114, ##26-28 
Inwardly… pursues  4, 115, #32 
Inner powers (of the soul)  4, 121, #50 
Inner disposition  4, 123, #60 
Inwardly, received  4, 126, #66 
Inner concentration  4, 128, #74 
Inner activity of the Spirit  4, 137, #100 
Inner discord  4, 144, #16 
Inner faith and love for God  4, 145, #23 
Inner turbulence (of the passions)  4, 146, #25 
Inward peace  4, 150, #39 
Inner activity (of the intellect)  4, 151, #43 
Inner self  4, 161, #68 
Inwardly, is  4, 161, #69 
Inwardly, psalmodising  4, 169, #89 
Inner being  4, 170, #93 
  
Theoliptos  
Inner distraction  4, 179 
Innermost citadel of the soul  4, 181 
Inner self  4, 181 
Innermost sanctuary of the intellect  4, 184 
Inner state  4, 189, #3 
  
Nikiphoros the Monk  
Inwards (turning of the senses)  4, 197 
Inwardly, concentrate  4, 197 
Inner state  4, 198, 199 
Inner gate (to evil spirits)  4, 200 
Inner work  4, 200 
Inwardly are adulterous  4, 201 
Inward heaven of the heart  4, 203 
Inwardly derange  4, 203 
  
Gregory of Sinai  
Inner qualities  4, 216, #20 
Inner disposition  4, 219, #40; 229, #86; 230, #89; 243, 
#123; 244, #125 
Inner converse  4, 221, #49 
Inner purity and saintliness  4, 230, #90 
Inner stability  4, 234, #101 
Inner stillness  4, 234, #102; 235#104 
Inner murkiness  4, 235, #107 
Inner grief  4, 236, #108 
Inner discrimination  4, 244, #123 
Inner ducts  4, 255, #6 
Inwardly, grieves  4, 268 
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Inwardness Language Philokalia Reference2 
Inner intention  4, 271-272, #12 
Inward grief and humility  4, 272, #13 
Inner invocation  4, 275, #1 
Inner turbulence  4, 279 
Inwardly, possess (God)  4, 282 
Inward grief  4, 284 
Inward pressure  4, 285 
Inward jubilation 4, 285 
Inwardly, manifested 4, 285 
  
  
Gregory Palamas  
Inward monk  4, 293, #1 
Inner self  4, 296, #10; 314, #53; 315, #54; 337, #7 
Inner state  4, 298, #15 
Inward watchfulness  4, 308, #38 
Inner flow (of evil thoughts)  4, 310, #42 
Inwards, turn  4, 315, #53 
Inner grace  4, 316, #59 
Inner being  4, 316, #59; 338, #8 
Inner dwelling place of Christ  4, 320, #65 
Inner affection  4, 324 
Inward parts  4, 333, #1; 340, #11 
Inner organ  4, 334, #3 
Innermost body (the heart)  4, 334, #3 
Inwards, to return  4, 336, #5 
Inward grief  4, 343, #1; 345, #3 
Inner powers  4, 344, #3 
Inner intelligence principle  4, 360, #35 
Innermost intelligence  4, 362, #37 
Inner death  4, 368, #48 
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Chapter 7: On Thoughts and Prayer 
 
If the Philokalia is concerned with mental well-being, or with the proper ordering of 
the inner life of thoughts, then its only understanding of this is in the context of 
prayer. But if it is concerned primarily with prayer, yet it insists that prayer may 
only be properly understood and practised if attention is given first to the world of 
thoughts. This understanding of an inextricable relationship between thoughts and 
prayer runs all the way through the Philokalia.  
 
Whilst the Philokalia has come down to us through the Eastern Church, and though 
its origins are in Classical and early Christian thought, it seems remarkably relevant 
to contemporary western concerns about mental wellbeing and the inner life. Even if 
its understanding of inwardness is somewhat different than that inherited in the west 
through Augustine, Descartes and Hume, inwardness is nonetheless a matter of 
common concern. Its points of contact with western psychotherapy, in particular its 
common inheritance of the cognitive emphases of Stoic philosophy, are remarkable, 
even if there are also equally remarkable points of divergence. The Philokalia also 
shares with western mental healthcare a concern for an holistic approach to human 
life. Physical, psychological, social and spiritual dimensions of being human all 
receive attention and are engaged with one another. All in all, the authors and editors 
of the Philokalia show a keen psychological awareness, which is highly relevant to 
contemporary western concerns about mental wellbeing. 
 
The Philokalia also offers important insights into the life of prayer which would be 
of interest to many western Christians, and perhaps also members of other faith 
traditions, if only it was better known to them. It does not allow prayer to be 
sidelined as a separate matter than the practical matters of virtuous daily living. It is 
realistic about the psychological challenges of prayer. It recognises the challenge 
presented by distractions of memory, perception, emotions, biological and cognitive 
processes. It is also realistic about the seemingly impossible task of relating to a God 
who is always above and beyond any words that we may bring to our prayers or any 
concepts that we may try and employ to understand him. 
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This psychological and spiritual relevance does, however, cut across the 
Enlightenment legacy of a separation between matters secular and religious. Whilst 
there is evidence that this is breaking down, and that spirituality is again being 
considered highly important in mental healthcare and in psychotherapy,1 the 
theological rationale of the Philokalia will clearly be seen by some as exclusive. 
However, in practice, many Christians and others find that they cannot and do not 
separate prayer from their inner psychological experiences. Perhaps the Philokalia 
has some lessons to teach about its central concern with the relationship between 
thoughts and prayers which may transcend the gulf that history and culture have 
placed between them? 
 
On the one hand, the relationship between thoughts and prayers is so obvious as to 
hardly need any comment. Just as any worthwhile human act or intention requires 
some level of thought, so does prayer. We are grateful to people who show 
thoughtfulness in acts of kindness or compassion which reveal that they had thought 
about the needs of others. We appreciate the careful choice of words that reveals the 
thoughts of a writer or speaker. Sometimes the silence of a friend or lover reveals 
their concern for us, and we take this as thoughtful on their part. Or, again, simple 
and routine things can be said in a thoughtful way that marks them out from the 
thoughtless repetition of social custom, and we are good at recognising this. So, in 
our prayers, we know the difference between thoughts that are engaged with our 
intentions and thoughts that are careless or occupied elsewhere. We can tell when 
intercessions are led by someone who has given thought to the real needs of a 
congregation or community. We know when our personal devotions have been 
thoughtful and when they have been careless or hurried. 
 
Yet, despite the obviousness of the connection, the relationship between thoughts 
and prayers is profoundly complex, mysterious and even paradoxical. Sometimes, as 
Evagrios so perceptively noticed, our apparent thoughts of hospitality, chastity or 
humility might conceal thoughts which are much less respectable, such as 
restlessness, pride, or vainglory. Or else, we may know very well what we should 
                                                 
1
 Cook, Powell and Sims, 2009 
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pray, even what we would like to pray, and yet our feelings betray completely the 
opposite. We want to forgive, but we feel angry. We want to care, but we feel 
careless. Sometimes, apparently holy and devoted thoughts so crowd our minds that 
God is squeezed out. Or else, we are left so bereft of words that we are simply left in 
God’s presence not knowing what to say. 
 
The relationship between thoughts and prayers is therefore not at all straightforward. 
But it is also very much to the heart of our sense of inwardness, our sense of who we 
are (and who God is). It is a very real indicator of our state of mental and spiritual 
wellbeing, in relationship to ourselves, and others and God. It is therefore very 
deserving of the considerable attention that the Philokalia devotes to it. 
 
In this chapter, a number of aspects of the relationship between thoughts and prayer 
will be explored further, and some of the themes of the Philokalia will be engaged 
with some strands of western thinking about thoughts and prayer. But, first, it may 
be helpful to give a little more attention to the question: Why are thoughts so 
important? 
 
 
1. On Thoughts 
 
Thoughts are important to human beings in a general sense, because they are the 
means by which we know ourselves. Although there are philosophical arguments 
about the possibility (or impossibility) of self-knowledge, and whether self 
awareness is more a function of perception or of thought,2 thoughts are nonetheless 
integrally involved in the sense of inwardness, and the processes of reflexivity, 
disengagement and expressivism which characterise the contemporary sense of 
inwardness, which is so important to us. Even though philosophical arguments 
against the very existence of the self, or against any unified sense of self, may be 
have to be taken seriously, in a practical day to day sense, it is difficult or impossible 
to imagine how human beings would manage their lives, in any recognisably human 
                                                 
2
 See Sorabji, 2006, pp.201-261 for a helpful review of these arguments. 
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sense, without thoughts.3 Thoughts are important because they are the means by 
which we manage our relationships with ourselves, other human beings, and the 
wider world. 
 
Thoughts are also important to human beings because of the way in which they 
enable a sense of self transcendence or spirituality. The word “spirituality” has only 
become popular during the last few decades, and there is still much debate about 
how exactly it should be defined,4 but arguably it is a very fundamental aspect of 
what it is to be human. Sandra Schneiders has suggested that spirituality, as a lived 
human experience, may be defined as: 
conscious involvement in the project of life integration through self-
transcendence toward the ultimate value one perceives5 
 
It is in the world of thoughts that human beings consciously involve themselves in 
their lives, seek to find a sense of integration (whatever that may be), and are able to 
identify transcendent value. 
 
Thoughts are important to Christians, however, in a further and more specific sense. 
In the western tradition, this has perhaps been most importantly promoted by 
Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas, in their affirmation of the importance of human 
reason (understood as an aspect of the imago Dei) in understanding and exploring 
faith.6 However, in the eastern tradition, as exemplified by the Philokalia, the link 
between thought and Christian faith is arguably even more intrinsic to the language, 
philosophy, anthropology and theology that are employed. As discussed in Chapter 
2, the intellect (	
), or spirit, is understood as the highest faculty of the soul, and is 
to be distinguished from “reason” (	), or mind. The ruling aspect of the 
intellect is the intelligence (		), which is etymologically connected to Logos 
                                                 
3
 I do not wish to engage here with debates about whether animals have thoughts, or about the serious 
ethical issues raised by severe brain damage, developmental disorder, or degenerative brain diseases 
which might impair or even completely prevent normal human thought processes. I hope that it is 
sufficient simply to argue that the very way in which these ethical debates challenge our very 
understanding of what it is to be human, and what constitutes a life worth living, are sufficient to 
demonstrate that thoughts are very important to our sense of self identity. There are however 
obviously many other and complex issues to be taken into account when making ethical and 
philosophical decisions about what it is to be human, and what constitutes human life. 
4
 Cook, 2004 
5
 Schneiders, 2005, p.1 
6
 Hastings, Mason and Pyper, 2000, pp.596-597, Cross and Livingstone, 1997, p.820 
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("		
), and therefore theologically closely connected with the concept of the divine 
Intellect. Thoughts, where they are understood as products of the pure intellect rather 
than being impassioned thoughts, or else mere reason, are thus more or less direct 
spiritual perceptions of God or of the inner essences of things (		). On the other 
hand, thoughts which are impassioned, or else mere products of the mind, potentially 
lead the soul away from God. Thoughts are thus intimately related to prayer.7 
 
Paradoxically, the Philokalia also teaches that thoughts are closely related to 
passions. However, thoughts may or may not be passions. At this point, some further 
clarification of the distinctions made in the Philokalia between various kinds of 
thoughts might be helpful. 
 
Logismoi (		), as in Evagrios’ Eight Thoughts, and as understood by 
Maximos and other authors of the Philokalia, are more like trains of thought than 
simple thoughts. For Evagrios, there is a somewhat complex causal relationship 
between thoughts and passions (as discussed in Chapter 3) in which thoughts may 
lead to passions, or passions may lead to thoughts. Logismoi are usually set in 
motion by demons, and generally have a negative connotation for Evagrios, but may 
exceptionally be benign or good.8 “Simple thoughts” (	"		) are neutral 
thoughts, which are neither associated with passion nor provoked by demons.9 
 
Noemata (	) are conceptual images, somewhere between fantasies and 
abstract concepts, which are usually understood by Evagrios as arising from neutral 
sense perception, or else as being inspired by angels.10 Noemata are likened by 
Evagrios to sheep, which require nurture and care.11 However, there are again 
exceptions in Evagrian usage of this term, and noemata may sometimes be hostile.12 
A subcategory of noemata, are homoiomata (		) or “likenesses”, which are 
                                                 
7
 See entries in the Glossary of the English translation of the Philokalia under “Intellect”, 
“Intellection”, “Intelligent”, “Logos”, “Reason”, and “Thought” 
8
 Konstantinovsky, 2009, p.35, Dysinger, 2005, p.35; See, for example, On Thoughts 8, for an 
example of logismoi inspired by angels. 
9
 Konstantinovsky, 2009, p.35 
10
 Dysinger, 2005, p.35, Konstantinovsky, 2009, p.35 
11
 On Thoughts 17 
12
 See, for example, Praktikos 42 
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specifically representations of material objects.13 The source of Evagrios’ 
understanding of the relationships between images and knowledge appears to be 
from Aristotle, via Clement of Alexandria.14 
 
The term noemata is frequently used by Maximos, and is understood as a “simple” 
thought ( 	) in contrast to composite thoughts (or logismoi) which are 
combined with passions. For example, in On Love: C2, he writes: 
Some thoughts are simple, others are composite. Thoughts which are not 
impassioned are simple. Passion-charged thoughts are composite, consisting 
as they do of a conceptual image combined with passion. This being so, 
when composite thoughts begin to provoke a sinful idea in the mind, many 
simple thoughts may be seen to follow them. For instance, an impassioned 
thought about gold rises in someone’s mind. He has the urge mentally to 
steal the gold and commits the sin in his intellect. Then thoughts of the purse, 
the chest, the room and so on follow hard on the thought of the gold. The 
thought of the gold was composite - for it was combined with passion - but 
those of the purse, the chest and so on were simple; for the intellect had no 
passion in relation to these things.15 
 
For Evagrios, simple thoughts and noemata are a positive feature of natural 
contemplation, indicating as they do that impassioned thoughts are being left behind. 
However, as they are also essentially plural, their multiplicity also provides a 
distraction from the unity that is inherent in God. Eventually, therefore, all such 
thoughts must be left behind in pursuit of theological contemplation. For Maximos, 
as Andrew Louth argues,16 exactly the opposite appears to be true. Noemata are 
associated with the highest state of dispassion, and thus the presence of such 
thoughts in the heart is a good sign.17 It is indicative of an outlook on the world 
which is passion-free. However, for Maximos also, there appears to be a higher state 
of contemplation in which all images and thoughts are eventually discarded: 
Through fulfilling the commandments the intellect strips itself of the 
passions. Through spiritual contemplation of things visible it casts off 
impassioned conceptions of such things. Through knowledge of things 
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 Konstantinovsky, 2009, p.35 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Philokalia 2, 79, #84. See also 2, 89, #43 
16
 Louth, 1996, p.42 
17
 Philokalia 2, 64, #93 
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invisible it discards the contemplation of things visible. Finally it denudes 
itself even of this through knowledge of the Holy Trinity.18 
 
For Evagrios and Maximos, in different ways, an understanding of the nature of 
thoughts, and an ability to manage thoughts effectively, is therefore essential to 
prayer. We shall return to this connection with prayer, below, but it may be helpful 
at this stage to note in passing that for both Evagrios and Maximos the relationship 
between thoughts and prayer appears to be governed by Christology. 
 
For Evagrios, natural contemplation is concerned with the “manifold wisdom” 
(			
 	) of Christ (or God), a phrase which is found as a recurring 
reference in Kephalaia Gnostica19 to Ephesians 3:10. Konstantinovsky argues that 
these references are best understood as revealing an Evagrian distinction between 
God as the source of all wisdom, and Christ as the source of the “manifold” wisdom 
associated with creation (but not the unified wisdom which finds its origin in God 
alone).20 Christ (who is distinguished by Evagrios from the eternal Logos) thus 
mediates natural contemplation, but theological contemplation is direct and 
unmediated (albeit Christ may play some kind of instructional role in it).21 For 
Maximos, in contrast, Christ (undistinguished from the eternal Logos) appears to be 
integrally involved in both cataphatic and apophatic prayer,22 and in direct 
contemplation of God.23 Louth argues that Maximos develops the notion of a 
Christological convergence of cataphatic and apophatic theology in the 
incarnation.24  
 
We have seen that, although shorter and longer lists abound, the basic thoughts with 
which the Philokalia is most concerned are those eight originally identified by 
Evagrios: 
 
                                                 
18
 On Love: C1, #94 (See Philokalia 2, 64); Maximos goes on to state that the “pure intellect” may be 
occupied with “passion-free conceptual images” or natural contemplation, or “the light of the Holy 
Trinity” (#97). He concludes this century of texts with a very apophatic affirmation that “knowing 
nothing is knowledge surpassing the intellect” (#100). 
19
 Kephalaia Gnostica 1.43, 2.2, 2.21, 3.11, 4.7, 5.84 
20
 Konstantinovsky, 2009, p.59 
21
 Ibid., pp.65-66 
22
 Philokalia 2, 147, #39. This passage is quoted in full, below. 
23
 Philokalia 2, 293 
24
 Louth, 1996, pp.52-54 
292 
 
Gluttony 
Fornication 	
Avarice 
Anger  	
Sadness 
Acedia   
Vainglory 		
Pride  
 
Whilst Evagrios claims that these categories include “every sort of thought”,25 it 
might at first appear that he cannot really mean this in a completely literal way. For 
example the list, at least as found in Eight Thoughts, does not include thoughts 
associated with the corresponding opposing virtues: abstinence, chastity, freedom 
from possessions, joy, patience, perseverance, freedom from vainglory, and 
humility. Neither does it include guilt, gratitude, fear or love. It does not include 
thoughts associated with natural contemplation, thoughts which prayerfully seek out 
the logoi, or inner essences of things. However, this first impression is somewhat 
dispelled by a recognition that Evagrios is talking about logismoi, not noemata, and 
that he usually reserves the former term for thoughts that are harmful, pernicious and 
demonic. His list therefore does not include thoughts that are neutral, or helpful to 
prayer. 
 
In On the Vices Opposed to the Virtues, Evagrios does describe virtues in terms 
opposite and complementary to those used to describe the vices (or logismoi). 
Interestingly, he also includes here a ninth vice (or logismos) of jealousy, which 
might suggest that he did not necessarily see his list of eight logismoi as completely 
comprehensive and exhaustive. However, it is also clear in this work that he 
understands jealousy as closely related to pride.26 We might conclude, therefore, that 
the list of eight logismoi is to be understood as a list of categories of thought with 
particular hostile and seductive qualities, qualities which Evagrios distinguishes 
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 Praktikos, 6 
26
 On the Vices Opposed to the Virtues 8 
293 
 
from the qualities of noemata, “simple thoughts”, forms of natural contemplation, or 
other benign kinds of thought. 
 
This recognition still leaves some arguable anomalies. What about guilt or fear, for 
example? Whilst each of these thoughts can be good (in encouraging or preserving a 
life of virtue, bringing about restoration of relationship with God or others, and 
encouraging the avoidance of harm, for example) each can also be preoccupying as a 
train of thought that distracts from prayer in the way that logismoi do. It is also 
possible to experience false guilt (over peccadilloes, or as a form of self indulgence, 
or even over a course of action that was morally correct) or false fear (as in phobias 
or obsessional ruminations). Perhaps Evagrios considered these to be forms of 
sadness, vainglory or pride,27 or else in someway more basic than logismoi?28 Or 
perhaps he recognised that guilt and fear more often encourage prayer, rather than 
being a distraction from it? 
 
Evagrios selected the thoughts for his list on the basis of his concern to lay the 
foundation for a life of prayer. The eight thoughts are therefore presumably the ones 
that Evagrios considers likely to cause trouble to the person who wants to pray. As 
we have seen (in Chapter 2) these thoughts do in fact have adverse consequences for 
prayer. Their train like quality confers the potential to lead to bad outcomes – either 
in terms of more bad thoughts, or in terms of sinful actions, or simply in terms of 
occupying enough mental space to exclude good thoughts. Hence, in On the Vices 
Opposed to the Virtues and elsewhere the thoughts are also referred to as vices. 
 
Given the purpose of instruction on prayer, it is still not entirely obvious why 
Evagrios has limited his list in the way that he has. Why not list good thoughts, 
alongside the bad ones, so that all kinds of thoughts are comprehensively classified? 
Why not give the good thoughts more attention rather than less? To some extent, it 
might be argued that this is exactly what he has done in some of his other works – in 
On the Vices Opposed to the Virtues, and in Antirrhetikos, for example.29 And even 
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 For example, Evagrios notes fear of fantasies as an example of pride (Eight Thoughts 8.10) 
28
 Evagrios appears to associate the potentially harmful kind of fear with different logismoi, and to 
understand the solution as being found in the measures to combat the logismoi or demons with which 
it is associated (eg Eight Thoughts 1.30, To Eulogius 22.23, On Prayer 97) 
29
 The “interaction of good and bad thoughts” is also discussed in Praktikos, 7 
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in Eight Thoughts, there is reference to abstinence in the sayings dealing with 
gluttony, chastity in the sayings about fornication, freedom from possessions in the 
sayings dealing with avarice, etc. Or again, it might be that he is simply drawing 
attention to thoughts that are problematic – in the way that modern psychotherapists 
will focus on troublesome thoughts (anxiety, depression, etc) and may not speak 
much about peace, joy, or other thoughts that do not represent any kind of problem 
or barrier to well-being. However, it is also clearly the case that Evagrios is aware 
that thoughts can be deceptive. A thought of chastity, for example, may actually be 
hiding a thought of pride or vainglory. Given that the works in which the eight 
thoughts are primarily addressed are intended for beginners, it may well be that he 
deliberately intends to encourage a vigilant search for problematic thoughts rather 
than risk complacency about apparently good thoughts which are actually hiding 
insidiously bad ones. 
 
If Evagrios has limited his list, so as to exclude some thoughts that we might have 
considered important topics for discussion, he has a very broad understanding of 
what thoughts are. His list includes items that we might consider as appetites or 
emotions or even simply physical tiredness rather than thoughts in the sense of 
cognitions. His descriptions also include perceptions and behaviours. Thus, for 
example, his account of fornication in Eight Thoughts notes that the mere sight of a 
woman can wound the soul30 and that guarding against fornication will therefore 
involve staying away from places where women might be encountered.31 But 
fornication (like the other thoughts) is also concerned with an inner disposition of 
virtue (or lack of it), and with memory and fantasy.32 Avoiding encounters with 
women does not provide immunity against it, and neither does an encounter with a 
woman necessarily interfere with prayer or lead to sin.33 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the authors of the Philokalia expand on Evagrios’ list of 
thoughts, and various shorter lists are proposed, but the basic principles of Evagrios’ 
approach are retained throughout. Thoughts are understood as being of fundamental 
importance to the life of prayer and thus, ultimately, to human well-being. The basic 
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 Eight Thoughts 2.6 
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 Eight Thoughts 2.7-2.10 
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 Eight Thoughts 2.17-2.20 
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 Eight Thoughts 2.17 
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distinction amongst thoughts is seen to be between those which open up a 
theocentric view of reality that facilitates prayer, and those which induce a seductive 
and self-referential illusion or fantasy that impedes prayer. 
 
 
2. The Interpretation of Thoughts 
 
To what extent is it valid to speak of the “interpretation” of thoughts? To suggest 
that thoughts may be interpreted presupposes that they have meaning, and that this 
meaning is not necessarily immediately and superficially obvious. In the context of 
spoken language, it is usually unnecessary to provide an interpreter for someone 
speaking in the same language as their listener(s), because the meaning of the speech 
will immediately be understood. That thoughts might need interpretation therefore 
suggests that their real meaning may not readily be understood, either by the thinker 
of the thoughts, or by those to whom these thoughts are relayed by means of speech 
or writing. 
 
It might be supposed that the thinker herself must always understand the meaning of 
what she has thought and that interpretation will only be needed (if at all) when she 
wishes to describe and explain her thoughts to another person. However, it has long 
been recognised that this is not so. Thoughts in dreams have been recognised as a 
subject for interpretation since ancient times (including some notable biblical 
examples, such as the dreams of Joseph in the Genesis narratives) for the obvious 
reason that their meaning is not always clear to the person who has had the dream. 
Most people recognise, at least in the context of complex, important or emotionally 
charged decisions, such as vocation or marriage that they do not always know 
themselves what they really want. Only after careful thought and discussion are they 
able to interpret their own thoughts and feelings in such a way as to be able to make 
a decision. This is not (necessarily) a question of finding out more facts, or 
understanding new arguments for or against a particular course of action. It is, 
rather, a matter of interpreting one’s own thoughts and feelings so as to judge what 
they really mean. Sometimes, having made a decision for a particular course of 
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action, a person realises that she feels disappointed, or guilty, or anxious. Only 
having made the decision does she realise what she really wanted or (to put it 
another way) what her own thoughts and feelings really meant. And many other 
examples could be added, such as feelings of anxiety or sadness that arise for no 
reason of which we are consciously aware, slips of the tongue that betray things that 
we did not consciously intend to mean or say, artistic inspirations which surprise 
even the artists who have them, the psychogenic causation of physical symptoms, 
and the experimental evidence for subliminal perception, amongst others.34 
 
If interpreting our own thoughts is not straightforward, then interpreting other 
people’s thoughts must assume another order of difficulty altogether, for we can 
never have as full access to another person’s thoughts as we may have to our own. 
However, this does not prevent human beings from interpreting one another’s 
thoughts as a frequent occurrence in daily life. In political debate, or in personal 
disputes, we readily accuse the other person (but less readily accuse ourselves) of 
untoward motives, such as self interest or prejudice. Or, perhaps, when someone is 
choosing their words carefully, so as not to cause offence, we say “Yes…. But what 
you really mean is….” and then disclose our understanding of what we think they 
really meant. 
 
Of course, awareness of all of this has become commonplace since the advent of 
Freudian psychoanalysis and the assimilation of concepts of the unconscious into 
everyday life and conversation. Psychotherapy, as a means of interpreting thoughts 
with a view to bringing about mental or behavioural change, has become an accepted 
treatment in mental healthcare and is even pursued by some simply for the purpose 
of deepening self awareness. The Evagrian corpus is but one reminder from the 
ancient world that suspicions about the need to interpret the real meaning of our own 
and other people’s thoughts have a much longer history than all of this. But to what 
extent is interpretation of thoughts a valid enterprise? 
 
One possible approach to answering this question derives from the work of Paul 
Ricoeur (b.1913). Ricoeur has suggested that, although the paradigm for 
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hermeneutics has been the interpretation of written texts, human actions and even 
the human psyche, may be considered as a kind of text that is amenable to 
interpretation.35 For Ricoeur, the criteria for textuality comprise:36 
1. The realisation of language as discourse 
2. The realisation of discourse as a structured work 
3. The relation of speaking to writing in discourse 
4. Discourse as “projection of a world” 
5. Discourse as the mediation of self-understanding 
 
Whilst thoughts may readily be understood to employ language in support of a kind 
of structured discourse which projects an account of its world (the world of 
thoughts) as a way of mediating self-understanding, there is an obvious problem in 
that thoughts are not normally written down as a text. They are transient and 
ephemeral and, even if spoken, have a very different relationship to the spoken word 
than does the written word. However, Ricoeur circumvents this problem by drawing 
attention to what he refers to as the criteria for “facts” in psychoanalysis. These 
criteria are:37 
1. Only that part of the experience that is capable of being spoken is brought 
into the field of treatment/investigation 
2. The analytic situation singles out from that which is capable of being spoken 
only that which is actually said to another person 
3. The analytic situation is concerned with psychical reality, not material 
reality. One of the important features of psychical reality is the 
substitutability of objects (eg the transferential object for the parental object, 
or the symbol in a dream for the reality in daily life) 
4. The analytic situation is selective from the entire experience of the subject so 
as to include only that which may be incorporated into a story or narrative. 
Thus, case histories are the “primary texts” of psychoanalysis 
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 Ricoeur, 1981, pp.197-221, 247-273 
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 Ibid., pp.131-144 
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 Ibid., pp.247-254 
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Ricoeur further draws attention to the way in which psychoanalysis is at once a 
method for the investigation of mental processes, a method of treatment for mental 
disorder, and a body of theoretical knowledge. It is the first of these, that is the 
investigatory procedure, which is obviously akin to hermeneutics. However, Ricoeur 
sees a tension between this and the therapeutic procedure such that, at one and the 
same time, it is necessary for the psyche to be metaphorically understood “both as a 
text to be interpreted and as a system of forces to be manipulated”.38 Ricoeur does 
not see Freud’s theoretical understanding as having adequately accommodated these 
different understandings, even though he does accept the status of psychoanalysis as 
one of the social sciences, and even though he does see the Freudian system as being 
an indispensible starting point for future work. However, more importantly, he 
argues that psychoanalysis cannot simply be a hermeneutical procedure, for it must 
always incorporate alongside the process of self-interpretation those “economic” 
procedures which aim to change the system that is being interpreted. 
 
Doubtless there are other hermeneutical approaches which could be taken to 
exploring the basis for attempting to construct a means of interpreting thoughts. 
However, the work of Ricoeur draws attention to a number of important 
considerations relevant to the present purpose: 
1. The process of interpreting thoughts might in theory be accomplished for its 
own sake alone, but in practice is inevitably linked to a therapeutic, or 
transformative, element. The challenge for any theoretical model is to 
adequately incorporate both of these processes. 
2. The use of metaphor to enable both the processes of interpretation and 
transformation of the psyche would seem to be important, if not inevitable. 
3. Whilst the psyche might be considered a kind of “text”, our access to its 
contents is humanly limited in various significant ways. In respect of other 
people most importantly by what they tell us and in respect of ourselves by 
what we are willing and able to bring to the process of reflection and 
interpretation. 
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3. The Interpretation of Thoughts in the Philokalia 
 
Evagrios does not merely classify and describe thoughts, he is committed to the 
interpretation of thoughts. This hermeneutic process is extremely complicated, for it 
is not always clear exactly what is being interpreted. Is Evagrios interpreting his own 
experience? For example, is he retrospectively interpreting his own flight from 
Constantinople and the sexual feelings that he encountered in the affair that he 
escaped from there? Is he interpreting the teaching and experience handed down to 
him by Makarios in the Egyptian desert, or is he interpreting the experiences of the 
monks who sought his own counsel and instruction there? Is he interpreting thoughts 
in the light of scripture and Christian tradition, or are scripture and tradition being 
interpreted in the light of his own thoughts? Probably all of these hermeneutical 
processes are at play, and it is not supposed that it will be possible to disentangle all 
of them here. Usually he reflects upon them only in general terms and he does not 
separate questions of investigation, from those of therapy and theory. A few general 
observations may, however, be made about the ways in which Evagrios, and 
subsequently other authors of the Philokalia, appear to go about the interpretation of 
thoughts: 
1. The facility with which authors of the Philokalia move between talking of 
thoughts, passions, vices and demons suggests an ambiguous, 
unsystematised, but sophisticated, recognition of the complexity of the 
hermeneutic task that is being undertaken. Each of the terms, passion, vice 
and demon, is itself an interpretation of thoughts. For example, when the 
term “demon” is employed, it implies external agency. In this case, the 
response to such thoughts (although not the origin of them) is therefore the 
responsibility of the subject concerned. 
2. Discourse in the Philokalia about thoughts, and their interpretation, employs 
heavily metaphorical language. This is an interesting and significant parallel 
to Ricoeur’s observations concerning the use of metaphor in psychoanalytic 
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language. In the introduction, having encountered the metaphor of thoughts 
as sheep, or else as rocks scattered on a shore line, the question arose as to 
whether such metaphors assist discourse on the subject at hand. It would 
appear that Ricoeur would argue that they do and, indeed, that in such an 
area of discourse as this their use may even be inevitable. 
3. We have already seen that the interpretative processes employed in the 
Philokalia were informed initially both by Classical (especially Stoic) 
philosophy, and also by the traditions of the Desert Fathers and the early 
Church. The former is evident primarily in the extent to which beliefs are 
intrinsically implicated in the passions, and the latter is evident, for example, 
in the way in which they are interpreted as being concerned with a struggle 
with temptation and with demons. Subsequently, the early Patristic texts have 
themselves become sources of authority which have informed the on-going 
interpretative process. In particular, the influence of Evagrios on other 
authors of the Philokalia (whether directly or indirectly) has been enduring. 
4. The authors of the Philokalia recognise an inner tension concerned with 
thoughts which are both hostile but pleasurable. This is interpreted as being 
contrary to nature, since it is presumed that the natural order, in accordance 
with Divine purpose, should be that hostile thoughts would not be 
pleasurable. That they are pleasurable is attributed ultimately to the 
sinfulness of human beings. An implicit theology of creation and the fall is 
therefore evident. In passing, it might be observed that a not dissimilar 
theology, but differently emphasised, might lead many Christians today to 
affirm the natural goodness of (for example) sexual desire. However, the 
fundamental problem of how to respond to such thoughts and the validity of 
the method provided by the Philokalia for dealing with them, arguably 
remain the same. 
5. The authors of the Philokalia recognise a tension between the inwardness of 
thoughts and their apparent origin in the outer world. On the one hand, the 
passions arise in response to a perception (or memory of a perception) of an 
object located in the external world. Or, elsewhere, they arise as the result of 
the assault of demons upon the soul. On the other hand, the pathology 
underlying the passions is understood as being located within the soul, or 
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even as being an impulse of the soul. Passions are thus both impulses to 
which the soul is passively subjected from without, and also internal matters 
of choice insofar as they invite varying response (according to, or contrary 
to, nature). 
6. The Philokalia incorporates a rich, albeit poorly systematised, body of 
theoretical knowledge concerning the proper interpretation and therapy of 
thoughts. For example, as discussed in Chapter 3, there are a series of 
analyses of the thought processes by which temptation is experienced and by 
which passions are generated. 
7. The interpretation of thoughts requires both spiritual instruction and 
engagement with remedial measures which include ascetic discipline, 
watchfulness, psalmody and prayer. 
8. The authors of the Philokalia understand thoughts as being significant by 
virtue of the way in which they influence relationships between human 
beings and, more importantly, between human beings and God in prayer. 
However, prayer has not merely been the end-point. Rather, the interpretative 
process is an aspect of prayer, and is undertaken in a context of prayer, as are 
the remedies to be applied. Thoughts – all thoughts – therefore become 
understood in the context of the apostolic injunction to continual prayer.39 
 
To return for a moment to Ricoeur’s model of psychoanalysis as being at once an 
investigatory process, a therapeutic process and a body of theory, we may see that 
the above eight observations on the interpretation of thoughts in the Philokalia 
reflect this same interplay. The first five are all concerned with the investigatory 
process. Points 7 & 8 are primarily concerned with the therapeutic process. Points 2 
to 6 are concerned with the Philokalia as a body of theoretical knowledge. 
 
We have also seen (in Chapter 3) that metaphor plays an important part in the 
Philokalia, both to enable both the processes of interpretation of thoughts, and also 
to assist in the transformation or therapy of the psyche (as discussed in Chapter 4). 
The diversity and richness of this metaphorical reference enables a dialectical 
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tension to be maintained in various aspects of interpretation, for example as to 
inwardness/outwardness. Whilst the psyche might be considered a kind of “text” in 
psychotherapy, the dominant image in the Philokalia is imposed by the “word” 
(		
). This is both because of the significance of the divine "		
in theological 
contemplation, but also because natural contemplation is concerned with the 		 
of all things. It is the interpretation of these words which leads the psyche ever more 
deeply into prayer. 
 
As in Ricoeur’s understanding of psychoanalysis, access to the contents of the 
psyche in the Philokalia is humanly limited in various significant ways. In 
particular, in the Philokalia, emphasis is placed upon inner watchfulness in respect 
of thoughts and on openness and honesty with a spiritual director. Thoughts which 
escape the inner process of watchfulness cannot be interpreted and subjected to 
rebuttal or other specific remedies. Only those thoughts which are disclosed in 
speech to a spiritual director are open to the process of reflection and interpretation 
with the benefit of their greater objectivity and wisdom. 
 
What is the meaning of thoughts, as understood by Evagrios and by the other authors 
of the Philokalia? Clearly, different meanings are attributable to different thoughts, 
but different meanings may also be ascribed to the same thought. Thus, a thought of 
offering hospitality may be an indication of vainglory or of desire to serve God and 
others.40 Similarly, if evil thoughts are easily overcome, this may either be because 
of recognition of the impossibility of attaining their object, or else because of 
apatheia.41 In general terms then, where discrimination is exercised, thoughts may 
provide an indication of spiritual progress. Specifically, thoughts are understood to 
arise from different sources, according to which a different human response is 
required. Evagrios suggests that thoughts may have angelic, human or demonic 
origin, and that with experience these can be distinguished.42 The meaning of 
thoughts is thus extended beyond the boundaries of inwardness to a cosmic realm in 
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which spiritual powers are engaged. And through all of this is extended the 
possibility of eventual union with God through deification.43 
 
 
4. The Interpretation of Thoughts in Psychotherapy 
 
What might a contemporary psychological listing of “thoughts” look like? Just as 
Evagrios’ list was selective, based upon his particular reasons for interest in the 
inner life, so the precise nature of any contemporary categorisation or lexicon of 
thoughts would doubtless depend upon the purpose for which it was being compiled. 
It is likely that for most psychological or therapeutic purposes the list would look 
very different than Evagrios’ although, as seen in Chapter 6, this is not to say that 
direct applications of the Evagrian list are not possible. 
Psychiatrists usually classify thought disorder according to stream, possession, form 
and content.44 Disorders of emotion are generally classified separately, although this 
is not to suggest that the two are unrelated. The purpose of this is to identify signs of 
mental disorder which might enable a diagnosis to be made – for example of an 
underlying depressive illness. On this basis, Evagrios’ list would comprise largely 
examples of content of thought, or of emotional reaction, and mostly non-
pathological ones at that. Thoughts of sadness, for example, might be considered 
completely appropriate if concerned with living in the Egyptian desert without 
adequate shelter, food or clothing, but would be considered pathological (delusional) 
if concerned with demonstrably false beliefs about personal guilt or worthlessness. 
This model therefore almost inverts the Evagrian system. The kind of sadness (or 
anger, lust, etc) against which Evagrios warns is normalised and some concerns 
which Evagrios might have considered healthy (albeit, perhaps, not in delusional 
intensity) are pathologised. 
 
                                                 
43
 It is recognised that Evagrios did not ascribe to an understanding of deification that would later be 
considered orthodox. His heavily gnostic approach to contemplation of God leading to eventual 
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In contrast to psychiatrists, cognitive therapists seek to identify automatic thoughts, 
cognitive distortions (or thinking errors), and the maladaptive cognitive schemata 
that underlie these automatic and erroneous thoughts.45 Here, the psychopathology is 
understood as being located in the thoughts themselves – with cognitive therapy 
offering a variety of strategies for modifying, or treating, such thoughts. On this 
basis, thoughts of sadness at the loss of a job would usually be considered normal, 
whereas thoughts that this job loss will inevitably now make one unlovable as a 
husband or wife would normally be considered erroneous (and therefore an 
appropriate target for therapy). It is unlikely that any contemporary cognitive 
therapist would consider Evagrios’ list a satisfactory catalogue of either automatic or 
erroneous thoughts. Rather, it is likely that thoughts such as those associated with 
sexual attraction, anger or sadness would be normalised, unless excessive, intrusive, 
or maladaptive in some way. However, in some ways, Evagrios proves to be a very 
perceptive cognitive therapist. Thus, for example, he recognises that underneath the 
thoughts that he calls “avarice”, there are valuations (which the cognitive therapist 
might call schemata) concerned with the relative importance of money, goods and 
material things as compared with prayer, knowledge and heavenly reward.46 
 
The kind of list of thoughts that a dynamic psychotherapist might wish to compile 
would undoubtedly depend specifically upon the particular school of dynamic 
psychotherapy that they belong to. However, amongst other thoughts, those 
indicative of unconscious processes, emotional pain, ego defence mechanisms and 
motivational drives might be considered important.47 In some ways this list has a 
close resonance with some of Evagrios’ descriptions of the eight thoughts. For 
example, Evagrios notes the way in which unconscious material emerges in dreams 
and fantasy,48 the dangers associated with the pain of resentful or troubled 
thoughts,49 and the power that lies behind sexual drives.50 However, it is also a very 
different kind of list insofar as it is informed by a very different model of human 
well-being and very different normative values. Evagrios is concerned with the 
potential for sexual drives to impede prayer and prevent a deepening relationship 
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with God. The dynamic therapist is aware of the way in which sexual drives, 
especially where they are not consciously acknowledged, may cause distress and 
emotional pain. 
 
The interpretation of thoughts in contemporary psychiatry, psychology and 
psychotherapy is likely to take place in one of three ways. Firstly (as in psychiatry) 
thoughts might be understood as signs or symptoms of pathology. Secondly (as in 
cognitive therapy) they might be understood as themselves representing a kind of 
pathology. Or, thirdly (as in dynamic psychotherapies), they might be understood as 
both causes and signs of psychopathology. In each case, the significance of the 
interpretation will primarily be in terms of the possibility that it provides for 
directing an intervention directed towards the relief of distress. However, it may also 
have the benefit of increasing self-understanding. 
 
Traditionally, organic psychiatry and behaviour therapy have not acknowledged the 
importance of meaning. According to the deterministic rationale underlying these 
disciplines, meaning does not have causal power. However, as cognitive therapy 
began to address the treatment of conditions such as depression and anxiety, a 
cognitive understanding of the importance of meaning began to gain acceptance. In 
particular, misinterpretation of meaning has been seen as important, as in 
circumstances where physical symptoms of anxiety are interpreted as indicating 
onset of serious physical illness, or where negative interpersonal cues are interpreted 
as indicating rejection. Although this model is clearly far removed from the 
meanings identified in relation to thoughts by authors of the Philokalia, yet the 
Evagrian instruction not to misinterpret the origins of thoughts does suggest a 
parallel of a certain kind. 
 
The meanings that emerge from dynamic psychotherapy include feelings and 
impulses which may be excluded from consciousness due to their social and/or 
personal unacceptability.51 Although the ultimate spiritual or theological meaning 
that is understood by the authors of the Philokalia is clearly different to this, the 
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Evagrian awareness that apparently good motives may hide less respectable ones is 
clearly of a very similar kind. 
 
Overall, then, Evagrios’ process of identifying problematic thoughts might be 
considered not dissimilar to that of the modern day psychiatrist or therapist, except 
that it is orientated towards the radically different goal of identifying potential 
problems with prayer, rather than towards making a psychiatric diagnosis or 
identifying thoughts which might cause distress. Whereas the psychiatrist or 
psychotherapist maintains a non-judgmental stance, Evagrios easily lapses from talk 
of thoughts into talk about vices. Where necessary, however, Evagrios’ recognises 
that thoughts are influenced by drives, judgments and values in a complex and not 
always consciously determined fashion. To this extent, he proves to be a perceptive 
psychotherapist, as well as a devoted theologian. 
 
 
5. On Prayer 
 
The importance of thoughts in the Philokalia is attributable to their relationship with 
prayer. They are impediments to prayer, but they are also a means of prayer. Since 
prayer, especially contemplative prayer, is the means of attaining union with God, or 
divinisation, and as this is of ultimate importance in the Christian life, an 
understanding of thoughts is crucial to the central discourses of the Philokalia. 
 
Firstly, and at the simplest level, thoughts are potential distractions from prayer.52 
For example, Isaiah the Solitary, in a passage which also draws attention to guarding 
of the heart as a measure which enables prayer, writes: 
Stand guard, then, over your heart and keep a watch on your senses; and if 
the remembrance of God dwells peaceably within you, you will catch the 
thieves when they try to deprive you of it. When a man has an exact 
knowledge about the nature of thoughts, he recognizes those which are about 
to enter and defile him, troubling the intellect with distractions and making it 
                                                 
52
 Passion free conceptual images may also form distractions in prayer (see Philokalia 2, 90, #49) 
307 
 
lazy. Those who recognize these evil thoughts for what they are remain 
undisturbed and continue in prayer to God.53 
 
Gregory of Sinai provides a vivid description of the mind that is distracted from 
stillness (hesychia): 
Unless your life and actions are accompanied by a sense of inner grief you 
cannot endure the incandescence of stillness. If with this sense of grief you 
meditate - before they come to pass - on the many terrors that await us prior 
to and after death you will achieve both patience and humility, the twin 
foundations of stillness. Without them your efforts to attain stillness will 
always be accompanied by apathy and self-conceit. From these will arise a 
host of distractions and day-dreams, all inducing sluggishness. In their wake 
comes dissipation, daughter of indolence, making the body sluggish and 
slack and the intellect benighted and callous. Then Jesus is hidden, concealed 
by the throng of thoughts and images that crowd the mind (cf. John 5:13).54 
 
Thoughts, then, can provide a barrier to prayer – they immobilise, distract, hide, 
crowd out – albeit they also provide a means55 of achieving stillness (and thus 
prayer). 
 
Secondly, as discussed in Chapters 2 to 4, thoughts are intimately related to the 
passions. Not that all thoughts are passions, but thoughts that are passionate pose an 
especial problem to prayer. Ilias the Presbyter contrasts three states of prayer – one 
in which the passions are unrestrained, one in which they are restrained, and 
passionless prayer: 
Those who indulge their passions, being materially-minded, are distracted 
during prayer by their thoughts as by frogs. Those who restrain their passions 
are gladdened during prayer by the changing forms of contemplation, which 
are like nightingales moving from one branch to another. But in the 
dispassionate there is silence and great quiescence of both thought and 
intellection during prayer.56 
 
Like Evagrios, Maximos understands the passions as a fundamental barrier to 
contemplative prayer: 
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Only a soul which has been delivered from the passions can without error 
contemplate created beings. Because its virtue is perfect, and because its 
knowledge is spiritual and free from materiality, such a soul is called 
‘Jerusalem’. This state is attained through exclusion not only of the passions 
but also of sensible images.57 
 
According to Maximos, the soul that is not dispassionate, and which yet attempts to 
engage in contemplative prayer, is in danger of making the passions worse, and thus 
simply regressing rather than advancing in prayer:  
Until you have been completely purified from the passions you should not 
engage in natural contemplation through the images of sensible things; for 
until then such images are able to mould your intellect so that it conforms to 
passion. An intellect which, fed by the senses, dwells in imagination on the 
visible aspects of sensible things becomes the creator of impure passions, for 
it is not able to advance through contemplation to those intelligible realities 
cognate with it.58 
 
Thoughts, then, may be a hindrance in prayer. However, as we have also already 
seen (in Chapter 4) the remedies for the passions employ a variety of strategies 
designed to identify the origins of thoughts and to conform thoughts to the process 
of prayer. These include behavioural measures (of ascetic discipline), cognitive 
measures (as in watchfulness), scripture (eg in psalmody), and prayer itself (eg the 
Jesus Prayer). Each of these remedies for the passions, in its own way, involves 
thoughts. Thoughts are thus a part of the solution, as well as the problem, for the 
passion bound human being who is separated from God. To take these remedies in 
turn: 
1. The emphasis on ascetic discipline, at least in places, appears to operate on 
thoughts on a very behavioural basis. Thus, for example, avoiding women is 
likely to avoid provocation by thoughts of fornication, and will avoid laying 
down further memories of women which might in their turn present further 
such thoughts.59 Evagrios, Maximos and others also appear to have believed 
that diet exerted some kind of physical influence upon thoughts – such that a 
frugal diet would render one less subject to thoughts of fornication.60 
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2. The process of watchfulness is concerned with cognitive vigilance, in order 
that evil thoughts may be rebutted, and helpful thoughts (eg meditation on 
death, or the words of the Jesus Prayer) invoked. 
3. The use of scripture, especially in psalmody, clearly provides a means of 
focussing on good thoughts and thus opening the mind to a good influence. 
To some extent, it might be seen as the reverse of the effect of evil thoughts 
which provide a distraction in prayer. Here, the intention is to distract the 
mind from evil thoughts, so as to engage in prayer. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, Evagrios’ understanding of psalmody is more sophisticated that 
this alone might suggest. Psalmody is understood as preparing the whole 
person for prayer, exerting a calming effect upon the body and soul, 
focussing the mind upon God, imprinting the meaning of the psalm upon the 
mind, and refuting evil thoughts. 
4. Prayer itself might be understood as a bringing of thoughts to the purpose of 
communion with God (cf Evagrios),61 as a bringing of thoughts to the 
purpose of petitioning God for his blessing (cf Maximos),62 or simply of a 
purification of thoughts (cf Gregory Palamas).63 
 
However, there is also a strong theme in the Philokalia of the need to eventually 
eliminate thoughts altogether. How can this be possible? Nikiphoros suggests 
banishing thoughts from the heart by replacing them with the Jesus Prayer, which 
suggests that a distinction may be made between “thoughts” of the Jesus Prayer and 
“thoughts” of other kinds.64 Maximos writes that “contemplation is illumined by 
divine conceptual images”,65 again suggesting that thoughts (here conceptual 
images, 	) can be a part of prayer, whereas Gregory of Sinai speaks of the 
need for hesychasts to eschew “all conceptual images”.66 Is the intention, then, to 
banish thoughts completely, or only to banish thoughts of a certain kind? 
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Ultimately, “pure prayer” or contemplative prayer (especially of the kind that 
Evagrios would refer to as theological contemplation) is wordless and imageless. 
Theophanis, for example, describes pure prayer as being associated with “peace 
from thoughts of every kind”,67 Peter of Damaskos describes spiritual prayer as 
being “offered by the intellect and free from all thoughts”68 and pure prayer as being 
“beyond all conceptual thought”.69 Gregory of Sinai understands stillness (hesychia) 
as freedom from all thoughts – even those which are divine.70 
However, in the final chapters of Kephalaia Gnostica, where contemplative prayer is 
more generally associated with knowledge than thoughts, Evagrios writes: 
It is said that the nous sees things that it knows and that it does not see things 
that it does not know; and because of this it is not all thoughts that the 
knowledge of God forbids it, but those which assail it from thumos and 
epithumia and those which are against nature71 
 
This would suggest that “natural thoughts” will endure, whereas those contrary to 
nature will be eliminated by those who reach the more advanced stages of 
contemplative prayer. On the other hand, we have already seen (in Chapter 5) that 
Maximos understands contemplation as leading to an end to natural thoughts 
immediately prior to deification. Similarly, Ilias the Presbyter writes of natural 
thoughts being at rest in the state of contemplative prayer associated with vision of 
the Divine light: 
He who is distracted during prayer stands outside the first veil. He who 
undistractedly offers the single-phrased Jesus Prayer is within the veil. But 
he alone has glimpsed the holy of holies who, with his natural thoughts at 
rest, contemplates that which transcends every intellect, and... has in this way 
been granted to some extent a vision of the divine light...72  
 
It may be that there are subtle differences in the thinking of Evagrios, Maximos and 
Ilias as to whether “natural thoughts” continue in contemplative prayer. Or, it may 
be that there is a distinction to be made between states of contemplative prayer and 
other states of mind (non-contemplative prayer, or not being at prayer) amongst 
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those of an advanced spiritual state. Perhaps, amongst such people, the texts of 
Evagrios and Ilias, if not also of Maximos, may be understood as suggesting that 
only natural thoughts remain and that even these are laid aside (or are “at rest”) 
during contemplative prayer.73 
 
Regardless of any such distinctions that may be made, the general trend towards a 
more apophatic, imageless and wordless, approach to contemplative prayer would 
seem most in keeping with the accounts of contemplative prayer and divinisation 
generally provided in the Philokalia. As was seen in Chapter 5, this imageless and 
wordless state of prayer is referred to in various places in terms of light, or 
illumination of the intellect. According to Konstantinovsky, Evagrios was the first 
Christian writer, apart from Luke’s account of the conversion of Saul, to provide an 
account of theophanic visions of light.74 Konstantinovksy argues that Evagrios 
understood these visions as entirely immaterial, and therefore graspable only by the 
immaterial intellect, or nous, and even then only by grace.75 Other contributors to the 
Philokalia, as we have seen, have taken up the same theme in various ways in an 
attempt to convey an account of a form of prayer, and vision of the Divine essence, 
which is essentially beyond ordinary (physical) sense experience, and also beyond 
words and thoughts.  
 
A related theme, which has been important in the Christian tradition generally, but 
which receives relatively little attention in the Philokalia, is that of the Divine 
essence as darkness. Darkness mysticism is generally understood as originating with 
Gregory of Nyssa, who brought together Platonic imagery with the Exodus account 
of the encounter of Moses with God on Mount Sinai.76 Gregory proved to be a 
significant influence on Pseudo-Denys the Areopagite,77 who in turn influenced 
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Maximos the Confessor.78 In essence, the argument is that in Plato’s allegory of the 
cave, and also in the Exodus narrative, there is an ascent towards a light which 
proves to be so bright as to be perceived as darkness. This darkness is a “luminous 
darkness”, for it is caused not by lack of light but by an overwhelming excess of 
light. Within this darkness, the darkness of God, all that is known becomes 
insignificant in the context of the knowledge of God, who is far greater than all that 
can humanly be known. It is therefore a darkness of unknowing. 
Although Divine light receives much more attention, the theme of Divine darkness is 
not completely absent from the Philokalia. In the Theoretikon (attributed to 
Theodoros) Adam is said to have been judged unworthy by God “of what he had 
rejected – the contemplation of God and of created beings” and so God makes 
“darkness His secret place”.79 Theognostos similarly makes reference to darkness as 
the “secret place” of God.80 Maximos, making allegorical reference to the Exodus 
account of Moses’ encounter with God on Mount Sinai, understands the darkness as 
the “immaterial realm of spiritual knowledge”.81 Gregory of Sinai refers to the “the 
divine darkness of theological wisdom”.82 However, it is Nikitas Stithatos who gives 
most attention to this theme. 
In a series of references,83 all explicitly or implicitly in the context of a discussion of 
contemplative prayer, he speaks of the “divine darkness of theology” or the 
“darkness of mystical theology”. This darkness theology appears to be understood 
by Stithatos as a state conferred by God on those who have achieved dispassion and 
have engaged in natural contemplation. It is a place of revelation of divine 
knowledge, a place of closeness to God or union with God or of resting with God, a 
place of joy or ecstasy, and a place of unspeakable silence. It is a place of 
contemplation of God:  
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surpassing its own limitations, rebelling against the fetters of the senses and 
transcending all creatureliness, [the soul] penetrates the divine darkness of 
theology in unutterable silence and - to the degree that grace permits - it 
perceives in the intellective light of inexpressible wisdom the beauty of Him 
who truly is. Reverentially entering ever more deeply into intellective 
contemplation of that beauty, it savours, in loving awe, the fruits of 
immortality - the visionary intellections of the Divine. Never withdrawing 
from these back into itself, it is able to express perfectly their magnificence 
and glory. Activated, as it were, in a strange way by the Spirit, it experiences 
this admirable passion in unspeakable joy and silence; yet how it is activated, 
or what it is that impels it, and is seen by it, and secretly communicates to it 
unutterable mysteries, it cannot explain.84 
Although Maximos makes only one reference to the divine darkness, he makes a 
series of reference to “unknowing” as the supreme way of knowing God. 85 
Maximos, Thalassios and Gregory Palamas also make explicit reference to apophatic 
theology,86 and Theoliptos and Gregory of Sinai are discernibly apophatic in their 
approach.87 The unknowability of God’s essence was a central point of contention in 
the 14th Century hesychast controversy, in which Gregory Palamas played such a 
significant part, and against which a defence is included as one of the texts of the 
Philokalia.88 It is therefore reasonable to say that there is a strong apophatic element 
to the Philokalia. This is illustrated well in a passage from Maximos: 
If you theologize in an affirmative or cataphatic manner, starting from 
positive statements about God, you make the Logos flesh, for you have no 
other means of knowing God as cause except from what is visible and 
tangible. If you theologize in a negative or apophatic manner, through the 
stripping away of positive attributes, you make the Logos spirit or God as He 
was in His principial state with God: starting from absolutely none of the 
things that can be known, you come in an admirable way to know Him who 
transcends unknowing.89 
In The Darkness of God, Denys Turner90 argues that, originating in the work of 
Pseudo-Denys the Areopagite, there is a negating of the negation that is built into 
apophatic theology in the western tradition. For example, he points out that in 
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Chapter 68 of the Cloud of Unknowing91 there is a warning against inwardness 
language such that the distinction between inner and outer is subverted. This means 
that distinctions between inner and outer are a feature of an outer view on things. 
True inwardness, of an apophatic kind, loses any sense of such distinctions. This, he 
argues, is a feature of negation within this tradition, that it first creates a dialectic 
between what can be said and what cannot be said, or known and unknown, and then 
negates its own negation so as to remove the very difference between them. 
Unfortunately, apart from his consideration of the work of Pseudo-Denys the 
Areopagite, Turner does not consider examples from the eastern tradition. However, 
it has to be said that it is difficult to find this kind of dynamic within the texts of the 
Philokalia. It might be argued that the reference of Maximos (above) to “Him who 
transcends unknowing” might be understood as a reference of this kind, but it is not 
elaborated upon. Similarly, the above quotation from Nikitas Stithatos refers both to 
the “divine darkness” and to the “intellective light” of God, thus setting up the kind 
of dialectic that Turner refers to, but still it lacks the negation of this dialectic. And 
again, Gregory Palamas comes close to the same kind of thing in Topics,92 in a 
passage where he is arguing that God’s attributes are to be distinguished from his 
essence. Here he argues that neither all of the things that can be said of God 
apophatically, nor all of the things that can be said cataphatically, can be said to 
disclose God’s essence. Thus, a kind of dialectic between apophatic and cataphatic is 
established, although it is here more a categorisation of things that can be said 
(negatively and positively) about the attributes of God than it is a dialectic as such. 
But still the negation of the dialectic is either only very weakly implicit or else 
completely absent. In fact, Gregory goes on to try to resolve the dialectic, rather than 
to negate it, and to “embrace both modes of theology” (ie cataphatic and apophatic) 
on the grounds that neither excludes the other.93 
If I am correct that the negation of the negation (what Turner refers to as the “second 
level” of negativity of the apophatic dialectic)94 is missing in the Philokalia, it might 
                                                 
91
 Wolters, 1978, pp.142-143, Turner, 1999, pp.186-210 
92
 Philokalia 4, 402, #118 
93
 Philokalia 4, 404, #123. Turner explicitly denies that the negation of the negation is any kind of 
synthesis of this kind. It is, rather, he says: “the collapse of our affirmation and denials into disorder” 
(Turner, 1999, p.22). 
94
 Ibid., p.252 
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still be argued that this is simply evidence of the different historical course that 
eastern and western apophatic theologies have taken. In other words, it might be of 
little practical importance. However, it is this second level of apophaticism that 
Turner argues has a capacity to transform our understanding of the goal of Christian 
spirituality – that of union with God. Specifically, it challenges the dialectic between 
union with God and the distinctiveness of human identity from God, between inner 
and outer worlds. Although in the case of Meister Eckhart this process has been 
perceived to progress beyond the bounds of doctrinal orthodoxy, it more positively 
appears to provide a check against a self-indulgent and excessively introverted focus 
on relationship with God. Turner also argues that it is this second level of negativity 
that subverts any tendency towards experientialism – a seeking of negative spiritual 
experiences for their own sake.95 If this second level of negativity is absent from the 
Philokalia, then what impact does this have upon its understanding of theosis, and 
what checks does it have against experientialism? 
Significantly, Turner draws attention to the way in which the darkness metaphor 
works at both levels of negativity: 
the imagery of ‘divine darkness’ is employed both to describe the product of 
ascending scales of affirmations and denials as the soul, like Moses, climbs 
the mountain to God; and also to describe the excessus by which the soul 
transcends and surpasses the contradiction between affirmation and denial, 
and so transcends the distinction between ‘similarity and difference’ itself, 
passing beyond all language into oneness with God.96 
 
However, as we have seen, the darkness metaphor is used less frequently in the 
Philokalia than the light metaphor, and it is the latter – light not darkness – which is 
used to describe the final process of theosis. This difference is reflected in the focus 
of the hesychasts on the transfiguration in light of Christ on Mount Tabor as the 
paradigm for their theology, rather than the focus of Pseudo-Denys on the encounter 
of Moses with God in Darkness on Mount Sinai. However, it clearly has its origins 
long before the 14th Century, being found in early form in the light visions of 
Evagrios and subsequently in various forms by numerous authors of the Philokalia.97 
                                                 
95
 Ibid., p.259 
96
 Ibid., p.253 
97
 Including Diadochos, John of Karpathos, Maximos, the author of the Discourse on Abba Philimon, 
Thalassios, Ilias the Presbyter, Nikitas Stithatos, Gregory of Sinai, and Gregory Palamas: see Chapter 
5. 
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This suggests that we might expect that, if there is one, the second level of negation 
in the Philokalia (if not also the first level) or its equivalent, will be associated with 
metaphors of light rather than darkness. Is there any evidence that this is in fact the 
case? 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5,98 the Divine light associated with theosis is understood in 
the Philokalia as arising in the context of contemplative prayer in those who have 
achieved apatheia. Apatheia, which might be considered here as a renunciation of 
the passions associated with human experience, is the result of a process of ascetic 
discipline and prayer which has challenged at root the tendency towards attachment 
to things or experiences. Because contemplation of God is generally seen as 
following experience of natural contemplation, when it is eventually achieved 
boundaries between things in the “outer” world – creation and God – are already 
blurred, for God is found in all things. Furthermore, theosis is understood as the fruit 
of an ascetic life and a process of self emptying modelled on the kenosis of Christ. 
The light metaphor in the Philokalia is therefore embedded in a process – we might 
even wish to call it a psychotherapeutic process – which fundamentally challenges 
questions of relationship between inner and outer, self and other. 
 
Various authors of the Philokalia take care to distinguish the divine light associated 
with theosis from sensory perceptual experience. Although in some way it appears to 
be a perceptual “experience” of the intellect, it is clearly not a sensory experience in 
the usual sense. Evagrios warns against pride and the “deceit of demons”, which 
might be associated with false experiences of this light. Diadochos, although perhaps 
atypical in seeing experiences of light as occurring at an early stage of spiritual 
progress, even expects that genuine experiences may be followed by a sense of the 
absence of God which will prevent such pride. 
 
In those who perceive the divine light, the boundaries between the individual human 
being and God, between inner and outer worlds, are blurred. Nikitas Stithatos 
suggests that the pure intellect assents only to divine thoughts and writes of being 
                                                 
98
 For source references to the assertions in this paragraph and the next two paragraphs, and for 
further detail, see Chapter 5. 
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“united and interfused with the primordial light”.99 Gregory of Sinai speaks of the 
light drawing the soul towards an ineffable spiritual union with God100 and Gregory 
Palamas of a state in which “both intellect and God work together”.101 
 
In none of this are second order negations of the kind identified by Turner readily 
identifiable. However, the breaking down of barriers between the inner and outer 
worlds, the blurring of the boundaries between self and God in theosis, and the 
negation of experientialism are all strongly evident. Indeed, the process of theosis 
looks more like a losing of the self in God, a going outwards to God, than it does a 
self indulgent inwardness, and the remedies for the passions described in Chapter 4 
might be considered equally as effective remedies for experientialism. 
 
It is interesting that the 14th Century saw the hesychasts embroiled in controversy in 
the east, and Eckhart accused of heresy in the west. There must be a warning here 
about the dangers that arise when apophatic theology blurs boundaries between inner 
and outer, self and God, to the point where they are too easily misunderstood. 
However, unlike Eckhart, the hesychasts were vindicated and it might be argued that 
Turner’s second level of negation allows a potentially more serious vulnerability to 
doctrinal misunderstanding than does the theology of the hesychasts. 
 
 
6. On Thoughts and Prayer 
If you are a theologian, you will pray truly; and if you pray truly, you will be a 
theologian.102 
 
Is it possible to be a theologian without understanding how to interpret thoughts? 
Evagrios clearly thought not. To “pray truly” requires that prayers be purified of 
thoughts that are not true, and it is not possible to identify which thoughts these are 
without some kind of hermeneutical process by means of which to interpret their 
                                                 
99
 Philokalia 4, 148, #31 
100
 Philokalia 4, 239, #116 
101
 Philokalia 4, 319, #62 
102
 Sinkewicz, 2003, p.199, #60. All translations and quotations from Evagrios in this section are from 
Sinkewicz, 2003, even where the texts are also to be found in the Philokalia, unless otherwise stated. 
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true meaning. Equally, to pray truly requires that a true interpretation of thoughts be 
made, in order that these thoughts may be offered to God in prayer. Eventually, 
however, thoughts in any ordinary human sense become inadequate for prayer, just 
as all human language is inadequate to express the superabundant excess of meaning 
that is God. 
 
The Philokalia demonstrates that thoughts are powerful. They have the capacity to 
enslave and control, to deceive, to blind, to make sick and to kill. But they also have 
the capacity to set free, to empower, to illuminate, to heal and to bring life. Thoughts 
have the power to deny prayer, and to enable prayer, to obscure God and to reveal 
God. 
 
The Philokalia offers a therapeutic programme aimed at finding God in prayer. In 
order to implement this programme, it is necessary to undergo a kind of 
psychotherapy. This psychotherapy of the Philokalia overlaps in places with 
psychological therapies that aim at other kinds of psychological wellbeing, but it is 
distinctive by virtue of its therapeutic focus on wellbeing understood in terms of 
prayer and union with God. Ultimately, this therapy leads to a breakdown in 
boundaries between inwardness and the outer world, between knowledge and 
unknowing, and between God and self. And then it has served its purpose. 
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Chapter 8: Epilogue 
 
Let us pasture our sheep below Mount Sinai, so that the God of our fathers 
may speak to us, too, out of the bush (cf. Exod. 3) and show us the inner 
essence of signs and wonders.1 
 
Being a shepherd, I am told, is not as romantic as it may sound. It is hard work. It 
requires perseverance in all weathers. It requires patience. Similarly, the process of 
“shepherding thoughts” that is described in the Philokalia is not for the faint hearted. 
It requires a self emptying that imitates that of Christ, it requires discipline, it 
requires watchfulness and patience. Above all, it requires perseverance in prayer. 
Just as sheep require pasture and protection every day, so do thoughts. Theognostos 
employs an image of the intellect as a sheep dog that has to keep watch lest the 
“cunning wolves” of the passions ravage the flock.2 This is the kind of task that is 
tiring and relentless. The Philokalia does not offer an easy way into the spiritual life, 
but it is very realistic and very practical in the measures that it prescribes. 
 
Just as the task is demanding, the rewards that the Philokalia offers are great. The 
above quotation from Evagrios associates the successful outcome as being a 
pasturing of sheep below Mount Sinai, the place in which Moses first encountered 
God in the burning bush and later “drew near to the thick darkness where God 
was”.3 The reference to the “inner essence” of signs and wonders provides an 
allusion to the facility of contemplative prayer to penetrate to the inner essences of 
things. Through purification, illumination and perfection of the intellect, the 
Philokalia promises to bring the faithful shepherd of thoughts to the place of theosis, 
to participation in the divinity of Christ. 
 
Sheep have a tendency to go astray. Thoughts may lead us away from God, just as 
they may lead us to God. They can obscure God, just as much as they can be a place 
of divine revelation. The shepherding of thoughts is thus at once a matter of a kind 
of psychotherapy and of prayer. The Philokalia provides a kind of manual for this 
                                                 
1
 Evagrios: Philokalia 1, 48-49, #16 
2
 Philokalia 2, 375, #68 
3
 Exodus 3, and Exodus 20:21, respectively. 
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psychotherapy that leads to, and enables, prayer. Not that this therapy shares in 
common with contemporary psychological therapies many of its underlying 
assumptions, or indeed its intended outcomes. However, one of its fundamental 
premises seems to be that it is not possible to talk about prayer without talking first 
about thoughts, and some of its insights into the world of thoughts are remarkably 
akin to those of the contemporary psychological therapies. It thus brings together the 
domain of spirituality and the sciences concerned with mental well-being in a way 
that is highly pertinent to contemporary concerns about the relationship of 
spirituality to mental and physical health. 
 
The Philokalia challenges us to look afresh at the ways in which we interpret 
thoughts – our own and those of other people. It presents a radical approach to 
psychotherapy which, like psychoanalysis, provides at once an investigative tool, a 
therapeutic method, and a theoretical understanding of the human psyche to inform 
these procedures. Unlike psychoanalysis and other contemporary psychological 
therapies, however, it pursues its method of therapy beyond any pathology that may 
be located within or behind our thoughts to a point where language and words begin 
to fail. It stretches knowing to the point of requiring unknowing, it blurs the 
boundaries between inner and outer worlds, and it enters a world of luminous 
darkness, within which God dwells. 
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Appendix 1.2: Abbreviations of titles employed in 
reference to constituent works of the English translation 
of the Philokalia 
 
Vol1 Pages Author Title Abbreviated Title 
1 22-28 Isaiah the Solitary On guarding the intellect: 27 
Texts 
Guarding the Intellect 
1 31-37 Evagrios the Solitary Outline teaching on asceticism 
and stillness in the solitary life 
Asceticism & Stillness2 
1 38-52 Evagrios the Solitary Texts on discrimination in 
respect of passions and thoughts 
Texts on Discrimination 
1 53-54 Evagrios the Solitary Extracts from the texts on 
watchfulness 
Watchfulness - Extracts 
1 55-71 Evagrios the Solitary On prayer: 153 Texts On Prayer: 153 Texts 
1 73-93 John Cassian On the eight vices Eight Vices 
1 94-108 John Cassian On the Holy Fathers of Sketis 
and on discrimination 
Holy Fathers of Sketis 
1 110-124 Mark the Ascetic On the spiritual law: 200 Texts On the Spiritual Law 
1 125-146 Mark the Ascetic On those who think that they are 
made righteous by works: 226 
Texts 
Righteous by Works 
1 147-160 Mark the Ascetic Letter to Nicolas the Solitary Letter to Nicolas 
1 162-198 Hesychios the Priest On watchfulness and holiness Watchfulness & Holiness 
1 200-250 Neilos the Ascetic Ascetic discourse Ascetic Discourse 
1 253-296 Diadochos of Photiki On spiritual knowledge and 
discrimination: 100 Texts 
On Spiritual Knowledge 
1 298-321 John of Karpathos For the encouragement of the 
monks in India who had written 
to him: 100 Texts 
For the Monks in India 
1 322-326 John of Karpathos Ascetic discourse sent at the 
request of the same monks in 
India 
Ascetic Discourse 
1 329-356 [Antony the Great] On the character of men and on 
the virtuous life: 170 Texts 
On the Character of Men 
2 14-37 Theodoros the Great 
Ascetic 
A century of spiritual texts Spiritual Texts 
2 38-47 [Theodoros the Great 
Ascetic] 
Theoretikon Theoretikon 
2 52-113 St Maximos the 
Confessor 
Four hundred texts on love On Love 
2 52 Maximos the 
Confessor 
Foreward to Elpidios the 
Presbyter 
On Love: Foreword 
                                                 
1
 Volume Number 
2
 The title of this work outside the context of its appearance in the Philokalia is The Foundations of Monastic 
Life: A Presentation of the Practice of Stillness, which will be abbreviated in this dissertation as simply 
Foundations 
 334
Vol1 Pages Author Title Abbreviated Title 
2 53-64 Maximos the 
Confessor 
First Century On Love: C1 
2 65-82 Maximos the 
Confessor 
Second Century On Love: C2 
2 83-99 Maximos the 
Confessor 
Third Century On Love: C3 
2 100-113 Maximos the 
Confessor 
Fourth Century On Love: C4 
2 114-163 Maximos the 
Confessor 
Two hundred texts on theology 
and the incarnate dispensation 
of the Son of God. Written for 
Thalassios 
For Thalassios 
2 114-136 Maximos the 
Confessor 
First Century For Thalassios: C1 
2 137-163 St Maximos the 
Confessor 
Second Century For Thalassios: C2 
2 164-284 Maximos the 
Confessor (actual and 
attributed) 
Various texts on theology, the 
divine economy, and virtue and 
vice 
Various Texts 
2 164-187 Maximos the 
Confessor (actual and 
attributed) 
First Century Various Texts: C1 
2 188-209 Maximos the 
Confessor (actual and 
attributed) 
Second Century Various Texts: C2 
2 210-234 Maximos the 
Confessor (actual and 
attributed) 
Third Century Various Texts: C3 
2 235-260 Maximos the 
Confessor (actual and 
attributed) 
Fourth Century Various Texts: C4 
2 261-284 Maximos the 
Confessor (actual and 
attributed) 
Fifth Century Various Texts: C5 
2 285-305 Maximos the 
Confessor 
On the Lord's Prayer On the Lord's Prayer 
2 307-332 Thalassios the Libyan On love, self-control, and life in 
accordance with the intellect. 
Written for Paul the Presbyter 
For Paul 
2 307-312 Thalassios the Libyan First Century For Paul: C1 
2 313-318 Thalassios the Libyan Second Century For Paul: C2 
2 319-324 Thalassios the Libyan Third Century For Paul: C3 
2 325-332 Thalassios the Libyan Fourth Century For Paul: C4 
2 334-342 [John of Damaskos] On the virtues and the vices On Virtues & Vices 
2 344-357 Anonymous A discourse on Abba Philimon Abba Philimon 
2 359-378 [Theognostos] On the practice of the virtues, 
contemplation and the 
priesthood 
On Virtues, 
Contemplation & 
Priesthood 
3 16-31 Philotheos of Sinai Forty texts on watchfulness Forty Texts on 
Watchfulness 
3 34-65 Ilias the Presbyter A gnomic anthology Gnomic Anthology 
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Vol1 Pages Author Title Abbreviated Title 
3 34-42 Ilias the Presbyter Part I Gnomic Anthology: 1 
3 43-46 Ilias the Presbyter Part II Gnomic Anthology: 2 
3 47-51 Ilias the Presbyter Part III Gnomic Anthology: 3 
3 52-65 Ilias the Presbyter Part IV Gnomic Anthology: 4 
3 67-69 Theophanis the Monk The ladder of divine graces Ladder of Divine Graces 
3 74-210 Peter of Damaskos Book I. A treasury of divine 
knowledge 
Book I 
3 211-281 Peter of Damaskos Book II. Twenty-four discourses Book II 
3 285-354 Symeon Metaphrastis Paraphrase of the homilies of St 
Makarios of Egypt 
Paraphrase of Makarios 
4 16-24 Symeon the New 
Theologian 
On faith On Faith 
4 25-50 Symeon the New 
Theologian 
One hundred and fifty-three 
practical and theological texts 
(Texts 1-118) 
Practical & Theological 
Texts 
4 50-63 [Symeon the New 
Theologian] (Actually 
by Symeon the 
Studite & Nikitas 
Stithatos) 
One hundred and fifty-three 
practical and theological texts 
(Texts 119-153) 
Practical & Theological 
Texts 
4 64-75 [Symeon the New 
Theologian] 
The three methods of prayer Three Methods of Prayer 
4 79-106 Nikitas Stithatos On the practice of the virtues: 
One hundred texts 
On Virtues: 100 Texts 
4 107-138 Nikitas Stithatos On the inner nature of things and 
on the purification of the intellect: 
One hundred texts 
On the Inner Nature of 
Things 
4 139-174 Nikitas Stithatos On spiritual knowledge, love and 
the perfection of living: One 
hundred texts 
On Spiritual Knowledge 
4 177-187 Theoliptos, 
Metropolitan of 
Philadelphia 
On inner work in Christ and the 
monastic profession 
On Inner Work 
4 188-191 Theoliptos, 
Metropolitan of 
Philadelphia 
Texts Texts 
4 194-206 Nikiphoros the Monk On watchfulness and the 
guarding of the heart 
Watchfulness & 
Guarding 
4 212-252 Gregory of Sinai On commandments and 
doctrines, warnings and 
promises; on thoughts, passions 
and virtues, and also on stillness 
and prayer: One hundred and 
thirty-seven texts 
On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4 253-256 Gregory of Sinai Further texts Further Texts 
4 257-262 Gregory of Sinai On the signs of grace and 
delusion, written for the 
Confessor Longinos: Ten texts 
For Longinos 
4 263-274 Gregory of Sinai On stillness: Fifteen texts On Stillness 
4 275-286 Gregory of Sinai On prayer: Seven texts On Prayer: 7 Texts 
4 293-322 Gregory Palamas To the Most Reverend Nun To Xenia 
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Xenia 
4 323-330 Gregory Palamas A New Testament decalogue New Testament 
Decalogue 
4 331-342 Gregory Palamas In defence of those who devoutly 
practise a life of stillness 
In Defence of Stillness 
4 343-345 Gregory Palamas Three texts on prayer and purity 
of heart 
On Prayer & Purity 
4 346-417 Gregory Palamas Topics of natural and theological 
science and on the moral and 
ascetic life: One hundred and 
fifty texts 
Topics 
4 418-426 Gregory Palamas The declaration of the Holy 
Mountain in defence of those 
who devoutly practise a life of 
stillness 
Declaration of the Holy 
Mountain 
33
7 
 Ap
pe
n
di
x
 
1.
3:
 
Au
th
o
rs
 
o
f t
he
 
w
o
rk
s 
in
cl
u
de
d 
in
 
th
e 
G
re
ek
 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
 N
o
.
 
C&
C 
N
o
.
 
Au
th
o
r 
D
at
e
 
B
io
gr
ap
hi
c
al
 
de
ta
ils
 
So
u
rc
e 
o
f 
bi
o
gr
ap
hi
ca
l 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
1 
1a
 
Au
th
o
r(s
) o
f O
n
 
th
e
 
Ch
a
ra
ct
e
r 
o
f 
M
e
n
 
 
1s
t t
o
 
4t
h 
Ce
n
tu
rie
s 
Th
is
 
w
o
rk
 
is
 
a
ttr
ib
u
te
d 
to
 
An
to
n
y 
th
e
 
G
re
a
t –
 
bu
t i
s 
a
ct
u
a
lly
 
th
o
u
gh
t 
to
 
be
 
by
 
va
rio
u
s 
u
n
kn
o
w
n
 
St
o
ic
 
a
n
d 
Pl
a
to
n
ic
 
a
u
th
o
rs
 
w
ho
se
 
vi
e
w
s 
a
pp
a
re
n
tly
 
re
fle
ct
 
th
o
se
 
o
f S
e
n
e
ca
,
 
Ep
ic
te
tu
s,
 
M
a
rc
u
s 
Au
re
liu
s 
a
n
d 
Sa
llu
st
iu
s.
 
Th
e
 
co
m
pi
le
r 
is
 
a
ls
o
 
u
n
kn
o
w
n
,
 
bu
t h
a
s 
e
di
te
d 
o
u
t s
o
m
e
 
n
o
n
-
Ch
ris
tia
n
 
te
rm
in
o
lo
gy
.
 
EG
P 
2 
2 
Is
a
ia
h 
th
e
 
So
lit
a
ry
 
? 
d4
89
/4
91
 
Th
e
re
 
is
 
so
m
e
 
u
n
ce
rta
in
ty
 
co
n
ce
rn
in
g 
th
e
 
id
e
n
tit
y 
o
f t
hi
s 
a
u
th
o
r,
 
bu
t 
he
 
is
 
th
o
u
gh
t t
o
 
be
 
a
 
m
o
n
k 
w
ho
 
liv
e
d 
a
t S
ke
tis
 
a
n
d 
th
e
n
 
m
o
ve
d 
to
 
Pa
le
st
in
e
 
a
t a
 
da
te
 
a
fte
r 
43
1.
 
H
e
 
di
e
d 
in
 
o
ld
 
a
ge
 
a
s 
a
 
re
cl
u
se
 
a
t 
G
a
za
 
o
n
 
11
 
Au
gu
st
 
49
1 
(or
 
po
ss
ib
ly 
48
9).
 
 
EG
P 
3 
3 
Ev
a
gr
io
s 
th
e
 
So
lit
a
ry
 
(E
va
gr
iu
s 
o
f P
o
n
tu
s) 
b3
45
/3
46
 
d3
99
 
Se
e
 
Ch
a
pt
e
r 
2 
 
4 
4 
Jo
hn
 
Ca
ss
ia
n
 
b.
c3
60
 
d.
c4
35
 
Se
e
 
Ch
a
pt
e
r 
2 
 
5 
5 
M
a
rk
 
th
e
 
As
ce
tic
 
e
a
rly
 
5t
h 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
Al
so
 
kn
o
w
n
 
a
s 
M
a
rk
 
th
e
 
M
o
n
k,
 
o
r 
M
a
rk
 
th
e
 
H
e
rm
it.
 
 
M
a
y 
ha
ve
 
be
e
n
 
a
 
di
sc
ip
le
 
o
f J
o
hn
 
Ch
ry
so
st
o
m
.
 
M
a
y 
ha
ve
 
be
e
n
 
su
pe
rio
r 
o
f a
 
co
m
m
u
n
ity
 
n
e
a
r 
An
cy
ra
 
in
 
As
ia
 
M
in
o
r.
 
Li
ve
d 
a
t o
n
e
 
st
a
ge
 
a
fte
r 
th
is
 
a
s 
a
 
he
rm
it 
in
 
th
e
 
de
se
rt,
 
bu
t i
t i
s 
n
o
t k
n
o
w
n
 
w
he
th
e
r 
th
is
 
w
a
s 
in
 
Eg
yp
t o
r 
Pa
le
st
in
e
.
 
Po
ss
ib
ly 
a
ls
o
 
a
 
pr
ie
st
 
a
n
d 
su
pe
rio
r 
o
f a
 
m
o
n
a
st
e
ry
 
a
t T
a
rs
u
s.
 
In
 
a
dd
iti
o
n
 
to
 
th
e
 
3 
w
o
rk
s 
by
 
hi
m
 
in
cl
u
de
d 
in
 
th
e
 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
,
 
he
 
w
ro
te
 
a
t l
e
a
st
 
6 
o
th
e
r 
w
o
rk
s.
 
H
is
 
te
a
ch
in
g 
is
 
a
ga
in
st
 
M
e
ss
a
lia
n
is
m
 
a
n
d 
a
ls
o
 
la
ys
 
e
m
ph
a
si
s 
o
n
 
ba
pt
is
m
a
l g
ra
ce
.
 
EG
P 
O
D
CC
 
6 
6 
H
e
sy
ch
io
s 
(H
e
sy
ch
iu
s) 
th
e
 
Pr
ie
st
 
?8
th
 
o
r 
9t
h 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
Ab
bo
t o
f t
he
 
m
o
n
a
st
e
ry
 
o
f t
he
 
M
o
th
e
r 
o
f G
o
d 
o
f t
he
 
Bu
rn
in
g 
Bu
sh
 
(V
a
to
s) 
a
t S
in
a
i. 
EG
P 
7 
7 
N
e
ilo
s 
(N
ilu
s) 
th
e
 
As
ce
tic
 
d.
c4
30
 
Fo
u
n
de
r 
a
n
d 
a
bb
o
t o
f a
 
m
on
a
st
e
ry
 
n
e
a
r 
An
cy
ra
 
in
 
th
e
 
e
a
rly
 
5t
h  
Ce
n
tu
ry
.
 
D
is
ci
pl
e
 
o
f J
o
hn
 
Ch
ry
so
st
o
m
.
 
Ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
le
ge
n
d 
(no
w
 
re
jec
te
d) 
w
a
s 
a
 
hi
gh
 
o
ffi
ce
r 
in
 
th
e
 
co
u
rt 
a
t C
o
n
st
a
n
tin
o
pl
e
 
a
n
d 
th
e
n
 
be
ca
m
e
 
a
 
he
rm
it 
o
n
 
M
t S
in
a
i. 
H
e
 
is
 
th
e
 
e
a
rli
e
st
 
w
rit
e
r 
to
 
re
fe
r 
EG
P 
O
D
CC
 
33
8 
 N
o
.
 
C&
C 
N
o
.
 
Au
th
o
r 
D
at
e
 
B
io
gr
ap
hi
c
al
 
de
ta
ils
 
So
u
rc
e 
o
f 
bi
o
gr
ap
hi
ca
l 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
e
xp
lic
itl
y 
to
 
th
e
 
Je
su
s 
Pr
a
ye
r.
 
W
a
s 
in
flu
e
n
tia
l a
n
d 
pr
o
lif
ic
 
co
rr
e
sp
o
n
de
n
t. 
8 
8 
D
ia
do
ch
o
s 
o
f P
ho
tik
i 
b.
c4
00
 
d.
be
fo
re
 
48
6 
Bi
sh
o
p 
o
f P
ho
tik
i in
 
Ep
iru
s 
(N
.
 
G
re
e
ce
). W
ro
te
 
a
ga
in
st
 
M
o
n
o
ph
ys
iti
sm
 
a
n
d 
M
e
ss
a
lia
n
is
m
 
a
n
d 
su
pp
o
rte
d 
th
e
 
Co
u
n
ci
l o
f 
Ca
lc
e
do
n
 
(45
1).
 
Em
ph
a
si
se
d 
th
e
 
fu
n
da
m
e
n
ta
l u
n
ity
 
o
f t
he
 
hu
m
a
n
 
bo
dy
 
a
n
d 
so
u
l. 
Al
so
 
w
ro
te
 
a
 
ho
m
ily
 
o
n
 
th
e
 
a
sc
e
n
si
o
n
,
 
a
n
d 
Vi
si
o
n
,
 
a
 
di
a
lo
gu
e
 
w
ith
 
Jo
hn
 
th
e
 
Ba
pt
is
t. 
EG
P 
O
D
CC
 
9 
9 
Jo
hn
 
o
f K
a
rp
a
th
o
s 
5t
h-
7t
h 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
Pr
e
su
m
a
bl
y 
ca
m
e
 
fro
m
 
th
e
 
is
la
n
d 
o
f K
a
rp
a
th
o
s,
 
be
tw
e
e
n
 
Cr
e
te
 
a
n
d 
R
ho
de
s.
 
Th
o
u
gh
t t
o
 
ha
ve
 
be
e
n
 
a
 
m
o
n
k 
th
e
re
,
 
a
n
d 
la
te
r 
be
ca
m
e
 
bi
sh
o
p.
 
M
a
y 
be
 
th
e
 
sa
m
e
 
Jo
hn
 
fro
m
 
“
Ka
rp
a
th
io
n
”
 
w
ho
 
si
gn
e
d 
th
e
 
a
ct
s 
o
f t
he
 
6t
h  
Ec
u
m
e
n
ic
a
l C
o
u
n
ci
l (6
80
-
68
1).
 
EG
P 
10
 
10
a
 
Th
e
o
do
ro
s 
th
e
 
G
re
a
t A
sc
e
tic
 
? 
9t
h 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
A 
m
o
n
k 
a
t t
he
 
m
o
n
a
st
e
ry
 
o
f S
t S
a
ba
s,
 
n
e
a
r 
Je
ru
sa
le
m
,
 
a
n
d 
la
te
r 
Bi
sh
o
p 
o
f E
de
ss
a
 
in
 
Sy
ria
.
 
Ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
N
ik
o
di
m
o
s,
 
he
 
liv
e
d 
in
 
th
e
 
7t
h  
Ce
n
tu
ry
,
 
bu
t p
ro
ba
bl
y 
sh
o
u
ld
 
be
 
co
n
si
de
re
d 
9t
h  
Ce
n
tu
ry
.
 
Sp
iri
tu
a
l 
Te
xt
s,
 
w
hi
ch
 
is
 
la
rg
e
ly 
a
 
pa
ra
ph
ra
se
 
o
f E
va
gr
iu
s,
 
w
a
s 
w
rit
te
n
 
n
o
t 
e
a
rli
e
r 
th
a
n
 
th
e
 
7t
h  
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
(si
n
ce
 
it 
dr
a
w
s 
o
n
 
M
a
xi
m
u
s 
th
e
 
Co
n
fe
ss
o
r) 
a
n
d 
n
o
t l
a
te
r 
th
a
n
 
e
a
rly
 
11
th
 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
(si
n
ce
 
it 
is
 
fo
u
n
d 
in
 
a
 
m
a
n
u
sc
rip
t o
f 1
02
3).
 
EG
P 
11
 
10
b 
Au
th
o
r 
o
f T
he
o
re
tik
o
n
 
? 
14
th
 
to
 
17
th
 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
Th
is
 
w
o
rk
 
is
 
a
ttr
ib
u
te
d 
in
 
th
e
 
G
re
e
k 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
to
 
Th
e
o
do
ro
s 
th
e
 
G
re
a
t A
sc
e
tic
,
 
bu
t a
ct
u
a
l a
u
th
o
rs
hi
p 
is
 
u
n
kn
o
w
n
.
 
St
yle
 
a
n
d 
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
e
 
in
di
ca
te
 
po
ss
ib
ly 
14
th
 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
a
u
th
o
rs
hi
p,
 
bu
t i
t m
ig
ht
 
be
 
a
s 
re
ce
n
t a
s 
17
th
 
Ce
n
tu
ry
.
 
EG
P 
12
 
11
 
M
a
xi
m
o
s 
th
e
 
Co
n
fe
ss
o
r 
58
0-
66
2 
Th
e
 
la
rg
e
st
 
si
n
gl
e
 
co
n
tri
bu
to
r 
to
 
th
e
 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
,
 
a
cc
o
rd
in
g 
to
 
th
e
 
ge
n
e
ra
lly
 
a
cc
e
pt
e
d 
a
cc
o
u
n
t, 
M
a
xi
m
u
s 
w
a
s 
bo
rn
 
to
 
a
n
 
a
ris
to
cr
a
tic
 
fa
m
ily
 
in
 
By
za
n
tiu
m
 
a
n
d 
be
ca
m
e
 
Im
pe
ria
l S
e
cr
e
ta
ry
 
u
n
de
r 
Em
pe
ro
r 
H
e
ra
cl
iu
s 
in
 
61
0.
 
In
 
c6
14
,
 
he
 
be
ca
m
e
 
a
 
m
o
n
k 
a
t t
he
 
m
o
n
a
st
e
ry
 
o
f 
Ph
ilip
pi
ko
s 
in
 
Ch
ry
so
po
lis
,
 
n
e
a
r 
Co
n
st
a
n
tin
o
pl
e
,
 
a
n
d 
in
 
62
4/
5 
m
o
ve
d 
to
 
th
e
 
m
o
n
a
st
e
ry
 
o
f S
t G
e
o
rg
e
 
a
t C
yz
ik
o
s.
 
In
 
62
6,
 
a
t t
he
 
Pe
rs
ia
n
 
in
va
si
o
n
,
 
he
 
fle
d 
to
 
Cr
e
te
 
a
n
d 
th
e
n
 
to
 
Af
ric
a
 
by
 
63
0.
 
Fr
o
m
 
63
3-
63
4 
he
 
pl
a
ye
d 
a
 
m
a
jor
 
ro
le
 
in
 
o
pp
o
si
n
g 
th
e
 
he
re
si
e
s 
o
f M
o
n
o
e
rg
is
m
 
a
n
d 
M
o
n
o
th
e
le
tis
m
.
 
H
e
 
w
a
s 
a
rr
e
st
e
d 
fo
r 
th
is
 
in
 
65
4,
 
tri
e
d 
in
 
Co
n
st
a
n
tin
o
pl
e
,
 
a
n
d 
th
e
n
 
e
xi
le
d.
 
Ev
e
n
tu
a
lly
,
 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
a
 
se
rie
s 
o
f 
EG
P 
O
D
CC
 
AL
1 
33
9 
 N
o
.
 
C&
C 
N
o
.
 
Au
th
o
r 
D
at
e
 
B
io
gr
ap
hi
c
al
 
de
ta
ils
 
So
u
rc
e 
o
f 
bi
o
gr
ap
hi
ca
l 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
fu
rth
e
r 
tri
a
ls
,
 
he
 
w
a
s 
co
n
de
m
n
e
d 
in
 
66
2 
a
n
d 
su
bje
ct
e
d 
to
 
flo
gg
in
g,
 
cu
tti
n
g 
o
u
t o
f h
is
 
to
n
gu
e
,
 
a
n
d 
cu
tti
n
g 
o
ff 
hi
s 
rig
ht
 
ha
n
d.
 
H
e
 
di
e
d 
so
o
n
 
a
fte
r 
a
s 
a
n
 
e
xi
le
 
in
 
Ca
u
ca
su
s.
 
H
is
 
te
a
ch
in
g 
w
a
s 
su
bs
e
qu
e
n
tly
 
a
ffi
rm
e
d 
a
t t
he
 
6t
h  
Ec
u
m
e
n
ic
a
l C
o
u
n
ci
l i
n
 
Co
n
st
a
n
tin
o
pl
e
 
in
 
68
0-
68
1.
 
H
e
 
w
a
s 
a
 
pr
o
lifi
c 
a
n
d 
hi
gh
ly 
in
flu
e
n
tia
l w
rit
e
r.
 
13
 
 
O
th
e
r 
a
u
th
o
rs
 
o
f V
a
rio
u
s 
Te
xt
s:
 
Sc
ho
lia
st
 
D
io
n
ys
iu
s 
th
e
 
Ar
e
o
pa
gi
te
 
c5
00
 
(D
io
n
ys
iu
s) 
10
th
 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
(S
ch
o
lia
st
) 
Va
rio
u
s 
Te
xt
s 
is
 
co
n
si
de
re
d 
by
 
th
e
 
En
gl
is
h 
tra
n
sl
a
to
rs
 
o
f t
he
 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
to
 
be
 
m
o
re
 
a
 
“
M
a
xi
m
ia
n
 
a
n
th
o
lo
gy
”
 
th
a
n
 
a
n
 
a
u
th
e
n
tic
 
w
o
rk
 
o
f M
a
xi
m
u
s 
hi
m
se
lf.
 
Au
th
e
n
tic
 
M
a
xi
m
ia
n
 
so
u
rc
e
s 
in
co
rp
o
ra
te
d 
he
re
 
in
cl
u
de
 
Le
tte
rs
,
 
To
 
Th
a
la
ss
io
s:
 
O
n
 
Va
rio
u
s 
Qu
e
st
o
n
s 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 
H
o
ly 
Sc
rip
tu
re
,
 
a
n
d 
Am
bi
gu
a
.
 
H
o
w
e
ve
r,
 
a
ls
o
 
in
cl
u
de
d 
a
re
 
va
rio
u
s 
sc
ho
lia
 
(co
m
m
e
n
ta
rie
s 
o
n
 
To
 
Th
a
la
ss
io
s) 
w
hi
ch
 
a
re
 
n
o
t b
y 
M
a
xi
m
u
s,
 
a
n
d 
a
ls
o
 
e
xt
ra
ct
s 
fro
m
 
D
io
n
ys
iu
s 
th
e
 
Ps
e
u
do
-
Ar
e
o
pa
gi
te
 
(c5
00
). 
EG
P 
O
D
CC
 
14
 
12
 
Th
a
la
ss
io
s 
th
e
 
Li
by
a
n
 
7t
h 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
Th
a
la
ss
io
s 
w
a
s 
a
 
pr
ie
st
 
a
n
d 
Ab
bo
t a
t a
 
m
o
n
a
st
e
ry
 
in
 
Li
by
a
.
 
H
e
 
w
a
s 
a
 
fri
e
n
d 
o
f M
a
xi
m
u
s 
th
e
 
Co
n
fe
ss
o
r,
 
a
n
d 
va
rio
u
s 
w
o
rk
s 
by
 
M
a
xi
m
u
s 
a
re
 
a
dd
re
ss
e
d 
to
 
hi
m
,
 
de
di
ca
te
d 
to
 
hi
m
,
 
o
r 
w
rit
te
n
 
in
 
re
sp
o
n
se
 
to
 
qu
e
st
io
n
s 
th
a
t h
e
 
ra
is
e
d.
 
M
a
xi
m
u
s 
m
a
y 
ha
ve
 
be
e
n
 
a
 
di
sc
ip
le
 
o
f 
Th
a
la
ss
io
s,
 
o
r 
e
ls
e
 
po
ss
ib
ly 
Th
a
la
ss
io
s 
w
a
s 
a
 
di
sc
ip
le
 
o
f M
a
xi
m
u
s.
 
Fo
r 
Pa
u
l, 
th
e
 
w
o
rk
 
o
f T
ha
la
ss
io
s 
in
cl
u
de
d 
in
 
th
e
 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
,
 
is
 
hi
s 
o
n
ly 
kn
o
w
n
 
w
o
rk
.
 
EG
P 
15
 
13
 
Au
th
o
r 
o
f O
n
 
Vi
rtu
e
s 
a
n
d 
Vi
ce
s 
d7
50
 
O
n
 
Vi
rtu
e
s 
a
n
d 
Vi
ce
s 
is
 
a
ttr
ib
u
te
d 
in
 
th
e
 
G
re
e
k 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
to
 
Jo
hn
 
o
f 
D
a
m
a
sk
o
s 
(c6
75
-
c7
49
), b
u
t i
s 
a
ls
o
 
a
ttr
ib
u
te
d 
e
ls
e
w
he
re
 
to
 
St
 
At
ha
n
a
si
o
s 
o
f A
le
xa
n
dr
ia
 
(c2
96
-
37
3) 
a
n
d 
St
 
Ep
hr
e
m
 
th
e
 
Sy
ria
n
 
(c3
06
-
37
3).
 
Ac
tu
a
l a
u
th
o
rs
hi
p 
is
 
ha
rd
 
to
 
de
te
rm
in
e
,
 
bu
t d
ra
w
s 
o
n
 
M
a
rk
 
th
e
 
As
ce
tic
,
 
Ev
a
gr
iu
s,
 
M
a
xi
m
u
s 
th
e
 
Co
n
fe
ss
o
r,
 
a
n
d 
po
ss
ib
ly 
a
ls
o
 
Jo
hn
 
Cl
im
a
cu
s,
 
a
n
d 
Jo
hn
 
th
e
 
So
lit
a
ry
 
(c5
00
). 
EG
P 
16
 
14
 
Au
th
o
r 
o
f A
bb
a
 
Ph
ilim
o
n
 
6t
h-
7t
h 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
Th
is
 
w
o
rk
 
is
 
An
o
n
ym
o
u
s.
 
N
o
th
in
g 
is
 
kn
o
w
n
 
a
bo
u
t A
bb
a
 
Ph
ilim
o
n
 
o
th
e
r 
th
a
n
 
w
ha
t i
s 
in
cl
u
de
d 
in
 
th
is
 
te
xt
.
 
It 
is
 
th
e
 
e
a
rli
e
st
 
te
xt
 
to
 
in
cl
u
de
 
th
e
 
pr
e
ci
se
 
fo
rm
u
la
 
o
f t
he
 
Je
su
s 
Pr
a
ye
r:
 
“
Lo
rd
 
Je
su
s 
Ch
ris
t, 
So
n
 
o
f 
G
o
d,
 
ha
ve
 
m
e
rc
y 
u
po
n
 
m
e
”
.
 
EG
P 
17
 
15
 
Au
th
o
r 
o
f O
n
 
Vi
rtu
e
s,
 
Co
n
te
m
pl
a
tio
n
 
& 
Pr
ie
st
ho
o
d 
?1
4t
h 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
Th
is
 
te
xt
 
is
 
a
ttr
ib
u
te
d 
by
 
N
ik
o
di
m
o
s 
to
 
Th
e
o
gn
o
st
o
s 
o
f A
le
xa
n
dr
ia
 
(3r
d  
Ce
n
tu
ry
) b
u
t i
t c
a
n
n
o
t b
e
 
by
 
hi
m
 
a
s 
it 
qu
o
te
s 
Jo
hn
 
o
f D
a
m
a
sk
os
.
 
It 
in
cl
u
de
s 
a
 
lo
n
g 
pa
ss
a
ge
 
(#2
6) 
by
 
Jo
hn
 
o
f K
a
rp
a
th
o
s,
 
w
hi
ch
 
is
 
a
 
EG
P 
34
0 
 N
o
.
 
C&
C 
N
o
.
 
Au
th
o
r 
D
at
e
 
B
io
gr
ap
hi
c
al
 
de
ta
ils
 
So
u
rc
e 
o
f 
bi
o
gr
ap
hi
ca
l 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
la
te
r 
in
se
rti
o
n
.
 
18
 
16
 
Ph
ilo
th
e
o
s 
o
f S
in
a
i 
? 
9t
h/
10
th
 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
Ph
ilo
th
e
o
s 
is
 
th
o
u
gh
t t
o
 
ha
ve
 
be
e
n
 
a
 
m
o
n
k 
a
t t
he
 
m
o
n
a
st
e
ry
 
o
n
 
M
o
u
n
t S
in
a
i. 
H
e
 
qu
o
te
s 
Jo
hn
 
Cl
im
a
cu
s 
a
n
d 
hi
s 
w
o
rk
 
sh
o
w
s 
co
m
m
o
n
 
co
n
ce
rn
s 
w
ith
 
H
e
sy
ch
io
s 
th
e
 
Pr
ie
st
,
 
n
o
ta
bl
y 
th
a
t o
f “
w
a
tc
hf
u
ln
e
ss
”
 
(or
 
in
n
e
r 
a
tte
n
tiv
e
n
e
ss
,
 
o
r 
gu
a
rd
in
g 
o
f t
he
 
in
te
lle
ct
). 
EG
P 
19
 
17
 
Ili
a
s 
th
e
 
Pr
e
sb
yt
e
r 
La
te
 
11
th
/ E
a
rly
 
12
th
 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
Ili
a
s 
is
 
th
o
u
gh
t t
o
 
ha
ve
 
be
e
n
 
a
 
la
w
ye
r,
 
pr
o
ba
bl
y 
a
 
jud
ge
 
in
 
a
n
 
e
cc
le
si
a
st
ic
a
l c
o
u
rt,
 
be
fo
re
 
be
co
m
in
g 
a
 
m
o
n
k 
a
n
d 
be
in
g 
o
rd
a
in
e
d.
 
It 
is
 
po
ss
ib
le
 
th
a
t h
e
 
is
 
o
n
e
 
a
n
d 
th
e
 
sa
m
e
 
a
s 
Ili
a
s,
 
M
e
tro
po
lit
a
n
 
o
f 
Cr
e
te
,
 
w
ho
 
w
ro
te
 
co
m
m
e
n
ta
rie
s 
o
n
 
G
re
go
ry
 
o
f N
a
zi
a
n
zu
s 
a
n
d 
Jo
hn
 
Cl
im
a
cu
s.
 
EG
P 
20
 
18
 
Th
e
o
ph
a
n
is
 
th
e
 
M
o
n
k 
? 
In
 
th
e
 
G
re
e
k 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
th
e
 
po
e
m
 
La
dd
e
r 
o
f D
iv
in
e
 
G
ra
ce
s 
is
 
in
cl
u
de
d 
w
ith
o
u
t i
n
tro
du
ct
io
n
,
 
a
n
d 
n
o
th
in
g 
a
t a
ll 
is
 
kn
o
w
n
 
co
n
ce
rn
in
g 
its
 
a
u
th
o
r.
 
EG
P 
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19
 
Pe
te
r 
o
f D
a
m
a
sk
o
s 
11
th
/1
2t
h 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
Pe
te
r 
o
f D
a
m
a
sk
o
s 
m
ak
es
 
th
e
 
se
co
n
d 
la
rg
e
st
 
co
n
tri
bu
tio
n
 
to
 
th
e
 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
a
fte
r 
M
a
xi
m
u
s 
th
e
 
Co
n
fe
ss
o
r,
 
a
n
d 
ye
t l
itt
le
 
is
 
kn
o
w
n
 
a
bo
u
t 
hi
m
.
 
N
ik
o
di
m
o
s 
u
n
de
rs
to
o
d 
hi
m
 
to
 
be
 
Bi
sh
o
p 
Pe
te
r 
th
e
 
H
ie
ro
m
a
rty
r 
(8t
h  
Ce
n
tu
ry
), w
ho
 
di
e
d 
in
 
e
xi
le
 
in
 
so
u
th
e
rn
 
Ar
a
bi
a
,
 
bu
t i
t i
s 
n
o
w
 
kn
o
w
n
 
th
a
t h
e
 
m
u
st
 
be
 
a
 
la
te
r 
fig
u
re
,
 
a
s 
he
 
re
fe
rs
 
to
 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
M
e
ta
ph
ra
st
is
.
 
H
e
 
w
a
s 
cl
e
a
rly
 
a
 
m
o
n
k 
a
n
d 
hi
s 
n
a
m
e
 
su
gg
e
st
s 
so
m
e
 
fa
m
ily
 
(al
th
o
u
gh
 
n
o
t n
e
ce
ss
a
ril
y 
pe
rs
o
n
a
l) c
o
n
n
e
ct
io
n
 
w
ith
 
D
a
m
a
sk
o
s.
 
H
e
 
re
fe
rs
 
to
 
a
 
w
id
e
 
ra
n
ge
 
o
f s
o
u
rc
e
s 
bu
t p
ro
ba
bl
y 
dr
e
w
 
u
po
n
 
e
xi
st
in
g 
a
n
th
o
lo
gi
e
s 
a
n
d 
m
a
y 
n
o
t h
a
ve
 
ha
d 
a
cc
e
ss
 
to
 
a
ll 
th
e
 
o
rig
in
a
l w
o
rk
s.
 
EG
P 
22
 
20
a
 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
M
e
ta
ph
ra
st
e
s 
fl 
c9
60
 
Th
e
 
M
a
ca
ria
n
 
ho
m
ilie
s 
w
e
re
 
th
e
 
w
o
rk
 
o
f a
n
 
u
n
kn
o
w
n
 
4t
h ,
 
o
r 
e
a
rly
 
5t
h ,
 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
a
u
th
o
r 
w
rit
in
g 
in
 
Sy
ria
 
o
r 
M
e
so
po
ta
m
ia
.
 
Th
e
y 
sh
o
w
 
EG
P 
O
D
CC
 
34
1 
 N
o
.
 
C&
C 
N
o
.
 
Au
th
o
r 
D
at
e
 
B
io
gr
ap
hi
c
al
 
de
ta
ils
 
So
u
rc
e 
o
f 
bi
o
gr
ap
hi
ca
l 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
23
 
20
b 
Ps
e
u
do
-
M
a
ka
rio
s 
c3
80
/3
90
-
43
0 
e
vi
de
n
ce
 
o
f M
e
ss
a
lia
n
is
m
,
 
bu
t a
re
 
fu
n
da
m
e
n
ta
lly
 
o
rth
o
do
x 
in
 
co
n
te
n
t, 
be
in
g 
co
n
ce
rn
e
d 
w
ith
 
th
e
 
in
n
e
r 
w
o
rk
 
o
f t
he
 
H
o
ly 
Sp
iri
t i
n
 
th
e
 
hu
m
a
n
 
he
a
rt,
 
a
n
d 
ha
ve
 
ha
d 
e
n
du
rin
g 
in
flu
e
n
ce
.
 
N
ik
o
di
m
os
 
a
n
d 
M
a
ka
rio
s 
di
d 
n
o
t i
n
cl
u
de
 
th
e
 
o
rig
in
a
l h
o
m
ilie
s 
in
 
th
e
 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
,
 
bu
t 
ra
th
e
r 
a
 
pa
ra
ph
ra
se
d 
se
le
ct
io
n
 
a
ttr
ib
u
te
d 
to
 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
M
e
ta
ph
ra
st
e
s.
 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
a
pp
e
a
rs
 
to
 
ha
ve
 
be
e
n
 
a
 
hi
gh
 
ra
n
ki
n
g 
ci
vi
l s
e
rv
a
n
t w
ho
 
be
ca
m
e
 
a
 
m
o
n
k 
la
te
 
in
 
lif
e
.
 
H
e
 
is
 
pr
o
ba
bl
y 
to
 
be
 
id
e
n
tif
ie
d 
w
ith
 
a
 
ch
ro
n
ic
le
r,
 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
M
a
gi
st
ro
s.
 
H
is
 
m
o
st
 
fa
m
o
u
s 
w
o
rk
 
is
 
M
e
n
o
lo
gi
a
n
 
(or
 
Li
ve
s 
o
f t
he
 
Sa
in
ts
), a
n
 
e
di
te
d 
bu
t u
n
cr
iti
ca
l c
o
m
pi
la
tio
n
 
o
f 
ha
gi
o
gr
a
ph
y.
 
24
 
21
a
 
35
a
 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
th
e
 
N
e
w
 
Th
e
o
lo
gi
a
n
 
94
9-
10
22
 
Bo
rn
 
in
 
As
ia
 
M
in
o
r 
to
 
le
ss
e
r 
n
o
bi
lit
y 
in
 
th
e
 
pr
o
vi
n
ce
s,
 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
w
a
s 
pl
a
ce
d 
in
 
th
e
 
ca
re
 
o
f a
n
 
u
n
cl
e
 
in
 
Co
n
st
a
n
tin
o
pl
e
 
a
t t
he
 
a
ge
 
o
f 1
1 
ye
a
rs
,
 
a
n
d 
su
bs
e
qu
e
n
tly
 
e
n
te
re
d 
im
pe
ria
l s
e
rv
ic
e
.
 
At
 
th
e
 
a
ge
 
o
f 1
4 
ye
a
rs
 
he
 
m
e
t, 
a
n
d 
ca
m
e
 
u
n
de
r 
th
e
 
in
flu
e
n
ce
 
o
f, 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
th
e
 
St
u
di
te
 
(c9
17
-
98
6/
7).
 
Ag
e
d 
20
 
ye
a
rs
 
he
 
ha
d 
th
e
 
fir
st
 
o
f a
 
se
rie
s 
o
f v
is
io
n
s 
o
f 
th
e
 
“
di
vi
n
e
 
a
n
d 
u
n
cr
e
a
te
d 
lig
ht
”
.
 
In
 
97
7 
he
 
be
ca
m
e
 
a
 
n
o
vi
ce
 
in
 
th
e
 
sa
m
e
 
m
o
n
a
st
e
ry
 
(S
tu
di
o
s) 
a
s 
hi
s 
m
e
n
to
r,
 
Sy
m
e
o
n
,
 
bu
t w
a
s 
fo
rc
e
d 
to
 
le
a
ve
 
w
ith
in
 
a
 
ye
a
r 
be
ca
u
se
 
o
f je
a
lo
u
si
e
s 
su
rr
o
u
n
di
n
g 
hi
s 
re
la
tio
n
sh
ip
 
w
ith
 
Sy
m
e
o
n
.
 
Af
te
r 
m
o
vin
g 
to
 
a
n
o
th
e
r 
m
on
a
st
e
ry
 
(S
t 
M
a
m
a
s) 
he
 
w
a
s 
qu
ic
kl
y 
pr
o
fe
ss
e
d 
a
s 
a
 
m
o
n
k,
 
o
rd
a
in
e
d 
pr
ie
st
 
(c9
80
) 
a
n
d 
th
e
n
 
e
le
ct
e
d 
a
bb
o
t. 
Un
de
r 
hi
s 
le
a
de
rs
hi
p 
th
e
 
m
o
n
a
st
e
ry
 
w
a
s 
tra
n
sf
o
rm
e
d 
fro
m
 
a
 
st
a
te
 
o
f d
e
cl
in
e
 
to
 
re
vi
va
l a
n
d 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
w
a
s 
m
u
ch
 
so
u
gh
t a
fte
r 
a
s 
a
 
sp
iri
tu
a
l a
dv
is
o
r.
 
H
e
 
w
a
s 
a
 
co
m
pa
ss
io
n
a
te
 
bu
t 
e
xa
ct
in
g 
a
bb
o
t, 
de
m
a
n
di
n
g 
th
a
t n
o
 
m
o
n
k 
sh
o
u
ld
 
re
ce
iv
e
 
co
m
m
u
n
io
n
 
w
ith
 
sh
e
dd
in
g 
te
a
rs
.
 
H
is
 
te
a
ch
in
g 
o
n
 
la
y 
co
n
fe
ss
io
n
,
 
a
m
o
n
gs
t o
th
e
r 
th
in
gs
,
 
a
ttr
a
ct
e
d 
cr
iti
ci
sm
 
a
n
d 
in
 
10
05
 
he
 
co
n
se
qu
e
n
tly
 
re
si
gn
e
d 
hi
s 
po
si
tio
n
 
a
s 
a
bb
o
t. 
In
 
10
09
 
he
 
w
a
s 
tri
e
d 
a
n
d 
co
n
de
m
n
e
d 
to
 
e
xi
le
.
 
Al
th
o
u
gh
 
th
e
 
se
n
te
n
ce
 
w
a
s 
re
vo
ke
d,
 
he
 
co
n
tin
u
e
d 
to
 
liv
e
 
th
e
re
 
u
n
til
 
hi
s 
de
a
th
 
in
 
10
22
.
 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
le
ft 
e
xt
e
n
si
ve
 
w
rit
in
gs
.
 
H
is
 
tit
le
 
“
th
e
o
lo
gi
a
n
”
 
re
fle
ct
s 
hi
s 
co
n
ce
rn
 
w
ith
 
th
e
 
in
n
e
r 
life
 
a
n
d 
e
xp
e
rie
n
ce
 
o
f 
pr
a
ye
r.
 
EG
P 
O
D
CC
 
34
2 
 N
o
.
 
C&
C 
N
o
.
 
Au
th
o
r 
D
at
e
 
B
io
gr
ap
hi
c
al
 
de
ta
ils
 
So
u
rc
e 
o
f 
bi
o
gr
ap
hi
ca
l 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
25
 
 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
th
e
 
St
u
di
te
 
c9
17
-
98
6/
7 
##
11
9-
15
2 
o
f P
ra
ct
ic
a
l &
 
Th
e
o
lo
gi
ca
l T
e
xt
s,
 
a
ttr
ib
u
te
d 
in
 
th
e
 
G
re
e
k 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
to
 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
th
e
 
N
e
w
 
Th
e
o
lo
gi
a
n
,
 
is
 
a
ct
u
a
lly
 
by
 
hi
s 
m
e
n
to
r,
 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
th
e
 
St
u
di
te
.
 
Th
is
 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
w
a
s 
a
 
la
y 
m
o
n
k 
a
t t
he
 
m
o
n
a
st
e
ry
 
o
f S
tu
di
o
s,
 
a
n
d 
w
a
s 
a
ls
o
 
kn
o
w
n
 
a
s 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
th
e
 
Pi
o
u
s,
 
o
r 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
th
e
 
D
e
vo
u
t. 
 
EG
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22
 
N
ik
ita
s 
St
ith
a
to
s 
11
th
 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
N
ik
ita
s 
St
ith
a
to
s 
w
a
s 
bo
rn
 
in
 
th
e
 
e
a
rly
 
11
th
 
Ce
n
tu
ry
,
 
a
n
d 
e
n
te
re
d 
th
e
 
m
o
n
a
st
e
ry
 
a
t S
tu
di
o
s 
a
t a
n
 
e
a
rly
 
a
ge
 
(c1
02
0).
 
H
e
 
w
a
s 
su
bs
e
qu
e
n
tly
 
o
rd
a
in
e
d 
pr
ie
st
,
 
bu
t r
e
m
a
in
e
d 
a
t S
tu
di
o
s 
fo
r 
th
e
 
re
st
 
o
f h
is
 
lif
e
.
 
H
e
 
w
a
s,
 
br
ie
fly
,
 
a
 
di
sc
ip
le
 
o
f S
ym
e
o
n
 
th
e
 
N
e
w
 
Th
e
o
lo
gi
a
n
 
a
n
d 
a
fte
r 
th
e
 
de
a
th
 
o
f t
he
 
la
tte
r 
N
ik
ita
s 
e
xp
e
rie
n
ce
d 
a
 
vi
si
o
n
 
in
 
w
hi
ch
 
th
e
 
sa
in
t 
a
pp
e
a
re
d 
to
 
hi
m
.
 
H
e
 
su
bs
e
qu
e
n
tly
 
co
m
pi
le
d 
a
n
 
e
di
tio
n
 
o
f S
ym
e
o
n
’s
 
w
o
rk
s 
a
n
d 
a
ls
o
 
be
ca
m
e
 
hi
s 
bi
o
gr
a
ph
e
r.
 
 
H
e
 
w
a
s 
kn
o
w
n
 
a
s 
“
st
ith
a
to
s”
 
(m
e
a
n
in
g 
br
a
ve
) b
e
ca
u
se
 
o
f h
is
 
o
u
ts
po
ke
n
n
e
ss
 
a
ga
in
st
 
th
e
 
Em
pe
ro
r 
in
 
re
ga
rd
 
to
 
hi
s 
a
ffa
ir 
w
ith
 
hi
s 
m
is
tre
ss
,
 
Sk
lir
a
in
a
.
 
H
e
 
m
a
y 
ha
ve
 
be
e
n
 
a
bb
o
t a
t S
tu
di
o
s 
pr
io
r 
to
 
hi
s 
de
a
th
.
 
In
 
a
dd
iti
o
n
 
to
 
th
e
 
a
bo
ve
 
m
e
n
tio
n
e
d 
w
rit
in
gs
,
 
a
n
d 
th
e
 
w
o
rk
s 
in
cl
u
de
d 
in
 
th
e
 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
,
 
he
 
a
ls
o
 
w
ro
te
 
a
 
de
fe
n
ce
 
o
f O
rth
o
do
xy
,
 
a
n
d 
a
 
n
u
m
be
r 
o
f t
he
o
lo
gi
ca
l 
tre
a
tis
e
s.
 
Li
ke
 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
th
e
 
N
e
w
 
Th
e
o
lo
gi
a
n
,
 
he
 
is
 
co
n
ce
rn
e
d 
w
ith
 
di
vin
e
 
lig
ht
,
 
in
n
e
r 
pr
a
ye
r 
a
n
d 
w
ith
 
th
e
 
pl
a
ce
 
o
f t
e
a
rs
 
in
 
th
e
 
sp
iri
tu
a
l 
life
.
 
H
is
 
w
o
rk
 
sh
o
w
s 
th
e
 
in
flu
e
n
ce
 
o
f E
va
gr
iu
s,
 
M
a
xi
m
u
s 
th
e
 
Co
n
fe
ss
o
r,
 
D
io
n
ys
iu
s 
th
e
 
Ps
e
u
do
-
Ar
e
o
pa
gi
te
,
 
Is
a
a
c 
th
e
 
Sy
ria
n
,
 
a
n
d 
Jo
hn
 
Cl
im
a
cu
s.
 
 
 Th
e
 
fir
st
 
pa
rt 
o
f #
15
3 
o
f P
ra
ct
ic
a
l &
 
Th
e
o
lo
gi
ca
l T
e
xt
s,
 
a
ttr
ib
u
te
d 
in
 
th
e
 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
to
 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
th
e
 
N
e
w
 
Th
e
o
lo
gi
a
n
,
 
is
 
a
ct
u
a
lly
 
ta
ke
n
 
fro
m
 
th
e
 
Li
fe
 
o
f S
ym
e
o
n
 
th
e
 
N
e
w
 
Th
e
o
lo
gi
a
n
 
by
 
N
ik
ita
s 
St
ith
a
to
s.
 
EG
P 
27
 
23
 
Th
e
o
lip
to
s,
 
M
e
tro
po
lit
a
n
 
o
f 
Ph
ila
de
lp
hi
a
 
b.
c1
25
0 
d.
13
22
 
Th
e
o
lip
to
s 
w
a
s 
m
a
rr
ie
d 
pr
io
r 
to
 
be
co
m
in
g 
a
 
m
o
n
k.
 
H
e
 
w
a
s 
im
pr
is
o
n
e
d 
be
ca
u
se
 
o
f h
is
 
o
pp
o
si
tio
n
 
to
 
re
-
u
n
io
n
 
be
tw
e
e
n
 
th
e
 
e
a
st
e
rn
 
a
n
d 
w
e
st
e
rn
 
ch
u
rc
he
s.
 
H
e
 
be
ca
m
e
 
bi
sh
o
p 
o
f P
hi
la
de
lp
hi
a
 
in
 
12
84
,
 
a
 
po
si
tio
n
 
w
hi
ch
 
he
 
re
ta
in
e
d 
fo
r 
a
lm
o
st
 
40
 
ye
a
rs
 
a
n
d 
w
hi
ch
 
in
cl
u
de
d 
hi
s 
de
fe
n
ce
 
o
f P
hi
la
de
lp
hi
a
 
a
ga
in
st
 
th
e
 
Tu
rk
s 
in
 
13
10
.
 
H
e
 
w
a
s 
a
 
w
id
e
ly 
re
sp
e
ct
e
d 
sp
iri
tu
a
l d
ire
ct
o
r 
a
n
d 
te
a
ch
e
r 
o
f h
e
sy
ch
a
sm
.
 
EG
P 
34
3 
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o
.
 
C&
C 
N
o
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Au
th
o
r 
D
at
e
 
B
io
gr
ap
hi
c
al
 
de
ta
ils
 
So
u
rc
e 
o
f 
bi
o
gr
ap
hi
ca
l 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
28
 
24
 
N
ik
ip
ho
ro
s 
th
e
 
M
o
n
k 
13
th
 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
-
 
2n
d 
ha
lf 
N
ik
ip
ho
ro
s 
th
e
 
M
o
n
k,
 
a
ls
o
 
kn
o
w
n
 
a
s 
N
ik
ip
ho
ro
s 
th
e
 
H
e
sy
ch
a
st
,
 
o
r 
N
ik
ip
ho
ro
s 
th
e
 
At
ho
n
ite
,
 
w
a
s 
bo
rn
 
in
 
Ita
ly,
 
a
n
d 
st
a
rte
d 
lif
e
 
a
s 
a
 
R
o
m
a
n
 
Ca
th
o
lic
.
 
H
e
 
su
bs
e
qu
e
n
tly
 
tra
ve
le
d 
to
 
th
e
 
By
za
n
tin
e
 
Em
pi
re
,
 
e
m
br
a
ce
d 
th
e
 
O
rth
o
do
x 
tra
di
tio
n
,
 
a
n
d 
be
ca
m
e
 
a
 
m
o
n
k 
a
t A
th
o
s,
 
w
he
re
 
he
 
w
ith
dr
e
w
 
in
to
 
is
o
la
tio
n
.
 
H
e
 
w
a
s 
im
pr
is
o
n
e
d 
a
n
d 
e
xi
le
d 
(12
76
-
12
77
) fo
r 
hi
s 
o
pp
o
si
tio
n
 
to
 
re
u
n
io
n
 
w
ith
 
th
e
 
w
e
st
e
rn
 
ch
u
rc
h.
 
H
e
 
is
 
th
o
u
gh
t t
o
 
ha
ve
 
di
e
d 
be
fo
re
 
13
00
.
 
EG
P 
29
 
25
 
G
re
go
ry
 
o
f S
in
a
i 
b.
c1
26
5 
d.
13
46
 
G
re
go
ry
 
o
f S
in
a
i w
a
s 
bo
rn
 
pe
rh
a
ps
 
c1
26
5 
n
e
a
r 
Kl
a
zo
m
e
n
a
i, 
in
 
As
ia
 
M
in
o
r.
 
As
 
a
 
yo
u
n
g 
m
a
n
 
he
 
w
a
s 
ta
ke
n
 
pr
is
o
n
e
r 
in
 
a
 
Tu
rk
is
h 
ra
id
 
bu
t 
re
le
a
se
d 
a
fte
r 
pa
ym
e
n
t o
f a
 
ra
n
so
m
.
 
H
e
 
e
n
te
re
d 
a
 
m
o
n
a
st
e
ry
 
in
 
Cy
pr
u
s,
 
bu
t w
a
s 
pr
o
fe
ss
e
d 
a
t a
 
m
o
n
a
st
e
ry
 
in
 
Si
n
a
i. 
Fr
o
m
 
th
e
re
 
he
 
w
e
n
t t
o
 
Cr
e
te
 
w
he
re
 
he
 
w
a
s 
pu
pi
l o
f a
 
m
o
n
k 
ca
lle
d 
Ar
se
n
io
s,
 
fro
m
 
w
ho
m
 
he
 
le
a
rn
e
d 
a
bo
u
t t
he
 
pr
a
ct
ic
e
 
o
f i
n
n
e
r 
pr
a
ye
r,
 
a
n
d 
th
e
n
 
(c1
30
0) 
he
 
m
o
ve
d 
to
 
M
o
u
n
t A
th
o
s,
 
w
he
re
 
he
 
re
m
a
in
e
d 
fo
r 
a
 
qu
a
rte
r 
o
f a
 
ce
n
tu
ry
.
 
Li
ke
 
N
ik
ip
ho
ro
s,
 
he
 
ch
o
se
 
to
 
liv
e
 
in
 
se
cl
u
si
o
n
.
 
H
e
 
le
ft 
At
ho
s,
 
c1
32
5-
8,
 
a
n
d 
re
tu
rn
e
d 
o
n
ly 
br
ie
fly
 
in
 
th
e
 
13
30
s.
 
H
e
 
sp
e
n
t t
he
 
la
st
 
ye
a
rs
 
o
f h
is
 
life
 
in
 
th
e
 
w
ild
e
rn
e
ss
 
o
f t
he
 
St
ra
n
dz
ha
 
m
o
u
n
ta
in
s,
 
o
n
 
th
e
 
bo
rd
e
r 
w
ith
 
Bu
lg
a
ria
,
 
w
he
re
 
he
 
ga
th
e
re
d 
a
 
la
rg
e
 
ba
n
d 
o
f 
di
sc
ip
le
s.
 
H
e
 
di
e
d 
th
e
re
 
o
n
 
27
 
N
o
ve
m
be
r 
13
46
.
 
EG
P 
34
4 
 N
o
.
 
C&
C 
N
o
.
 
Au
th
o
r 
D
at
e
 
B
io
gr
ap
hi
c
al
 
de
ta
ils
 
So
u
rc
e 
o
f 
bi
o
gr
ap
hi
ca
l 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
30
 
26
 
G
re
go
ry
 
Pa
la
m
a
s 
c1
29
6-
13
59
 
G
re
go
ry
 
Pa
la
m
a
s 
w
a
s 
bo
rn
 
a
n
d 
ra
is
e
d 
in
 
Co
n
st
a
n
tin
o
pl
e
.
 
H
is
 
fa
th
e
r 
w
a
s 
a
 
pe
rs
o
n
a
l f
rie
n
d 
o
f t
he
 
Em
pe
ro
r.
 
In
 
hi
s 
yo
u
th
,
 
G
re
go
ry
 
w
a
s 
in
flu
e
n
ce
d 
by
 
Th
e
o
lip
tu
s 
o
f P
hi
la
de
lp
hi
a
.
 
R
e
jec
tin
g 
a
 
pr
o
m
is
in
g 
ca
re
e
r 
in
 
se
cu
la
r 
life
,
 
he
 
e
n
te
re
d 
m
o
n
a
st
ic
 
lif
e
 
o
n
 
M
o
u
n
t A
th
o
s 
in
 
a
bo
u
t 1
31
8.
 
Si
m
u
lta
n
e
o
u
sl
y,
 
hi
s 
m
o
th
e
r,
 
br
o
th
e
rs
 
a
n
d 
si
st
e
rs
 
a
ls
o
 
e
n
te
re
d 
re
lig
io
u
s 
life
 
in
 
re
sp
o
n
se
 
to
 
hi
s 
e
n
co
u
ra
ge
m
e
n
t. 
G
re
go
ry
,
 
lik
e
 
N
ik
ip
ho
ro
s 
a
n
d 
G
re
go
ry
 
o
f S
in
a
i, 
liv
e
d 
o
n
 
At
ho
s 
a
s 
a
 
he
sy
ch
a
st
 
in
 
re
la
tiv
e
 
se
cl
u
si
o
n
.
 
Th
e
 
a
dv
a
n
ce
 
o
f t
he
 
Tu
rk
is
h 
a
rm
ie
s 
fo
rc
e
d 
hi
m
 
to
 
fle
e
 
to
 
Th
e
ss
a
lo
n
ic
a
,
 
w
he
re
 
he
 
w
a
s 
o
rd
a
in
e
d 
pr
ie
st
 
in
 
13
26
.
 
H
e
 
re
tir
e
d 
a
ga
in
 
a
s 
a
 
he
rm
it 
o
n
 
a
 
m
o
u
n
ta
in
 
n
e
a
r 
Be
ro
e
a
,
 
bu
t r
e
tu
rn
e
d 
to
 
At
ho
s 
in
 
13
31
.
 
 
Fr
o
m
 
13
35
-
13
51
 
he
 
w
a
s 
de
e
pl
y 
in
vo
lv
e
d 
in
 
th
e
 
he
sy
ch
a
st
 
co
n
tro
ve
rs
y,
 
a
n
d 
a
lth
o
u
gh
 
hi
s 
po
si
tio
n
 
in
 
th
is
 
co
n
tro
ve
rs
y 
w
a
s 
u
ph
e
ld
 
a
t t
he
 
Co
u
n
ci
ls
 
o
f C
o
n
st
a
n
tin
o
pl
e
 
in
 
13
41
,
 
13
47
 
a
n
d 
13
51
,
 
he
 
br
ie
fly
 
su
ffe
re
d 
co
n
de
m
n
a
tio
n
 
a
n
d 
e
xc
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
tio
n
 
in
 
13
44
.
 
H
is
 
te
a
ch
in
g 
w
a
s 
a
ls
o
 
u
ph
e
ld
 
by
 
hi
s 
fe
llo
w
 
m
o
n
ks
 
o
n
 
M
o
u
n
t 
At
ho
s,
 
w
ho
,
 
a
t t
he
ir 
sy
n
o
d 
o
f 1
34
0-
13
41
 
a
gr
e
e
d 
a
n
d 
si
gn
e
d 
a
 
su
pp
o
rti
ve
 
st
a
te
m
e
n
t k
n
o
w
n
 
a
s 
th
e
 
H
a
gi
o
rit
e
 
To
m
e
,
 
w
rit
te
n
 
by
 
G
re
go
ry
 
hi
m
se
lf,
 
w
hi
ch
 
w
a
s 
su
bs
e
qu
e
n
tly
 
in
cl
u
de
d 
in
 
th
e
 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
.
 
G
re
go
ry
 
w
a
s 
m
a
de
 
Ar
ch
bi
sh
o
p 
o
f T
he
ss
o
lo
n
ic
a
 
in
 
13
47
,
 
bu
t o
w
in
g 
to
 
po
lit
ic
a
l t
u
rm
o
il c
o
u
ld
 
n
o
t t
a
ke
 
po
ss
e
ss
io
n
 
o
f h
is
 
se
e
 
u
n
til
 
13
50
.
 
H
e
 
w
a
s 
sa
cr
a
m
e
n
ta
l i
n
 
hi
s 
pr
e
a
ch
in
g 
a
n
d 
de
e
pl
y 
co
n
ce
rn
e
d 
fo
r 
th
e
 
po
o
r 
a
n
d 
o
pp
re
ss
e
d.
 
In
 
13
54
 
he
 
w
a
s 
ta
ke
n
 
pr
is
o
n
e
r 
by
 
th
e
 
Tu
rk
s 
a
n
d 
re
m
a
in
e
d 
in
 
ca
pt
iv
ity
 
fo
r 
a
 
ye
a
r.
 
D
u
rin
g 
th
is
 
tim
e
 
he
 
w
a
s 
e
n
ga
ge
d 
in
 
do
ct
rin
a
l d
is
cu
ss
io
n
 
w
ith
 
lo
ca
l M
u
sl
im
s.
 
H
e
 
di
e
d 
in
 
13
59
 
a
n
d 
w
a
s 
m
a
de
 
a
 
sa
in
t o
n
ly 
9 
ye
a
rs
 
la
te
r.
 
H
e
 
le
ft 
n
u
m
e
ro
u
s 
w
rit
in
gs
.
 
H
is
 
te
a
ch
in
g 
o
n
 
he
sy
ch
a
sm
 
w
a
s 
ba
se
d 
o
n
 
hi
s 
be
lie
f i
n
 
th
e
 
fu
n
da
m
e
n
ta
l u
n
ity
 
o
f h
u
m
a
n
 
be
in
gs
 
a
s 
bo
dy
 
a
n
d 
so
u
l t
o
ge
th
e
r.
 
H
e
 
di
st
in
gu
is
he
d 
be
tw
e
e
n
 
G
o
d’
s 
u
n
kn
o
w
a
bl
e
 
e
ss
e
n
ce
 
a
n
d 
hi
s 
u
n
cr
e
a
te
d 
e
n
e
rg
ie
s.
 
W
hi
ls
t t
he
 
fo
rm
e
r 
is
 
be
yo
n
d 
hu
m
an
 
e
xp
e
rie
n
ce
,
 
th
e
 
la
tte
r,
 
he
 
a
rg
u
e
d,
 
is
 
n
o
t. 
Li
ke
 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
th
e
 
N
e
w
 
Th
e
o
lo
gi
a
n
,
 
he
 
e
m
ph
a
si
ze
d 
th
e
 
im
po
rta
n
ce
 
o
f v
is
io
n
 
o
f t
he
 
D
iv
in
e
 
Li
gh
t. 
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Au
th
o
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D
at
e
 
B
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gr
ap
hi
c
al
 
de
ta
ils
 
So
u
rc
e 
o
f 
bi
o
gr
ap
hi
ca
l 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
31
 
27
 
Ka
llis
to
s 
& 
Ig
n
a
tiu
s 
Xa
n
th
o
po
u
lo
s 
d1
39
7 
& 
la
te
 
14
th
 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
re
sp
e
ct
iv
e
ly 
Ka
llis
to
s 
Xa
n
th
o
po
u
lo
s 
be
ca
m
e
 
Pa
tri
a
rc
h 
Ka
llis
to
s 
II 
o
f 
Co
n
st
a
n
tin
o
pl
e
 
fo
r 
o
n
ly 
3 
m
o
n
th
s 
be
fo
re
 
hi
s 
de
a
th
 
in
 
13
97
.
 
Ig
n
a
tiu
s 
Xa
n
th
o
po
u
lo
s 
w
a
s 
a
 
cl
o
se
 
fri
e
n
d 
(an
d 
po
ss
ib
ly 
br
o
th
e
r) 
o
f K
a
llis
to
s.
 
Ig
n
a
tiu
s 
a
n
d 
Ka
llis
to
s 
w
e
re
 
he
sy
ch
a
st
 
m
o
n
ks
 
to
ge
th
e
r 
a
t t
he
 
M
o
n
a
st
e
ry
 
o
f t
he
 
Xa
n
th
o
po
u
lo
i i
n
 
Co
n
st
a
n
tin
o
pl
e
.
 
Ig
n
a
tiu
s 
su
rv
iv
e
d 
Ka
llis
to
s 
a
n
d 
be
ca
m
e
 
he
a
d 
o
f t
he
 
co
m
m
u
n
ity
.
 
D
B 
M
EC
 
32
 
28
a
 
Ka
llis
to
s,
 
Pa
tri
a
rc
h 
14
th
 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
–
 
2n
d  
ha
lf 
Te
xt
s 
o
n
 
pr
a
ye
r 
is
 
a
ttr
ib
u
te
d 
to
 
“
Pa
tri
a
rc
h 
Ka
llis
to
s”
,
 
bu
t i
t i
s 
n
o
t 
e
n
tir
e
ly 
cl
e
a
r 
w
he
th
e
r 
th
is
 
is
 
Ka
llis
to
s 
o
f X
a
n
th
o
po
u
lo
s 
(K
a
llis
to
s 
II,
 
Pa
tri
a
rc
h 
13
97
) o
r 
Ka
llis
to
s 
I (P
a
tri
a
rc
h 
13
50
-
13
53
,
 
13
55
-
13
63
). 
Ka
llis
to
s 
I p
re
si
de
d 
a
t t
he
 
sy
n
o
d 
o
f 1
35
1,
 
w
hi
ch
 
fo
u
n
d 
in
 
fa
vo
u
r 
o
f 
th
e
 
he
ys
ch
a
st
s 
AL
2 
33
 
29
 
Ka
llis
to
s 
Te
le
cu
de
s 
14
th
 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
–
 
2n
d  
ha
lf 
Ka
llis
to
s 
Te
le
cu
de
s 
(T
e
lic
u
de
s) 
is
 
pr
o
ba
bl
y 
th
e
 
sa
m
e
 
pe
rs
o
n
 
a
s 
An
ge
lic
u
de
s 
M
e
le
n
ik
e
a
te
s 
(ak
a
 
Ka
llis
to
s 
An
ge
lic
u
de
s,
 
Ka
llis
to
s 
M
e
lit
e
n
ia
te
s).
 
Th
is
 
Ka
llis
to
s 
w
a
s 
a
 
Pa
la
m
ite
 
m
o
n
k 
a
n
d 
m
ys
tic
a
l 
w
rit
e
r 
w
ho
 
w
ro
te
 
a
 
ha
n
db
o
o
k 
o
f h
e
sy
ch
a
st
ic
 
do
ct
rin
e
.
 
D
S 
N
CE
 
34
 
30
 
Au
th
o
r 
o
f S
e
le
ct
e
d 
Te
xt
s 
o
f t
he
 
H
o
ly 
Fa
th
e
rs
 
o
n
 
Pr
a
ye
r 
a
n
d 
W
a
tc
hf
u
ln
e
ss
 
14
th
 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
–
 
2n
d  
ha
lf 
Se
le
ct
e
d 
Te
xt
s 
o
f t
he
 
H
o
ly 
Fa
th
e
rs
 
o
n
 
Pr
a
ye
r 
a
n
d 
W
a
tc
hf
u
ln
e
ss
 
is
 
in
cl
u
de
d 
in
 
th
e
 
G
re
e
k 
Ph
ilo
ka
lia
 
a
s 
a
n
 
a
n
o
n
ym
o
u
s 
te
xt
,
 
bu
t i
t i
s 
n
o
w
 
th
o
u
gh
t t
ha
t i
t m
a
y 
be
 
by
 
Ka
llis
to
s 
Te
le
cu
de
s 
(ab
o
ve
) 
D
S 
35
 
31
 
Ka
llis
to
s 
Ca
ta
ph
yg
io
te
s 
La
te
 
14
th
/ 
Ea
rly
 
15
th
 
Ce
n
tu
ry
 
N
o
th
in
g 
kn
o
w
n
.
 
Co
u
ld
 
be
 
n
a
m
e
d 
a
fte
r 
th
e
 
Ch
u
rc
h 
o
f t
he
 
Th
e
o
to
ko
s,
 
ca
lle
d 
Ka
ta
ph
yg
i (r
e
fu
ge
). C
o
u
ld
 
be
 
Ka
llis
to
s 
Xa
n
th
o
po
u
lo
s,
 
bu
t 
N
ik
o
di
m
o
s 
do
e
sn
’t 
se
e
m
 
co
n
vi
n
ce
d.
 
D
S,
 
N
G
P 
36
 
32
 
Sy
m
e
o
n
,
 
Ar
ch
bi
sh
o
p 
o
f 
Th
e
ss
a
lo
n
ic
a
 
d1
42
9 
Sy
m
e
o
n
,
 
Ar
ch
bi
sh
o
p 
o
f T
he
ss
a
lo
n
ic
a
 
fro
m
 
a
ro
u
n
d 
14
16
 
o
r 
14
17
 
u
n
til
 
hi
s 
de
a
th
 
in
 
14
29
,
 
w
a
s 
o
n
e
 
o
f t
he
 
m
o
st
 
si
gn
ific
a
n
t w
rit
e
rs
 
o
f h
is
 
tim
e
.
 
H
is
 
pr
in
ci
pa
l w
o
rk
,
 
D
ia
lo
gu
e
 
a
ga
in
st
 
a
ll 
H
e
re
si
e
s 
a
n
d 
o
n
 
th
e
 
O
n
e
 
Fa
ith
,
 
in
cl
u
de
s 
w
o
rk
 
o
n
 
do
ct
rin
e
,
 
lit
u
rg
y 
a
n
d 
sa
cr
a
m
e
n
ts
,
 
a
s 
w
e
ll 
a
s 
po
le
m
ic
a
l p
a
ss
a
ge
s 
co
n
ce
rn
in
g 
o
th
e
r 
fa
ith
s 
a
n
d 
th
e
 
w
e
st
e
rn
 
Ch
ris
tia
n
 
tra
di
tio
n
.
 
Sy
m
e
o
n
 
w
a
s 
bo
rn
 
in
 
Co
n
st
a
n
tin
o
pl
e
,
 
a
n
d 
pr
o
ba
bl
y 
be
ca
m
e
 
a
 
m
o
n
k 
in
 
hi
s 
e
a
rly
 
yo
u
th
.
 
H
e
 
a
pp
e
a
rs
 
to
 
ha
ve
 
be
e
n
 
a
 
di
sc
ip
le
 
o
f K
a
llis
to
s 
a
n
d 
Ig
n
a
tiu
s 
Xa
n
th
o
po
u
lo
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Appendix 3.1: Table of adjectives used in reference to 
the passions in the Philokalia1 
 
Adjective Author Work Philokalia 
Reference 
Abominable Gregory of Sinai To Xenia 4, 300, #20 
According (to nature) Ilias the 
Presbyter 
Gnomic Anthology: 4 3, 63, #122 
Accursed Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C5 2, 262, #5 
Active Mark the Ascetic Righteous by Works 1, 132, #85 
Letter to Nicolas 1, 154 
1, 157 
1, 159 
Hesychios the 
Priest 
Watchfulness & 
Holiness 
1, 175, #74 
Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 233 
1, 249 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C2 2, 72, #4 
For Thalassios: C1 2, 124, #52 
Various Texts: C5 2, 266, #26 
[Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C1 2, 182, #77 
Thalassios the 
Libyan 
For Paul: C1 2, 312, #92 
Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of 
Makarios 
3, 329, #100 
Nikitas Stithatos On Spiritual 
Knowledge 
4, 157, #58 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 224, #71 
Adherent [Antony the 
Great] 
On the Character of 
Men 
1, 343, #89 
Affecting Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C2 2, 65, #2 
Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 94, #60 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 226, #77-78 
Anarchic Nikitas Stithatos On Spiritual 
Knowledge 
4, 146, #25 
Behind Ilias the 
Presbyter 
Gnomic Anthology: 1 3, 41, #70 
Bestial [Theognostos] On Virtues, 
Contemplation & 
Priesthood 
2, 366, #33 
                                                 
1
 This list was compiled by searching for references to the passions in the Philokalia Concordance on 
CD-ROM, compiled by Basileios S. Stapakis. For full details, see the footnote in the relevant section 
of Chapter 3. 
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Adjective Author Work Philokalia 
Reference 
Bodily Isaiah the 
Solitary 
Guarding the Intellect 1, 26, #19 
Mark the Ascetic Letter to Nicolas 1, 153 
[Antony the 
Great] 
On the Character of 
Men 
1, 339, #66 
Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 16, #12 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
For Thalassios: C2 2, 163, #97 
 
[Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C2 2, 206, #89 
[John of 
Damaskos] 
On Virtues & Vices 2, 341 
Ilias the 
Presbyter 
Gnomic Anthology: 4 3, 55, #59 
3, 63, #122 
Gregory of Sinai Book II 4, 226, #77-78 
4, 277, #4 
Brute-like Nikitas Stithatos On Spiritual 
Knowledge 
4, 151, #42 
Carnal Evagrius On Prayer: 153 Texts 1, 64, #74 
St Mark the 
Ascetic 
Letter to Nicolas 1, 147 
John of 
Karpathos 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 324 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C2 2, 208, #98 
[John of 
Damaskos] 
On Virtues & Vices 2, 335 
Ilias the 
Presbyter 
Gnomic Anthology: 4 3, 65, #139 
St Gregory 
Palamas 
To Xenia 4, 309, #41 
4, 310, #42 
Coarse(r) Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 202 
Continuous Philotheos of 
Sinai 
Watchfulness: 40 
Texts 
3, 29, #34 
Contrary to the 
intelligence 
[Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C5 2, 261, #1 
to nature Evagrius Texts on 
Discrimination 
1, 49, #19 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C1 2, 56, #35 
On love: C2 2, 67, #16 
Various Texts: C2 2, 198, #53 
Various Texts: C2 2, 206, #90 
[Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C1 2, 182, #77 
Various Texts: C2 2, 196, #40 
Various Texts: C3 2, 211, #6 
2, 221, #47 
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Adjective Author Work Philokalia 
Reference 
Ilias the 
Presbyter 
Gnomic Anthology: 4 3, 63, #122 
Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of 
Makarios 
3, 313, #64 
Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 89, #37 
Corrupting Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C1 2, 175, #53 
On the Lord's Prayer 2, 291 
Culpable Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C1 2, 56, #35 
Dark [St Antony the 
Great] 
On the Character of 
Men 
1, 353, #157 
Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 86, #26 
Deadly Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C1 2, 59, #60 
[Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C2 2, 192, #21 
Gregory Palamas To Xenia 4, 306, #33 
Deep-seated Mark the Ascetic Letter to Nicolas 1, 157 
Degrading St Gregory 
Palamas 
To Xenia 4, 310, #41 
Demonic St John of 
Karpathos 
For the Monks in 
India 
1, 317, #81 
Destroying Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C1 2, 168, #14 
Destructive John Cassian Eight Vices 1, 78 
Mark the Ascetic Letter to Nicolas 1, 147 
Thalassios the 
Libyan 
For Paul: C3 2, 324, #91 
Philotheos of 
Sinai 
Watchfulness: 40 
Texts 
3, 24, #21 
Nikitas Stithatos On the Inner Nature 
of Things 
4, 108, #6 
On Spiritual 
Knowledge 
4, 143, #12 
Dominant Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C2 2, 79, #85 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 224, #71 
Dreadful Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 31, #79 
Earthly Maximos the 
Confessor 
On Prayer: 153 Texts 2, 62, #83 
Emerging Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 233 
Enormous Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 233 
Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 101, #82 
Evil John Cassian Eight Vices 1, 79 
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Adjective Author Work Philokalia 
Reference 
Mark the Ascetic Letter to Nicolas 1, 157 
1, 159 
[St Antony the 
Great] 
On the Character of 
Men 
1, 343, #89 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C2 2, 71 
Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of 
Makarios 
3, 301, #40 
3, 302, #41 
3, 343, #130 
3, 344, #132 
3, 351, #146 
[Symeon the 
New Theologian] 
Practical & 
Theological Texts 
4, 62, #152 
Nikiphoros the 
Monk 
Watchfulness & 
Guarding 
4, 199 
Gregory Palamas In Defence of Stillness 4, 338, #9 
Topics 4, 370, #50 
Fleshly Hesychios the 
Priest 
Watchfulness & 
Holiness 
1, 165, #19 
Anonymous Abba Philimon 2, 354 
Foul(est) Thalassios the 
Libyan 
For Paul: C3 2, 320, #30 
[John of 
Damaskos] 
On Virtues & Vices 2, 335 
Foul-smelling Gregory Palamas To Xenia 4, 306, #33 
Frightful Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 94, #59 
Full (of sorrow) Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book II 3, 230 
Great John of 
Karpathos 
For the Monks in 
India 
1, 305, #33 
Gross(er) Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C3 2, 92, #59 
2, 93, # 60 
Grown John of 
Karpathos 
For the Monks in 
India 
1, 305, #33 
Philotheos of 
Sinai 
Watchfulness: 40 
Texts 
3, 29, #34 
Habitual Philotheos of 
Sinai 
Watchfulness: 40 
Texts 
3, 29, #34 
Hateful Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book I 3, 161 
Hidden John Cassian Eight Vices 1, 77 
1, 85 
Mark the Ascetic Letter to Nicolas 1, 150-151 
Hesychios the 
Priest 
Watchfulness & 
Holiness 
1, 175, #72 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C2 2, 70, #31 
2, 73, #44 
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Adjective Author Work Philokalia 
Reference 
On love: C3 2, 95, #78 
On love: C4 2, 106, #52 
Thalassios the 
Libyan 
For Paul: C3 2, 319, #8 
Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of 
Makarios 
3, 351, #145 
Hostile Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 29, #69 
Nikitas Stithatos On the Inner Nature 
of Things 
4, 121, #50 
4, 134, #93 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 241, #121 
Human Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 202 
Nikitas Stithatos On Spiritual 
Knowledge 
4, 144, #17 
Ignoble Mark the Ascetic Letter to Nicolas 1, 155 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C3 2, 212, #11 
 
Thalassios the 
Libyan 
For Paul: C1 2, 308, #27 
Implicit Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C5 2, 266, #26 
Impotent Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C1 2, 182, #77 
Impure Evagrius On Prayer: 153 Texts 1, 64, #74 
John of 
Karpathos 
On Spiritual 
Knowledge 
1, 299, #5 
[Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C2 2, 203, #75 
Thalassios the 
Libyan 
For Paul: C2 2, 314, #16 
For Paul: C3 2, 322, #63 
Inactive Hesychios the 
Priest 
Watchfulness & 
Holiness 
1, 175, #74 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C2 2, 72, #40 
Incurable [Antony the 
Great] 
On the Character of 
Men 
1, 352, #152 
Indwelling Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book II 3, 232 
Gregory Palamas To Xenia 4, 316, #58 
Inherent (in thought) [John of 
Damaskos] 
On Virtues & Vices 2, 338 
Innate [Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C3 2, 217, #33 
Inner Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of 
Makarios 
3, 352, #146 
Innumerable Theodoros the Spiritual Texts 2, 33, #87 
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Adjective Author Work Philokalia 
Reference 
Great Ascetic 
Insubstantial Maximos the 
Confessor 
On the Lord's Prayer 2, 303 
Inveterate John of 
Karpathos 
For the Monks in 
India 
1, 300, #6 
In us Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C2 2, 68, #22 
2, 80, #85 
Various Texts: C3 2, 214, #22 
Linked (with images) Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C3 2, 89, #40 
Material [Antony the 
Great] 
On the Character of 
Men 
1, 352, #152 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
For Thalassios: C2 2, 162, #95 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 243, #123 
Many Hesychios the 
Priest 
Watchfulness & 
Holiness 
1, 175, #72 
Diadochos of 
Photiki 
On Spiritual 
Knowledge 
1, 277, #71 
[Antony the 
Great] 
On the Character of 
Men 
1, 352, #142 
Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 21, #38 
[Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic] 
Theoretikon 2, 42 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C2 2, 72, #39 
On love: C4 2, 106, #52 
Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book I 3, 86 
3, 112 
3, 160 
Book II 3, 236 
Gregory Palamas To Xenia 4, 306, #34 
Mindless Maximos the 
Confessor 
For Thalassios: C1 2, 134, #94 
Natural Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C3 2, 214, #21 
Noxious Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 89, #37 
Opposed/Opposing (one 
another) 
Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 249 
Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 30, #75 
Outer Anonymous Abba Philimon 2, 347 
Powerful Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 233 
Present [Antony the 
Great] 
On the Character of 
Men 
1, 354, #168 
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Adjective Author Work Philokalia 
Reference 
[Theognostos] On Virtues, 
Contemplation & 
Priesthood 
2, 364, #25 
Prevalent Thalassios the 
Libyan 
For Paul: C3 2, 320, #19 
Quiescent Thalassios the 
Libyan 
For Paul: C3 2, 322, #62 
Rebellious Nikitas Stithatos On the Inner Nature 
of Things 
4, 125, #65 
Reprehensible Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C2 2, 208, #98 
Thalassios the 
Libyan 
For Paul: C3 2, 321, #40 
Ridiculous Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book I 3, 161 
Rooted Peter of 
Damaskos 
Paraphrase of 
Makarios 
3, 285 
Ruling Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book I 3, 79 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 231, #91 
Savage Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 225 
Abba Philimon Abba Philimon 2, 345 
Secret Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of 
Makarios 
3, 285, #3 
3, 351, #146 
Sensual Gregory of Sinai Further Texts 4, 253, #2 
Serious Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C1 2, 60, #67 
Shameful Mark the Ascetic On the Spiritual Law 1, 119, #135 
John of 
Karpathos 
For the Monks in 
India 
1, 306, #37 
Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 15, #7 
2, 19, #27 
2, 27, #64 
2, 30, #77 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C1 2, 173, #41 
Various Texts: C3 2, 212, #11 
Various Texts: C4 2, 251, #63 
2, 259, #96 
Various Texts: C5 2, 266, #24, 
#28 
2, 273, #52 
On the Lord's Prayer 2, 302 
2, 304 
Peter of Book I 3, 180 
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Adjective Author Work Philokalia 
Reference 
Damaskus Book II 3, 219 
3, 230 
Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of 
Makarios 
3, 285, #2 
3, 294, #23 
3, 300, #36 
Gregory Palamas To Xenia 4, 316, #58 
Shameless(ly) Isaiah the 
Solitary 
Guarding the Intellect 1, 25, #14 
Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book II 3, 259 
Sinful Diadochos of 
Photiki 
On Spiritual 
Knowledge 
1, 282, #81 
Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of 
Makarios 
3, 297, #31 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 226, #77 
Swarming in Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 33, #87 
Stirring Mark the Ascetic Letter to Nicolas 1, 153 
Strong Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 232 
Subtle(st) John Cassian Eight Vices 1, 91 
Gregory Palamas To Xenia 4, 308, #38 
Taking advantage Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 233 
Tyrannising Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 18, #22 
Unclean Evagrius On Prayer: 153 Texts 1, 55, prologue 
John of 
Karpathos 
For the Monks in 
India 
1, 300, #6 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C3 2, 90, #47 
Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 88, #33 
Unhealed John Cassian Eight Vices 1, 85 
Unholy Ilias the 
Presbyter 
Gnomic Anthology: 4 3, 63, #125 
Unnatural Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C4 2, 251, #63 
[John of 
Damaskos] 
On Virtues & Vices 2, 335 
Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book I 3, 101 
Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of 
Makarios 
3, 294, #23 
Unnoticed John Cassian Eight Vices 1, 85 
Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 233 
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Reference 
Unseen Nikitas Stithatos Spiritual Texts 2, 16, #12 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C3 2, 90, #47 
Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of 
Makarios 
3, 285, #3 
3, 352, #146 
Violent Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 223, #63 
Worldly [St Antony the 
Great] 
On the Character of 
Men 
1, 332, #18 
Gregory Palamas To Xenia 4, 298, #15 
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Appendix 3.2: Table of nouns used in reference to the 
passions in the Philokalia1 
 
Metaphor Author Work Philokalia 
Reference 
Action Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 16, #9 
Activity Mark the Ascetic  Letter to Nicolas 1, 150 & 155 
Neilos the Ascetic Ascetic Discourse 1, 248 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
 
For Thalassios: C1 2, 121, #33 
2, 129, #76 
Various Texts: C1 2, 182, #79 
Various Texts: C2 2, 206, #90 
Various Texts: C3 2, 214, #21 
Nikitas Stithatos On Spiritual Knowledge 4, 162, #70 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 225, #74 
Acts Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of Makarios 3, 329, #100 
Aridity  Nikitas Stithatos  On Spiritual Knowledge 4, 156, #55 
Armies, hostile John of Karpathos For the Monks in India 1, 304, #27 
Assaults  Diadochos of 
Photiki 
On Spiritual Knowledge 1, 293, #95 
Nikitas Stithatos  On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 98, #73 
Attack(s) John Cassian Eight Vices 1, 92 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C1 2, 58, #51 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C1 2, 182, #79 
2, 183, #80 
Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of Makarios 3, 313, #64 
Nikiphoros the 
Monk  
Watchfulness & Guarding 4, 198 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 225, #74 
Blasts [Symeon the New 
Theologian] 
Three Methods of Prayer 4, 74 
Bonds  Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C2 2, 65, #3 
Symeon the New 
Theologian 
Practical & Theological 
Texts 
4, 42, #86 
Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 94, #57 
Gregory of Sinai  For Longinos 4, 260, #5 
                                                 
1
 This list was compiled by searching for references to the passions in the Philokalia Concordance on 
CD-ROM, compiled by Basileios S. Stapakis. For full details, see the footnote in the relevant section 
of Chapter 3. 
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Metaphor Author Work Philokalia 
Reference 
Burden  John of Karpathos  For the Monks in India 1, 314, #67 
Burning energy  Maximos the 
Confessor  
For Thalassios: C2 2, 153, #67 
Camels John of Karpathos For the Monks in India 1, 304, #27 
Cloak  Nikitas Stithatos  On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 86, #26 
Cloud(s) of cares [Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic] 
Theoretikon 2, 42 
storm Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 95, #61 
engulfing On the Inner Nature of 
Things 
4, 108, #5 
Clutches  Gregory of Sinai  On Stillness 4, 265, #3 
Company Nikitas Stithatos On Spiritual Knowledge 4, 142, #9 
Corruption  Nikitas Stithatos,  On the Inner Nature of 
Things 
4, 136, #98 
Crooked paths  Maximos the 
Confessor  
Various Texts: C2 2, 199, #58 
Cunning Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C3 2, 98, #91 
Darkening Peter of Damaskos Book I 3, 102 
Darkness Thalassios the 
Libyan 
For Paul: C2 2, 315, #35 
Philotheos of Sinai Watchfulness: 40 Texts 3, 30, #37 
Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of Makarios 3, 302, #41 
3, 329, #100 
3, 331, #105 
Theoliptus On Inner Work 4, 179 
4, 186 
Death [Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C2 2, 197, #49 
Defilement(s) Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C1 2, 181, #73 
Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 91, #49 
Depravity  Symeon 
Metaphrastis  
Paraphrase of Makarios 3, 341, #128 
Desires [Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C3 2, 221, #47 
Disposition(s) Maximos the 
Confessor 
On Spiritual Knowledge 2, 294 
Peter of Damaskos Book I 3, 207 
Nikiphoros the 
Monk 
Watchfulness & Guarding 4, 199 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 243, #123 
Domination Evagrius Asceticism & Stillness 1, 32 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
For Thalassios: C1 2, 124, #52 
Gregory of Sinai Further Texts 4, 255 
Dunghill Nikitas Stithatos  On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 93, #55 
 359
Metaphor Author Work Philokalia 
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On the Inner Nature of 
Things 
4, 116, #34 
Egypt of the spirit Thalassios the 
Libyan 
For Paul: C2 2, 315, #35 
Enemies Neilos the Ascetic Ascetic Discourse 1, 248 
Energy Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C5 2, 274, #55 
Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of Makarios 3, 341, #127 
Gregory of Sinai For Longinos 4, 262, #10 
Eruption Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C2 2, 203, #76 
[Theognostos] On Virtues, Contemplation 
& Priesthood 
2, 364, #23 
Evils Mark the Ascetic Letter to Nicolas 1, 147 
Peter of Damaskos Book I 3, 94 
Book II 3, 245 
Existence (without) [Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C1 2, 182, #77 
Fall Maximos the 
Confessor 
For Thalassios: C2 2, 148, #44 
Fantasies Hesychios the 
Priest 
Watchfulness & Holiness 1, 197, #197 
Neilos the Ascetic Ascetic Discourse 1, 225 
1, 233 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C5 2, 284, #98 & 99 
Fetters  Thalassios the 
Libyan 
For Paul: C3 2, 324, #98 
Philotheus of Sinai Watchfulness: 40 Texts 3, 24-25, #21 
Fire Nikitas Stithatos  On the Inner Nature of 
Things 
4, 121, #50 
Gregory Palamas  New Testament Decalogue 4, 326, #4 
Flame [Theognostos] On Virtues, Contemplation 
& Priesthood 
2, 365, #29 
Form Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C5 2, 266, #24 
Frost  Nikitas Stithatos  On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 81, #9 
Fumes [Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic] 
Theoretikon 2, 42 
Garment woven Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 27, #64 
filthy, 
soiled 
Maximos the 
Confessor  
Various Texts: C1 2, 177, #61 
old Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 220, #41 
Grip Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of Makarios 3, 302, #41 
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Symeon the New 
Theologian 
Practical & Theological 
Texts 
4, 38, #66 
Heat  Nikitas Stithatos  On Spiritual Knowledge 4, 156, #55 
Heat, arid  Gregory of Sinai  On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 229, #85 
Herbs of the soul 
(evil) 
Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 19, #27 
Imprint [Theognostos] On Virtues, Contemplation 
& Priesthood 
2, 365, #29 
Impulse(s) [Antony the Great] On the Character of Men 1, 351, #143 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C1 2, 56, #35 
On love: C2 2, 67, #16 
[Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C3 2, 221, #47 
Peter of Damaskos Book I 3, 200 
Book II 3, 256 
Impulsion   [Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C3 2, 222, #52 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C5 2, 265, #23 
Infancy Neilos the Ascetic Ascetic Discourse 1, 233 
Influence Mark the Ascetic Righteous by Works 1, 138, #152 
Peter of Damaskos Book II 3, 231 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 244, #124 
Life [Theognostos] On Virtues, Contemplation 
& Priesthood 
2, 368, #39 
Lordship Maximos the 
Confessor  
Various Texts: C2 2, 198, #54 
Malady  Gregory of Sinai  On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 233, #98 
Material, raw  Nikitas Stithatos  On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 84, #19 
Materiality Nikitas Stithatos On the Inner Nature of 
Things 
4, 135, #95 
Matter Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C5 2, 266, #24 
Matter, 
inflammatory 
[Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C5 2, 264, #15 
Mediators Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C2 2, 71, #34 
Moisture Neilos the Ascetic Ascetic Discourse 1, 242 
Mountains Nikitas Stithatos  On Spiritual Knowledge 4, 158, #61 
Gregory of Sinai On Prayer: 7 Texts 4, 285 
Movement  Mark the Ascetic Letter to Nicolas 1, 153 
Maximos the 
Confessor  
On love: C2 2, 73, #47 
Murk  Hesychios the 
Priest  
Watchfulness & Holiness 1, 182, #116 
Night Nikitas Stithatos  On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 101, #84 
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Reference 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 225, #73 
Obscurity Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of Makarios 3, 344, #132 
Operations  Maximos the 
Confessor  
For Thalassios: C1 2, 129, #77 
Paralysis  [Maximos the 
Confessor]  
Various Texts: C2 2, 192, #21 
Plague  Nikitas Stithatos  On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 99, #75 
Power Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic  
Spiritual Texts 2, 34, #93 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C5 2, 266, #24 
Presence Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C3 2, 95, #76 
Princes  Gregory of Sinai  On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 225, #71 
Prison(s) Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C1 2, 182, #79 
Nikitas Stithatos  On Spiritual Knowledge 4, 156, #56 
Provocations John Cassian Eight Vices 1, 91 
Neilos the Ascetic Ascetic Discourse 1, 202 
1, 233 
Putrescence Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 100, #79 
Quiescence Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C5 2, 271, #43 
Rawness  Diadochos of 
Photiki  
On Spiritual Knowledge 1, 271, #61 
Red Sea  Nikitas Stithatos  On the Inner Nature of 
Things 
4, 131, #83 
Resurgence Mark the Ascetic Righteous by Works 1, 131, #77 
Roots Neilos the Ascetic Ascetic Discourse 1, 233 
Peter of Damaskos Book I 3, 128 
Sea John of Karpathos  Ascetic Discourse 1, 324 
Nikitas Stithatos On Spiritual Knowledge 4, 158, #62 
Gregory of Sinai On Prayer: 7 Texts 4, 279 
Seeds  Nikiphoros the 
Monk 
Watchfulness & Guarding 4, 198 
Gregory of Sinai  On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 237, #110 
Sensuality  Gregory of Sinai  On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 225, #72 
Servants Thalassios the 
Libyan 
For Paul: C3 2, 322, #64 
Sickness  Theognostos,  On Virtues, Contemplation 
& Priesthood 
2, 375, #68 
Slave(ry) Evagrius On Prayer: 153 Texts 1, 64, #72 
John Cassian Eight Vices 1, 85 
Neilos the Ascetic Ascetic Discourse 1, 200 
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Reference 
[Antony the Great] On the Character of Men 1, 332, #18 
1, 337, #57 
1, 339, #67 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C3 2, 96, #81 
For Thalassios: C2 2, 149, #48 
Various Texts: C2 2, 206, #90 
Various Texts: C3 2, 216, #30 
On the Lord's Prayer 2, 294 
[Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C4 2, 254, #75 
Thalassios the 
Libyan 
For Paul: C2 2, 316, #64 
Peter of Damaskos Book I 3, 77 
3, 102 
3, 155 
Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 88, #36 
Slaying Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 100, #79 
On the Inner Nature of 
Things 
4, 137, #99 
Soot  Maximos the 
Confessor  
Various Texts: C5 2, 264, #17 
Sphere  Maximos the 
Confessor  
For Thalassios: C2 2, 150, #53 
Springs  Nikitas Stithatos  On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 84, #22 
State Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C5 2, 266, #26 
[John of 
Damaskos] 
On Virtues & Vices 2, 338 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 224, #71 
Stench  Gregory of Sinai  On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 219, #37 
Stink  Maximos the 
Confessor  
Various Texts: C1 2, 177, #61 
Stone John of Karpathos For the Monks in India 1, 308, #44 
Storm  Nikitas Stithatos  On the Inner Nature of 
Things 
4, 121, #50 
Suckers Neilos the Ascetic Ascetic Discourse 1, 238 
Swarm Mark the Ascetic  Letter to Nicolas 1, 147 
1, 150 
Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 16, #10 
Nikitas Stithatos On the Inner Nature of 
Things 
4, 115, #31 
Sway Mark the Ascetic Righteous by Works 1, 139, #160 
John of Karpathos  For the Monks in India 1, 301, #15 
Gregory of Sinai Further Texts 4, 255, #6 
Tempest Gregory Palamas To Xenia 4, 311, #43 
Torrents  Gregory of Sinai  On Commandments & 4, 235, #105 
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Doctrines 
Trace Mark the Ascetic Letter to Nicolas 1, 153 
Gregory of Sinai For Longinos 4, 260, #4 
Tumult  Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic  
Spiritual Texts 2, 34, #92 
Turbulence [Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C1 2, 184-185, #89 
Nikitas Stithatos On Spiritual Knowledge 4, 146, #25 
Gregory of Sinai  On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 214, #12 
Turmoil  Maximos the 
Confessor  
For Thalassios: C2 2, 162, #95 
Various Texts: C2 2, 195, #38 
Tyranny Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic  
Spiritual Texts 2, 16, #11 
2, 32, #82 
2, 34, #91 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C2 2, 70, #30 
 
On the Lord's Prayer 2, 303 
Thalassios the 
Libyan 
For Paul: C1 2, 310, #65 
[Theognostos] On Virtues, Contemplation 
& Priesthood 
2, 369, #43 
Peter of Damaskos Book I 3, 76 
3, 98 
Book II 3, 244 
3, 252 
Ugliness Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of Makarios 3, 349, #141 
Veil  Symeon 
Metaphrastis  
Paraphrase of Makarios 3, 349, #143 
Violence  Diadochos of 
Photiki  
On Spiritual Knowledge 1, 271, #61 
Waters  Gregory of Sinai  On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 235, #105 
Waves  Nikitas Stithatos  On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 102, #85 
On Spiritual Knowledge 4, 158-159, #62 
Weals Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of Makarios 3, 329, #100 
Winter  [Theognostos] On Virtues, Contemplation 
& Priesthood 
2, 369, #44 
Working(s) Mark the Ascetic Letter to Nicolas 1, 153 
Hesychios the 
Priest 
Watchfulness & Holiness 1, 181, #112 
Gregory of Sinai  On Prayer: 7 Texts 4, 286 
World  Maximos the 
Confessor  
For Thalassios: C2 2, 162, #95 
Peter of Damaskos Book II 3, 260 
Wounds  Symeon Paraphrase of Makarios 3, 329, #100 
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Metaphrastis  
Yoke Neilos the Ascetic  Ascetic Discourse 1, 241 
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Appendix 3.3: Table of verbs used in reference to 
actions of the passions in the Philokalia1 
 
Verb Author Work Philokalia 
Reference 
Affect Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 94, #60 
Afflict Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 88, #35 
Gregory of Sinai On Stillness 4, 263, #1 
Agitate Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C2 2, 76, #68 
Arise Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book I 3, 207 
[Symeon the 
New Theologian] 
Three Methods of 
Prayer 
4, 75 
Gregory Palamas To Xenia 4, 305, #31 
Arouse Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C3 2, 97, #90 
Assume Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C5 2, 265, #23 
Attach Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C2 2, 65, #2 
Attack Isaiah the 
Solitary 
Guarding the Intellect 1, 25, #14-15 
1, 27, #24 
Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 215 
1, 233 
Diadochos of 
Photiki 
On Spiritual 
Knowledge 
1, 291-292, 
#94 
Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 15, #9 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C1 2, 58, #51 
Various Texts: C1 2, 182, #79 
2, 183, #80 
Various Texts: C3 2, 212, #11 
Ilias the 
Presbyter 
Gnomic Anthology: 1 3, 41, #69 
Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book I 3, 160 
3, 260 
Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of 
Makarios 
3, 313, #64 
Theoliptus On Inner Work 4, 186 
Nikiphoros the 
Monk 
Watchfulness & 
Guarding 
4, 198 
Gregory of Sinai On Prayer: 7 Texts 4, 277, #4 
                                                 
1
 This list was compiled by searching for references to the passions in the Philokalia Concordance on 
CD-ROM, compiled by Basileios S. Stapakis. For full details, see the footnote in the relevant section 
of Chapter 3. 
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Reference 
Become Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C1 2, 179, #66 
Become (evil) Gregory Palamas To Xenia 4, 309, #41 
Befuddle Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 249 
Belong  to nature [Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C2 2, 192, #20 
to soul/body [John of 
Damaskos] 
On Virtues & Vices 2, 334 
Beset Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book II 3, 268-269 
Besiege [Theognostos] On Virtues, 
Contemplation & 
Priesthood 
2, 372, #58 
Blind  Maximos the 
Confessor  
On love: C4 2, 110, #77 
2, 112, #92 
Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book II 3, 274 
Bring injury Gregory Palamas To Xenia 4, 308, #38 
Carry away [Antony the 
Great] 
On the Character of 
Men 
1, 344, #96 
Gregory of Sinai On Stillness 4, 271, #11 
Cause disease Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 234 
Come into being [Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C3 2, 210, #3 
Come to life Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C4 2, 106, #54 
Conquer Peter of 
Damaskos  
Book II 3, 258 
Consist Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C1 2, 177, #60 
Constrain Ilias the 
Presbyter 
Gnomic Anthology: 4 3, 62, #116 
Contribute Gregory Palamas To Xenia 4, 308, #39 
Corrupt Mark the Ascetic Letter to Nicolas 1, 151 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C1 2, 175, #53 
On the Lord's Prayer 2, 291 
Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 94, #60 
Creep Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book II 3, 219 
Darken Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C5 2, 283, #96 
[John of 
Damaskos] 
On Virtues & Vices 2, 335 
Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book I 3, 102 
3, 116 
Book II 3, 274 
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Reference 
Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of 
Makarios 
3, 301, #103 
Deaden Thalassios the 
Libyan 
For Paul: C4 2, 327, #41 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 247, #129 
Debilitate Nikitas Stithatos On the Inner Nature 
of Things 
4, 113, #22 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 236, #110 
Decrease Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C2 2, 68, #22 
Defile Maximos the 
Confessor  
On love: C4 2, 110, #77 
Thalassios the 
Libyan 
For Paul 2, 316, #66 
Symeon 
Metaphrastis 
Paraphrase of 
Makarios 
3, 302, #41 
Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 91, #48 
Deject Diadochos of 
Photiki 
On Spiritual 
Knowledge 
1, 270, #58 
Delude Thalassios the 
Libyan 
For Paul: C4 2, 326, #19 
Destroy Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C5 2, 274, #57 
Disperse Nikitas Stithatos On Inner Work 4, 183 
Distract Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C4 2, 106, #53 
Disturb Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C4 2, 106, #53 
[Theognostos] On Virtues, 
Contemplation & 
Priesthood 
2, 364, #25 
Dominate Evagrius Asceticism & Stillness 1, 32 
Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 249 
John of 
Karpathos 
For the Monks in 
India 
1, 306, #37 
1, 317, #82 
1, 318, #87 
Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 20, #30 
2, 34, #93 
Maximos the 
Confessor  
On love: C1 2, 57, #48 
On love: C2 2, 65, #3 
2, 66, #8 & 9 
2, 80, #89 
On love: C3 2, 84, #8 
For Thalassios: C2 2, 149, #48 
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Verb Author Work Philokalia 
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Various Texts: C1 2, 175, #53 
2, 176, #58 
Various Texts: C5 2, 266, #24 
Thalassios the 
Libyan 
For Paul: C3 2, 319, #4 
[John of 
Damaskos] 
On Virtues & Vices 2, 335 
[Theognostos] On Virtues, 
Contemplation & 
Priesthood 
2, 363, #20 
Ilias the 
Presbyter 
Gnomic Anthology: 1 3, 41-42, #73 
Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book I 3, 175 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 225, #71 
4, 226, #76 
Further Texts 4, 255, #6 
On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 240, #117 
Gregory Palamas To Xenia 4, 320, #66 
Drag Mark the Ascetic Righteous by Works 1, 131, #75 
Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 226 
Drag down [Theognostos] On Virtues, 
Contemplation & 
Priesthood 
2, 365, #28 
Encompass Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book I 3, 98 
Enervate Diadochos of 
Photiki 
On Spiritual 
Knowledge 
1, 270, #58 
Enslave Maximos the 
Confessor 
On Spiritual 
Knowledge 
2, 294 
Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book I 3, 77 
3, 102 
3, 155 
Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 88, #36 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 240, #117 
Ensnare Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 233 
Establish within Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 225 
Fight Symeon the New 
Theologian 
Practical & 
Theological Texts 
4, 37, #61 
Get a hold Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 235, #104 
Generate  images [Theognostos] On Virtues, 
Contemplation & 
Priesthood 
2, 364, #25 
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other 
passions 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 251, #135 
Give (entry to demons) Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 224, #70 
Govern [Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C5 2, 273, #50 
[John of 
Damaskos] 
On Virtues & Vices 2, 336 
Grieve Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C1 2, 54, #13 
Grow Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 233 
1, 237-238 
John of 
Karpathos 
For the Monks in 
India 
1, 305, #33 
Harass Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 15, #9 
Hold back Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C1 2, 63, #85 
Humiliate Nikitas Stithatos On the Inner Nature 
of Things 
4, 130, #82 
Impel (towards evil) Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C2 2, 71, #43 
Imprison Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 34, #90 
Increase Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C2 2, 66, #11 
 Induce darkness Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book I 3, 91 
to descend to 
the realm of 
the senses 
[Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C5 2, 261, #1 
a state Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 219, #36 
suffering Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 226, #77 
Intercommunicate Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 226, #78 
Intoxicate Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 249 
Involve Ilias the 
Presbyter 
Gnomic Anthology: 4 3, 62, #116 
Keep from (prayer) Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C2 2, 66, #7 
Kill [Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C5 2, 274, #58 
Lead (astray) Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book II 3, 260 
Lie Maximos the 
confessor 
On love: C3 2, 95, #78 
On love: C4 2, 112, #92 
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Verb Author Work Philokalia 
Reference 
Various Texts: C5 2, 271, #44 
[Maximos the 
confessor] 
Various Texts: C5 2, 271, #45 
Lurk Philotheos of 
Sinai 
Watchfulness: 40 
Texts 
3, 29, #35 
Make (like domestic 
animals) 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
For Thalassios: C2 2, 153, #67 
Master Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 240, #117 
Gregory Palamas To Xenia 4, 308, #38 
Motivate Maximos the 
Confessor 
For Paul: C1 2, 310, #58 
Operate Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 89, #37 
Oppose Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book II 3, 233 
Oppress Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 221 
Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 34, #90 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 236, #110 
Overcome Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 16, #9 
Maximos the 
Confessor 
For Thalassios: C2 2, 150, #55 
[Symeon the 
New Theologian] 
Three Methods of 
Prayer 
4, 69 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 240, #117 
Overpower Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C2 2, 66, #8 
For Thalassios: C1 2, 119, #27 
Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 101, #82 
Overwhelm Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 27, #65 
Symeon the New 
Theologian 
Practical & 
Theological Texts 
4, 37, #51 
Persuade Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C1 2, 62, #84 
Pierce [Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic] 
Theoretikon 2, 42 
Precede Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 225, #74 
Prevail Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 84, #19 
Prevent Gregory Palamas To Xenia 4, 306, #34 
Produce licentiousness Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C3 2, 84, #6 
disturbance For Thalassios: C1 2, 118, #21 
2, 134, #96 
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Verb Author Work Philokalia 
Reference 
diffusion of 
blood around 
the heart 
On the Lord's Prayer 2, 294 
obfuscation Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book I 3, 165 
obscurity Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book I 3, 177 
Prompt Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C3 2, 222, #51 
Provoke Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book I 3, 145 
Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 223, #62 
Put down (roots) Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book I 3, 140 
Return Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 231 
Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book II 3, 245 
Revolt Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 80, #6 
Rot [Antony the 
Great] 
On the Character of 
Men 
1, 352, #152 
Seek (our perdition) Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 30, #75 
Shake Isaiah the 
Solitary 
Guarding the Intellect 1, 28, #27 
Shatter Symeon the New 
Theologian 
Practical & 
Theological Texts 
4, 37, #62 
Shipwreck (faith) Gregory Palamas To Xenia 4, 308, #38 
Slay Nikitas Stithatos On Virtues: 100 texts 4, 100, #79 
On the Inner Nature 
of Things 
4, 137, #99 
Smut Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C5 2, 264, #17 
Spring Gregory Palamas To Xenia 4, 309, #41 
Stain Maximos the 
Confessor 
For Thalassios: C2 2, 148, #42 
Stay Anonymous Abba Philimon 2, 347 
Stifle Gregory of Sinai On Stillness 4, 273, #14 
Stimulate Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 16, #11 
2, 16, #14 
Subside Gregory of Sinai On Stillness 4, 263, #1 
Suggest Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C2 2, 75, #60 
For Thalassios: C1 2, 125, #53 
Support (other passions) Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 251, #135 
Take root Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 30, #75 
 372
Verb Author Work Philokalia 
Reference 
[Symeon the 
New Theologian] 
Practical & 
Theological Texts 
4, 51, #120 
Tie Maximos the 
Confessor 
On love: C3 2, 92, #56 
Trouble John Cassian Eight Vices 1, 92 
Neilos the 
Ascetic 
Ascetic Discourse 1, 233 
Diadochos of 
Photiki 
On Spiritual 
Knowledge 
1, 277, #71 
1, 294, #99 
John of 
Karpathos 
For the Monks in 
India 
1, 320, #95 
[Theognostos] On Virtues, 
Contemplation & 
Priesthood 
2, 360, #7 
2, 361, #12 
Tyrannise Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book II 3, 200 
3, 244 
Visit Peter of 
Damaskos 
Book II 3, 268 
War Gregory of Sinai On Commandments & 
Doctrines 
4, 244, #125 
Weaken Evagrius On Prayer: 153 Texts 1, 60, #30 
Work Maximos the 
Confessor 
Various Texts: C5 2, 266, #23-24 
[Maximos the 
Confessor] 
Various Texts: C5 2, 266, #25 
Wound Mark the Ascetic Righteous by Works 1, 142, #194 
Theodoros the 
Great Ascetic 
Spiritual Texts 2, 26, #62 
 373
Bibliography 
A Monk of the Eastern Church (1987) The Jesus Prayer, Crestwood, St Vladimir's 
Seminary. 
Allen, N. B. (2006) Cognitive Psychotherapy. In Bloch, S. (Ed.) An Introduction to 
the Psychotherapies. 4th ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 141-166. 
Anderson, S., Butterfield, J., Daintith, J., Holmes, A., Isaacs, A., Law, J., Lilly, C., 
Martin, E., Mckeown, C., Stibbs, A. & Summers, E. (2004) Collins English 
Dictionary, Glasgow, Collins. 
Balfour, D. (1982) St Symeon of Thessalonica: A Polemical Hesychast. Sobornost, 
4, 6-21. 
Bielawski, M. (1997) The Philocalical Vision of the World in the Theology of 
Dumitru Stniloae, Bydgoszcz, Homini. 
Bloch, S. & Harari, E. (2006) An Historical Context. In Bloch, S. (Ed.) An 
Introduction to the Psycotherapies. 4th ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
3-17. 
Brewin, C. R. & Power, M. J. (1997) Meaning and Psychological Therapy: 
Overview and Introduction. In Power, M. & Brewin, C. R. (Eds.) The 
Transformation of Meaning in Psychological Therapies. John Wiley, 
Chichester. 1-14. 
Brock, S. (1982) The Prayer of the Heart in Syrian Tradition. Sobornost, 4, 131-142. 
Brown, D. & Pedder, J. (1980) Introduction to Psychotherapy, London, Tavistock. 
Brown, W. S. (1998) Cognitive Contributions to Soul. In Brown, W. S., Murphy, N. 
& Malony, H. N. (Eds.) Whatever Happened to the Soul? Scientific and 
Theological Portraits of Human Nature. Minneapolis, Fortress. 99-125. 
Bundy, D. (1990) Evagrius Ponticus, the Kephalaia Gnostica. In Wimbush, V. L. 
(Ed.) Ascetic Behavior in Greco-Roman Antiquity. A Sourcebook. 
Minneapolis, Fortress. 175-186. 
Casiday, A. M. (2006) Evagrius Ponticus, London, Routledge. 
Cavarnos, C. (1972) St Macarios of Corinth, Belmont, Institute for Byzantine and 
Modern Greek Studies. 
Cavarnos, C. (1994) St Nicodemos the Hagiorite, Belmont, Institute for Byzantine 
and Modern Greek Studies. 
Chamberas, P. A., Bebis, G. S. & Harakas, S. S. (1989) Nicodemos of the Holy 
Mountain: A Handbook of Spiritual Counsel, New York, Paulist Press. 
Chirban, J. T. (Ed.) (2001) Sickness or Sin? Spiritual Discernment and Differential 
Diagnosis, Brookline, Holy Cross Orthodox Press. 
Chrysostomos, A. (2007) A Guide to Orthodox Psychotherapy, Lanham, University 
Press of America. 
Conticello, V. & Citterio, E. (2002) La Philocalie Et Ses Versions. In Conticello, C. 
G. & Conticello, V. (Eds.) La Théologie Byzantine Et Sa Tradition. 
Turnhout, Brepols. 999-1021. 
Cook, C. (2007a) Considering the Link between Spirituality and Addiction. 
SCANbites, 4, 10-11. 
Cook, C., Powell, A. & Sims, A. (Eds.) (2009) Spirituality and Psychiatry, London, 
Royal College of Psychiatrists Press. 
Cook, C. C. H. (2004) Addiction and Spirituality. Addiction, 99, 539-551. 
Cook, C. C. H. (2006) Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 374
Cook, C. C. H. (2007b) Aa's First European Experience and the Spiritual Experience 
of Aa. Addiction, 102, 846-847. 
Cross, F. L. & Livingstone, E. A. (1997) The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian 
Church, Oxford, Oxford. 
Deurzen, E. V. (2009) Psychotherapy and the Quest for Happiness, Los Angeles, 
Sage. 
Dixon, T. (2003) From Passions to Emotions, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Drummond, L. M. & Kennedy, B. (2006) Behavioural Psychotherapy. An 
Introduction to the Psychotherapies. 4th ed. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 167-196. 
Dysinger, L. (2005) Psalmody and Prayer in the Writings of Evagrius Ponticus, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Eid, M. & Larsen, R. J. (Eds.) (2008) The Science of Subjective Well-Being, New 
York, Guilford. 
Eijk, P. J. V. D. (2005) Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Featherstone, J. M. E. & Tachiaos, A. E. N. (1989) The Life of Paisij Velykovs'kyj, 
Cambridge, MA, Harvard. 
Ferguson, E., Mchugh, M. P. & Norris, F. W. (1999) Encyclopedia of Early 
Christianity, New York, Garland. 
Frank, J. D. (2006) What Is Psychotherapy? In Bloch, S. (Ed.) An Introduction to the 
Psychotherapies. 4th ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 59-76. 
Gelder, M., Gath, D., Mayou, R. & Cowen, P. (1996) Oxford Textbook of 
Psychiatry, Oxford, Oxford. 
Gregg, R. C. (1980) Athanasius: The Life of Antony and the Letter to Marcellinus, 
Mahwah, Paulist Press. 
Hackmann, A. (1997) The Transformation of Meaning in Cognitive Therapy. In 
Power, M. & Brewin, C. R. (Eds.) The Transformation of Meaning in 
Psychological Therapies: Integrating Theory and Practice. Chichester, 
Wiley. 125-140. 
Hamilton, M. (1981) Fish's Clinical Psychopathology, Bristol, Wright. 
Harkins, P. W. & Riese, W. (1963) Galen on the Passions and Errors of the Soul, 
Ohio State University. 
Harris, W. S., Gowda, M., Kolb, J. W., Strychacz, C. P., Vacek, J. L., Jones, P. G., 
Forker, A., O'keefe, J. H. & Mccallister, B. D. (1999) A Randomized, 
Controlled Trial of the Effects of Remote, Intercessory Prayer on Outcomes 
in Patients Admitted to the Coronary Care Unit. Archives of Internal 
Medicine, 159, 2273-2278. 
Hastings, A., Mason, A. & Pyper, H. (2000) The Oxford Companion to Christian 
Thought, Oxford, Oxford. 
Hausherr, I. (1978) The Name of Jesus, Kalamazoo, Cistercian Publications. 
Haybron, D. M. (2008) Philosophy and the Science of Subjective Well-Being. In 
Eid, M. & Larsen, R. J. (Eds.) The Science of Subjective Well-Being. New 
York, Guilford Press. 17-43. 
Helman, C. (1985) Culture, Health and Illness, Bristol, Wright. 
Innes, R. (1999) Discourses of the Self: Seeking Wholeness in Theology and 
Psychology, Bern, Peter Lang. 
 375
Jackson, P. & Cook, C. C. H. (2005) Introduction of a Spirituality Group in a 
Community Service for People with Drinking Problems. Journal of 
Substance Use, 10, 375-383. 
Jackson, S. W. (1969) Galen - on Mental Disorders. Journal of the History of the 
Behavioral Sciences, 5, 365-384. 
Kadloubovsky, E. & Palmer, G. E. H. (1979) Writings from the Philokalia on Prayer 
of the Heart, London, Faber & Faber. 
Kerr, I. B. & Ryle, A. (2006) Cognitive Analytic Therapy. In Bloch, S. (Ed.) An 
Introduction to the Psychotherapies. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 267-
286. 
Koenig, H. G., Mccullough, M. E. & Larson, D. B. (2001) Handbook of Religion 
and Health, New York, Oxford. 
Konstantinovsky, J. (2009) Evagrius Ponticus: The Making of a Gnostic, Farnham, 
Ashgate. 
Kurtz, E. (1996) Twelve Step Programs. In Van Ness, P. H. (Ed.) Spirituality and 
the Secular Quest. London, SCM. 277-302. 
Laird, M. (2007) Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp of Faith, Oxford, Oxford. 
Larchet, J. C. (2005) Mental Disorders and Spiritual Healing: Teachings from the 
Early Christian East, Hillsdale, Sophia Perennis. 
Lawson-Tancred, H. (1986) Aristotle: De Anima (on the Soul), London, Penguin. 
Lawson-Tancred, H. C. (1991) Aristotle: The Art of Rhetoric, London, Penguin. 
Lee, D. (2003) Plato: The Republic, London, Penguin. 
Leighton, S. R. (1982) Aristotle and the Emotions. Phronesis, 27, 144-174. 
Lloyd, G. E. R., Chadwick, J., Mann, W. N., Lonie, I. M. & Withington, E. T. 
(1983) Hippocratic Writings, London, Penguin. 
Louth, A. (1989) Discerning the Mystery: An Essay on the Nature of Theology, 
Oxford, Clarendon. 
Louth, A. (1996) Maximus the Confessor, London, Routledge. 
Louth, A. (2003) The Theology of the Philokalia. In Behr, J., Louth, A. & Conomos, 
D. (Eds.) Abba: The Tradition of Orthodoxy in the West. Festschrift for 
Bishop Kallistos (Ware) of Diokleia. Crestwood, St Vladimir's Seminary 
Press. 351-361. 
Louth, A. (2004) The Literature of the Monastic Movement. In Young, F., Ayres, L. 
& Louth, A. (Eds.) The Cambridge History of Early Christian Literature. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 373-381. 
Luibheid, C., Russell, N. & Ware, K. (1982) John Climacus: The Ladder of Divine 
Ascent, Mahwah, Paulist. 
Mace, C. (2008) Mindfulness and Mental Health, London, Routledge. 
Mackey, J. P. (2000) The Critique of Theological Reason, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Macmahon, D. (2006) The Pursuit of Happiness: A History from the Greeks to the 
Present, London, Allen Lane. 
Maloney, G. A. & Ware, K. (1992) Pseudo-Macarius: The Fifty Spiritual Homilies 
and the Great Letter, New York, Paulist. 
Martin, R. & Barresi, J. (2006) The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self, New York, 
Columbia University Press. 
Mcdonald, W. J., Magner, J. A., Mcguire, M. R. P. & Whelan, J. P. (Eds.) (1981) 
New Catholic Encyclopedia, Washington DC, Catholic University of 
America. 
 376
Meyendorff, J. (1996) Theosis in the Eastern Christian Tradition. In Dupré, L. & 
Saliers, D. E. (Eds.) Christian Spirituality Iii: Post-Reformation and Modern. 
London, SCM. 470-476. 
Mihailoff, V. (2005) Breaking the Chains of Addiction, Salisbury, MA, Regina 
Orthodox Press Inc. 
Muse, S. (Ed.) (2004) Raising Lazarus: Integral Healing in Orthodox Christianity, 
Brookline, Holy Cross Orthodox Press. 
Nussbaum, M. C. (1994) The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic 
Ethics, Princeton, Princeton. 
Nutton, V. (2006) Ancient Medicine, London, Routledge. 
Osborn, E. (2005) Clement of Alexandria, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Palmer, G. E. H., Sherrard, P. & Ware, K. (1984a) The Philokalia: The Complete 
Text Compiled by St Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain and St Makarios of 
Corinth, London, Faber & Faber. 
Palmer, G. E. H., Sherrard, P. & Ware, K. (1984b) The Philokalia: The Complete 
Text Compiled by St Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain and St Makarios of 
Corinth, London, Faber & Faber. 
Palmer, G. E. H., Sherrard, P. & Ware, K. (1986) The Philokalia: The Complete Text 
Compiled by St Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain and St Makarios of Corinth, 
London, Faber and Faber. 
Palmer, G. E. H., Sherrard, P. & Ware, K. (1995) The Philokalia. The Complete Text 
Compiled by St Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain and St Makarios of Corinth, 
London, Faber & Faber. 
Parry, K. (2007) The Blackwell Companion to Eastern Christianity, Oxford, 
Blackwell. 
Parry, K., Melling, D. J., Brady, D., Griffith, S. H. & Healey, J. F. (1999) The 
Blackwell Dictionary of Eastern Christianity, Oxford, Blackwell. 
Pentkovsky, A. & Smith, T. A. (1999) The Pilgrim's Tale, New York, Paulist Press. 
Richards, P. S. & Bergin, A. E. (Eds.) (2000) Handbook of Psychotherapy and 
Religious Diversity, Washington DC, Americal Psychological Association. 
Ricoeur, P. (1981) Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Rowe, C. (2005) Plato: Phaedrus, London, Penguin. 
Russell, N. (2004) The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Savin, O. & Hopko, T. (2001) The Way of a Pilgrim and the Pilgrim Continues His 
Way, Boston, Shambhala. 
Schema-Monk Metrophanes (1976) Blessed Paisius Velichkovsky: The Life and 
Ascetic Labours of Our Father, Elder Paisius, Archimandrite of the Holy 
Moldavian Monasteries of Niamets and Sekoul. Optina Version, Platina, 
Saint Herman of Alaska Brotherhood. 
Schneiders, S. M. (2005) Christian Spirituality: Definition, Methods and Types. In 
Sheldrake, P. (Ed.) The New Scm Dictionary of Christian Spirituality. 
London, SCM. 1-6. 
Searle, B. A. (2008) Well-Being: In Search of a Good Life?, Bristol, Policy Press. 
Sheldrake, P. (2005) The New Scm Dictionary of Christian Spirituality, London, 
SCM. 
Shuman, J. J. & Meador, K. G. (2003) Heal Thyself: Spirituality, Medicine, and the 
Distortion of Christianity, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 377
Simon, B. (1978) Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece, Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press. 
Sinkewicz, R. E. (2003) Evagrius of Pontus: The Greek Ascetic Corpus, Oxford, 
Oxford. 
Smith, A., Palmer, G. E. H., Sherrard, P. & Ware, K. (2006) Philokalia: The Eastern 
Christian Spiritual Texts - Selections Annotated & Explained, Woodstock, 
Skylight Paths. 
Sorabji, R. (2002) Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian 
Temptation, Oxford, Oxford. 
Sorabji, R. (2006) Self: Ancient and Modern Insights About Individuality, Life, and 
Death, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
Stapakis, B. S. & Coniaris, A. M. (2004) The Philokalia: Master Reference Guide, 
Minneapolis, Light & Life. 
Sykes, S. (1984) The Identity of Christianity, London, SPCK. 
Taylor, C. (1989) Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Telfer, W. (1955) Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa, London, SCM. 
Thermos, V. (2002) In Search of the Person: "True" And False Self" According to 
Donald Winnicott and St. Gregory Palamas, Montreal, Alexander Press. 
Thomson, J. A. K., Treddenick, H. & Barnes, J. (1983) Aristotle: Ethics, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
Thyer, J. (2004) Steps to Life: A Spiritual Journey with Christian Mysticism and the 
Twelve Steps, Sydney, ABC. 
Turner, D. (1999) The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism, 
Cambridge, Cambridge. 
Vlachos, H. (1994) Orthodox Psychotherapy, Levadia, Birth of the Theotokos 
Monastery. 
Ward, B. (1984) The Sayings of the Desert Fathers: The Alphabetical Collection, 
Kalamazoo, Cistercian Publications. 
Ward, B. (2003) The Desert Fathers: Sayings of the Early Christian Monks, London, 
Penguin. 
Ware, K. (1984) Philocalie. In Viller, M., Cavallera, F., De Guibert, J., Rayez, A., 
Derville, A. & Solignac, A. (Eds.) Dictionnaire De Spiritualité. Paris, 
Beauchesne. 1335-1352. 
Ware, K. (1989) The Power of the Name: The Jesus Prayer in Orthodox Spirituality, 
London, Marshall Pickering. 
Webber, M. (2003) Steps of Transformation: An Orthodox Priest Explores the 
Twelve Steps, Ben Lomond, Conciliar Press. 
Wheeler, E. P. (1977) Dorotheos of Gaza: Discourses and Sayings, Kalamazoo, 
Cistercian Publications. 
Wimbush, V. L. (1990) Ascetic Behavior in Greco-Roman Antiquity. A Sourcebook, 
Minneapolis, Fortress. 
Wolters, C. (1978) The Cloud of Unknowing and Other Works, London, Penguin. 
Young, T. R. (2001) Psychotherapy with Eastern Orthodox Christians. In Richards, 
P. S. & Bergin, A. E. (Eds.) Handbook of Psychotherapy and Religious 
Diversity. Washington DC, American Psychological Association. 89-104. 
 
 
 
